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Abstract
The Effectiveness of Professional 
Lobbyists in Britain 1986-1999
The impact of professional lobbyists varies according to context. 
The thesis assesses the relationship between professional 
lobbying and policy outcomes, and the impact of external 
variables. Whilst the effectiveness of professional lobbyists is 
partly a function of internal variables like skill, contacts and 
resources, external contextual factors are more often the key 
determinants of policy. Contextual variables include factors 
external to government like the world economy and judicial 
decisions, and factors internal to government including party 
ideology and the autonomy of government actors.
Its four case studies (Sunday Trading, CrossRail, Jubilee Line 
Extension and Professional Liability), representing a range of 
issues, from high to low profile, and varying in degrees of 
technicality and politicality, test nine hypotheses against evidence 
from in-depth interviews, governmental and parliamentary papers, 
and the press.
When context is favourable, lobbyists have the greatest effect on 
non-contentious, technical and non-partisan issues. On low-profile 
issues, when low-profile tactics have failed, lobbyists can be 
effective if they use high-profile tactics to increase the salience of 
the issue within government. On issues initially and inherently 
high-profile, non-technical and political, there are more variables 
so the lobbyist’s impact is proportionally less.
Though lobbyists on occasion affect policy, they are rarely at the 
centre of decision-making. Policy outcomes are decided by bigger 
factors than the activities of lobbyists. Their impact is at the 
margins of policy, and the perception they and the press hold 
about their major effects is illusory.
Whilst lobbyists rarely influence policy significantly, they do add 
value to clients. They bring economies of scale (offering services 
more cheaply than if provided in-house) and are often a 
worthwhile investment. They have experience; they educate 
clients; they know key players and processes and can overturn 
established procedure. More importantly, on rare occasions when 
the context is right, their involvement can affect policy outcomes.
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Chapter One
1 Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to assess under what circumstances 
professional lobbyists are likely to be effective. Assessing their 
effectiveness is controversial. The current debate shows wide variance 
in judgements about the efficacy of lobbyists. Do lobbyists advance 
special-interests over the collective interest? Who is right -  the critics 
who deplore the activity of lobbyists, assuming their effectiveness, or 
those within government who dismiss their effect?
A classic study of ‘the lobby’ in 1950s and 1960s Britain identified 
those innumerable and ubiquitous groups that influenced public policy.^ 
Finer’s anonymous group empire emerged from the shadows in the 
1980s. The participation of outside interests in policy-making has 
become institutionalised. Formal consultation procedures, departmental 
select committees, and legislative inquiries on draft Bills provide groups 
with formal mechanisms to contribute to policy-making.
Since the early 1980s the ‘Empire’ has commissioned an 
anonymous and discreet ‘mercenary army’ of professional lobbyists.^ 
British political science has largely ignored this development in interest- 
group politics. What Salisbury said of Washington lobbyists in the mid- 
1980s foreshadowed the plight of British lobbyists today: that the real 
world accords lobbyists importance, but they are not designated 
significant by social scientists.^ Yet, outside interests are increasingly 
aided and abetted by professional lobbyists.'^ Finer’s words forty years 
ago befit professional lobbyists today: “their day-to-day activities pervade 
every sphere of domestic policy, every day, every way, at every nook and 
cranny of government.’’^
' Finer, S., (1966), p18 
2 Moloney, K., (1996), pp1-20 
 ^Salisbury, R., (1984), p70 
Rush, M., (1994b), p645 
® Finer, SE., (1966), p18
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Pick any domestic policy on the government’s agenda, and 
professional lobbyists will likely be involved somewhere somehow. 
Political science has overlooked this subtle evolution. There is a need to 
bring together the current academic understandings of interest-group 
impact on policy and the new reality of professional lobbying. The 
widespread involvement of professional lobbyists is unmistakable, but 
their impact on policy-making is uncertain.
The question of who influences policy formulation is central to 
political science, and the effect of professional lobbyists has implications 
for the study of public policy. The increase in professional lobbying has 
raised fears about a policy-making system exposed to bias. It is time to 
re-evaluate these fears in light of the evidence presented in this thesis.
For scholars interested in lobbying, effectiveness is a captivating 
subject.® There are limitations to the existing literature, of which paucity 
of data on effectiveness and their contradictory conclusions are striking.^ 
The literature on effectiveness and influence “is an interesting example of 
avoidance based on a recognition that previous studies have mostly 
generated more smoke than fire, more debate than progress, more 
confusion than avoidance.”® Grant concludes his study on British 
pressure groups by stating “if we are interested in finding out who wins 
and who loses in the political process, and why they win and lose, the 
question of effectiveness cannot be ignored by pressure-group 
analysts.”® A question which needs answering is why are lobbyists 
influential and under what circumstances are they effective? Jordan 
sums up neatly, asking whether lobbyists are ‘unfairly useful or fairly 
useless’.
Clients pay high fees for lobbyists’ services to influence policy, yet 
the return on investment is uncertain and difficult to substantiate.^® Berry 
notes “the question remains, however, to what extent these techniques
® Whiteley and Winyard contend that interest group effectiveness is the least adequately researched aspect of 
interest group literature Whiteley, P., and Winyard, S., (1987). Dearlove looked at groups that enjoyed 
effective access in the policy making of local government. See Dearlove, J., (1973), in Jordan et al (1992a)
 ^Harris and Lock promote a research agenda for the advancement of studies of corporate lobbying [sic], 
noting “how does one measure effectiveness, values, and success of failure?” in Harris, P., and Lock, A., 
(1996), pp 313-328
® Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p13 
3 Grant, W., (1995), p i52 
Grantham, C., (1989)
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are effective in any meaningful way?”^^ Jordan has asked for “detailed 
examples of the impact of these increasingly expensive a c t i v i t i e s . H e  
continues “If there are lobbyists active on both sides of a question, there 
are bound to be plenty of cases where the lobbyists can claim to have 
been effective... whether the client wins because of the impact of the 
lobbying or whether the lobbying was merely incidental is something that 
requires detailed investigation. Such an assessment however requires 
more detailed case study evidence than is yet a v a i l a b l e . T h i s  thesis 
provides the case-studies and analysis.
Whilst the market for professional lobbying suggests that they are 
a worthwhile investment, Warhurst suggests the market is not always 
right and that lobbyists would not describe their own work as ineffective.^"^ 
Whilst this statement is true, it also pays for lobbyists to show real results 
-  repeat business and referrals are important in a market which has 
moved from retainers to case work.
Similarly Berry wonders whether “the tendency [of the media] to 
emphasise the ‘influence’ of lobbyists, and to place them at the centre of 
the decision-making process, is borne out by more than hearsay and 
unsubstantiated newspaper speculation?’’^^  Effective lobbying may be 
impossible to discover because “a great lobbyist is like the perpetrator of 
the perfect crime. At the very best there is no indication the crime has 
even been committed. When they have done their job well, there are no 
fingerprints.’’ ®^ Although the lobbying industry is increasingly discreet in 
the face of recent press coverage, now is an opportune moment to 
undertake research. Some lobbyists are aware of the reasons why they 
should be the subject of academic scrutiny; for example the creation of 
the Association of Professional Political Consultants (APPC) has shone 
light on the lobbying industry.
Attention is being paid to effectiveness. The public relations 
journal PR Week launched its ‘10% Campaign’ in 1998 to encourage
Berry, S., (1992), p227. Cliff Grantham claims the most important question, “and the most difficult to 
answer, is what effect do political consultants have in influencing public policy?” Grantham, C., (1989), p512. 
emphasis added. Jordan, G., (1991a), p i 89 
Jordan, G., (1991a), p i89 
Warhurst, J., (1990)
'5 Berry, S. (1993), p345
Palast, G., (1998), “The American Way of Influence”, The Observer, 19 July 1998 citing Larry Makinsons 
from the Center for Responsive Politics in Washington
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practitioners to allocate ten per cent of their budget to assessing the 
value and impact of their services/^ Similarly more attention is being 
paid to lobbying by practitioners and journalists, reflecting its higher 
profile and increasing importance.^® Lobbyists entered popular culture, 
with even the News of the World reporting their activities.^® Restricted 
scholarly interest in professional lobbying continues -  a recent special 
edition of Parliamentary Affairs examined the regulation of lobbying.^® 
Regulation is a questionable enterprise unless decision-makers can be 
sure lobbyists are influential. A study is needed to assess the views of 
the press, which ascribes the lobbyist influence, and of the civil service 
and ministers who suggest the journalists’ interpretation is inaccurate.
The debate between those suggesting lobbyists are effective and 
those arguing they are an information service staggers on. By explaining 
what factors facilitate effectiveness, this thesis has the potential to 
resolve questions about the influence of lobbyists, to explain how the 
policy process operates and how different actors interact.
Since the attention given to professional lobbyists in UK academic 
circles is less extensive than in the US, some of the material cited is of 
American origin. This work is referred to only when its analysis or 
insights are applicable to the UK.
PROA and ICO, (1997); Fairchild, M., (1997) and Fairchild, M., (forthcoming)
Greer, I., (1997); Jones, N., (1997); Mitchie, D., (1998); Moloney, K., (1996); Souza, C., (1998), Jones, N., 
(1999)
The News of the World declared in their Political Thought of the Week “Lobbyists are to government what a 
dog is to a tree.” News of the World, 5 July 1998 
Greenwood, J., (1998a) (ed), pp487-600
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Objectives el the Thesis
The literature that exists on influence and effectiveness has failed 
to reach concrete conclusions, or rather has thrown up contradictory 
answers on the impact of lobbyists.^^ To understand when, how and why 
lobbyists are effective will allow for an improved understanding of public 
policy-making.^^ Many lobbyists seek to portray their work as simply a 
service to complement a client’s strategy.^^ But this definition fails to 
withstand practical application. Lobbyists have a vested interest in 
denying their activity can be measured. The attempt to maintain a 
‘professional mystique’ indicates that lobbyists wish to be measured by 
their inputs into the policy process and not outputs. However, their 
promotional literature is laden with bravado about policy successes from 
effective lobbying.^"^
The thesis assesses whether lobbyists meet their client’s targets. 
It will seek to distinguish between publicly-expressed and private 
objectives of the client. It will distinguish between lobbyist’s skills 
(internal variables) and contextual factors (external variables). It will 
apply a contextually-rich framework. Assessment of effectiveness 
requires attention to the policy outcome. A lobbyist will be judged 
effective if the policy-outcome meets the client’s objective, and if that 
outcome can be traced at least in part to the activity of the lobbyist.
Lobbyists, like academics and journalists, have two versions of 
their effect. Version one is for the media and the public: the lobbyist is 
depicted as an adviser who has little ability to upset a system that takes 
decisions based on merit. Version two is for clients: the lobbyist is 
portrayed as an effective operator and the key to success. The two faces
Broad surveys have been conducted by Heinz, J., et al (1993); Scholozman K, and Tierney, J., (1986); and 
Walker, J., (1991); Milbrath, L., (1963).
22Milbrath, L , (1963)
Peter Moore, director of Market Access, Seminar at Brunei University, 11 December 1996 
For example, Ian Greer Associates gives examples of case studies on TV listings, Trafalgar House, Honour 
Hong Kong Campaign and Mobil Oil Company; "Government Policy Consultants is a leading public affairs 
consultancy with a reputation for consistently achieving success for its clients." Government Policy 
Consultants brochure. The Business of Politics, nd. The “political balance within the company means that we 
can lobby effectively whichever government is in power. At GJW we have a record of achieving good results 
for our clients.” GJW brochure, nd GJW considers itself the “most effective government relations consultancy" 
but is too discreet to provide examples; G PC informs prospective clients “the best measure of any 
consultancy is the success it achieves for its clients”, and proceeds to claim credit for “a public sector 
transport project secured £250m of public funding... A Private Members Bill was successfully promoted to 
deregulate legislation for a major trade association, opening up significant new market opportunities... the 
Secretary of State agreed to block a large housing development despite the government having previously
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of the lobbyist are reflected in the literature on the value of lobbying. 
Those views can be distilled into two schools. First that lobbyists have 
little effect and their influence is trivial. Second that lobbyists do affect 
public policy.
The American ‘communications school’ of lobbying, proposed by 
Milbrath amongst others, argues that lobbyists do not have a significant 
effect on the decisions of officials or legislators.^® Lobbyists have been 
portrayed as timid, approaching only those decision-makers that agree 
with them and acting as a service bureau.^® Lobbyists are simply 
channels of information to improve decision-makers’ knowledge.^^ 
Lobbyists are not influential; in fact they are ill-informed and badly 
organised. Part of the reason lobbyists were deemed ineffective was 
because they did not lobby; or rather their lobbying was directed at those 
who were already convinced.^® This school encouraged political science 
to move away from analysing the policy process and to concentrate on 
internal group dynamics.^®
Recent research in the UK “suggests that commercial lobbyists 
achieve low levels of effectiveness, defined as the ability to achieve pre­
stated measurable goals by their own behaviours.’’®® It is not only 
academics who dismiss the impact of lobbying as superficial. 
Government also denies lobbyists are effective.
John MacGregor MP, a former Cabinet Minister and Leader of the 
House of Commons, in evidence to the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life argued the work of one lobbying company. Decision Makers, 
added nothing to the decisions being taken by government. Ministers, he 
argued, made their decisions based on representations received and the 
clear benefits.
indicated support for the scheme... along with more example: Market Access is more discreet and adds ‘help’ 
to its case studies, MA “help them win a major contract / major PFI contract / relaxation of cross media rules'".
Milbrath, L., (1963); Scott, A., and Hunt, M., (1965); Dexter, L., (1969b); and Zeigler, H., (1964). In Leech,
B., and Baumgartner, (1996).
Lewis Dexter has argued that lobbyists target their friends and leave their enemies alone. See Dexter, L., 
(1969a and 1969b). Also Bauer, R., Pool, I., and Dexter, L., (1963)
See Leech, B., and Baumgartner, P., (1998)
This field of political science has been well ploughed by Ainsworth and Austin Smith amongst others who 
developed the counter-active theory of lobbying. They claimed, in contradistinction to Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 
that the interest-group more likely to lobby is the one against whose interests the legislator will vote in the 
absence of lobbying. Supporting groups are then forced to lobby their supporters -  counter-actively -  to offset 
the approaches from the first group.
Baumgartner and Leech, (1998), p64 
Moloney, K., (1996), p146
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MacGregor went on to say
I think the role and so-called influence of lobby firms needs to 
be put into its proper perspective. In my experience and 
judgment it is greatly overstated. They do not have 
preferential access to and influence with government. 
Presumably if such claims are made, they are made to 
potential clients for marketing purposes and to win business. 
On the other hand, lobbying firms do have a legitimate role. 
For those companies, organisations and pressure groups who 
do not have their own resources they can provide a proper 
and useful information service... They can provide technical 
knowledge on how government and Parliament work, and 
they have experience in knowing how best to present a 
case.^ ^
If MacGregor’s interpretation holds true, much of the hyperbole 
about lobbyists and their impact is empty boastfulness on the part of 
firms seeking business. Similarly a parliamentary question about the 
effect of lobbyists produced the following unambiguous response: 
“Lobbyists play no role in decisions made by my Department” [Welsh 
Office].""
Others have shown lobbyists to be effective. The press in Britain 
and in America has been captivated by the influence of lobbyists."" The 
Guardian and The Independent in the UK have long run stories about 
their access and supposed efficacy.""^ This journalistic obsession was 
illustrated in 1998 by a team from The Observer posing as 
representatives of an American energy company."^ The story rested on 
the foundation that lobbyists were unduly effective. The lead journalist 
argued Labour modernisers were “now boasting that the contacts they 
made when the party was in opposition can now be used to gain access 
to and information from their erstwhile fellow-modernisers playing key 
roles in government.”"" Although government dismissed the investigation
Evidence of Rt Hon John MacGregor MP to The Committee on Standards in Public Life. Transcript of Oral 
Evidence, 24 January 1995, p79 section 395
32 HC Deb, WA, Col 228, 9/12/1998
33 See the Cash-for-Questions affair in 1994 and the Cash-for-Access story in 1998 in the UK. There have 
been various books on the substantial influence of lobbying in the USA, see the following work by American 
commentators: Birnbaum, J., (1992); Birnbaum J., and Murray A., (1987); Choate, P., (1990); Edsall, T., 
(1988); Smith, H., (1988)
3^  “Labour to sell policy papers to lobbyists”, The Independent, 9 March 1998; “Labour spin doctor quits to join 
Thatcher’s PR man”. The Independent. 8 April 1998; “Blair woos sponsors for welfare roadshows”. The 
Guardian, 28 January 1998; “Revealed; Labour's links with lobbyists”. The Independent, 24 March 1998; 
“Companies hand out jets and Jaguars as pre-election perks”, The Observer, 23 March 1997; “Ex-Labour 
aides selling the inside track on how to block party policy”. The Independent, 7 September 1998; Also see the 
cash-for-access investigation by The Observer which started with the following story: “New Labour insiders 
offer secrets for cash”. The Observer, 5 July 1998. See the quality press for the following eight days 5 July- 
13 July 1998
3® “New Labour insiders offer secrets for cash”. The Observer, 5 July 1998 
33 Palast, G., (1998), “The American Way of Influence”, The Observer, 19 July 1998
Chapter One
as empty boasting by ambitious thirtysomethings, Palast argued “The 
Observer has demonstrated the boasts were well-founded."^^ He pointed 
to a No 10 Policy Unit member who said one lobbyist was part of the 
inner circle and offered preferential access.^®
Two Cabinet ministers, David Clark and Clare Short, expressed 
concern at lobbyists flitting around special advisers and ministers like 
moths around a flame. Short argued ministers should not deal directly 
with lobbyists and advised colleagues “we should frown on it and 
completely distance ourselves from it.”®® The Association of Professional 
Political Consultants’ report, which pointed to human error not 
management system deficiencies, extinguished the matter."^ ®
Journalistic commentators suggest professional lobbyists have too 
much influence over policy-making. However, a correlation does not 
prove a causal relationship -  and the press frequently take a one­
dimensional view of policy-making."^^ In general the validity of journalistic 
assertions has been difficult to establish.
In support of the journalists some scholars advocate the ‘interest- 
group dominance’ thesis, suggesting lobbyists and groups play an 
important role in policy communities and can be dominant."^® 
Schattschneider’s study of tariff policy found that interest-groups were 
effective."^® Various scholars make normative judgements about the 
desirability of their activity and deem lobbyists effective if only because 
they judge their activities undesirable."^"  ^ Lobbyists are alleged to be 
detrimental to good government. They supposedly pull decision-makers 
away from the public interest."^ ®
ibid
The key criticisms were that lobbyists: boasted they made use of Treasury information before it was 
announced; helped a company save £40million by persuading ministers to abandon plans for a car park tax; 
knew in advance the contents of the Chancellor’s Mansion House speech and that the Treasury would 
announce a new housing inspectorate; breached the embargo on a Trade and Industry Select Committee in 
advance of publication and sent it to a client (in reality an Observer journalist); claimed to have privileged 
access to ministers and key advisers in government; passed inside information about public spending plans to 
an investment bank; arranged a meeting between PowerGen and Treasury officials; placed clients on 
advisory committees; and were able to arrange tea with the Paymaster General.
“Cabinet tells Blair: ditch the lobbyist”, The Sunday Telegraph, 12 July 1998
Purnell and Armstrong concluded ‘There is nothing intrinsically improper about the role of political 
consultants. On the contrary, they have a valuable role to perform in assisting their clients to make proposals 
and cases to agencies of government in the most effective way.” Purnell, N., and Armstrong, R., (1998)
Malbin, M., (1984), p247
Both Truman and Latham showed decision-makers changing policy to satisfy interest-groups. Truman, D., 
(1951) and Latham, E., (1952). See also Lowi, T., (1969); McConnell, G., (1966)
Schattschneider, E., (1935a)
^  Doig, A., (1986a; 1986b; 1986c; 1990a; 1990b; 1991; 1995a)
Rauch, J., (1994); Chub, J., and Peterson, P., (1989); Lowi, T., (1969); Burns, J., (1963)
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This thesis moves away from this debate. The two camps talk 
past one another “with academics dismissing the validity of popular 
claims in a few paragraphs and the popular press ignoring the research 
of scholars or quickly rejecting its methods and conclusions as 
irrelevant.’“^ ® Confusion is inflated by concealment. Twelve ministerial 
departments failed to answer PQs about the meetings ministers, officials, 
special advisers and PPSs had with people working for lobbying firms. 
Ministers replied baldly that meetings are all governed by the ‘Ministerial 
Code’ and the ‘Civil Service Code’ and ‘Guidance for Civil Servants: 
Contacts with Lobbyists’.
The contradictory conclusions in the lobbying literature are partly 
explained by the perspectives of the researchers, their methodology and 
those to whom they speak. An incomplete explanation of the variance is 
that some academic studies concentrate on legislative voting and find 
little effect. It may be that such studies are looking at the wrong stage in 
the process. Second, to look at an issue from the perspective of the 
lobbyist, researchers concluded lobbyists were often ignored, spent most 
of their time submitting information, and were ineffectual. From the 
standpoint of government, however, researchers who saw decision­
makers under pressure from lobbyists and interest-groups accorded them 
influence.
Neither finding is wrong. The difference between the two 
approaches appears irreconcilable only if debate is limited to the 
misleading question of whether lobbyists “are important at all, and if one 
is forced to make a single answer to that question and hold to it in all time 
periods and all conceivable circumstances.’’"^® There is sufficient 
anecdotal evidence to suggest lobbyists make a difference on a case-by- 
case basis."^ ® This thesis seeks to move ahead by recognising that the 
existing literature allows us “to stipulate at least occasional interest-group
‘‘® Grenzke, J., (1990), p i44 
HC Debs, WAS, 9/3/1999 Col 168: 31/3/1999 Cols 684, 712, 758, 842; 13/4/1999 Cols 14, 29, 34, 108, 
123, 145, 170; 16/4/1999, Col 367; 19/4/1999 Col 415.
Hayes, M„ (1978), p i 37
Grantham and Seymour-Ure note “there are various cases which suggest that consultants have achieved 
for clients outcomes that otherwise were unlikely to have been achieved.” Grantham, C., and Seymour-Ure,
C., (1990), p73
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influence and to concentrate instead on the circumstances under which 
groups are influential.” ®^
The contradictions are variations that need to be explained.®^ It is 
necessary to examine the circumstances under which lobbyists are 
ef fect ive.Research should adopt “a contextually-rich view of the policy 
process” to explain effectiveness.^^ It is important to disaggregate the 
policy-making system and recognise that lobbyists’ effectiveness 
depends on context.^"  ^ Policy outcomes depend on the combined 
influence of a number of factors.
The Principal Hypothesis
A review of the literature suggests eight hypotheses. The 
hypotheses are constructed around external and internal variables. With 
the context of a congenial external environment, success depends on the 
lobbyist’s possession of those internal characteristics necessary for 
effectiveness.
The central hypothesis of this thesis is based on three external 
variables: lobbyists tend to be effective on (a) low-profile, (b) non­
political, and (c) technical issues. “Consultants operate more regularly, 
and more effectively, at the level of incremental day-to-day policy-making 
rather than at the more visible level of medium and high policy.”^^
Because the effect of lobbyists depends on the presence or 
absence of a range of variables, ceteris paribus lobbyists will be effective 
when other variables do not impinge on decision-makers.^® On politically 
high-profile issues the concept of effectiveness becomes more diffuse as 
lobbyists have to wade through areas of subjective human factors.
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p146. Jack Walker took “for granted that under certain 
circumstances, interest groups exert influence over legislators, bureaucrats and the public...” Walker, J., 
(1983), p390 
Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p i26 
=2 Hayes, M., (1978)
Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p i78. See also Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986); Knoke, D., 
(1990); Walker, J., (1991); Hansen, J., (1991); Heinz, J., et al (1993); McFarland, A., (1993); Browne, W., 
(1995)
Fowler and Shaiko show the context of policy “matters a good deal in how much groups affect the 
outcome...” Fowler, L., and Shaiko, R., (1987), p503
“  Grantham, C., (1989), p514. Malbin concurs arguing “Interest groups tend to be more successful on bills 
that do not capture the public's attention that on ones that do.” Malbin, M., (1984), p249 
Prendrais, J., and Waterman, R., (1985), pp403. Charles Lindblom noted some policy areas received public 
attention whilst others received no public attention; he argued business will be at its weakest on issues in the 
public domain. See Lindblom, C., (1984)
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On low-profile technical issues lobbyists will be effective because 
persuasion and reasoned argument is more important within a closed 
community where external variables do not operate as powerfully as they 
normally do. Organised opposition and media interest are less likely on 
technical issues.®  ^ Lobbying, which on high-profile matters would not 
exert influence, can tip the balance on low-profile, technical, non-political 
issue. Smith suggests that visibility and salience, issue technicality, and 
the degree of partisanship are variables that influence effectiveness.®® 
Lobbying on technical issues should be effective across time and space 
because contextual factors impinge on effectiveness.
Scrutinising less observable areas of effectiveness is laborious 
when compared with studying parliament. It is precisely because of the 
likelihood that lobbyists are more effective in low-profile policy spheres far 
from the public eye that this study is important. The results may be 
stronger if the research moves to that part of the policy-making process 
which is “less amenable to study.”®®
Previous research has asked the wrong question.®® The question 
should be under what circumstances are lobbyists effective and on what 
type of issue. Because lobbyists are not masters of their own destiny, the 
thesis accounts for internal variables and the contextual variables that 
are fundamental determinants of effectiveness.
Langbein, L., and Lotwis, M., (1990)
=8 Smith, R„ (1995)
59 Malbin, M., (1984), p249 
Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p i34
11
Chapter One
Research Metheds
Survey research has acknowledged the importance of contextual 
factors in lobbying strategies, but surveys have rarely been linked to 
particular case studies.®  ^ Generalised quantitative studies tend to 
obscure contextual information. However, neither are qualitative case 
studies flawless. They often reach contradictory conclusions thereby 
making it difficult to generalise. Case studies are rich in detail but often 
fail to support broad conclusions about lobbyists’ effectiveness.®^
The most potent research method is to blend techniques. This 
research project utilises both methods; case studies and a quantitative 
survey.®® Because surveys look at general behaviour, four chapters (4-7) 
focus on specific policy-based research. The case studies’ task is to 
explain policy development, test the hypotheses and provide a 
disaggregated picture of lobbyists’ effectiveness and the variables which 
impact on success.
The thesis examines evidence in the public domain, such as 
Hansard, government papers, business reports, press cuttings, and 
opinion polls. The case studies are also based on impressionistic 
evidence. Interviews were undertaken with civil servants, ministers, MPs, 
special advisers, lobbyists and their clients. A postal survey was carried 
out, allowing the research to come to broader, generalisable 
conclusions.®"  ^ The detailed results are contained in Appendix A.
Over a three-year period (1996-1999) the author conducted 185 
interviews. 18% were with officials or policy advisers. 17% were held 
with politicians, including ministers and MPs. 21% of the interviews were 
with lobbyists, 37% with their clients and a final 7% with third parties such 
as consultants, journalists and academics. Interviewees ranged from 
Secretaries of State to junior ministers and MPs, and from Permanent 
Secretaries to grade 7 civil servants. This range of informants allows the 
research to reflect the multi-level nature of policy-making and the 
perspectives each level holds about events.
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1996c)
“  There have been several classic American reviews of policy-making cases, of which some are: 
Schattschneider, E., (1935a); Maass, A., (1951) and Fritschler, A., (1975)
Data from a quantitative survey carried out by the author are presented in Appendix A 
^  Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p i28
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Interviews focused less on factual developments, most of which 
could be tracked by press cuttings and government papers. They sought 
to obtain the subject’s views on the effectiveness of the lobbyists, the 
campaign and the impact of contextual factors. Almost all the interviews 
lasted between 45 minutes and an hour.
The sampling method relied upon computerised newspaper 
searches, published directories and snowballing (using references in the 
text to spot other players and data sources). Interviewees were identified 
initially by informal conversations with lobbyists. Further discussions 
identified key players. Two reference books, Dods and the Civil Service 
Yearbook, identified politicians and officials. Combing the press 
identified businessmen and interest-group campaigners. Another source 
of respondents was discussions with interviewees. All respondents were 
asked ‘who do you think is important inside and outside government for 
this policy?’ and ‘who else do you recommend I talk to?’. This technique 
identified players who would otherwise have remained anonymous.
Why Case Studies?
The comparative case study approach allows valid generalisations 
to be drawn provided there is a theoretical statement against which to 
compare case studies. By comparing case studies one should be able to 
make analytical generalisations.®^
Case studies help test theories.®® They are an alternative to 
quantitative studies. This thesis compares the findings of the case 
studies against an analytical framework, which allows it to revise the 
hypotheses. The case-study findings are compared with the statements 
or propositions, which are revised as necessary. “The comparative case 
[study] method is a genuine alternative to quantitative methods”; it links 
the historian’s ‘what’ questions to the political scientist’s ‘why’ questions.®^
This thesis focuses on three policy areas -  home affairs, transport 
and trade and industry. Because government is fragmented, the nature 
of the lobbyist-government relationship varies over time and issue. It is
“ Rhodes, R., (1995a)
“  Eckstein, H„ (1975) and Yin, R„ (1984), p i08-9 
Rhodes, R., (1994), p183
13
Chapter One
important to include a range of policy areas. In some studies only case 
histories with positive results are investigated. This study will examine 
failed and successful lobbying campaigns ranging from high-profile to 
low-profile. Both have valuable normative implications.®® The focus on 
policy across a range of departments helps ensure the generalisations 
about outcomes and the effect of lobbyists do not reflect the idiosyncrasy 
of particular departments or directorates. The four case studies also 
span different time periods. The choice of three policy arenas provided 
breadth and the opportunity to compare and contrast.
The Washington-based policy study conducted by Heinz et al was 
restricted by its concentration on issues of high politics, and consequently 
they found it difficult to separate the actions of actors in complex and 
multiple games,®® Because context is a key variable, the profile of the 
campaign was the principal criterion. The four policy areas -  Sunday 
trading, CrossRail, the Jubilee Line Extension and Professional Liability -  
contain a high-profile, two medium-profile and one low-profile issue. 
These case studies were selected to present different patterns of 
lobbyist-client-government interactions and different patterns of 
government response.
The following table presents data from a word search of The 
Financial Times, The Independent, The Times, The Guardian and The 
Daily Telegraph from 1987 to 1998 in ‘FT-Profile’. All available data were 
searched.^® Table 1.1 and figure 1.1 justify the selection of the case 
studies. Sunday trading is a highly visible issue. The Jubilee Line and 
CrossRail received similar levels of press coverage and occupy the 
middle-ground. The Jubilee Line received more coverage because of 
delays in construction and its association with the Millennium 
celebrations. Limited Liability Partnerships received little mention in the 
press. Adding the tabloid newspapers. The Daily Mail, The Mirror and 
The Evening Standard to the search of broadsheets added only two more 
hits, justifying its classification as low-profile.
similar point is made by Baumgartner and Leech when discussing the merits and demerits of US interest 
group studies for use in meta-analysis. Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1996c), pp17-25 
namely agriculture, energy, health, and labour, in Heinz, J., et al (1993)
Most of the broadsheet newspapers date back to the early 1980s. The exact dates are Daily Telegraph 
3/87; The Guardian 7/84; The Times 7/85; The Independent 9/88; and Financial Times 1/82. The Dally Mall 
records date back to 1/93; The Mirror, 9/94; and The Evening Standard 1/93
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Table no: 1.1
Search term » ‘Sunday
Trading’
‘Jubilee Line 
Extension’
‘CrossRail’ ‘Limited Liability 
Partnership’
Telegraph, Guardian, Times, 
Independent, and FT
2,900 1199 717 89
All of above plus Mail, Mirror 
and Evening Standard
3121 1678 969 91
Sunday newspapers; 
Observer, Independent on 
Sunday, Sunday Telegraph, 
Sunday Times, Sunday Mail, 
Sunday Mirror
320 178 78 9
Total of Daily and Sunday 
broadsheets and tabloids
3441 1856 1047 100
Figure no: 1.1
Number of Newspaper Articles 
about Case Study issues
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Another essential criterion was the activity of lobbyists. All four 
policy areas had lobbyists working on them. Three of the four case 
studies had more than one consultancy involved -  opposing one another. 
The fourth case study was driven by one lobbying company, but with 
other consultancies involved in minor aspects.
The Jubilee Line and CrossRail exhibit interesting contrasts. One 
failed, the other succeeded. The thesis explains whether the outcomes 
were the consequences of lobbyists or contextual factors. The two 
policies keep several variables constant -  the civil servants responsible, 
ministers, budgets, economic factors, policy community members. These 
two case studies allow the research to focus on the role of internal 
variables.
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WhatisLobbyingP
It is difficult, and some argue not really necessary, to give a 
precise definition of the activity of professional lobbyists/^ The concept 
of lobbying has meanings so varied as to lead inevitably to 
misunderstanding/^ Salisbury, writing about lobbyists in America, noted 
of the word ‘lobbying’ “that much-abused word is so fraught with ordinary 
language meaning, most of it unsavoury, as to defy rehabilitation anyway, 
but it is also true that none of its historic uses comfortably fits with what 
many Washington representatives do."^^
The term ‘lobbying’ need not be hostile, but attempts at close 
definition are often self-defeating/‘^  Statutory definitions of lobbying are 
“either hopelessly restrictive infringements on free speech or because 
they are so narrow... only a few rare behaviors are af fected.Sal isbury 
argues the word does not reflect what ‘lobbyists’ do, such as the 
presentation of a technical case or a legal challenge. He prefers the term 
‘interest representation’.^ ® In fact “[pjrofessional lobbyists go under a 
variety of names, such as public affairs official, consultant, public 
relations specialist or parliamentary liaison officer. What lobbying is even 
goes beyond the elephant problem of being something one instantly 
recognises but cannot define precisely, because what may be lobbying to 
one individual, or in a particular cultural setting, may be a routine 
exchange to another.’’^  ^ There are some boundaries: lobbying relates to 
government decision-making; it is motivated by a desire to influence 
government decisions; it implies the presence of a representative; and it 
involves communication.^®
One definition of a lobbyist is any person who, for payment, 
attempts to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage of legislation or
European Parliament, Second Report on Lobbying in the European Parliament, Committee on the Rule of 
Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, Rapporteur: Mr Glyn Ford, 12 June 1996, PE 
216.869/fin. Greenwood and Thomas argue that definitions of lobbying and interest groups are fraught with 
difficulties. Greenwood, J., and Thomas, C., (1998), pp490-91 
Milbrath, L , (1963), p7 
Salisbury, R., (1984), p71 
Biffen, J., (1989)
Baumgartner and Leech, (1998), p29
Salisbury prefers the word ‘representative’ to lobbyist as a description of the individual because it “connotes 
a free-standing agent, retained on a fee-for-service basis and often on the assumption that the agent 
possesses particular skills or credentials of relevance to the advocacy role that are not readily available within 
the interested organization, whether institution or membership group.” Salisbury, R., (1984), p72 
Greenwood, J., and Thomas, C., (1998), p491 
See Milbrath, L , (1963), pp7-8
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the taking of public policy decisions/® Some scholars have argued 
lobbying occurs only when an individual or group acts on behalf of 
someone else/® However, the definition of lobbying does not 
necessarily have to centre on the act of representing an interest to and 
before parliament, government and officials. It may include non-direct 
work such as providing strategic advice and monitoring since both fall 
under the concept of representation. The “reality behind much of the 
lobbying industry’s activity in Britain, while open to question and 
investigation, remains surprisingly mundane, and largely unrecognisable 
from the sensationalist lobbyist excesses so often portrayed in the 
m e d i a . M o n i t o r i n g  and advice must be “seen as a form of 
representation [because it] requires the third party’s presence to be 
meaningful.”®^ Therefore the thesis disregards Lord Donoughue’s 
distinction between advocacy and advice because the attendance of the 
lobbyist is a requirement of both services.®®
Rush et al defined lobbyists as
professional lobbyists or consultants whose business is to 
advise their clients on lobbying, and sometimes to lobby on 
their behalf;
organisations outside Parliament and government who 
themselves seek to lobby, ranging from those who are fully 
professionalised or bureaucratised... to entirely voluntary 
bodies, who have no paid staff and only limited resources; 
MPs and other individuals with direct access to parliament 
who also have a pecuniary interest in a particular policy 
area or who receive some sort of remuneration to 
represent the interests of an outside organisation;
MPs and other individuals with direct access to Parliament 
who have non-pecuniary interests in a particular policy 
area and who represent the interests of, or make 
representations on behalf of, an outside organisation.®'^
Lobbying involves both communicating the client’s aims and 
preferences and advising clients how to attempt to influence public policy. 
This thesis will use the Association of Professional Political Consultants’ 
comprehensive definition of a lobbying company.
Pross, P., (1991)
See Milbrath, L., (1963), p8 “Lobbying is the stimulation and transmission of a communication, by someone 
other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a governmental decision-maker with the hope of 
influencing his decision."
8' Berry, S., (1992), p231 
“ Salisbury, R., (1984), p71 
“  Donoughue, B., (1995)
^  Select Committee on Members’ Interests - submission by Professors Michael Rush, Philip Norton, Colin 
Seymour Ure and Malcolm Shaw for the Report on Parliamentary Lobbying, HC 586 Session 1990/91
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Individual partnership or company (including divisions of 
companies) who either hold themselves out as offering 
consultancy services (meaning advice, representation, 
research, monitoring or administrative assistance provided for 
commercial gain by a professional political consultant relating 
to the institutions of UK central and local government and/or 
other public bodies) whether such activities are the principal 
business of that consultant or are ancillary or incidental to it, 
such work in each case being undertaken for their parties for 
commercial gain.®^
It follows that a ‘lobbyist’ is a principal of a lobbying company, 
whilst the verb ‘lobbying’ encompasses the representative work 
undertaken by the lobbyist on behalf of a third party. The APPC paper 
continues “These criteria therefore cover advisers, the majority of whose 
trading revenue is derived from advice or advocacy related to dealings 
with public authorities, or those undertaking one-off or ad hoc projects, 
and others, such as law and accounting firms, who may deal with 
Government on behalf of third parties but only on a basis incidental to 
their main business since in undertaking such work they are implicitly 
holding themselves out as possessing professional competence.’’®®
Who Oounts as a Prafassianal LabbyistP
Lobbyists often have experience in political parties.®  ^ The Public 
Policy Unit described itself as “a group of former officials. Minister, MPs, 
Peers and political advisers who now act as policy analysts and 
consultants on dealing with political and regulatory bodies at central and 
local government levels in the UK and EC.’’®® In Washington DC the 
majority of lobbyists are lawyers. This legal dominance does not apply to 
the UK. Professional lobbyists in Britain have political and or 
administrative experience. They bring with them a detailed knowledge of 
the policy process and friends within the political system.
An advertisement in The House Magazine, from a leading 
professional lobbying firm seeking a managing director, sought a 
candidate with a “Westminster, Whitehall, Brussels or similar background, 
together with existing consultancy experience. Experience in publishing.
“  Association of Professional Political Consultants, Introductory Paper 
ibid
Jordan, G„ (1989), p i07 
Public Policy Unit, (1991a), pi
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information services, journalism or economic consultancy would also be 
considered.”®® Many have experience at the periphery of the political 
arena, such as civil servants, lobby correspondents, or departmental 
press officers.
Professional lobbyists market themselves on their experience of 
the ‘village atmosphere' of Whitehall.®® Lobbyists are mainly an amalgam 
of ambitious white middle-class political activists and a gaggle of 
aristocrats. They all have in common experience of and contacts in 
politics, the monarchy or elite business circles.
There are several types of consultancies offering professional 
lobbying services. First, the specialised professional lobbying 
consultancies, which are members of the APPC, tend to be the largest 
firms and the market leaders. Second, there exist smaller independent 
professional lobbying consultancies, eligible to become members of the 
APPC, but who chose not to for various reasons. Third, there are several 
large public relations companies with large public affairs departments and 
genuine experience (some US-owned), for example Burson-Marsteller 
and Hill & Knowlton. Fourth, there are a vast number of smaller PR 
companies which offer ‘political services’ treating government as another 
‘public’ or ‘stake-holder’.
Fifth, a host of ‘one-man bands’ exploit their contacts and 
experience of the political system, including Dorothy Drake (former chief 
press officer at DHSS) and Keith McDowell (ex-CBI). Sixth, the larger 
legal practices have public affairs departments (Clifford Chance and 
Lovell White Durrant). The boundary between the services provided by a 
lobbying company and those provided by a legal firm is hazy. Lobbyists 
have seen “increasing competition from law firms in Brussels and the UK 
[and] from a number of merchant banks.”®^
Seventh are registered Parliamentary Agents, with passes giving 
privileged access to the Palace of Westminster, who offer political 
consultancy services.®^ Since the replacement of the Private Bill with the 
Transport and Works Act (1992) and subsequent Orders and
Grantham, C., (1989), p508 
^D oig , A.. (1986c)
Andrew Gifford, evidence to the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 24 January 1995
19
Chapter One
Regulations, they have moved into lobbying. The distinction between 
professional lobbyists and parliamentary agents is no longer relevant. 
Both are concerned with case-building and advocacy.
Eighth, the Big Five’ accountancy companies have established 
offices in Brussels to monitor and lobby the Commission and Parliament. 
Some firms provide a full range of legislative lobbying services, whilst 
others offer monitoring and strategic planning but avoid advocacy. The 
accountancy companies have developed sophisticated computerised 
databases to track the EU legislative process. UK-based accountancy 
houses also offer legislative and policy services to their clients.
Finally, journalists have stepped in to exploit the lobbying market. 
The European Parliament has noted “some journalists express a 
specifically political agenda; and sometimes even... receive income from 
industrial or commercial interests for their advice and i n s i g h t s . P e t e r  
Luff MP argued in evidence to the Select Committee on Member’s 
Interests that
there are a number of paid relationships between outside 
interests and Lobby correspondents who are able to obtain 
more information on a confidential basis than even Members 
of Parliament, and if there were any attempt to curtail 
Members’ ability to maintain relationships with outside 
interests... one could easily be left with a situation where 
others... had privileged access and would be more furtive than 
any of the possible abuses we are seeking to curtail here.®"*
Therefore professional lobbyists exist in a range of forms and 
might have previous experience as a local government officer or 
councillor, party official, civil servant. Commission official, NDPB official, 
MP, special adviser, journalist, in-house specialist, regulatory expert, 
lawyer, accountant or trade association official. They are an eclectic 
collection of representatives, each with a distinctive area of expertise and 
knowledge.
^  Parliamentary Agents include, Sherwoods & Co, Sharpe Pritchard, Dyson Bell Martin, Vizzards, Lewin 
Gregory and Rees and Freyer. Most of their political work is oriented towards legislation or regulation.
European Parliament, Second Report on Lobbying in the European Parliament, Committee on the Rule of 
Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, Rapporteur: Mr Glyn Ford, 12 June 1996, PE 
216.869/fin
^  Luff, evidence to Select Committee on Members' Interests cited in Doig, A., (1986a)
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Who Hires Professional LobbyisisP
Following Mancur Olson the term ‘interest-group’ became 
synonymous with membership organisations.®® However, earlier interest- 
groups embodied a range of organisations, including professional 
lobbyists, industries, foreign and local governments and corporations.®® It 
is a mistake to restrict the definition of groups to membership 
organisations because it has dragged political science away from 
examining non-membership organisations so influential in policy 
development.®^
It is also arguable that the cost concentrating on internal structure 
was significant since it led to “the marginalization of interest group 
studies as they lost their relation with the core issues of democratic 
governance.”®® Olson and those who followed him concentrated on 
internal factors to the detriment of the contextual. More recently 
academics have broadened the concept of interest-groups to include 
institutions and other organised interests.®® This thesis refers to all non­
governmental organised interests as interest-g roups.
Lobbyists are employed by interest-g roups able to afford the fee. 
Clients are typically business organisations and companies. Even large 
companies with in-house staff employ external consultancies. Foreign 
governments use lobbyists as an alternative channel to traditional 
diplomacy. Executive bodies, executive agencies and local government 
use lobbyists to help them understand informal policy development in 
Whitehall. Government even hires lobbyists: The Department for 
International Development hired the Public Policy Unit in 1998.^°°
For example Walker limited his definition of an interest group to functioning associations open to 
membership and concerned with policy: Walker. J., (1991), p4. Baumgartner, P., and Leech, 8., (1998), p26 
See Crawford (1939); Truman, D., (1951); Herring, P., (1929) and Key, V., (1964) in Baumgartner, P., and 
Leech, B„ (1998), p27 
Salisbury, R„ (1984)
Baumgartner and Leech, (1998), p68 
^  Schlozmann, K., and Tierney, J., (1986), plO; Heinz, J., et al (1993); and Gray, V., and Lowery, D., (1996a), 
all use broader definitions of interest groups.
Association of Professional Political Consultants register of June 1998
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The services of lobbyists are “sought when, and only when, the 
client firm requires those services, and their billing is usually based on an 
hourly c h a r g e . C l i e n t s  frequently have several criteria when judging 
whether to embark upon lobbying: the relative importance of the issue to 
the interest; the probability of success; the complexity of the issue; is the 
group obliged to get involved?; the insider/outsider criterion; an 
assessment of other actors already involved; the topicality of the issue.
The potential market size is large. Every company is affected by 
public-policy decisions. In its nascent years lobbying-industry clients 
were mainly large business and City financial i n s t i t u t i on s . By  the mid- 
1990s the lobbyists’ client base had become more diverse. Although 
private companies are the largest client group, trades unions, local 
authorities, public bodies and campaign groups also hire lobbyists. The 
increased use of professional lobbyists by the private-sector has forced 
parts of the public-sector to follow because they often do not have good 
relations with central departments.
Figure 1.2 shows the breakdown of Association of Professional 
Political Consultants’ member companies’ clients. In mid-1998 the APPC 
had 16 members. Companies account for 69% of clients. Public bodies 
account for 9%, whilst trade associations account for 13%.
Salisbury, R„ (1984), p73 
Smith, Martin., (1991)
A Financial Times survey in 1985 of 180 sizeable companies found more than 40% utilised the services of 
political consultants.
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APPC Clients'^" 
Table no: 1.2
Company Trade
Association
Trade
Union
Foreign
government
Campaign
group
Local
government
Public
body
APCO 26 6 1 1 0 0 0
AS Biss 24 1 0 0 2 0 0
Beaumark 11 3 0 0 0 0 0
Citigate
Westminster
50 14 0 0 3 2 11
Connect 9 6 2 0 4 2 8
Fishburn
Hedges
13 1 0 0 2 0 1
GJW 81 13 1 0 6 3 11
GPC 68 9 0 0 5 0 4
Policy
Partnership
12 2 0 2 0 0 0
Political
Planning
Services
43 0 0 0 0 0 0
Politics
International
39 14 0 0 4 0 1
Public Policy 
Unit
33 6 0 0 2 1 9
Rowland Public 
Affairs
14 2 0 1 5 0 3
Shandwick 26 3 0 2 4 3 7
Waterfront
Partnership
24 3 0 0 0 0 5
Westminster
Strategy
43 12 0 0 9 2 9
Total 516 95 4 6 46 11 69
% 69.1 12.7 .005 .008 6.1 1.5 9.2
Figure no: 1.2
APPC Client Profile
13%
69%
□  Company
□  Trade Union
■  Carnpaign Group
□  Public Body
□  Trade Association
□  Foreign Government
□  LocarGovernment
Some blue-chip UK companies do not employ professional 
lobbyists. One reason is that the government may perceive hiring 
lobbyists as a sign of weakness. Second, Jordan opines that large
Association of Professional Political Consultants register of June 1998
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politically-aware companies have no need to purchase lobbying skills 
from professional lobbyists/®® They can afford to employ in-house 
representatives to ensure their views are heard. He gives several 
examples of senior officials joining companies.^®® Despite the presence 
of experienced former public servants a lobbyist will support many large 
companies with a government affairs department. A lobbyist is often 
closer to decisions and can usually deliver high-quality intelligence.
Contrary to Jordan, Salisbury spotted a trend in Washington where 
the complexity of the policy system encouraged large companies to hire 
several representatives. He writes, “Ford, General Electric, IBM, GM, 
Exxon, and other giants may hire eight or ten separate outside 
representatives in addition to working through trade associations and 
their own substantial government relations staff."^®  ^ Similarly British Gas 
hired several lobbying firms during the deregulation of the gas market for 
two reasons: the issue was complex, and their competitors were left a 
restricted choice of adviser.
So lobbyists often support large companies with an in-house 
government affairs department. They may work for companies because 
an issue may be important, it may be particularly demanding for a short 
time, or the company may face a crisis. The issue may also be too 
complex to be handled in-house or the company could have been forced 
to participate and needs advice. The company may see a potential 
competitive advantage in hiring a lobbyist to bring about change. Some 
lobbyists are also acknowledged experts in specific policy areas. The 
Public Policy Unit is regarded for its expertise in regulatory matters whilst 
the Waterfront Partnership gathers experts in transport policy.
Lobbying companies have a range of clients. They include trades 
unions like the Transport and General Workers Union and the 
Association of University Teachers; campaign groups like the Multiple 
Sclerosis Society, Fast Tracks to Europe Alliance and National Anti- 
Vivisection Society; and companies like BG, British Telecom, GKN
Jordan, G.. (1991b)
Recent press comment notes the following; Sir Anthony Reeve, former diplomat joined Barclays; John 
Gummer former Secretary of State for Environment joined Johnson Matthey; Douglas Hurd former Foreign 
Secretary joined Nat West Markets; Steve Norris, former Transport Minister joined Bell Pottinger a lobbying 
company; Roger Freeman, former Cabinet Office minister joined Coopers and Lybrand. “Major ministers 
shackled in job market”. The Guardian, 29 July 1998.
Salisbury, R., (1984), p74
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Westland and Glaxo-Wellcome. Other clients include foreign 
governments like British Virgin Islands, the Azerbaijhan Republic and the 
State of Bahrain. Bell Pottinger, which is not a member of the APPC, 
was hired by the Chilean Reconciliation Movement to run a campaign in 
defence of Senator Augusto Pinochet.^°®
Growth of Profossional lobbying
Scholarly interest in the circumstances under which professional 
lobbyists are effective is partly a product of the increase in lobbying. This 
section and the next examine the reasons for the growth in professional 
lobbying and the foci of lobbyists’ activity.
Lobbyists are now hired by thousands of organisations. The 17 
APPC members alone have 747 clients serviced by 268 staff. Because 
of the number of lobbyists now working in the UK, the value of the 
industry (estimated in 1998 at £70million a year °^®), and their pivotal 
involvement in policy-making, an assessment of the circumstances under 
which they are effective is needed.
The development of professional lobbying is often described as an 
e x p lo s io n . H o w e v e r ,  given the UK government’s long tradition of 
dealing with consultants it may be more accurately viewed as the latest 
stage in a continuum. David Saint-Martin talks of a consultocracy’ 
c u l t u r e . A l t h o u g h  new public management increased government’s 
demand for business involvement, the involvement of the private-sector 
in Whitehall dates back far longer. The long-term experience of 
consultants gave access to inner circles and made possible the exercise 
of influence on policy.
Scholars have estimated that interest-groups in America tripled 
between 1960 and 1990.^^  ^ There are four principal reasons explaining 
the increased growth in lobbying in the UK.
McSmith, A., and Calvert, J., (1999), “Look who’s coming to the rescue of Augusto”, The Observer, 17 
January 1999
Palast, G., (1998), ‘The American Way of influence”. The Observer, 19 July 1998 
This phenomenon is noted by Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), pplOO-102. They cite a range of 
scholars over time, ail of whom have talked of an explosion in lobbying including Pollock, J., (1927); Crawford, 
K„ (1939); and Berry, J., (1997)
Saint-Martin, D., (1998)
Baumgartner, P., and Jones, B., (1993)
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Government Factors
i. Government became dependent upon interest-groups for 
information, advice and the implementation of policy. Statutory co­
option of groups allowed for specific interests to be included in the 
political system. In some cases there was a continuous dialogue 
with permanent lobbies. The element of ‘bureaucratic 
accommodation' to policy-making increased.”  ^ A ‘consultation 
culture’ developed following the Second World War.^ "^^  War brought 
outside interests closer to government, and the interaction that 
began during the war became established by the post-war period.
ii. Increased lobbying may be the consequence of government’s 
increased scope in setting corporation tax and regulations.^^® As 
government has become more intrusive, organisations have become 
politically i n v o l v e d . “If government is a significant actor in a 
corporation’s environment, then, ceteris paribus, that corporation will 
be politically a c t i v e . G o v e r n m e n t  matters because of its 
expenditure and increased regulation. Groups cannot afford to be 
inactive."'^®
iii. The Conservative governments brought the professional lobbyist to 
the fore. Reforms distanced formerly public organisations from 
central government. These processes meant there were more 
potential clients, and more organisations keen to retain contact with 
policy-makers. Privatisation and sub-contracting became 
commonplace. Professional lobbying is a consequence of those 
trends. Privatisation expunged the incestuous relationship that 
existed between the centre and nationalised industries. Though the 
system consults more, arguably it deals with outsiders less.
” 3 Jordan, G., and Richardson, J., (1982)
See, for example: Beer, S., (1982); and Middlemas, K., (1986, 1990,1991) 
Miller, 0 ., (1991)
Jordan, G., (1991b)
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1983), p367 
Humphries, C., (1991), p355 
'1® Wilson, G., (1991)
26
Chapter One
Privatisation erected Chinese walls that distanced the system from 
outsiders. Business thinks lobbyists help them scale these Chinese 
walls. It is also commonplace in business to contract-out services.
iv. The changing structure of government has led to a proliferation of 
lobbying. EU institutions have broadened their policy 
c o m p e t e n c e . T h e  Single European Act enhanced the power of 
the Commission, which can now initiate policy in several areas. The 
power of the European Parliament has also increased given the co­
operation procedure, and parliament now influences the detail of 
Community legislation. Similarly the 1997 Labour Government’s 
devolution programme encouraged the growth of lobbying firms in 
Edinburgh and Cardiff.^^^
Business Factors
i. The private-sector increasingly relies on public subsidies and 
general economic decisions. The increase in lobbying may be the 
consequence of a shift from distributive to redistributive policy. More 
interest-groups seek a share of increasingly limited resources.
ii. The lack of innate empathy between government and organisations 
dealing with it has contributed to the rise of professional lobbying. 
Those individuals able to link government and business became 
indispensable. The decline of the Establishment’ and of lobbying by 
social affiliation in the last thirty years has also allowed for the 
emergence of the lobbyist.
iii. Business reacted to the activity of environmentalists and consumer 
protection groups, which were successful in the 1970s, by
Mazey, S., and Richardson, J., (1992)
“Old political foes team up to lobby in new parliament”, Scotland on Sunday, 5 July 1998; John, S., (1998), 
“Devolution encourages new Business-Politics links". Public Affairs Newsletter, Vol 5, No 2, October; “Scottish 
public affairs firm calls for strict new Code of Conduct”, Public Affairs Newsletter, Vol 5, No 1, September 
1998; “GJW launches new Scottish political consultancy”. Public Affairs Newsletter, Vol 4, No 9, June 1998 
'22 Miller, 0 ., (1988)
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establishing trade associations to represent their interests. 
Companies also hired professional lobbyists.
Parliamentary Factors
i. The increased workload of ministers and MPs means the old style 
personal contact lobbying is less effective. MPs may lack the 
opportunity, because they are too busy and not expert enough, to 
act as an interface between interest-groups and government. 
Therefore interest-groups turn to lobbyists.
ii. The complexity and length of parliamentary decision-making 
processes encouraged the growth of lobbying. Similarly, the 
behavioural changes of parliament have witnessed more 
independent voting, making the legislature a more relevant target -  
before 1970 lobbyists rarely troubled MPs. There has been a 
“significant and observable change in parliamentary lobbying" 
argues NodonT^ The select committee system has also given 
groups a platform and encouraged lobbying.
iii. There was an increase in the willingness of MPs to engage in such 
work.^^^ During the 1980s many MPs were directors of lobbying 
companies. Doig identified 39 MPs who were part-owners or 
employees of consultancies.^^®
Supply-driven Factors
i. Modern communications technology allowed the identification of new 
coalitions around relatively narrow i s s u e s . T h e s e  new issues have 
altered the role of the political party. “The communications revolution 
has helped lobbyists in almost every aspect of their work, but
'23 Wilson, G.. (1991) 
Norton, P., (1991), p62 
'25 Doig, A., (1986a, 1990a) 
'25 Doig, A., (1986a), p524 
'27 Post, G„ (1991)
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particularly in their ability to present technical arguments to individual 
members and how to activate the grass roots.
ii. Professional lobbyists are political entrepreneurs similar to those 
noted by Kavanagh.^^® Though he concentrates on ‘think-tanks’, 
lobbyists also enter this category. Growth may be supply-led as 
entrepreneurs exploited a market opportunity. There is a saloon 
door mentality in professional lobbying; many move on to become 
political players.
iii. There is a ‘me too’ philosophy: one must hire a professional lobbyist 
if ones competitors have done so.^^° Foreign firms may drive the 
growth. An American journalist argued “American companies and 
their money are pushing the UK lobbying industry to provide the 
same sort of service they would expect in W a s h i n g t o n .T h e y  
demand “the same levels of access and political intelligence to which 
they have become accustomed at home.’’^^ ^
Focus Of Profosslonol lobbying
To understand the circumstances under which lobbyists tend to be 
effective it is necessary to understand the circumstances in which they 
operate. There are two principal foci of professional lobbying: parliament 
and the civil service.
Lobbyists focused increasingly on parliament. Norton writes “since 
1979, the government has been perceived as more resistant to interest 
group influence, and so groups were turning increasingly to Parliament 
for a h e a r i n g . T h e r e  is substantial debate on the appropriate focus 
of professional lobbying. Some practitioners argue those representatives 
who direct their activities at select committees and MPs in general are 
‘professionally bankrupt’. They argue for a professional lobbyist to direct
'28 Malbin. M.. (1984), p250 
'28 Kavanagh, D., (1992)
'2° Jordan, G., (1991a)
'2' Palast, G., (1998), “The American Way of Influence”, The Observer, 19 July 1998 
'22 ibid
'22 Philip Norton, (1995) contribution to a seminar on “Ethical and Effective Lobbying” organised by Bruce 
Naughton Wade (public affairs counsellors) 21 March 1995.
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“clients down the parliamentary road because he knows no better, is to 
turn what is often an administrative or technical matter into a political 
one.”^^"^  Miller claims it is a misdirection of effort caused by an 
exaggerated media interest in parliament because it is easy to report/^^ 
He argues they are profile-raising techniques which are essentially 
ineffective.
It may be that failure to persuade key actors in Whitehall will lead 
professional lobbyists to target Westminster. However, insider groups 
tend to be more active in virtually every form of parliamentary contact. 
Professional lobbyists will operate on ‘all-fronts’. Though parliament 
sometimes contributes to policy-making, it more often acts as a 
representative body, which confers legitimacy on policy. Parliament can 
be an important route of access to ministers, for example through the 
medium of the PPS.
Lobbying parliament
Arguably the concentration of interest-groups on parliament is out 
of proportion with the legislature’s influence. This imbalance may be the 
consequence of an inaccurate perception held by outside interests of 
parliament’s influence or a reliance on parliament when other channels 
have f a i l e d . S o m e  practitioners argue the reactions to professional 
lobbying have over-emphasised the significance of parliament in the 
decision-making p r o c e s s , a n d  the role of lobbyists is to disabuse 
clients of the misapprehension that parliament is the key to influencing 
policy.
However, other lobbyists argue parliament is important and is part 
of the policy-cycle, which needs cultivation.^^® As a ‘policy influencing’ 
chamber the House of Commons is a relevant target for lobbyists. To be 
effective in parliament the lobbyist requires knowledge of 
parliamentarians and procedure. Similarly, Rush et al refute the notion of
cited in Jordan, G., (1989). 
'35 Miller, C .,(1991)
'36 Rush, M., 09908), p143 
'37 Berry, S., (1993)
138 Greer, I., (1991)
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the UK as a post-parliamentary democracy and argue parliament makes 
a difference and is relevant to influencing policy."'^ ®
The focus of professional lobbyists on parliament can be both 
cosmetic and su b s t a n t i v e . I t  is cosmetic, because dining in the Palace 
of Westminster and meeting MPs is ineffective but impresses clients. But 
parliament is substantive because it influences some important decisions, 
such as moral issues. Although Miller reduces parliament to the “gift- 
wrapping of Government”, he is forced to concede that parliament is 
important when government majorities are low.^ "^  ^ The events of the late 
1970s and the Major governments in the 1990s justified lobbyists’ 
attention to parliament.
Various types of MPs are targeted by lobbyists. Policy advocates 
can be ideologues, generalists or specialists. Specialist policy advocates 
are the most professional, seeking to influence policy ‘carefully... 
persistently and effectively in narrow policy a r e a s . S u c h  specialists 
rely on outside contacts for advice, and work with lobbyists. MPs who 
are ministerial aspirants are concerned with power, whereas policy 
advocates seek influence. Ministerial aspirants would be prepared to 
work with professional lobbyists on policy issues if they foresee political 
advantage. Members who are primarily concerned about their 
constituents will usually work with professional lobbyists when they 
realise the lobbyist’s cause will benefit their constituents. ‘Parliament 
men’ notes Searing include ‘spectators’ (those who want to be at the 
centre of things), and ‘club men’ who more active than spectators but 
absorb themselves in the atmosphere and collegiality of the Commons.
To some the Conservative reforms of the 1980s encouraged 
lobbyists to focus on parliament. The reforms of the Thatcher 
governments divested central government of its operational involvement 
and embraced the private-sector. Because of the speed of the reforms 
lobbyists targeted parliamentarians rather than civil servants.
See Rush, M., (1990b), especially David Judge’s chapter 2 and Michael Rush’s conclusion. 
Grantham, C., (1989), p505 
Miller, 0 ., (1987), p38 
'^ 2 Searing, D„ (1993)
Searing, D., (1993)
Doig, A., (1990a)
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Standing and Select Committees
Lobbying of members of standing committees is now extensive. 
Interest-groups ‘circularise’ all or some members of Standing 
Committees, and many ask MPs to table amendments. Only a few Bills 
each session are highly political, therefore the bulk of business is routine, 
and briefing material allows MPs to participate in deliberations. Norton 
argues lobbying improves the knowledge of standing committee 
members, and reduces the ability of the government to rely on the party 
majority automatically to approve its policy. Lobbying at committee 
stage, argues Norton, renders the Bill more acceptable. He suggests 
those interest-groups hiring professional lobbyists are more effective, 
since they can monitor committee proceedings and are “better placed to 
have some influence than those who cannot afford such assistance.
The select committee system is organised around departmental 
business and encourages a specialised focus on public-policy issues. 
Lobbyists are adept at exploiting this platform and use it as a route to 
departmental policy-making. They train clients on how to represent their 
case in front of adversarial questioning from MPs anxious to portray 
themselves in televised select committee hearings as robust defenders of 
the public-interest.
Miller claims whilst the committees have increased parliamentary 
scrutiny of ministerial and official actions they have not been a complete 
success because their reports are rarely debated and are too late to 
affect policy.^ "^ ® However, since many witnesses are representatives from 
outside groups, the process of giving evidence provides them with the 
opportunity to influence the recommendations of the select committee 
and to gain the attention of ministers and civil servants who have to note 
and reply.^ "^  ^ Agriculture, Education, Energy, Social Services and Trade 
and Industry committees obtain over half their evidence from outside 
g r o u p s . S o m e  select committees would not be able to operate were it 
not for interest-group involvement. Several scholars have shown select 
committees provide interest-groups with valuable information about how
'“s Norton, P.. (1991), p72 
Miller,C., (1987), p42.
Rush, M., (1990a), p143. 44% of written and oral evidence comes from outside groups 
Judge, D., (1992b)
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departments are th ink ing .C onsequently  select committees have acted 
as a magnet for outside interests and lobbyists. Rush has also 
suggested that backbench party committees and all-party groups play 
some part in setting the policy agenda.
Select committees are able to place issues on the House’s agenda 
or to increase their standing in Whitehall. Committee reports usually filter 
down to debate and questions in the chamber of the Commons. Sir 
Clifford Boulton notes 25% of select committee reports were the subject 
of debate in the House, but only a small proportion had been the subject 
of a substantive motion or an adjournment m o t i o n . T h e r e  have been 
many requests for extra parliamentary time to be set aside for debate of 
select committee reports.
Select committees are used to attract the attention of players 
outside the legislature. Although Whitehall is the key arena for most 
policy, select committees force ministers and civil servants to listen or to 
respond to committee reports containing the group’s evidence.
Lobbying the Civil Service
For every policy decision government is forced to change as a 
consequence of high-profile pressure there are likely to be “several 
hundred where decisions are made or influenced purely through the 
undramatic submission of a well-researched, well-argued and 
representative case.’’ ®^^ The word pressure’ does not adequately 
describe the professional lobbyist-civil servant relationship: “‘pressure’ 
implies that some kind of sanction will be applied if a demand is refused, 
and most groups, most of the time, simply make requests or put up a 
case; they reason and they argue.
The civil service has undergone massive change since 1979. A 
central theme to the reform of the civil service has been the devolution of 
managerial authority and responsibility. Managerial devolution implies 
discretionary judgment by officials, opening the way for different solutions
Rush, M.. (1990b); Marsh. I., (1986); and Judge. D.. (1990) 
'5° Judge. D.. (1992b)
Miller. 0 .. (1988)
Finer. S.. (1958). cited in Jordan. G.. (1991a)
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to similar problems.Junior  officials have enhanced autonomy and are 
increasingly important targets for lobbyists.
The quiet approach is the most effective when dealing with civil 
servants. “The safest solution for the corporate lobbyist is to fix his 
[client], and then to watch his [client] fix the civil service. For once the 
deal is done, the honour of the civil service is engaged. If it fails to 
deliver its Ministers bound hand and foot, it hangs its head in shame. 
Whereas the lobby which [only] converts the politicians is inevitably 
confronted by the resistance of the civil service."^^ Similarly Miller 
argues there are “few civil servants at principal grade and above who do 
not spend some of every day giving advice to, engaging in consultations 
or professional negotiations with, or simply meeting representatives of 
their sponsoring area of responsibility.”^^ ^
Guidance on Contact with Lobbvists
Following newspaper allegations about the effect of lobbyists on 
policy the Prime Minister instructed the Cabinet Secretary to investigate. 
He produced informal guidance for civil servants about their contact with 
lobbyists. The report amplified the Civil Service Code and reminded 
officials of the high levels of integrity and honesty demanded of them.
Some years earlier the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
rejected the arguments for regulating lobbyists and placed the burden on 
the institutions of government to “develop ways of controlling the reaction 
to approaches from professional lobbyists in such a way as to give due 
weight and attention to their case while always taking care to consider 
the public interest.”^^® The pivotal role of lobbyists in policy-making was 
accepted and the 1998 paper dismissed a ban on dealings with lobbyists.
The report identified gradients of severity. The most serious 
offences were for civil servants to leak confidential or market-sensitive 
information to a lobbyist, and to help a lobbyist attract business by giving 
privileged access to ministers or undue influence over policy.^^^
Quinlan, M., (1994) 
cited in Jordan, G., (1991a)
'“ Miller, C., (1987), p97
First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Vol 1, Report, Standards in Public Life, p 35. 
Cm 2850-1
“ 7 Cabinet Office, (1998)
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In essence the advice was for officials to exercise their common 
sense. Civil servants were instructed not to:
•  do or say anything that could be seen as granting lobbyists preferential or
premature access to information;
• accept gifts or hospitality that could lead to an obligation to the donor;
• give the impression that the idea of a lobbyist’s client would be decisive;
• do anything to breach parliamentary privilege;
• use insider knowledge to impress lobbyists;
•  use insider status to get lobbyists an undeserved benefit;
•  offer or give the impression of offering preferential access to lobbyists.
Civil servants should:
• declare all personal or family business interests;
• take care when accepting hospitality from lobbyists;
• consider when meeting one group, their views should be balanced by other
groups.
The Cabinet Secretary noted sardonically if civil servants “have a 
friend who is a lobbyist you do not have to sever your friendship and stop 
meeting them socially. If you are married to one you do not have to get 
divorced!”^^® He urged that common sense prevail. Officials with 
concerns about their relations with lobbyists should be cautious, consult a 
line manager and make a note on the file noting they had considered 
issues of propriety. Most important was the ‘Private Eye test’. Officials 
should do nothing about which they would feel embarrassed were it to 
become public knowledge.
The burden of fairness and transparency was placed on the public 
servant. Because many lobbyists have other roles (local councillors, 
journalists, consultants) civil servants could not “expect the lobbyists to 
keep their different roles in watertight c o m pa r t m e n t s . S in c e  lobbyists 
are shameless self-publicists who talk up their own influence. Sir Richard 
Wilson concluded “It is the job of all civil servants to make sure that they 
conduct their dealings with lobbyists in a manner which is proper and not 
open to misinterpretation.
ibid 
5^8 ibid 
ibid
35
Chapter One
Even critics of lobbying recognise professional lobbying is now an 
entrenched part of policy-making.^®^ It is considered less an unbecoming 
political activity imported from the US and increasingly a legitimate part of 
the policy process. Sir Richard’s tone indicated his acceptance of 
professional lobbying and his reliance on the integrity of the civil service 
to prevent misbehaviour. A former Cabinet Secretary has also written 
professional lobbying plays a valuable role in policy-making and there 
was nothing intrinsically wrong in it.^ ®^  In many respects the lobbying 
industry has emerged from its various crises as an accepted and integral 
part of the policy-making landscape.
Conclusions
The number and activity of professional lobbyists have grown 
rapidly since Finer’s examination of interest-groups. Lobbyists pervade 
many areas of government’s domestic policy-making, and their activity 
has caused concern. The two schools of thought on the effect of 
lobbyists (the communications school and the interest-group dominance 
thesis) have clouded the debate on effectiveness. Clarity can be brought 
to the subject by recognising that the two schools are variations that can 
be explained by attention to context and circumstances. Four policy 
areas (from high to low profile) are examined and the contextual 
variables that impinge on decision-makers are identified in each case, as 
well as the variables within the control of lobbyists and their clients. This 
approach enables researchers to assess which contexts are most 
amenable to effective lobbying. It allows the study to identify which 
internal variables (those within the lobbyists’ control like skill and 
resources) are important, and when and why they are important.
Doig, A.. (1990a)
Purnell, N., and Armstrong, R., (1998)
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2. EHeciiwness______
This chapter examines the concept of effectiveness. It provides a 
working definition of what effective lobbying is. It investigates different 
perceptions of effectiveness and the difficulties of judging effectiveness. 
The chapter reviews the literature on practical attempts to measure and 
improve effectiveness, before presenting a method to assess 
effectiveness.
Although effectiveness is a fuzzy concept, this chapter suggests 
attention to effectiveness is important and worthy of investigation. To 
help assess effectiveness the chapter closes by identifying two sets of 
variables that effect influence: contextual / external independent variables 
and internal independent variables. These two variable types are the 
building blocks of the hypotheses presented in the subsequent chapter. 
Sensitivity to context is key. External variables are, by and large, beyond 
the control of the lobbyist and the client, operating at the macro and 
meso-levels. The lobbyist and client generally affect only internal 
variables. Therefore, other things (a favourable external context) being 
equal, a lobbyist tends to be effective if he possesses the internal 
independent variables in greater number (contacts, knowledge of rules, 
resources, client-lobbyist relationship, a dependency relationship, long­
term relationships and credibility).
WhatiseffectivenessP
There is no consensus on what effectiveness means for lobbying. 
Effectiveness could be based on having an effect on votes in the 
legislature,^ gaining access to decision-makers,^ customer satisfaction, or
 ^ Rothenberg, L , (1992) especially chapter 8; Fritschler, A., (1975) 
 ^Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986); and Hansen, J., (1991)
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having an effect on policy outcome.^ An effective lobbying campaign may 
simply be routine monitoring and agenda setting."^
Effectiveness depends on what the client wants. Since there is no 
one route to an effective campaign, effectiveness must mean different 
things to different people. Once a definition has been selected, 
effectiveness, say as meeting the client’s objectives, may be achieved not 
because of the activity of the lobbyist but because of contextual factors. 
Therefore, when examining policy outcomes it is as important to assess 
the impact of a range of factors on policy as it is to examine the activity of 
the lobbyist. The lobbyist is just one of the independent variables that 
interact to produce the dependent variable -  the policy outcome.
Government since 1979 has become more concerned with 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy. The advent of New Public 
Management, including the Rayner scrutinies, the Financial Management 
Initiative, contracting-out, the Private Finance Initiative and Value-For- 
Money audits, has increased the profile of effectiveness. The term 
effectiveness, when applied to policy-making, is challenging to 
conceptualise.^ There are several definitions of effectiveness.® The most 
appropriate is
Effectiveness is concerned with the relationship between the 
intended and the actual results of projects, programmes or 
other activities. How successfully do outputs of goods, 
services or other results achieve policy objectives, operational 
goals and other intended effects?^
The common theme to the definitions is that effectiveness refers to 
the value given to the relationship between activity and its effects. This 
relationship causes conceptual problems.® There exists a loose 
consensus on what the effects of activity are. Outputs are the direct 
products of certain processes: for example in a lobbying campaign briefs 
will be circulated, meetings held and information gathered. Outcomes are 
the measurable consequences of a policy or strategy. These effects can
Maass, A., (1951)
* Heinz, J., at a! (1993), p313 
® Glynn, J., Gray, A., and Jenkins, B., (1992)
® "The extent to which the objectives of a policy are achieved. The most effective policy Is one which achieves 
all Its objectives” Treasury HM (1988), p28. "Effectiveness means providing the right services to enable the 
Local Authority to Implement Its policies and objectives” Audit Commission, (1986), p8. "Ensuring the output 
from any given activity Is achieving the desired result” Price Waterhouse, (1990), p4. "The value which 
society desires from given Inputs and outputs of a particular service" Tomkins, (1987), p49 
 ^National Audit Office (no date), p5 
® Glynn, J., Gray, A., and Jenkins, B., (1992)
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be external to the activity itself; lobbying by one interest may spur an 
opposing group into activity. Impacts are the ultimate effects of a policy, 
representing the change in gross and net values.
The motive behind lobbying is to influence governmental 
decisions.® But other factors influence the policy process, and one must 
distinguish between intended and unintended effects. It is essential to 
demonstrate a causal link between outcomes and the intended actions of 
a lobbyist. Functionality is the relationship between an activity’s 
underlying purpose and its effects, and is at the heart of the concept of 
effectiveness. Effectiveness can be restricted to intended effects; if a 
policy does not meet its intended effects it is not ‘effective’, however 
valuable the actual outcome. Definitions limiting effectiveness to the 
extent to which effects are desired do not capture the essence of 
effectiveness. Effectiveness is a measure of the functionality of activities 
and effects and, only secondarily, the extent to which they are intended 
and desirable.^®
There should be a distinction between substantive effectiveness 
and evaluative effectiveness. Substantive effectiveness is the 
contribution of activities and their effects to designated purposes. It is 
concerned with the direct relationship between an activity and its effects. 
Substantive effectiveness has two sub-divisions, managerial 
effectiveness and policy effectiveness. Managerial effectiveness is the 
extent to which management style can bring about functional outputs. It 
is concerned with direct outputs and is expressed as output effectiveness. 
For inputs to be transformed into outputs requires funds, labour, skill and 
expertise. Policy effectiveness relates to whether inputs produce 
outputs/outcomes that are consistent with the underlying aims. Policy 
effectiveness is concerned with outcome effectiveness.
Evaiuative effectiveness is the capability of strategies and policies 
to measure their own substantive effectiveness and improve it. The 
inability of a lobbyist to evaluate his own activity lessens his learning 
potential and thus reduces his substantive effectiveness.
Milbrath, L , (1963)
° Unintended effects can be beneficial and intended effects can be undesirable.
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Evaluative effectiveness depends on an ability to examine ones 
technical capability, such as the possession of data bases and 
information systems, and an expertise in quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies necessary to undertake evaluation. An ability to judge the 
organisational structures of a campaign, such as reporting links, lines of 
responsibility and decision-making functions is necessary to improve 
substantive effectiveness.
Attempts to measure the effectiveness of lobbying activity are 
likely to be politically-sensitive. Economists use cost-benefit analysis, 
and statisticians measure effectiveness by means of causal models and 
simulations, but these methodologies are of little use to the political 
scientist. Methodology strategies can improve measurement of 
effectiveness by asking three types of question: descriptive, explanatory 
and normative. Descriptive questions require information about specific 
conditions. Explanatory questions seek to establish causes and effects of 
activities, i.e. did lobbying lead a civil servant to change his mind? 
Normative questions ask whether goals were achieved; for example, 
while a civil servant may have altered his position, policy may not have 
changed. This thesis seeks to answer these three questions.
A particular effectiveness study may explore simultaneously 
different forms of effectiveness, leading to a number of differing questions 
that, in turn, demand differing measurement approaches. There are 
several methods employed in judging effectiveness. First, a case study 
approach describes and analyses the relationships within and 
surrounding a complex event. Second, survey research analyses a 
structured collection of data from a sample of those affected by policy. 
Survey research is primarily descriptive, but it allows actors scope to offer 
subjective evaluations of effectiveness. Unstructured interviews, 
structured interviews and questionnaires are used to assess 
effectiveness by seeking the subjective opinions of the political actors 
involved.
The issue of effectiveness has been addressed by Milbrath and 
Berry using surveys, but they asked lobbyists what strategies they 
considered most effective; they did not analyse effectiveness in specific
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policy c a s e s . A  subsequent, more comprehensive, survey asked what 
attributes helped lobbyists be effective, and showed that the lobbyist’s 
years in government, contacts and client were associated with 
effectiveness.^^ They asked lobbyists if they believed they had been 
effective. The team of researchers then sought to confirm or refute self- 
assessment reports by interviewing government officials and politicians.
Third, performance indicators are quantitative expressions of 
various characteristics or consequences of an activity. Indicators focus 
on levels of performance. Absolute indicators report volume or incidence, 
and indices report relative achievement. Their function is primarily 
descriptive and they are unlikely to provide explanations.
The Problems of Judging Effectiveness
Because policy influence is awkward to operationalise, political 
science is unclear over how to assess the influence of lobbyists.^^ 
Methodological problems prevent an accurate judgment of 
effectiveness.^"^ There exists no methodological or quantitative 
framework to judge the effectiveness of one lobbyist against another.^^ 
Berry says
Whilst Washington lobbyists express a high degree of 
certainty in their evaluating lobbying success, political 
scientists are considerably more cautious, finding it very 
difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of interest groups’ 
advocacy campaigns. In carrying out such analyses, political 
scientists face formidable obstacles in developing 
scientifically valid measures of influence.^®
i. The most obvious problem is there are too many variables. There 
are usually other interests and other lobbyists involved on any one 
issue. Berry argues “If all the individual relationships among the 
numerous variables were drawn in with appropriate lines and arrows, 
one fears that all would be obscured in a hopelessly tangled
Milbrath, L., (1963); Berry, J., (1977). The studies prove certain types of strategies are more effective than 
others, for example face-to-face contact is regarded as more effective than letter-writing campaigns.
Heinz, J., et al (1993)
For a useful book which assesses influence and tries to predict when groups will attempt Influence see 
Gamson, W., (1968) chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8.
Grant, W„ (1995)
Woo ton, G., (1970) noted it is “a real Irish bog of a subject that has claimed many victims” p73; and Wilson, 
G., (1990), has concluded it was impossible to measure p34, in Moloney, K., (1996)
Berry, J., (1989a), p i62
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maze.”^^  There is no obvious way to isolate and measure 
adequately the causality of the activities and advice of lobbyists on 
policy outcomes: this task is made more difficult in larger campaigns 
which have more variables.^® Berry says “any attempt at evaluation, 
however, is limited by the methodological difficulties to be 
encountered in trying to operationalize the concept of influence. The 
problems of distinguishing the influence of interest groups upon 
policy makers, as distinct from other influences such as the press, 
general public opinion, and other political elites, remain rather 
substantial."^^
ii. Correlation does not prove c a u s a t i o n .A  statistical relationship may 
exist between lobbying and policy because unobserved or omitted 
variables may determine the outcome.^^ Salisbury has argued “it is 
exceedingly difficult to identify when influence has occurred and 
when there is really only a parallelism of purpose and action 
between the lobbyist and government o f f i c i a l . B e r r y  comments 
“the crux of the issue, therefore, is actually ‘proving’ that the interest 
group caused government officials to change their behavior in some 
manner. How is one actually to know that it was an interest group 
that caused an observed change in behavior on the part of a 
governmental policy maker?”^^  Similarly, Grant says “there is never 
a tangible end-product which can be attributed to the efforts of the 
lobbyist; if the campaign is successful, it may have nothing to do with 
the lobbyist’s efforts.
iii. Assumptions and assertions about the effect of lobbying are flawed 
because studies have been unable to establish convincing 
counterfactuals (ie what effect an organisation would have on policy 
if lobbyists' activities were not performed). The qualitative studies, 
which consist of anecdotes and interviews, and quantitative
Berry, J„ (1977), p271
Johnson attempts to measure the effectiveness of various independent variables (concentrating on Political 
Action Committee contributions) on Congressional voting patterns by using a simultaneous equation model. 
She reaches few firm conclusions, but says PACs are “minimally successful in influencing... voting patterns.” In 
Johnson, L., (1985)
Berry, J., (1977), p285.
Grantham, C., (1989)
Chappell, H., (1981)
Salisbury, R., (1975), p207 
22 Berry, J., (1977), p274 
2“ Grant, W., (1995), p75
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correlation studies, arguably fail to prove a link between lobbying 
activity and policy outcome.^^ However, establishing a counter- 
factual is impossible,
iv. Self-reports on influence by lobbyists are, by their very nature 
unreliable, but have been used in US studies.^® Lobbyists probably 
exaggerate their impact. There is an element of ‘Emperor’s clothes’ 
to the work of consultants.^^ They view a successful outcome as 
testimony to their effectiveness even though that outcome may have 
been the consequence of contextual factors.^®
V. “[R]eliable conclusions about the true influence of one political actor 
over another requires knowledge of the initial sincere preferences of 
both actors uncontaminated by considerations of anticipated 
reactions which may influence what one actually tries to achieve.” ®^ 
Actual influence may be less than potential influence because of a 
deficiency in consciousness.^® Similarly policy-makers may be 
unwilling to admit they have been swayed by lobbyists. Civil 
servants are unlikely to acknowledge the true impact of lobbyists, 
though it may be “not so much a case of officials wanting to hide 
something as it is the selective perception that leads them to believe 
that their decisions were based on other factors.’’®^ Officials are 
unlikely to admit to having been influenced by ‘pressure’,
vi. Policy-making is often hidden and transient. Much lobbying is 
specific and short-lived in duration; or “like the dog that Sherlock 
Holmes realized had not barked in the night, effective representation 
may entail doing nothing.’’®^ Much of what lobbyists do is not on 
public record. Client lists have only recently been made public by 
the voluntary APPC. It is also difficult to uncover the government’s 
true intention. “Sometimes government may toughen up a Green 
Paper or a White Paper so that it has something to give away to
Smith, R„ (1995)
Schattschneider noted that interest-groups and lobbyists sought to exaggerate their importance. 
Schattschneider, E., (1935a), p225. Heinz et al were aware of the risks of inflation in self-reports of success 
but stated confidently “there does not appear too much bias of that kind in these kind of data." Heinz, J., et al 
(1993), p346
 ^Although lobbying companies are sophisticated and professional there is rarely a tangible end product 
attributable to their actions, see Grant, W., (1995)
Berry, J., (1989a) p i63 
Evans, D., (1996), p291 
Dahl, R., (1991)
Berry, J., (1977), p274 
“ Salisbury, R., (1984), p71
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pressure groups at a later stage without compromising its core 
pos i t i on .Lobby is t s  may appear to have been effective, but the 
concession may have been an inexpensive loss-leader for 
government. The government keeps intact its over-riding objectives.
vii. The scale of the change and the importance of an issue to an 
interest-group make judging effectiveness problematic. Grant asks 
“how does one compare a substantial impact on a policy which is 
basically unfavourable to a group with some small adjustments to a 
policy which is more in line with a group’s t h i n k i n g . W i t h  this point 
in mind, it would be inaccurate to treat the policy outcome as a 
dichotomous variable.^^ To judge success on whether or not a policy 
changed or a vote was won would misrepresent the lobbying 
process.^® The winner-loser dichotomy is also misleading. The 
policy process is not a simple game.
viii. It can be difficult to separate the closely entwined functions of 
different professionals who will have a similar brief from the client 
firm. Some interest-groups employ more than one lobbying 
consultancy.^^ On take-over battles, for example, participating 
companies hire lawyers, merchant bankers, accountants, financial 
public-relations consultants as well as lobbyists. Outcomes are 
usually an amalgam of various factors. It is also difficult to 
distinguish between where monitoring or contact-building ends and 
where ‘lobbying’ begins [see pages 16-18], Precise assessment is 
difficult because some clients, having no discernible policy goal, 
require only profile-raising. The objectives of clients often differ 
too.^® Some will want to change law or regulations, whilst others 
want less tangible services such as contact-building. Clients also 
often have multiple objectives.
ix. Effectiveness or success is a function of expectation.^® The political 
consultant may persuade the client to scale-down its objectives so
Grant, W.. (1995), p i29 
Grant, W„ (1995), p i 29
Studies using probit analyses treat policy outcome as a dichotomous variable assigning 1 to successful and 
0 to unsuccessful. For example Evans, D., (1996) and Wiggins, C., Hamm, K., and Bell, C., (1992) 
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p i35
British Gas hired many of the leading consultancies to lobby for the liberalisation of the gas market. Its 
rationale was to prevent competitors from hiring the highest calibre advisers.
Grant, W., (1995)
Heinz, J., et al (1993), p352
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they become a ‘placebo’. In the end what the client ‘wants’ may be 
so limited and unnecessary as not to be worthwhile. But, by 
achieving those circumscribed goals, the client perceives the lobbyist 
effective. Otherwise, a compromise with government may be forced. 
Whilst falling short of the client’s ultimate objective, the compromise 
may be favourable to the client.
In essence “there is no clear methodology which can enable a 
clear assessment of group effectiveness. One has to look at policy 
outcomes... and then try to assess how far those policies have been 
influenced by [one group] as distinct from other actors. It is possible to 
fall back on perceptions of effectiveness, but if a group is perceived to be 
effective, this may itself be a cause of effectiveness rather than a way of 
measuring the dependent variable.
The principal problem when assessing “the effectiveness of the 
lobbying techniques used, whether by organisations or their consultants, 
is that it is impossible to tell whether the tactics adopted make any 
di f ference.Customers often find it difficult to show any definite benefit 
from their services. “Given the difficulty that political scientists have in 
measuring influence, it could be expected that there are no standards or 
criteria for effectiveness accepted by the lobbyists themselves.’’"^  ^
Therefore the judgment has to be subjective.
As such, the interview material used in this thesis, and the 
subsequent conclusions, are based on actors’ perceptions of influence 
not actual influence. However, “if groups act on this perceived reality 
then the perception is just as important as an objective assessment.’’"^  ^
Whilst it may be impossible to be precise about the effects of actions, we 
may draw general conclusions about the attributes which might help 
towards effectiveness. Given the pitfalls, the best one can offer is 
generalisations and illustrations drawn from a period of participant- 
observation.'^'^ Whilst the effects of lobbyists’ actions may, strictly 
speaking, be unmeasurable interviewing relevant actors and obtaining
Grant, W„ (1995). pi 52 
Miller, C., (1991), p63 
Berry, J., (1977), p274.
Furlong, S., (1997), p341 
** Richardson, J., and Jordan, G., (1979)
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their subjective assessment is the most appropriate means of judging 
effectiveness.
Measuring Effectiveness
Several attempts to assess effectiveness have included surveys of 
MPs by polling companies, client surveys and attempts to establish a 
causal link between lobbying and legislative votes.
The trade association sector has undertaken research to improve 
its political effectiveness. The DTI Secretary of State, Michael Heseltine, 
attacked the complacency of trade associations that “believe they are 
effective, when it is all too brutally clear they are not.”"^  ^ In 1996 DTI, 
launching a Trade Association Initiative, published a best-practice guide 
and funded a study into effectiveness."^®
To be effective a trade association should externally: represent the 
whole industry; be aware of changing policy; form coalitions; maintain 
contact with key officials and politicians; respond to formal consultation; 
be regarded as credible by decision-makers; maintain an active media- 
relations programme; maintain contact with academics, think tanks and 
other opinion formers. To be effective it is necessary internally to have 
resources; provide quality services; satisfy members and clients; have a 
long-term strategy; and have a high-calibre secretariat and management 
team.
In a survey in 1996 MPs were asked their impression of the 
“overall effectiveness of various lobby consultancies in providing advice 
to their clients.” For about 60% of companies the majority of MPs felt 
unable to express an opinion. In those 40% of leading companies where 
the majority of MPs did express an opinion 53% of MPs felt the 
consultancies in general were ‘very’ or ‘quite effective’. T h e  survey did 
not ask MPs if they felt lobbying consultancies were effective in helping 
their clients meet their objectives. A further reason for viewing these data 
with scepticism is that one can argue MPs rated firms effective if they
Michael Heseltine cited in Boléat, M., (1996), pi 36 
Compass Partnership, (1996)
Harris Research Centre, (1996)
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‘liked’ them -  so the firms rated most effective may be those run by the 
most amiable people.
Some consultancies, for example Shandwick Consultants, employ 
polling agencies to survey their clients to see whether they believe they 
are obtaining an effective service. Other methods of self-assessment are 
used. Shandwick argue if press coverage shifts from describing an 
outcome from being possible’ to ‘being probable’ it might be considered 
successful repositioning. Similarly, “positive mentions... in the House of 
Commons could be another measure of success.’’"^®
However, these assessment criteria are dubious. Press comment 
is often imprecise, especially on mergers and take-overs. Second, unless 
the raison d’être of the client is to be mentioned in Hansard then this 
measure is futile. For example, Hansard references are irrelevant to a 
manufacturing company with a solid customer base; whilst to a public 
utility company avoiding negative parliamentary comment may be crucial 
to prevent local newspapers running with hostile stories.
Grant Butler Coomber, a London public affairs consultancy 
specialising in technology policy, leads the assessment of performance 
and effectiveness. Between five and ten per cent of its fees are set aside 
for the measurement of effectiveness. The measurement of performance 
has been client-driven. GBC’s business philosophy is to seek to prove to 
clients that they receive a clear return on investment. GBC charges 
clients according to whether targets, which are set and agreed to in 
advance by the client and consultancy, have been achieved. 
Assessment is undertaken by focus groups, surveys and interviews.
Further efforts to improve lobbying effectiveness draw on 
American management consultancy techniques."^® Advocates of 
benchmarking argue effectiveness demands lobbyists quantify and 
qualify their goals.^° Benchmarking concentrates on internal process not 
external independent variables, though it may improve an organisation’s 
ability to react to external shocks. Miller suggests those who deal with
CrossRail Contract -  A proposal submitted by Shandwick Consultants Ltd, London, December 1994 
Benchmarking has become increasingly fashionable in public affairs in the 1990s. There has been a spate 
of articles in public affairs journals, see ImPACt published by the American Public Affairs Council; Public 
Affairs, published by the Public Affairs Association of Canada; Communication World published by the 
International Association of Business Communication; Corporate Public Affairs published by the Australian 
Centre for Public Affairs; and the Public Affairs Newsletter in the UK.
Fleisher, C., (1995), p20
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government “should be regarded not as an overhead but as a profit 
cen t r e . However ,  it is often difficult for lobbyists to link their activities to 
those issues deemed most important by their clients’ senior officers.
Benchmarking involves comparing the actions of one organisation 
to a high-performing neighbour. It encourages quantum rather than 
incremental learning. Benchmarking forces a lobbyist to define a client’s 
objective and requirements and set achievable goals. Its principal utility 
is as a check against complacency built on past successes.
Other tools that are used to measure or improve effectiveness are 
quantification (applies a monetary value to lobbying -  i.e. the value of 
legislation adopted or defeated); client surveys; broader opinion-former 
surveys; process maps (diagrams that identify unnecessary steps in 
procedures); and measuring results against objectives.^^
How to Judge Effectiveness
Given all the difficulties in measuring the influence of lobbyists, the 
design presented here cannot resolve all the aforementioned problems. 
The best it can hope for is to suggest options to mitigate some of the 
pitfalls.
Analysing the direct observable attempts by lobbyists and their 
clients to influence policy is sensible. Whiteley and Winyard argue the 
most appropriate way to assess effectiveness is to interview policy­
makers and other actors to obtain their perceptions.^"^ Different 
respondents see the process from different perspectives and have 
different conceptions of ‘effectiveness’. Therefore, it is important to gain 
the perceptions of as many players from as many angles as possible, 
lobbyists, their clients, their opponents, the administrative and political 
executive and legislators to obtain some form of balance.
This thesis examines policy outcomes. Its methodology looks 
backwards from the outcome to examine the inputs of various actors and 
the impact of contextual variables. Policy outcomes, not lobbyists, will be 
the focus of analysis. It uses self-reports of lobbying activity by lobbyists
Miller, C., (1997)
“  Fleisher. C.. (1997)
”  Hawkinson, B., (1997)
^  Whiteley, P., and Winyard, S., (1987) in Grant, W., (1995), p129
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to assess their own perceptions, but will limit the risks inherent in such a 
methodology by interviewing lobbying opponents and other key actors. A 
shift of emphasis allows the question to be broadened to include other 
factors that impact on policy. A question asking what circumstances 
allow for effectiveness enables the research to pay closer attention to the 
independent variables.^^
In examining effectiveness the thesis identifies the key décision- 
points in the policy-making process. It investigates what lobbyists did, 
what they wrote and said to whom and when, whether lobbyists 
influenced a decision or helped create an environment in which the 
decision could be made.
The study must clarify the objectives of the client to establish 
whether or not its aims were achieved. Researchers should interview 
clients to discover what strategy the lobbyist advised (which the client had 
not envisaged). The study distinguishes between the publicly-expressed 
objectives and the private objectives of the client, and assesses whether 
the lobbyist down-graded the initial objectives. Only once this framework 
is clear is it possible to judge what influence lobbyists had. The thesis 
measures effectiveness by how successfully lobbyists meet their clients’ 
targets. The salient task is to judge what effect lobbyists’ techniques or 
services had on achieving the goals of the client whilst accounting for 
external factors.
Therefore, this thesis assumes lobbyists to have been effective if 
they have had some effect on a policy outcome that can be traced to their 
input into the policy process whilst controlling for external factors.
Effectiveness depends on a combination of factors, which can be 
split in two -  factors beyond the control of the lobbyist and factors within 
his control. Measuring effectiveness can realistically be undertaken only 
in the context of those factors within the lobbyist’s control.
However, as the diagram overleaf shows, all the internal variables 
may be operating efficiently, but they may have little impact on policy 
because of the intervention of external variables. So, assessment of 
effectiveness will need to be subtle. On occasions, the failure to achieve
“  Such as the ideology of state actors and government institutions, economic constraints, electoral politics, 
prior policies or the constraints imposed by supra-national treaties.
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a desired policy outcome might not mean the lobbying was ineffective. It 
may at times be important to disentangle effectiveness from the policy 
outcome and activity of the lobbyist. Survival may often be the key to 
success. “The outcome of any particular issue will be less important than 
that the group lives to fight again. Given the surrounding circumstances, 
therefore, success might be defined in any number of ways. It will not 
necessarily mean that the group ‘won’.” ®^
Lobbyists can set an objective, run an effective campaign, fail to 
achieve that objective, but achieve an acceptable subsidiary outcome 
such as inducing decision-makers to think again about an issue. Even if 
the policy outcome was not the one desired, it may be possible to 
conclude the lobbyist performed effectively if the contextual variables 
were hostile and obstructive.
Heinz, J., at a! (1993), p351
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tactic Ctactic D
tactic A tactic B
Objective
Outcome
Lobbying
Other
influences
Other
influences
Figure no: 2.1 -  Determinants of policy outcome 
It is possible to assess effectiveness at steps along a campaign as 
well as assessing the impact of lobbying on the outcome, as is shown 
diagrammatically above.
Variables influencing Effectiveness
Lobbyists can be effective, but their influence has limits. With 
sensitivity to context acknowledged as an essential requirement to 
studying effectiveness, this chapter examines the existing literature and 
draws out the external variables and the internal variables that act as 
determinants of effectiveness.
External Variables
1 Sensitivity to Context
Interests are shaped by context -  social, economic and 
governmental.^^ An important gap in group literature is the lack of 
attention to contextual factors like economic growth, government subsidy 
and political conflict.^® A broad range of factors affects decisions.^^ 
External factors and government officials are significant contextual
Salisbury, R., (1984); Walker, J., (1991); Gray, V., and Lowery, D., (1996b) in Baumgartner, F., and Leech, 
B., (1998), p7 
Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p i2 
“  McFarland, A., (1987)
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variables.®® Heinz et a! conclude that whilst “Groups and their 
representatives are often influential... so are other actors including 
government officials, academicians [sic], and journalists.”®^
Political science has suffered because effectiveness and influence 
have been portrayed as a game that produces winners and losers. 
Salisbury suggests the process is continuous and there is no clear 
resolution, and recommends closer attention to context.®^ Some 
academics have advocated a population-ecology perspective that places 
emphasis on the environmental, social and political factors rather than on 
internal factors.®® Biologists would not explain the population and 
behaviour of an animal species “without taking into consideration 
environmental factors such as the amount of food available, the climate 
or the presence of competitors.”®"^
Researchers must seek to demonstrate the effectiveness of a 
lobbyist when controlling for rival factors that may have influenced the 
decision. The conventional approach is to “estimate a baseline of 
expected behaviors using a set of measured variables such as ideological 
predisposition, direct interest, committee assignments, and party, then to 
ascribe any deviation in voting patterns to whatever lobbying activities 
might have been measured.”®® However, attempts to measure 
effectiveness depend on all the other influential variables having been 
identified -  to try to do so would be based on the “chimeral promise of 
measuring the unmeasurable.”®®
It is necessary to pay attention to the exogenous variables that 
could provide other explanations for a similar policy outcome. Exogenous 
forces may affect a community by opening or closing a ‘policy window' of 
opportunity. The ability of lobbyists to exploit a policy window depends 
on the willingness of government officials to modify their behaviour. 
Because to a large extent policy outcomes depend on exogenously-
Gray, V., and Lowery, D., (1996a and b). It has also been shown that contextual factors affect decisions to 
join groups. See Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p79 
Heinz, J., et ai (1993), p57 
“  Salisbury, R., (1984) in Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p14 
Gray, V., and Lowery, D„ (1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995, 1996b); Walker, J., (1991)
^  Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p i04 
“  ibid, p36-37 
“  ibid, p37
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determined factors rather than the explicit behaviour of actors, successful 
lobbying is dependent upon contextual variables.®^
Some commentators recognise the importance of evaluating the 
activity of lobbyists in a wider political context. Eckstein notes the pattern 
of policy is an important determinant of effectiveness because “it is one of 
the situational elements which selects among the objective attributes of 
the group those which are of special account.”®® In discussing the 
problems of studying lobbying Baumgartner and Leech quote various 
scholars:®^
The fact that scholars have tended to debate how important lobbying is 
might not be because one person is right and another is wrong but, 
rather, that influence is conditional..
The most important point, however is that so much of the variance in 
success is not explained by these analyses. This suggests that the 
determinants of success are usually situation specific... on much more 
particular factors that vary from issue to issue.^^
The kinds of issues that become salient, how they are defined in policy 
debates, and the different institutional arrangements for making policy 
choices all have a powerful impact on group fortunes.
Macro-political events and high political actors influence 
effectiveness.^® Berry recognises that “[rjegardless of how hard lobbyists 
work, policy outcomes will often be determined by factors out of their 
c o n t r o l . T h e s e  external variables are the cause of the discrepancy in 
effectiveness studies. Issues of effectiveness can be explained only in 
the context of policy issues.
2 Profile of the Case
An important contextual variable is the salience or profile of an 
issue. The type of issue will usually determine its profile and the 
campaign style, although the profile of some issues can be raised by 
campaign techniques. A technical issue can be made high-profile by 
lobbyists.
Klngdon, J., (1995)
Eckstein, H., (1960), p36-38
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1996c), p25
Rothenberg, L., ^992), p254
Heinz, J., et al (1993) p351
Mucciaroni, G., (1995), p26
McFarland, A., (1991)
Berry, J., (1989a), p81
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Lobbyists maybe more effective if the issue they are concerned 
with is low-profile, non-political and technical. Jordan recognises “the 
less open the lobbying the less complaints there will be.”^^  Baumgartner 
and Leech argue “Focusing only on those cases with little or no public 
controversy is incomplete and can be misleading, just as would be a 
focus on highly salient i s s u e s . T h i s  thesis examines four issues at 
different levels of salience.
The lower the profile the less likely government is to have a fixed 
view. Lobbyists dealing with low-profile non-controversial issues are 
likely to deal with the bureaucracy whilst those dealing with controversial 
issues concentrate on the legislature.^^ The task of lobbyists is more 
difficult on high-profile issues.^® The more important the issue, the more 
likely both sides of the argument will mobilise, which may cancel one 
another out.
The higher the profile, the broader the issue network and players 
begin to lose control. Government can lose control. Lobbyists lose 
control too. The presence of more groups complicates issues and 
presents a wider range of choices. The more players in the game, the 
more restricted lobbyists' effectiveness.^® Lobbyists have to work harder 
on higher-profile issues. It is also more difficult for commentators to 
establish a causal link in high-profile issues because there are more 
variables.
3 Quality of the Case
Arguably the most effective technique has remained unchanged: a 
well-founded case that pre-empts all counter arguments.®® Miller 
suggests in an average decision the merit of the case accounts for 70% 
of influence factors.®  ^ The case must be accurate, reasonable and 
politically attractive. Miller’s assertion could imply an over-confident 
assumption that there are both objective criteria of evidence and of policy
See Jordan, G., (1991b), pi 82 
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p40 
Bachelier, J., (1977)
Grantham, C., (1989), p514 
Smith, M., (1993), ch. 9 
Miller, 0 ., (1988)
Miller, C., (1997). Political concerns account for 15%, pressure 5%, big battalions 15%, media 10% and the 
courts 1%.
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choice, and that all fully informed and intelligent people would agree with 
one another once all the facts were available. In fact Lord Tebbit has 
argued that whilst it may be necessary to have a strong case, it is not 
necessarily sufficient.®^ One person's well-founded argument is another’s 
dogmatic nonsense. The ideological, doctrinal, or policy culture may be 
receptive to some arguments and not to others. The quality of the case 
cannot be divorced from political circumstances.
Lobbyists can mould the case put to decision-makers. They can 
emphasise themes that connect with politicians. Briefs sent to Whitehall 
policy officials need to be well-researched. If there are evidently negative 
consequences the civil service would prefer lobbyists to state them 
openly. Lobbyists should anticipate arguments and deal with them: “do 
not try to sweep inconvenient information under the carpet: assume that 
officials with find out, so get your rebuttal in before they draw the wrong 
conclusion.”®®
Whilst some groups are treated seriously and acted upon, others 
will be ‘politely received, but mainly ignored’. When a minister, Joel 
Barnett found it difficult to treat representations seriously when they made 
an unbalanced case/* So, how the case is presented, as well as its 
objective merits, is important. Baumgartner and Jones propose that 
effectiveness depends on whether the client’s objectives destabilise or 
reinforce the existing policy communities and whether the issue is on or 
off the political agenda.®® The decision to lobby will depend on 
perceptions of the chances of success.®® Miller says lobbyists should ask 
themselves “is this a ‘yes-able’ proposition; and if not, can we make it 
so?”®^
4 Government
Democratic government is a key explanatory variable in its own 
right. Lobbyists tend to be effective only if their client’s case is in line with 
government thinking. Government can ignore a lobbyist if contextual
Norman Tebbit, The House Magazine, 29 November 1985 
“ Miller. C., (1997), p14 
“ Barnett, J., (1982)
“  Baumgartner, F., and Jones, B., (1993)
“  Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p140 
“ Miller, (1 ,(1997), plO
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factors are hostile. Similarly the strength of politicians or officials affects 
policy actors.®®
To leading practitioners the autonomy of government is central. 
Government officials do not see themselves as a part of a wider audience
-  they are part of a self-contained system with its own rules and
sensitivities. Miller says:®®
•  the cart rarely pushes the horse: the system expects you to know which 
institution to deal with and who to approach
• the system is the boss: it hates people who crow about their successes... it 
checks everything and suspects all arguments / views from outside the 
system
•  politicians want themselves and their institutions to be appreciated and 
respected
• the system is more important than those on whose behalf it is run (it
decides what it wants to do and then asks us if it is ok)
•  the system’s daily / weekly / annual rhythm will not change for you. It 
expects you to work within the timetables for MPs, assembling EU 
Presidency priorities and bids for UK legislative slots
•  lobbying should be focused because the system has limited patience. 
Unnecessary contact is disadvantageous
Not only can a change of parties in government influence 
effectiveness, but also changes in personalities at the top of parties. 
There were substantial differences in the way the Heath and Thatcher 
governments approached some interest-groups.^® Wilson surmises 
“circumstances change, and as circumstances change, interests find it 
necessary to form groups or to adopt different tactics. An interest 
protected by a favourable ideological climate may not find that it is so
protected for ever.”®^ Ministers matter. Government actors have
autonomy. These factors have unintended effects that can benefit or 
injure the client.
Lobbyists’ effectiveness can be determined by government 
structure.®^ Eckstein notes three factors. First, whether power is
Hall, R., and Wayman, F., (1990); Hall, R., (1996)
Miller. C., (1997), p7
Grant, W., (1995), p145. Aaron Wildavsky’s book on the American budgetary process notes the House 
Appropriation Committee was governed by a Treasury norm. However, an influx of Liberal Democrats rejected 
the existing norms and changed the character of the institution. See Wildavsky, A., (1964), pp47-62 
Wilson, G., (1981), p i3 
Eckstein, H„ (1960), p36-38
56
Chapter Two
concentrated or dispersed. Where power is widely dispersed groups are 
given multiple entrées into the system. Second, effectiveness may 
depend on the electoral system. For clients the ability to mobilise sheer 
weight of numbers is more important under PR, whereas breadth of 
support is important under the plurality model. Third, the administrative 
structure may be a determinant of effectiveness: “Administrative systems 
are not merely tools for executing policy, but are themselves structures of 
power; they influence (often make) policy, and within them different 
departments carry different degrees of weight depending on the political 
position of their heads, the broadness and significance of their functions 
and their traditions.”®^
Another important contextual factor is government officials’ 
concept of the public-interest. Because the public-interest is not codified 
it is a nebulous and indistinct notion.®"^  A working definition often used by 
officials is that policy is in the public-interest if it is likely to be approved 
by parliament. However, most officials tend to balance the 
client/consumer interest against supplier/producer interests. Officials will 
subject submissions to a range of questions: Can the ideas work? What 
is wrong with their case? Is the case in line with government policy? Will 
government look negligent if it ignores the submission? Is the case built 
on sound data? Where did the data come from? Will their case be 
attacked by other lobbies? Have they acknowledged the weaknesses in 
their own case?®^
5 Scope of Change
Effectiveness depends on the scope of change. Jordan suggests 
lobbyists are more likely to be effective if they are attempting to change 
existing legislation. He has termed this factor the ‘piggy-back’ 
approach.®® He notes a campaign will be more effective if influencing an 
existing Bill rather than attempting to raise new interest. However it is
Eckstein, H., (1960), p36-38 
^  Eckstein said “I for one have no idea how to determine an objective general interest.” He suggests three 
questions deal with the question. Does the policy adopted seem to be what most people want? Would the 
policy have been more effective if the lobbyists and interest groups had been less effective and less involved? 
Does a policy, because of special interest pressure, withdraw too large a share from total national wealth 
relative to other services? (Has the group encroached unduly on the generalisable resources of society?) 
Eckstein, H., (1960), p i60 
“ Miller, C., (1997)
“  Jordan, G., (1991a)
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unclear if Jordan is correct, and it may often be easier to introduce 
change before issues become legislation.
Many issues are delegated to civil servants thereby allowing 
politicians to avoid choosing between conflicting i n t e r e s t s . L o w i  
recognised the importance of the scope of change by noting the 
difference between substantive legislation and legislative evasion 
(decisions made by administrators).^® Lobbyists tend to be more effective 
on policy developed by administrators. Hayes argues the scope of policy 
change -  whether it is discretionary policy (symbolic and structural) or 
explicit policy (material and allocative) influences the effect of lobbyists.®®
6 Type of Change
The type of policy change required may determine the 
effectiveness of the lobby. Issues may be at the margins of the 
legislation, but central to the client’s concerns. Minor changes to 
legislation are more likely to be effective than objections to manifesto 
commitments -  for example the Utilities’ opposition to Labour’s windfall 
tax.^°° BAA was initially included in the tax -  its strategy was not to 
oppose the tax, but to seek to prove to government that BAA did not fit its 
own criteria, leading to BAA being taxed less than other utilities.
Hayes draws on the typology of Salisbury and Heinz to distinguish 
between structural and allocative policy.^®  ^ Structural policy changes 
establish rules for future allocation. Allocative policy confers direct 
material or symbolic benefits. Clients of lobbyists may seek to obtain 
tangible benefits rather than just changing the rules. It is possible that the 
nature of a policy change -  allocative or structural -  may affect the 
likelihood of success.
7 Extent of Lobbying
There might be an occasion when organisational lobbying is 
diluted through over-use.^®^ As a consequence of the growth of public
Hayes, M„ (1978), p144 
®®See Lowi, T., (1969, 1971) 
Hayes, M„ (1978)
Jordan, G„ (1991a) 
Hayes, M„ (1978) 
'“ Miller, C., (1991)
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relations in the 1970s professional lobbying became synonymous with its 
intellectually inferior neighbour. Miller suggests business has 
concentrated too much on providing information rather than building a 
well-constructed case, warning it is mistaken to equate power of delivery 
with the strength of the argument.
Too much lobbying can be ineffective. Lobbyists should do less, 
but do it better by concentrating on fewer activities with greater care.^°^ It 
has been argued that the British Airways parliamentary lobby was so big 
that decision-makers expected it and discounted accordingly.^®"^
There may be occasions where different lobbyists work for 
different clients within the same sector, for example telecommunications. 
The agendas of the various lobbyists may not be in direct competition, but 
a degree of overlap would reflect the different competitive pressures and 
may lead to decision-makers receiving confused signals from a sector. A 
policy area lobbied from all sides by lobbyists may create more freedom 
for the politician or official to act.
The presence or absence of active opposition is significant.^®^ 
Opposition may be more important than a range of broad supportive and 
co-operative interests. Interest-groups and lobbyists will be more
effective if opposition is absent.^®® Lack of opposition means the demand 
pattern is consensual. Opponents shift the demand pattern so it
becomes conflictuel. If the issue is conflictuel, groups may still be 
effective but their influence is harder to recognise.
8 Public Opinion
The electoral consequence of policy is an important factor for 
politicians. Effectiveness can depend on “the ‘attractiveness’ of the client 
group in terms of its electoral influence and the degree to which it was 
seen as deserving.” ®^^ Ainsworth’s model states that lobbyists provide 
politicians with intelligence about constituent preferences; “the lobbyist 
signals electoral salience.’’ ®^® Though lobbyists may seek to campaign to
'“ Miller, C.. (1997)
Miller, C„ (1991), p59 
Salisbury, R., and Heinz, J., (1970) 
Hayes, M„ (1978)
'“ Grant, W„ (1995), pi 31 
Ainsworth, S., (1993), p41
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change public opinion, they are more likely to be effective if public opinion 
is already favourable. Public opinion depends on how the client’s case 
chimes with cultural values and emotions.^®®
Six relationships between public opinion and the objectives of 
interest-groups have been listed by Rose.^^° They are:
•  Harmony between pressure group demands and general cultural norms
• A gradual increase in the acceptability of political values supporting
pressure group demands
• Bargaining with fluctuating support from cultural norms
• Advocacy in the face of cultural indifference
• Advocacy in opposition to long-term cultural trends
• Conflict between cultural values and pressure group goals.
Public opinion is an important contextual variable that can either 
help or hinder a lobbyist. If the structure of the issue at hand allows it, 
lobbyists tend to be more effective if they can keep the issue out of the 
public domain and deal with it in the confines of Whitehall.
9 Economic Circumstances
Economic factors affect the likelihood of success. Grant notes 
“[ajgainst a background of continued pressure on public expenditure, 
demands for increases in service provision -  or other changes in policy 
requiring more expenditure -  are unlikely to be met.”^^ ^
Internal Variables
Several academics have examined the influence of internal 
variables and techn iques.Al t hough they used different methods most 
of their findings have proved cogent. One American author, Jeffrey 
Berry, lists five internal factors that can impact on a lobbyist’s 
effectiveness; credibility, quality research, retaining friends, compromise 
and dependency.^^^ Grant, suggests the following internal factors
Rose, R., (1974), p253 in Grant, W., (1995), p143 
Rose, R., (1974), p254-55
Grant, W„ (1995), p147
Grant, W., (1995): Berry, J., (1977); Walker, J., (1983,1991); Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1984,1986) 
Berry, J., (1989a), pp81-85
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influence effectiveness: internal organisational structure, marketing skills, 
membership mobilisation capacity, financial and staff resources, 
sanctioning capacity and choice of strategy
In some occasions the “capacity of lobbyists to shape policy [can] 
be explained by their particular characteristics.”^ A lth o u g h  Heinz et al 
found evidence of influence of a ‘general sort’ they were largely unable to 
explain self-reports of policy success and concluded that success on 
particular events was not well explained by individual characteristics. The 
organisation type, career path, and political ideology and activism did not 
explain success; although a long-term track record and contacts improve 
reputation, but it is unclear which comes f i r s t . I t  proved possible to 
identify effective lobbyists, but “the characteristics of these elites, and the 
occasions on which their influence is effective, vary by domain, by issue 
and by historical period” -  in other words external variables.^
1 Credibility
Lobbyists need to be credible. The analogy of a village community 
is applied as easily to Capitol Hill as to Whitehall. Reputation is important 
because a lobbyist’s task is to convince decision-makers of another 
party’s case. Effective lobbyists tend not to lie or mislead politicians.
The emergence of a professional status along with the requisite 
snobbery was charted by Jordan and Moloney. They attempt to debunk 
the myth that lobbyists can be effective only if they have experience of 
working in the system and conclude effective lobbying is something that 
can be l e a r n t . ^ Wh i l s t  experience is important the most important 
attribute is credibility.
Credibility is principally a function of other attributes -  knowledge, 
insider status and honesty. Lobbyists should cultivate a relationship of 
trust with decision-makers. Miller terms this relationship, the ‘call back 
factor’ (based on credibility and amiability) -  the ability of a lobbyist to
Grant, W„ (1995), ppl 30-143 
Heinz, J., et al (1993), p405 
ibid, p407 
ibid, p408
Jordan, G., and Moloney, K., (1993)
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have politicians or officials return his callJ^^ Trust is essential in 
maintaining good professional relationships with decision-makersJ^°
To be perceived as honest seems to be regarded as an essential 
a t t r i b u t e . I t  may be important for lobbyists to establish a consultative 
relationship with government departments, because some issues may be 
the subject of subordinate legislation. The literature suggests effective 
lobbyists tend not to spring surprises on government.
In addition to being trustworthy, there are other characteristics an 
effective lobbyist should possess. According to Milbrath they are 
“extrovertness, gregariousness, confidence, sincerity, enthusiasm, 
energy, forthrightness, thick skin, slowness to frustration and anger, 
patience, persistence, determination and physical attractiveness. 
Jordan and Moloney argue lobbyists manufacture an empowering and 
legitimising discourse to mask the private dealings with politicians and 
officials.
Some lobbyists revel in their public profile and enjoy promoting 
what they perceive as their glory and successes. However, revelling in 
victory harms reputation. Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are 
reserved and cautious. It is incumbent on lobbyists to be discreet. 
Indiscreet lobbyists are ineffective because decision-makers perceive 
them to be exercising their influence improperly and exploiting 
friendships. Because the ‘system’ lobbyists operate within is founded on 
discretion, judicious behaviour by lobbyists is indispensable.
2 Available Tactics and Avoidance of Politics
Most lobbyists use a wide range of tactics. Reliance on a single 
strategy is uncommon. The characteristics of the issue often determine 
what tactics will be used, but the effective lobbyist knows which tactics to 
deploy from his armoury.^^"^
If the issue is low-profile, effective lobbyists tend to target actors 
and institutions inside government. If the issue is high-profile, effective
Miller, C„ (1997)
Holbach, B„ (1991)
Cates, P., (1988)
Milbrath. L , (1963), p141 
Jordan, G., and Moloney, K., (1993)
It is also likely that internal variables, as well as external context, will determine what mixture of tactics 
(strategy) will be used. For example, tactics are likely to depend on financial, time and human resources.
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lobbyists tend to target parliament, the media, the general public as well 
as ministers and civil servants. However, choice of tactics is also a 
function of internal variables.
The most effective lobbyists “may not be those that are best at a 
given strategy but rather those that have the greatest repertory of 
strategies available to them and who are most skilful at choosing the right 
strategy for the issue at hand.”^^  ^ Tactic choice depends on a host of 
internal factors like human and financial resources, contacts and 
knowledge of procedure.
This thesis pays attention to visible and invisible tactics. Visible 
tactics include face-to-face meetings with policy-makers, correspondence 
and submissions. Invisible tactics incorporate agenda setting, ‘shadow 
lobbying’ and recruiting ‘parliamentary pushers’. T h e  process is 
amorphous, and “some of the most effective strategies of policymaking 
may involve much more general efforts at issue definition.
Lobbyists can be effective if they de-politicise a policy issue to 
avoid it being dealt with as a matter of party political principle.
3 Burned Bridges
Long-term relationships are important. Lobbyists can be more 
effective if they maintain regular contact with decision-makers and 
cultivate politicians and officials over time.^^® Lobbyists must be non­
threatening and avoid the ‘public exposure and humiliation’ techniques 
employed by some pressure groups.
Because lobbyists are long-term players they cannot afford to vent 
their anger at their failure to achieve their client’s o b j e c t i v e . I t  is also 
important to retain a sense of proportion. They need to keep 
relationships friendly. The minister or official who refuses to help on one 
occasion will probably be of help in the future. The effective lobbyist puts 
his collective clients’ interests above any one policy failure and tends to
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p148
Shadow lobbying describes how professional lobbyists no longer engage in direct advocacy with decision­
makers, but remain in the shadows and advise their clients how to deal with politicians and officials. 
Baumgartner, P., and Leech, B., (1998), p i55 
Jordan, G., (1991a), pi 85
Contrary to this assertion, Heinz et al note the more time lobbyists spend in a policy domain and have 
established themselves, the more likely they were to name adversaries and enemies, in Heinz, J., et al (1993) 
Key, V„ (1964)
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be 'non-emotional'J^^ Legislators and their staff “prefer dealing with 
contract lobbyists, believing that the penalties for misleading information 
are so great as to deter the contract lobbyist from telling untruths or half 
truths.””'^^
Professional lobbyists lack any sanction to punish opponents in 
government. Contacts would disintegrate in the face of threatening 
behaviour or unreliable information. Therefore lobbying tends to be 
persuasive rather than coercive. Effectiveness depends on the actions of 
others whom lobbyists cannot offend. Some public-interest lobbyists do 
not care much for those in the system they see as ‘sinners and 
backsliders’. L o b b y i s t s  are unlikely to have these moral objections 
because they represent others in return for a fee.
4 Threats and Intimidation
At times it may be necessary to sacrifice future co-operation for an 
immediate return. But to threaten or intimidate is especially high-risk 
because lobbyists are long-term players. However, there is no reason 
why a lobbyist cannot pursue a quiet insider strategy and a low-profile 
outsider strategy simultaneously. A lobbyist can offer a velvet-gloved 
hand to decision-makers, whilst holding a flick knife concealed in the 
other.
5 Compromise
Effective lobbyists tend to be able to persuade their clients of the 
advantage of compromise or to persuade clients to limit their objectives in 
the first place. Berry says “the difference between success and failure is 
achieving an acceptable c o m p r o m i s e . T h e  effective lobbyist is 
constantly seeking acceptable compromises and is searching for 
solutions. Within the policy-game lobbyists will seek to bargain with those 
elements of the client’s demands that are least important. The client’s 
case can shift from being ‘special interest’ to ‘public interest’. T h e y
Berry, J„ (1989a), p83 
Wilson, G., (1991), p68 
Berry, J., (1989a), p83 
Berry, J., (1989a), p83
Jordan, G., (1989), pi 86
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look for ‘sweeteners’. Effective lobbyists cut deals. They can judge 
positions because they know personalities and backgrounds of other 
players.
The concept of Allison’s bargaining game has been extended by 
J o r d a n . B a r g a i n i n g  enters discussions between lobbyists and 
decision-makers, when terms such as ‘trade-ofF, ‘fall-back’ and ‘sticking 
point’ are used.^^^ The concept of bargaining (log rolling etc.) seems to 
contradict the view that lobbyists have no ultimate sanction since to 
bargain both sides must have a degree of power. The literature may be 
skewed because groups in America are arguably in a stronger position 
than UK groups where the power-relationship favours government.
It is also important to take care when incorporating ‘compromise’ 
into measurements of effectiveness. As defined earlier, effectiveness is 
the ability of lobbyists to achieve clients’ objectives. It may be easier for a 
lobbyist to scale-down a client’s wishes than by seeking to influence 
government. It may be that the most intelligent (or ‘effective’) lobbyists 
encourage clients to pick ‘winnable’ targets as opposed to accepting the 
client’s initial brief. So, in certain circumstances, achieving the ‘client’s’ 
objectives can mean little.
6 Dependency
Lobbyists have greater potential to deliver clients’ objectives if 
policy-makers depend upon them for credible information. Effective 
lobbyists drop the right information into the process at the right time. 
They build up relationships. “This familiarity in time gives lobbyists the 
advantage of repeated opportunities to interact with policy-makers to 
display their e x p e r t i s e . T h e  restructuring of the civil service means 
officials have less time to undertake original research and are more 
dependent on outside information and more open to d i a l o g u e . I t  is 
possible that lobbyists, like professionals, possess knowledge allowing 
them to play a part in policy-making.
Jordan, G., (1989), p i93 
Smith, M .,(1986)
Berry, J., (1989a), p84 
Pryor, A., (1997)
Parsons, W., (1996), p p l53-68
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Smith claims the National Consumer Council produces reports of 
high quality: without such experience and independence the Council’s 
lobbying would be less e f f e c t i v e “Lobbyists increase their 
effectiveness as they increase their knowledge of their policy area.” "^^  ^ As 
civil servants move, and companies enter and leave the policy process as 
issues change, the lobbyist often holds a wealth of knowledge. What 
appears technical to others becomes routine for the lobbyist. Some 
lobbyists are hired to be industry-representatives and manage trade 
associations. Their expertise makes them valuable to those in 
government.
7 The Pre-Legislative Stage
The key to effective lobbying is monitoring. Passive monitoring of 
Hansard is not enough. Effective lobbyists tend to monitor actively. They 
obtain the views of officials about policy development and feedback on 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . T h o s e  organisations that hire lobbyists receive 
advance warning of policy-thinking and are therefore advantaged. 
‘Potential’ and less-organised groups lack this basic monitoring resource 
and are less effective.^ " "^^
The most effective lobbying is done at the pre-legislative stage 
when policy is germinating in Whitehall o f f i c e s . B e r r y  suggests 
“influence is achieved through continuous work in the t r e n c h e s . M i l l e r  
notes “the great proportion of administrative judgements ... are made by 
officials" early in the legislative processJ^^ He suggests officials become 
disposed against lobbyists who concentrate on parliament. By the time 
legislation reaches the House of Commons it has been months in 
drafting. Interest-groups must invest time and resources early on, 
otherwise the campaign is likely to be considered opportunistic or even 
lazy. Parliamentary fire-fighting tends to be less effective than pre­
emptive lobbying.
Smith, Martin, (1991), p125 
Berry, J., (1989a), p83 
Miller, 0., (1997)
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p97 
Jordan, G., (1991a)
Berry, J., (1989a), p i99 
Miller, C., (1987), p99
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8 Client-Lobbyist Relationship
Effectiveness can be judged only if a client’s lobbying strategy has 
a clear focus. Lobbyists might help secure a favourable operating 
environment for their client.^ "^ ® How the client is perceived by decision­
makers is an important factor. It is important to understand whether the 
client takes the lobbyist’s advice. If the client acts contrary to the advice 
of consultants, it is difficult to judge effectiveness. The brief of the client 
and the services required and provided are important factors to 
understand when examining success. The effective lobbyist is not forced 
by the client to react to developments, but plans in advance of the 
political agenda.
Effective lobbying is dependent upon the understanding and 
support of top executives in the client organisation. Support for the 
lobbyist must be consistent. Understanding of the lobbyist’s strategy 
must be realistic.^"^  ^ Eckstein suggests organisational cohesiveness is 
important for effectiveness and is a function of other variables notably 
degree of client commitment.^^° Effective lobbying requires the 
involvement of key employees of the client organisation. The point Grant 
makes about membership mobilisation by pressure groups is relevant to 
lobbyists since a lobbyist must be able to mobilise his client -  the actions, 
whilst possibly intrusive and time-consuming to the businessman, are 
inclined to be low-cost politically, such as attending meetings and 
preparing research.''^’'
Effectiveness depends on how ‘open’ or honest the client can be 
with the lobbyist and whether the client will share with the lobbyist the 
construction of the case. If the lobbyist is asked simply to ‘communicate’ 
an organisation’s policy the lobbyist’s impact may be restrained. 
Researchers should be aware that much of the lobbyist’s work is 
advisory. If lobbyists’ advice is not taken commentators cannot judge 
effectiveness.
Boléat, M.. (1996) p238 
Cates, P., (1988), p243 
Eckstein, H„ (1960), p36-38 
Grant, W„ (1995) p i 37-38
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9 Timing
Timing is a factor in any political campaign. Timing a campaign or 
an approach effectively can be the consequence of luck. It may also be 
down to skill. More effective lobbying may occur in the later stages of 
government. Greer argues that a government’s parliamentary agenda is 
crammed with manifesto commitments in the first 2-3 years of its life, so 
for big issues it is wise to wait until later in the parliament.^^^ However, it 
is also possible to argue that the bigger, more controversial issues need 
to be grasped in the first years of a new government -  the honeymoon -  
when government’s popularity can carry issues forward.
10 Quid Pro Quo
‘Mutual aid’ implies lobbyists should be able to offer decision­
makers something positive or at least neutral (certainly not negative) in 
return for being granted insider status. Rhodes argues “all actors in a 
particular policy area need one another.’’^^ ^
Even if a deal is not self-evident an effective lobbyist tends to 
recognise that government will more likely deliver policy change in 
exchange for concessions. Concessions may involve making a policy 
change more in-line with the government’s conception of the public- 
interest.
11 Coalitions
More groups usually mean Increased confllctJ^ Effective 
lobbyists mobilise other interests, so the messages politicians receive 
from their constituencies or centrally are supportive. As there is more 
diversity and interests active in policy-making, the potential for coalition- 
building increases. Lobbyists can help form connections with other 
organisations based on shared interests.
As technology and the nature of a competitive market ensure 
increased conflict within the business community, the nature of divisions 
and shared objectives changes constantly. For example, the changing
Greer, I., (1985)
Rhodes, R., (1996b), p657 
Berry, J., (1989b)
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nature of telecoms business has transformed group relations and the 
policy communityJ^^ Coalitions form and break-down constantly. The 
perceived benefits to potential coalition members may be distributed 
unequally, making coalition less likely.
If there is conflict within the business community there is the 
possibility of vicarious representation. Collective groups are often 
unorganised. An issue that leads to powerful actors on both sides of an 
issue offers collective groups the opportunity of representation by one of 
the active interest-groups.^^®
Coalitions allow lobbyists and their clients to share resources and 
improve effectiveness. Coalitions enhance credibility.^®^ Grant argues to 
be effective interest-groups must reduce external competition. Any 
coalition and interest-group improves its effectiveness by constructing an 
internal structure that involves a variety of viewpoints in the decision­
making process. The risk of tensions breaking apart a coalition or group 
is real and breakaways are damaging.^®® The coalition must take account 
of its members’ views and be flexible to contextual factors.
If consensus proves impossible, then Miller suggests lobbyists get 
their retaliation in first by pre-empting the points the opposition might 
make.^ ®^
12 Contacts
The ‘unique selling point’ of the professional lobbyist is his access 
to parts of the decision-making system that an in-house lobbyist cannot 
r e a c h . L o b b y i s t s  tend to be effective if they are well connected. 
Contacts bring intelligence and inside information which in turn bring 
status and policy expertise.^®^ Contacts facilitate access, deliver 
intelligence and amplify advocacy. Kooiman has suggested that no actor 
has the over-view necessary to dominate or be successful.^®^ It is
'“ Berry, J„ (1997)
Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), pi 14 
See Berry, J., (1989a), p i94 
See Grant, W„ (1995), pi 34-136 
Miller, C., (1997)
'“ Wilson, G„ (1991)
'®' See Berry, J., (1989a), p79 and 185
Kooiman, J., (1993) cited in Rhodes, R., (1996b)
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possible that the lobbyist has the best vantage-point. He can weave 
between the players, talk to all sides and take an objective standpoint.
Various scholars have pointed to the importance of contacts for 
effectiveness.^®^ The American literature shows that contributions to 
politicians buy access to representatives rather than their votes.^®'  ^
Lobbyists could be the ‘highly knowledgeable policy-watchers' that Helco 
wrote about.^ ®®
Though ‘perceived political neutrality’ can be essential to effective 
lobbying,^®® circumstantial evidence suggests ties with parties are 
important. Most political consultants are party-political, helping the 
lobbyist gain access to closed political circles and the information that 
circulates within them.
13 Procedure
Lobbyists are effective if they understand the procedures of 
Whitehall and parliament. Procedure is how the system ought to operate. 
However, knowledge of the process is as valuable: not just the formal 
rules, but the informal rules and understandings that govern everyday 
procedure. They can be as simple as an appreciation of how the working 
days of officials and politicians are structured. Lobbyists understand the 
language’ of Whitehall. The similar characteristics displayed by civil 
servants and interest-group leaders (and lobbyists) is striking. They are 
similar in “their official personalities, modes of operation, language and 
perception of the policy process [...] Such skills have to be developed... if 
they want to be effective.’’ ®^^
14 Resources
Resources are important because they allow interest-groups to 
buy the goodwill of influential persons, to advertise, to hire prestigious 
lobbyist and buy in technical expertise.^®® [Resources are discussed in 
more detail on pages 107-109]
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986); Heinz, J., et a! (1993)
Berry, J., (1997); Gopoian, D., (1984); Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986) 
Helco, H., (1978)
Smith, Martin, (1991), p125166
Grant, W„ (1995), p p l38-39 
Eckstein, H„ (1960), p36-38
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Conclusions
Important contextual variables have been often omitted from 
analyses of effectiveness. Many independent variables influence policy 
outcomes. The interests of government actors and the wider political, 
social and environmental context impact on effectiveness. Government 
will demand public-interest requirements. If the external factors are held 
constant (Eckstein leaves them out altogether, including the pressure of 
events and conditions, social values, political attitudes, government 
mandates and autonomous government departments), then it is possible 
to show that interest-groups (the BMA in his example) and lobbyists have 
an impact.^®® If the external environment is friendly then internal 
variables become important.
Internal variables, within the control of lobbyists, explain their 
effectiveness. The effective lobbyist understands the operating 
procedures and how to ‘play’ the ‘policy game’ within the pre-established 
rules. In the informal negotiations and bargaining process lobbyists are 
likely to be more effective if they monitor developments and establish 
contact at an early stage before ideas begin to set. Effective lobbyists 
tend to be able to spot and construct coalitions. The relationship with the 
client should be close and supportive. Long-term relationships or 
contacts in Whitehall or Westminster make for enhanced effectiveness. A 
quid pro quo is helpful, as is the ability to compromise. A range of tactics 
to choose from is helpful. Effective lobbyists deploy their resources in a 
skilful manner likely to realise their goals.
Following the unwritten rules on internal variables does not 
guarantee effectiveness or influence. Lobbyists are constrained, and 
their effectiveness is in large part determined by contextual variables. 
But when the context is favourable these norms enhance 
effectiveness.
Eckstein, H., (1960), postscript 
Berry, J., (1989a), p85
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3. AnaWlcal Franwwork
This chapter builds a conceptual framework for analysing the 
effectiveness of lobbying. It reviews the theoretical literature and deduces 
eight hypotheses within the context of a multi-level framework.^ It 
examines the macro-level, an overall view of the policy process; the 
meso-level, which concentrates on networks; and the micro-level, 
concerned with personal interactions. It discusses the hypotheses, built on 
the external and internal variables explored in chapter two. The chapter is 
structured in the following manner. At the macro level there are three 
hypotheses:
Level Hypothesis Explanatory
Variable
Macro Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are 
lobbying on low-profile, technical and non­
political issues
External
Macro Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no 
disadvantageous external or contextual 
constraints beyond the control of government 
players.
External
Macro Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs 
of political decision-makers, pre-existing 
policy and previous experience of government 
players are congruent with the lobbyist's 
obj ective.
External
The effectiveness of professional lobbyists can best be understood 
if their activity is set in the wider context of ‘theories of the state’. Whilst 
there are several grand theories of the state, this thesis operates within 
two -  pluralism and government autonomy -  and develops them. It 
contends that pluralism and government autonomy are indistinguishable.
Effectiveness is variable, relative, and depends on context. Smith 
argues “when considering the decision-making process in the core 
executive, many causes and interactions will affect outcomes. [...] The
 ^ Similar to the framework used in Parsons, W., (1996), p82-83
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power of various actors and institutions will vary according to the policy, 
the context and the tactics of those involved.”  ^ This macro-level 
perspective proposes that in certain arenas government agencies or 
actors can act autonomously. The effectiveness of the lobbyist is also 
constrained by external contextual factors, such as economic factors and 
the salience of ‘public-interest’ issues.
At the meso-level the following hypotheses are relevant:
Meso Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can 
include their client in the policy community and 
manage their client's activity within that 
network.
External / 
Internal
Meso Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a 
multi-faceted approach and facilitate access to 
multiple points in the decision-making process.
External / 
Internal
Following Marsh and Rhodes, at the meso-level the policy network 
approach is best applied.^ Lobbyists can be facilitators and managers, 
but also actors in their own right.
Three hypotheses apply at the micro level:
Micro Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are 
familiar with routines and standard operating 
procedures and know when and where to intervene 
in the policy-making process.
Internal
Micro Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good 
contacts and can spot connections to potential 
allies and can construct coalitions.
Internal
Micro Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has 
abundant resources and is skilful in deploying 
them.
Internal
At the micro-level the chapter examines Allison’s governmental 
politics and organisational models and Rhodes’ work on resources. 
Lobbyists must be aware of the dominant games being played. The 
effective lobbyist will know the procedures and rules of government, and 
how to deploy the resources of the client.
Smith, M., (1999), p36
Marsh, D., and Rhodes, R., (1992)
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Macro-level
Profile, technicality and poiiticality: Hypothesis 
One
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on 
low-profile, technical and non-political issues.
There is evidence that contradicts this hypothesis: Furlong’s 
results suggest that policy type does not make a difference in terms of 
influence. In other words, interest groups are just as likely (or unlikely) to 
influence policy tightening a clean air standard as they would attempting 
to increase social security benefits."^ It also is contradicted by the 
conclusion of Whiteley and Winyard. They argue a “quiet insider strategy 
does not pay off any better than an open promotional strategy. Since the 
era of consensus politics described by Beer and Eckstein, policy making 
has become more conflictuel, but also more fragmented."^
This hypothesis synthesises three variables into one: visibility; 
technicality and poiiticality® and is a variation on Eckstein’s conclusion 
that “the influence of groups certainly is enhanced by the lack of any wide 
public interest in an area of policy, simply because such lack of interest, 
apart from minimizing group competition tends to neutralize some of the 
more important centres of influence which compete with private groups as 
such.’’^  Stewart notes that “the situation faced by groups is in part 
reflected in the general nature of their aims.’’® As such, low-profile issues 
means lobbyists will deal with government actors (officials and ministers) 
rather than with the political process as a whole, increasing their chances 
of being effective.
Though not directly applicable to the UK, American studies 
examining the impact of contributions by interest-groups on votes of
* Furlong, S., (1997), p340
® Whiteley, P., and Winyard, S., (1987), p i36, in Grant, W., (1995), p i41
® Smith in his review of surveys notes researchers’ conclusions on the circumstances under which lobbyists 
are more likely to be effective. Smith, R., (1995),p94
 ^Eckstein, H., (1960), p i 55. Eckstein suggests that in the simplest terms "group influence is enlarged by 
anything which restricts the influence on policy-making of anything else. This either is or comes close to being 
a tautology, but is none the less worth stating."
® Stewart, J., (1958), p4
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legislators are relevant because they seek to assess the effectiveness of 
pressure. The literature plays close attention to external factors as key 
explanatory variables. Various groups of researchers have claimed 
groups were more effective when issue visibility was low,^ when the issue 
was technical® or when the issue was politically neutral.
Visibilitv
The influence of lobbyists increases when there is less publicity. 
This statement echoes the ‘distributive’ policy noted by Lowi.^^ Various 
scholars have hypothesised interest-groups will be more effective when 
the issue is low-profile. High-profile issues are more likely to be 
controversial, forcing external factors into play.^^ Politicians are more 
likely to be forced to vote in line with their party, with their constituency 
interests or with their ideology on high-profile matters.
Lobbying is traditionally most successful when it is least overt, and 
largely unnoticed by the public.^"  ^ This conclusion is supported by 
Schlozman’s and Tierney’s identification of the most effective tactics 
being low-profile: including testifying at hearings, contacting officials 
directly and engaging in informal contact with o f f i c i a l s . T h e  least 
effective tactics are public endorsements of candidates and contributing 
to electoral campaigns.
Contributions count for less on high-visibility issues, whilst on such 
issues the party background of legislators is an important determinant of 
policy-outcome.^® High-profile issues “require a greater adherence to 
party and constituent desires. Low-visibility issues allow greater
® Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986); Jones, W., and Keiser, R., (1987); Sabato, L., (1989b); Magleby, D.,
and Nelson, C., (1990); Grenzke, J., (1990); Neustadtl, A., (1990); Conway, M., (1991); and Sorauf, F., (1992)
cited in Smith, R., (1995)
Welch, W., (1982); Sabato, L., (1985); Frendreis, J., and Waterman, R., (1985) cited in Smith, R., (1995)
”  Malbin, M., 0984); Wright, J., (1985b); Frendreis, J., and Waterman, R., (1985); Schlozman, K., and 
Tierney, J., (1986); Magleby, D., and Nelson, C., 0990); Conway, M., (1991) cited in Smith, R., (1995)
In his review of Bauer, Pool and Dexter’s American Business and Public Policy Lowi noted three types of 
policy issue -  distributive (narrow), regulative (middle) and redistributive (broad) -  when discussing group- 
government interaction. Lowi suggested the salience of the issue affected campaign and legislative behaviour. 
Lowi, T., (1964, 1972)
Bachelier argues the 'controversiality' of an issue is an important variable determining the effect of legislative 
lobbying. See Bachelier, J., (1977)
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1983)
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986)
Neustadtl, A., (1990)
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freedom...” and “more behind-the-scene maneuvering [is] possible...
As one would expect Neustadtl found that the effect of party is greater on 
high-profile than on low-visibility issues. On less visible issues
contributions made the strongest impact.^® Malbin, who is equivocal 
about an association between votes and campaign funds, suggests they 
may be more effective on low-profile issues.
The less publicity there is on an issue, the less likely there will be 
organised opposition. It follows that officials and politicians will have 
more freedom of movement.^® Therefore the impact of lobbying varies 
inversely with the visibility of the issue; similarly on legislative lobbying 
the influence of constituents and the media varies with visibility.^^
In addition, low-profile issues are often dealt with in low-profile 
settings -  arenas in which lobbyists are more likely to be effective. 
Lobbying is more likely to be effective at the agenda-setting stage of 
policy-making. As Sabato argues, “Press, public, and even ‘watchdog’ 
groups are not nearly as attentive to initial legislative proceedings.”^^
Technicalitv
The nature of the issue is a significant variable in explaining 
effectiveness.^^ Welch suggests research concentrate on comparing the 
impact of variables on both obscure technical amendments and highly 
visible issues.
Frendreis and Waterman also looked at the impact of contributions 
on technical issues. They found that constituency pressure, party and 
ideology displayed variable relationships with policy outcome, depending 
on the nature of the issue under consideration.^"^ However, they did 
report a relationship between contributions and legislative votes. Sabato
Neustadtl, A., (1990), p550
Jones, W., and Keiser, R., (1987); and Souraf, F., (1992), p171. Schroedel examined the impact of lobbyists 
and contributions on financial policy issues at committee level rather than in the chamber. He found 
“contributions appear to have the greatest predictive power when there is low public visibility.” Schroedel, J., 
(1986), p387
® Malbin, M., (1984). Chappell’s conclusions are also ambiguous -  he suggests his results do not show 
contributions have a significant effect on votes, but neither would be appropriate to conclude they had no 
effect. Chappell, H., (1981)
Grenzke, J., (1990)
Welch, W., (1982)
Sabato, L , (1990), p i35 
Welch, W., (1982)
Frendreis, J., and Waterman, R., (1985), p402
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also lists technicality as a variable that can affect the dependent variable, 
arguing contributions have more of an effect on narrow and specialised 
issues.^^ The “[t]echnicality of issues inherently limits the scope of 
conflict.” ®^
Politicalitv
Interest-groups may be most influential on issues that do not 
arouse controversy within or between the parties/^ If an issue is non­
partisan it may influence the effectiveness of contributions.^® The same 
may be argued for lobbying. Therefore “the interest group concerns it 
represents may prevail only on the less visible issues where the influence 
of party ideology, or constituency are not important.”^^  Malbin also 
reports that groups can be more effective on non-partisan issues.®®
Ideology and party also display a variable relationship with voting; 
the dominant variable depends on the issue, for example on high-profile 
matters constituency concerns were important.®^ When an issue is non­
partisan Frendreis and Waterman discovered that legislators found it 
difficult to assess the issue’s relevance to their constituents so other 
variables like lobbying could tip the balance.®® Wright agrees that many 
variables impact on policy outcome, and argues that cues like party are 
important.®®
However, the more fragmented the process the more likely there is 
to be an array of access channels into the policy process available to a 
range of actors. The wider an issue the more interest-groups are able to 
hunt for other supporters if one policy-maker is hostile.®"^
Lobbyists can be more effective if the policy community is closed, 
dominated by civil servants, unconstrained by political involvement, and
Sabato, L , (1990), p i36 
^  Parsons, W., (1996), p i34 
Stewart, J., (1958), p i9 
Conway, M., (1991)
Conway, M„ (1991), p211-12 
Malbin, M„ (1984)
Frendreis, J., and Waterman, R., (1985), p412 
Frendreis, J., and Waterman, R., (1985), pp401-12
Wrigtit, J., (1985). Wright says that contributions have an effect only when party influence is weak. In 
another paper Wright argues lobbying contacts, not contributions, shape and reinforce the decisions of policy­
makers. Wright, J., (1990)
^^Krasner, S., (1978)
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rarely considered by the national press. The lobbyist can be more 
effective if the issue does not become ‘political’. Subdued pressure is 
more effective than forceful pressure.^^ New players are attracted to an 
issue when it is redefined, and both lobbyists and government actors are 
less able to control events if issues are broadened. They cannot direct 
actors on political and controversial policy, and the likelihood of co­
ordinated opposition increases. Lobbyists are more effective on 
‘consultation politics’ than on ‘electoral politics’. If an issue is shielded 
from public and media scrutiny and does not arouse “deeply felt 
convictions, lines of party cleavage, or particularistic constituency needs", 
lobbyists can be more effective.^®
Finer argued interest-groups are most influential on ‘official 
legislation’.^  ^ Technical legislation developed by civil servants and 
interest-groups is often a continuation of earlier legislation. “By interview, 
deputation, letter or telephone the affected groups keep continuous 
contact with the administering department... And out of such two-way 
consultation on administration new policy often emerges.
There is often a ‘search for predictability’ whereby both parties 
encourage a symbiotic relationship.^® This search is more evident on 
small, technical issues. Lobbyists help their clients enter these policy 
niches. The lobbyist knows the participants in technical communities, 
and the lobbyist is better able to influence the client’s activity in a smaller 
community. On high-policy issues the public, the media, the courts and 
senior politicians become involved. The autonomy of all players, 
including government, is eroded and control over the game is lost.
The salience of an issue can determine how far lobbyists can be 
effective and whether government actors can act with autonomy. On 
most issues the salience, technicality and its political nature will 
determine the type of campaign and the impact of the lobbyist.
“  Stewart, J.. (1958), p34 
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986), p314 
Finer, S., (1958)
Finer, S., (1958), p20
Jordan, G., Maloney, W., and McLaughlin, A. (1992b)
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External and contextual factors: Hypothesis Two
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no 
disadvantageous external or contextual constraints 
beyond the control of government players.
Hypothesis two looks at how government is structured by a range 
of political and economic constraints, including financial markets, the EU, 
judicial decisions and the world economy, which are beyond its control. 
The compatibility of an interest-group's objectives with society’s 
traditional values make success likely."^ ® Skocpol et al, recognising the 
importance of contextual factors, suggest that the degree of
industrialisation, urbanisation, workforce composition and level of
economic development may have been important determinants of
pensions reform in the USA."^ ^
Thus, changing social, political and institutional environments 
affect policy-making."^^ Policy change can be “strongly influenced by the 
economic, political and ideological context within which the network 
o p e r a t e s . “Public policy now takes place in a world system as well as 
in national political systems’’ and many domestic issues are interlocked 
with global issues."^ "^  The government’s power and the influence of 
lobbyists can be restricted by exogenous and contextual structural 
factors. The international economic environment, supra-national bodies, 
technological changes and fiscal constraints can limit the autonomy of 
government actors and affect groups. Factors such as economic hazards 
may undermine a policy community."^^
So lobbying may be peripheral to ‘other’ significant influencing 
f a c t o r s . S m i t h  notes the following contextual factors; “economic 
conditions, policy success/failure, world events, level of popular support
Furlong, S., (1997). Also see Keefe, W., (1988)
Skocpol, T., Abend-Wein, M., Howard, C., and Goodrich-Lehmann, (1993)
Baumgartner, P., and Jones, B„ (1993), p54 & 243 
Marsh, D„ (1995a), p3 
Parsons, W., (1996), p234
Dudley and Richardson note ministers are in a unique position in the policy process affording them certain 
powers and the ability to effect change unavailable to others. They argue ministers exhibit promiscuity in their 
relations with interest groups and have the power to take decisions independently of the policy community. 
Ministers are mobile policy actors. Dudley, G., and Richardson, J., (1996a)
Berry, S., (1991), p21
79
Chapter Three
and parliamentary support.”"^  ^ Contextual factors can constrain and 
facilitate players. Lobbyists cannot be effective if the broader context is 
antagonistic.
Hypothesis two shows that policy can be structurally determined. 
Structure identifies winners and losers. External factors may open or 
close avenues of opportunity.
Pre-existing policy and experience of government 
players: Hypothesis Three
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of
political decision-makers, pre-existing policy and
previous experience of government players are
congruent with the lobbyist's objective.
There are several constraints within government's, but outside the 
lobbyist’s control. They are often political constraints, including political 
beliefs, perceptions about limits to government action or acceptable 
behaviour. The government has autonomy. If this constraint is 
favourable, lobbyists are likely to be effective -  they can rely on events 
and ministerial commitment. But, as Stewart writes, when a campaign 
“runs contrary to the main policies of the political party in power it is 
almost bound to fail.”'^ ^
This hypothesis reflects a move away from examining interest- 
group demands to recognising the capacity of government to follow its 
own objectives. Bennett suggests campaigners tend to be effective when 
“the lobbyist is most closely meeting the needs of those that are being 
l o b b i e d . P r e v i o u s  policy choices and past political bargains partly 
determine current policy.^® Skocpol et al conclude “pre-existing policies, 
the institutional arrangements of governments, and the organizational
Smith, M.. (1995a), p i l l  
Stewart, J., (1958), p i l l
Bennett, R., (1997), p62. The author suggests the problem with a voluntary business association sector is 
that it promotes fragmentation, therefore he suggests “a level of state organisation or ‘support’ is required to 
assure association effectiveness from a public policy perspective."
“  Quinn, D., and Shapiro, R., (1991), p856
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characteristics of political parties may also influence the goals, access, 
and alliances of officials and social groups active in politics.
Pluralism
This thesis places group-government interaction in a pluralistic 
framework. However, to understand the effect of lobbyists, a recognition 
of government autonomy would be helpful. Pluralism is a resilient policy 
perspective which concentrates on the interactions of groups with 
government.^^ Pluralists adopt a behaviouralist methodology and 
recognise that groups can mobilise political pressure to their advantage.
The pluralist perspective has been criticised by various scholars 
and has been modified over the years.^^ A stereotype of the pluralist 
perspective has been attacked as being simplistic and holding a benign 
view of power distribution.^"^ Baumgartner and Leech suggest in classical 
pluralism “The role of the state was not to dictate outcomes, but rather to 
arbitrate among various interests.
Classical pluralism model I has evolved into model II (neo) and 
model III (reformed) pluralism. Neo-pluralists accept business is the most 
powerful group and can dominate a policy arena.^® Lindblom argued 
business inducements are necessary for a healthy economy, and in a 
market economy government-business collaboration is needed to make 
the system work.^^ One flaw in neo-pluralism is it understates 
government’s ability to act autonomously.^®
More useful in explaining why and how lobbyists can be effective is 
reformed pluralism because it recognises the autonomy of government 
actors. Smith notes the model
Overcomes one of the problems of traditional pluralism by 
analysing the differences between policy areas and it also
Skocpol, T., Abend-Wein, M., Howard, C., and Goodrich-Lehmann, (1993), p692 
Jordan, G., (1990c)
Various scholars critiqued pluralism as an inaccurate description of policy systems, including Maass, A., 
(1951): Cater, D., (1964); McConnell, G., (1966); Lowi, T., (1969); Fritschler, A., (1975) in Baumgartner and 
Leech, (1998), p57
^  Some authors argue pluralism sees the state as neutral, that policy-making is accessible to all, and that 
outside groups are equal to government in their influence. See Jessop, B., (1983); and Dearlove, J., and 
Saunders, P., (1991)
“  Baumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p48 
Various scholars have noted bias in favour of the business community, notably, Schattschneider, E., (1935); 
Walker, J., (1983, 1991); Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1983, 1986); Heinz, J., et al (1993).
Lindblom, C., (1977), p 175
See Smith, M., (1990); and Manley, J., (1983)
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overcomes the limitation of Marxism [or neo-pluralism] by 
rejecting the view that one economic group will always be 
dominant.®®
Groups can be excluded. Perfect competition between groups 
does not exist in practice.®® Reformed pluralists recognise that certain 
policy arenas are open, whilst others are institutionalised and closed. 
Since usually only a limited number of groups are either interested or 
have access, government actors may depend on them for information.®^ 
Reformed pluralism manages to account for both institutionalised 
relationships and the exclusion of some groups.
Recognising the autonomy of government actors suggests in some 
circumstances lobbyists will be ineffective because their client’s 
objectives and those of government clash. Lobbyists, to be effective, 
depend on government autonomy pre-disposed in their favour. On 
routine technical issues government autonomy is potentially high because 
changes usually have a narrow impact, but it is more common that 
government has no fixed views and is open to persuasion. The more 
high-profile the issue, the less autonomy government has.®  ^ If the issue 
becomes highly political, government autonomy can be curbed by a 
coalition of the majority of affected interests and public and political 
pressure
Government Autonomv
‘State theorists’ argue the pluralist-functionalist approach views 
government as a dependent variable: an arena within which interest- 
groups contend or ally with one another to shape policy decisions.®® 
Jordan commenting on Polsby notes “there is an unspoken notion in 
pluralist research that at bottom nobody dominates.’’®"^ So government is 
allegedly no more than a weather vane. Pluralism, it is said, does not 
take government seriously as an independent actor and neo-statists
Smith, M., (1990), p315 
“  Richardson, J., and Jordan, G., (1979)
Smith, M., (1990)
Andrew McFarland argues on high-profile issues the autonomy of the government agency is likely to be 
strong because of countervailing groups. McFarland, A., (1991)
^  Skocpol, T., (1982, I960); Krasner, S., (1984); Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D., and Skocpol, T., (1985)
^  Jordan, G., (1981) p i01, citing Polsby, N., (1963). Similarly Helco notes it is difficult to identify the dominant 
actors. Helco, H., (1978)
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criticise pluralism for expounding society-centred reductionism. This 
section examines government autonomy in more detail before discussing 
the similarity with reformed pluralism.
Government is the group of elected and appointed officials 
endowed with decision-making power.®  ^ The government autonomy 
thesis is founded on four blocks. Public officials can form their own policy 
preferences depending on the government’s internal variations. The 
government may act on its preferences despite the opposition of powerful 
societal interests. Governmental institutional contours and procedures 
can affect government-group relations. Finally, government can use its 
autonomy to identify important interest-groups.
Nordlinger’s work -  which is empirical, positivist and arguably 
pluralist -  asserts the autonomy of government but does not exclude the 
power of societal factors.®® He defends pluralism, but urges researchers 
to recognise the ability of government players to assert their 
independence. His focus is on emphasis. He argues policy can be 
determined by government actors who have ideas and preferences.
Nordlinger defines different degrees of government autonomy.®^ 
The preferences of government actors condition policy outcomes. The 
strong state’ thesis sees societal-state preferences diverge. The 
government deters opponents from exploiting their resources, sanctions 
interest-groups or uses its coercive powers to threaten opponents. In the 
‘medium state’ preferences initially diverge but then align once society’s 
preferences alter. When government autonomy is weak government 
subtly guides policy because its and society’s preferences align.®®
The government autonomy and reformed pluralism perspectives 
recognise that access is not always open and that relationships change 
over policy areas. Lobbyists may be effective because the government’s 
and client’s objectives coincide. Government actors can decide on policy
”  Easton, D„ (1960)
Nordlinger, E., (1981,1987). McFarland also notes the autonomy of US state institutions, using the term 
‘elite pluraiism’ to describe a triadic theory of power where policy can be dominated by groups, but opposing 
groups also emerge. He recognises government agencies are assumed to have some autonomy. See 
McFarland, A., (1987)
Nordlinger, E., (1981)
Christiansen, L., and Dowding, K., (1994)
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which, in their view, best fits their objectives.®^ Similarly policy options 
are often constricted by institutional possibilities. The system decides 
when and whom to consult, and what questions to ask.
Various factors suggest that government actors can act 
autonomously. These factors include: turnover of government actors, 
centralisation, autonomous policy leadership, unconscious application of 
rules and the content of ideas. Jordan argues that the initiative is with the 
groups because civil service turnover means “the new civil servant relies 
on the group for policy history.” ®^ However, he argues elsewhere “not all 
parties are equal: the governmental department is an actor with special 
resources (legitimacy, prior knowledge, staff) not available to other 
a c t o r s . H i s  earlier work is congruent with this thesis. In fact ministerial 
and civil service turnover endows advantages on government. It allows 
government to change its stance as personalities change and bring 
issues to a close and others to the front. Government agencies can be 
more autonomous if they have a clear conception of their role, distance 
between themselves and client groups, clear regulations defining 
responsibilities of social groups and an ability to generate their own 
information.
Second, the centralisation of decision-making authority is another 
variable that affects lobbying.^® Centralisation precludes other bodies, by 
formal procedure, from influencing policy. In Cortel’s example 
centralisation allowed lobbyists and groups to be more effective because 
it reduced the number of competing government interests and 
concentrated authority in units sharing the industry’s preferences.^^ 
Changes in the structure of government altered the capacity of 
government officials, allowing them to achieve their preferences.
Government interests are diverse. For elected politicians they could be electoral, career-related, ideological 
or a wish to appease sectional groups. For civil servants they could be career-related, to enhance their power, 
to expand their department and promotion of the ‘national interest". These interests sometimes clash, but 
often over-lap.
Jordan, G., (1990b), p332
Jordan, G., (1981), p106
Atkinson, M., and Coleman, W., (1989a), p52
Cortel, A., (1997)
Cortel, A., (1997) p 269 says “an interest group's influence can increase when an institutional network links 
the group's representatives to a centralized desisionmaking structure.”
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Third, it is argued ‘autonomous policy leaders' (APL) are able to 
“overcome a range of social, governmental, economic and secular factors 
which tend to structure policy choice in order to introduce important policy 
innovations...”^^  For the APL electoral considerations come second to a 
policy quest: to do the ‘right thing’. Again context is important. Wallis and 
Dollery conclude it would be wrong to study APLs outside the social 
context that makes it possible for them to exercise their style of 
leadership.
Fourth, government can make policy without groups, but the cost 
of developing some policies without the involvement of certain groups will 
almost certainly be higher. Although in practice there is a functional need 
for civil servants to consult,^® groups may be excluded without conscious 
decision by the institutionalised nature of relationships.^^ The influence of 
government actors may be exercised in an unconscious manner through 
the application of operating procedures, repertoires and ‘routine 
behaviour’.^ ® Government has a steering capacity. McFarland notes
Government decision-makers enter politics with their own 
preferences, which they then promote... Lindblom implies 
that, more often than not, it is government decision-makers 
who start a policy process. Interest groups react to 
governmental measures, but do not control government 
policy-making, which is continually redefined by policy­
makers, and perhaps taken in new directions in response to 
group reactions.^^
Finally, it is important to take account of the content of ideas -  the 
quality of the case.®° Lobbyists help frame the idea within a broader 
framework.®^ They help clients weave their objectives into government 
plans. Government may redefine specifics of policy to pacify lobbyists, 
but the general drift of policy usually remains in line with government 
objectives. Effective lobbyists identify political and ideological trends and 
‘surf the ‘waves of enthusiasm’.®^
Wallis, J., and Dollery, B., (1997), p2
Jordan, G., Maloney, W., and McLaughlin, A., (1992a)
Smith, M„ (1993), p 72
Giddens, A., (1986)
McFarland, A., (1987), p i38 
Kingdon, J., (1995), p i25
The term ‘policy discourse’ was used to describe the interactions of individuals and institutions in policy­
making. Within this discourse, the concept of "framing" was used to set the idea in context -  to explain its 
underlying rationale. See Merin, M., and Schon, □., (1991)
Baumgartner, P., and Jones, B., (1993), p5
85
Chapter Three
Fragmentation
It would be wrong to suggest that government as a whole has a 
single set of objectives. Departments and units have their own goals, 
which are loosely tied to the general political drift of the government.®^ 
Because of this fragmented agenda Jordan argues policy communities 
“and other types of comparatively closed and stable networks [are] not 
compatible with a state autonomy view of politics...” because no single 
state view exists.®"^  However, since Jordan accepts subgovernmental 
autonomy, it follows that the disparate nature of the core means different 
government actors can act autonomously.
Government is an ensemble of multi-functional institutions which 
often conflict.®® It is impossible to identify the ‘governmental interest' 
because it has no single set of interests. Sub-governments have diverse 
concerns. Government actors have their own interests that they derive 
from conflict between branches of the government or organisational 
culture. The government’s interests can be contradictory and might 
clash. Different government organisations can take autonomous action 
within their policy communities.
Because of the complexity of ‘organisational ecology’ the degree of 
government autonomy varies across policy arenas.®® Because of this 
disaggregation it is essential to take a disaggregated view of the 
government, looking at different levels - micro, meso, macro.
Government Constraints
Whilst government actors can act autonomously, and departments 
can have goals that are rarely revealed formally, government is unlikely 
independently to always spot problems and identify answers. It might 
react to lobbyists and interest-group pressure, but in responding advance
Departmental autonomy is increased when the political head and official torso of a department work 
together; when they are founded on a functional mandate rather than around a clientelle; when their actions 
involve applying fixed regulations and laws; and if civil servants are able to generate information and data 
internally. See Atkinson, M., and Coleman, W., (1989a)
^  Jordan, G., and Maloney, W., (1997), p565
“  Laumann, E., and Knoke, (1987); also see Allison later in this chapter.
Atkinson, M., and Coleman, W., (1989a)
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its own goals.®  ^ Salisbury argues in the US some lobbyists “have 
become dependent on and are sometimes exploited by government 
officials rather than the other way around...”®®
Government does not act as a ‘cash register’ balancing inputs, and 
the majority of pluraliste have not portrayed it as such.®  ^ Pluralism does 
not see the government as neutral: government procedures often 
“handicap some efforts and favour others.” ®^ Modern commentators such 
as Jordan and Richardson are close to Dahl and Truman in this respect.®  ^
Although critics of pluralism have been ‘more right’ in some of their 
comments than others, much of their criticism is misdirected.®^ In the 
1960s’ pluralist literature “autonomous government agencies were 
frequently part of the pluralist descriptions of politics.”®®
Any perspective seeking to explain how and why lobbyists are 
effective must take account of the “frequency of autonomous actions by 
government agencies.”®"^ The debate on the distinction between the two 
approaches seems tautological rather than substantive.®® In some 
arenas lobbyists will be effective because government actors are open to 
persuasion, whilst in others they will be ineffective because government 
has fixed objectives.®® Policy-making should be seen as set in systems of 
‘structured inequality.’ Analyses of lobbying have to recognise the 
context within which government actors and lobbyists operate and the 
partial autonomy that government actors exercise.®^ Eckstein argues 
“governmental institutions do not simply ring up the outcome of group
Cortel. A., (1997), p264 
Salisbury, R., (1990), p340
Schlozman argues “government is no mere punching bag registering the relative strength of the pressure 
group blows to which it is subjected.” Schlozman, K., (1984)
^  Truman, D„ (1951), p322 
Richardson, J., and Jordan, G., (1979); Jordan, G., and Richardson, J., (1987a, 1987b)
Jordan, G., (1990c)
McFarland, A., (1987), p i39 
^  McFarland, A., (1987), p i36
^  David Marsh notes “contemporary pluralism recognises an increased role for the state. This is particularly 
clear in the work of Nordlinger who emphasises the autonomy of the democratic state and views pluralism as 
much in terms of conflict between the different interests of sections within government as in terms of conflict 
between interest groups within civil society.” See Marsh, □., (1995a). Jordan argues “those wishing to bring 
the state back in also want to decompose the state. The weak state is fashionable. There is no longer a 
homogeneous state.” Jordan, G., (1990a), p484 
Atkinson and Coleman are correct to call for a more nuanced approach to autonomy at the macro-level. 
Atkinson, M., and Coleman, W., (1989a, 1989b)
The importance of the state has been emphasised by: Nordlinger, E., (1981); Evans, P., Rueschmeyer, □., 
Skocpol, T, (1986); Lowi, T., (1988); Fabrini, S., (1988)
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conflicts like mere cash registers but themselves make decisions...”®® 
McFarland terms this approach ‘critical pluralism’, which “admits that 
government agencies often act autonomously and do not simply reflect 
the group balance of power within an issue area.”®® Nordlinger’s 
argument has been paraphrased thus: “it is just as reasonable to maintain 
that the state guides policy outcomes as for pluralists to claim that groups 
do so.”''®®
Almond argues about pluralism: “Autonomous government agencies 
are present and important throughout this literature. The pluralist 
‘paradigm’ is not the one-sided one of Skocpol, Krasner, and others but 
rather a two-directional one with the ‘state’ influencing society, as well as 
the society influencing the state.”"'®'' Almond says “The policeman can 
stop traffic; drivers cannot stop the policeman.” ®^^ The effectiveness of 
lobbying depended on the structure and objectives of government.^®®
Governments have the power to act unilaterally even if political 
costs of arbitrariness make it unlikely.^®"  ^ Richardson and Jordan 
recognise implicitly the autonomy of government by defining legitimacy as 
“acceptance by government departments that the group is making 
‘reasonable’ demands which deserve attention.” ®^® Such a definition, as 
Dowding notes, makes the government the source of legitimacy. The 
government “allow[s] only those groups with which it sympathises 
institutional access” to policy spheres.^®®
Government officials “have their hands directly on the policy 
levers.” ®^^ Because Britain has strong parties and a powerful executive.
Eckstein, H., (1960), p153. He says earlier that “it is always the interplay of governmental structure, activity 
and attitudes which determine the form of pressure group politics.” (pi 7)
McFarland, A., (1991), p270 
Christiansen, L., and Dowding, K., (1994)
Almond, G., (1988), p866
Almond, G., (1988), Almond later concludes that “ovenvhelmingly the pluralist literature has been shown to 
be one in which governmental autonomy is recognised.”
Eckstein, H., (1960). Also Herring, P., (1936), recognises the autonomy of government actors and their 
pursuit of the public interest in the face of competing group demands.
Jordan, G., (1990a), p472
Jordan, G., and Richardson, J., (1987b), p29 
Christiansen, L., and Dowding, K., (1994) 
Nordlinger, E., (1981), p79
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the autonomy of government institutions and players are key contextual 
explanatory variables.
Meso-Level
To account for the difference of sectoral policy-making this section 
examines two meso-level hypotheses that include both external and 
internal variables. Parsons notes “meso analysis is a middle-range or 
bridging level of analysis which is focused on the linkage between the 
definition of problems, the setting of agendas and the decision-making 
and implementation processes.
Involvement in the policy-making process: 
Hypothesis Four
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can include 
their client in the policy community and manage their 
client's activity within that network.
Policy networks concentrate on the informal policy process rather 
than on conventional inst i tut ions.^This thesis examines policy networks 
peculiar to policy issues at the sub-sectoral level. Policy communities are 
networks “characterised by: stability of relationships; continuity of a 
restrictive membership; vertical interdependence based on shared 
delivery responsibilities; and insulation from both other networks and, 
invariably, the public (including parliament).”^ N e t w o r k s  stretch across 
a spectrum from wide issue-networks to narrow and controlled policy 
communi t i es .Because  the form of network relationship differs, policy 
networks can also explain and account for more corporatist 
associat ions.^Marsh and Rhodes are mistaken when they assume 
issue networks are more likely to exist when the policy area is relatively
Baumgartner notes that European single state agencies are more likely to act independently or to be at the 
centre of power relations than in the US where many agencies, levels of government and legislative actors are 
likely to be involved. Baumgartner, P., (1996)
109 Parsons, W., (1996), p85
Jordan, G„ (1990b) 
Rhodes, R., (1997), p38111
Hecio suggests that issue networks are broad communication networks of interested parties including 
business, government, academics, journalists and MPs. Helco, H., (1978)
Jordan, G., (1981)
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unimportant for macro-pol icy.^In fact, the technical micro-policy issues 
are more likely to have a small homogeneous and stable community.^
The policy community approach of co-option and a consensual 
style accounts better for policy outcomes than do examinations of party 
stances, of manifestos or parliamentary influence.^^® The model 
assumes policy-making is complex. Focusing on parliament alone does 
not explain outcomes because many important decisions are made with 
little or no party political involvement. However, the policy network 
approach has been criticised for failing to explain policy change.
Policy networks can be centred around and directed by a 
government agency, person or central department, or around specific 
problems, policy issues and legislation. A core assumption of the 
network concept is that institutionalised relations develop between 
governmental and non-governmental organisations to facilitate policy- 
making.^^® Influence is based on dependence. This thesis looks at policy 
communities focused around specific policy. Jordan notes in a policy 
community “a specific item of business is transacted in a context where 
the participants already have mutual needs, expectations and 
experiences.”^ P o l i c y  communities are dynamic; they change as policy 
progresses.
All central departments hold databases of ‘interested parties’ 
associated with specific issues. This list may be characterised as the 
policy network. On particular policy issues a select few will be ‘involved 
and relevant’ and asked for their views. Those who return substantive 
comments are likely to be members of the policy community. Thus, whilst 
networks may be forces of stability, communities are usually transient 
because they emerge to deal with policy issues and dissolve once the 
issue is f i n i shed .Never the less ,  the interests continue their close 
‘policy network’ relationship with the departments.
Marsh, D., and Rhodes, R., (1992)
Similar to epistemic communities at the European level.
Richardson, J., and Jordan, G., (1979), p73-74
Dowding, K., (1995a); Rhodes, R., and Marsh, D., (1992b); Kassim, H., (1995); Dudley, G., and 
Richardson, J., (1998)
Jordan, G., Maloney, W., and McLaughlin, A., (1992a)
Jordan, G„ (1990b), p326
See Jordan, G., and Maloney, W., (1997), p574
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The network approach re-conceptualises government-group 
relations. Jordan and Richardson see ‘state autonomy’ and policy 
networks as mutually exclusive.^^^ However, government actors and 
agencies have the potential to act autonomously, and the policy network 
model fits neatly into the government autonomy/reformed pluralism 
paradigm.
Since there is no single governmental view, different players have 
their own perspectives, departments have their own styles, units within 
departments have ‘lines’, civil servants have personal preferences and 
ministerial styles differ.^^^ Relations between government actors and 
interest-groups vary in a fragmented process. Salisbury argues the “use 
of multiple representatives, each concentrating on a specialized set of 
policy concerns, surely must intensify the fragmenting, disaggregating 
tendencies in public policy.’’^^  ^ Consistent with government autonomy, 
access may be denied to groups not in clientelistic relationships. 
Lobbyists help manage clients’ involvement in decision-making 
relationships.
Policy communities take civil servants to be key decision-makers. 
Policy is made at low levels -  political actors often accept the broad thrust 
of policy.^^^ Many policy areas will be attended to by only a handful of 
civil servants (possibly an under secretary, a principal and an assistant 
secretary) reflecting the complexity and specialisation of policy. This 
linoleum’ level is cultivated assiduously by lobbyists because they have a 
predominance of influence.
The model assumes trust between participants. The lobbyist must 
develop a reputation as a discreet and reliable source, using a common 
(expert) language. Since the Whitehall village is small and professional 
lobbying is concentrated in a few sectors of government, to be effective in 
influencing policy, interest-g roups should build long-term relationships 
through which they should supply reliable information.^^® Professional
Richardson, J., and Jordan, G., (1979)
Jordan, G., Maloney, W., and McLaughlin, A., (1992b)
121 
122
Salisbury, R„ (1984)
Jordan, G„ (1990c)
Smith, M„ (1990)
Mackenzie, W., (1955) cited in Jordan, G., Maloney, W., and McLaughlin, A., (1992b)
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lobbyists act as channels between clients and officials. Given this 
information exchange, the civil service might become dependent on, or 
even obligated to, the lobbyist.
Civil servants usually have stable relationships with outsiders, but 
a minister may wish to destabilise the community by introducing new 
actors. Lobbyists can help by pushing clients forward. Communities 
exist often because government wills it so; and by locking groups in the 
autonomy of government actors can be enhanced. But Rhodes cautions 
that dependence remains reciprocal even if it appears that one side 
dominates.
Civil servants can freeze groups out, but lobbyists can help by 
suggesting other routes to overcome or avoid obstructive officials or 
ministers. They can prise open established relationships. New players 
can enter as the agenda shifts. The type of network and its permeability 
vary depending upon the macro-political institutions and the policy issue. 
Some groups will be outsiders by virtue of their objectives: either way 
insiders and outsiders are consulted. Consultation, discussed next, can 
be unimportant, and interest-g roups that are consulted can be ineffective.
Insiders and Outsiders
Grant has explored the notion of insiders and outsiders in 
B r i t a in . L o b b y i s t s  might be effective because they are of a similar 
‘political culture’ to civil servants and politicians. They have worked in 
parties, parliament and Whitehall. Lobbyists learn to “exploit shared 
cultural, social and educational backgrounds as well as to play by the 
Whitehall mores of trust, responsible behaviour, secrecy, compromise 
and g radua l i sm.Lobby is t s  are effective because they “understand the 
mentality and processes at the heart of the m a c h i n e . T h e y  are the 
ultimate insiders.
Rhodes in Jordan, G., (1990c)
Grant, W., (1995,1978); also see Jones, B., (1995) 
Doig, A., (1991), p149 
Miller, C., (1991), p58
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There are three types of insider group: prisoners, low-profile and 
h igh-prof i le .Outs ider  groups can be divided into ‘potential insiders', 
‘outsiders by necessity’ and ‘ideological outsiders’. Professional lobbyists 
may provide outsider groups with the requisite degree of political 
sophistication to gain access to the policy community.^^^ They can 
advise them how to act in a manner acceptable to civil servants and 
government.
Jordan et al reformulate Grant’s insider-outsider m o d e l . T h e y  
argue insider groups should be divided into ‘core participants’ including 
groups seen as relevant sources of policy, such as the NFU or BMA. 
‘Niche participants’ have a specific interest and are a reliable and 
authoritative source of information. Such groups will respond in detail to 
policy proposals in their niche area, whereas outside their niche they may 
have little influence. Peripheral insider groups’ are seen by officials as 
legitimate because they do not use high-cost actions, but their relevance 
to a policy issue may be marginal. Outsider groups are left outside the 
process by ideological convictions. The views of such groups cannot be 
incorporated in the policy-making process. ‘Outsider groups by choice’ 
are those which make a conscious decision not to become involved in a 
cosy arrangement with government. ‘Failed insiders’ are possible 
insiders, but their inexperience denies them such a status.
Consultation is an everyday part of the policy process. However, 
the implication in the literature is that consultation and insider status imply 
influence. But consultation is not influence. Government now engages in 
pre-consultation with a select group, so that formal consultation has less 
impact on policy. Government actors have their own preferred options. 
Dudley and Richardson note that long and drawn out consultation rarely 
overturns the main lines of public policy.^^^ Being on a consultation list
Grant, W„ (1978, 1989)
Grant, W., (1989)
Jordan, G., Maloney, W., and McLaughlin, A., (1992b)
‘Issue publics’ are also said to exist. For example in Sunday Trading various sides were interested in the 
policy but did not agree on the solution. The preferences of the actors had to be taken into account by the 
other participants. See Laumann, E., and Knoke, D., (1987). Jordan argues opposition are excluded from key 
policy circles. The empirical evidence in this thesis refutes his hypothesis. All sides can agree on the rules of 
the game and behavioural norms. Opponents are met by ministers, have regular contact with officials and 
submit policy papers. They are very much included. That is not to say, however, they are influential, because 
government can act autonomously. See Jordan, G., (1990b)
Dudley, G., and Richardson, J., (1998)
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does not secure clout. Government decides whom to consult and topics 
of consultation. It decides what action to take. Although issues of access 
have implications for power, it is important not to be too concerned with 
ostensible behaviour because to do so would be to conclude that 
consultation equals access, which equals influence. The relationship is 
unlikely to be causal.
The British government sees the majority of interests as legitimate. 
All are invited to participate in consultation. Even opponent groups often 
enjoy warm relations with civil servants and MPs. They meet with 
officials, are consulted regularly, are suppliers of data and are informed of 
policy thinking. Despite this access these group have little effect on 
policy.
The notion that insider status is conferred on a few has been found 
by some to be a myth.^^^ Page assumes regular contact with 
departments and group-government policy coincidence is commensurate 
with the prestige of insider status. However, the survey on which his 
findings are based focused on Statutory Instruments. It was undertaken 
during a honeymoon' period, and relied heavily on the perceptions 
groups held about their own influence. This example illustrates how 
important it is to break the chain that links ‘insider’ with ‘influence’.
Christiansen and Dowding consider Amnesty International has 
‘insider-status’ with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office because 
Amnesty provides information, attends meetings and maintains formal 
and informal contact with o f f i c i a l s . H o w e ve r ,  it is doubtful whether 
Amnesty affected policy. It was simply an easy source of information. 
The reformed pluralism framework portrays the relationship as one in 
which the FCO used the group for its own ends as a source of quality 
information.
Interest-g roups may have insider status in one arena but outsider 
status in another and be ignored in both. Amnesty is both included in and 
excluded from different policy communities, but in both its interests
136 Smith, M., (1995b)
Page, £ .,(1998)
Christiansen, L., and Dowding, K., (1994)
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diverge from the departments’. Dowding fails to convince that insider 
status leads to i n f l u e n c e . A  group can be an insider, and yet have little 
if any impact on policy. In contradistinction, interests excluded from the 
policy community, by selecting the right arena and message, can have an 
impact on policy.'"^°
Lobbyists know how to enter the ‘inner arena’ where policy is 
made. They can introduce their clients and their new ideas and 
knowledge to challenge a prevailing process. Groups without 
professional advice might find access difficult, but the real advantage of 
the lobbyist is that he manages activity within the community.
Multi-faceted lobbying: Hypothesis Five
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi­
faceted approach and facilitate access to multiple 
points in the decision-making process.
Evidence presented by Furlong challenges this hypothesis. His 
results “suggest that organizations may prove more effective in 
influencing regulatory policy by focusing their efforts on one form of 
a c c e s s . H o w e v e r ,  many forms of lobbying activity are positively 
associated with effectiveness, and “the general pattern is that doing more 
of anything produces greater success than doing less, regardless of 
strategy.’’ "^^  ^ Truman noted groups’ effectiveness required access to one 
or more points of decision in government.^"^^
A multi-faceted approach is a product of both internal and external 
factors. Externally the salience and the political and technical nature of 
the case, and the stance of government may determine whether a variety 
of approaches are exploited. However, if external factors allow a multi­
faceted approach its effectiveness is determined by the lobbyist’s internal 
characteristics, like skill and contacts.
Access does not equal influence. In contradistinction to the argument in Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J. 
(1986)
Dudley, G., and Richardson, J., (1996b)
Furlong, S., (1997), p340 
Heinz, J., et al (1993), p348 
Truman, (1951), p437
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One reason for believing effective lobbying is difficult to measure is 
that lobbyists may concentrate on those who are already convinced 
However, more recent research has challenged earlier conclusions by 
finding that lobbyists target a range of players, including friendly and 
unfriendly legislators.”''^ ^
Access may be a key objective, but it is rarely the ultimate goal of 
the lobbyist. Access is the ‘facilitating intermediate objective’ of 
l ob by i s t s . Acc es s  “structures the success or failure of the lobbyist, all 
of which come[s] after the access is a c h ie v e d .L o b b y i s t s  practise low- 
cost political actions such as involvement in day-to-day discussions, 
responding to consultation, commissioning research and meeting 
government. '^^® Hansen suggests that lobbyists and their clients can gain 
access if they have a competitive advantage over rivals in helping the re- 
election of politicians, and if the issue is likely to recurJ^^
Jordan quotes a civil servant “the average outsider tends to regard 
an Under Secretary as a fount of wisdom but anyone who has been in the 
[Civil] Service will want more than the fingers of both hands to count the 
number of stupid, silly or perverse Under Secretaries of his 
a c q u a i n t a n c e . W h i l s t  lobbyists deal at the lower levels of the 
Whitehall civil service, effective lobbyists tend to use all available entry 
points not only into the sponsoring department but also into other 
departments with an interest, parliament and the media.
An important resource available to groups is their degree of 
acceptance by government, and whether this acceptance allows for an 
informal and friendly relationship. “[G]roups which do not gain legitimacy 
remain outside the policy-making process and hence are ‘effectively’ 
mute.’’^^  ^ It may be that if access to policy communities is restricted, 
groups will adopt a high-profile campaign strategy. They will certainly be 
forced to pursue a multi-faceted approach. Lobbyists provide technical
Bauer, R., Pool, I., and Dexter, L., (1963)
145 Austen-Smlth, D., and Wright, J., (1994, 1996)
Truman, (1951)
Ainsworth, S., (1993), p43; Christiansen, L., and Dowding, K., (1994) 
Dunleavy, P., (1991)
Hansen, J., (1991)
Jordan, G., Maloney, W., and McLaughlin, A., (1992b)
Christiansen, L., and Dowding, K., (1994)
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guidance about the most effective manner to approach decision-makers. 
Even for groups with good relations with government, a multi-faceted 
approach is more likely to be effective.
Micro-level
Following the discussion of networks, it is important to recognise 
the significance of different layers, spheres, individuals and rules and 
their impact on policy outcomes. Inst i tut ions,  organisations, rules and 
procedures have profound effects on lobbyists and provide a partial 
explanation of e f f ec t i veness .The  impact of lobbyists depends on the 
interests of government actors because they make rules and have the 
potential to act autonomously.^^"^ Different agencies have different 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) and structures that configure 
relations with interest-groups. The effectiveness of lobbyists depends on 
those structures.
Routines and Standard Operating Procedures: 
Hypothesis Six
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar 
with routines and standard operating procedures and 
know when and where to intervene in the policy-making 
process.
Organisational Process
In regarding government actors as an independent variable, 
analysts invariably focus on recurring directives, procedures and 
institutional features. Rules and procedures are of key importance. 
Statute, conventions, executive orders and culture determine rules. In 
some networks rules will be explicit, in others implicit; some are stable, 
others change regularly. But rules define the game. The procedural and
See Parsons, W., (1996), p246 
See Baumgartner, F., (1996)
Smith, M„ (1993)
Political actors follow rules and procedure if they can. See Searing, D., (1991)
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cultural aspects of the relationship between the formal and informal rules 
and the actors impact on whether lobbyists can be effective.
Government administrators are socialised by their experiences, 
procedures and programmes. There are established rules for resolving 
disputes and gaining information and a dv i c e . Sub -go ve rn me n t a l  
organisations have their own preferences [pages 86-92]. Officials with 
narrow responsibilities develop predictable routines and practices when 
they formulate policy.^^^ Organisational needs and rivalries, policy 
frameworks, decisional criteria and policy options’ ramifications mould 
preferences.^^®
Institutions enjoy double-barrelled explanatory power because the 
resources of officials are institutionally derived, and institutional norms 
and procedures mediate their effective use and impact. A government 
agency is able to alter interest-group preferences by “fragmenting, 
neutralizing and countering the deployment of private resources.’’ ®^®
The government's “recurring directives and activities, internal 
processes, structural arrangements, and symbolic accoutrements help 
shape political beliefs and norms; levels and strategies of participation 
and opposition; the political crystallisation and alignments of ethnic 
segments, classes and interest groups; and the letter’s organisational 
contours, inclusiveness and specialisation.’’ ®^® Without undermining 
pluralism government actors can be accorded an analytical 
distinctiveness.
Complex problems are fragmented into component parts and 
explanations of policy outcomes must account for government’s sub- 
unüsJ®^
Government is a disparate set of administrative agencies, which 
are often governed by their own organising principles. Interaction with 
groups is conducted within the constraints and opportunities defined by
Cortel suggests that changes in the structure of a government agency can empower a well-placed lobbyist. 
Cortel, A., (1997)
157
Nordlinger, E„ (1988)
March, J., and Oisen, J., (1996)
Nordlinger, E., (1988), p883-884 
Nordlinger, E., (1988), p884
Steinbruner, J., (1974)
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procedures. The government has regulatory and selective functions to 
define interests and to select legitimate interests. March and Olsen 
suggested the organisation of political life makes a d i f f e rence .Ac to rs  
behave in structured contexts that influence outcomes. To judge the 
effectiveness of lobbyists it is important to recognise the organisation of 
the policy process.
Government and departments are a conglomerate “of semi-feudal, 
loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own.” ®^^ 
Each department and sub-governmental unit has responsibility for 
particular tasks and acts in a quasi-autonomous manner. Because 
boundaries are blurred, several bodies, co-ordinated by a minister or 
senior civil servant, will frequently have input into important problems. 
However, these political leaders impact on, but do not control, the 
behaviour of organisations. Problems are resolved by SOPs largely 
because of time-pressure and workload. The behaviour of organisations 
is determined in large part by established routines.
Games and routines explain how decisions are made. Institutional 
arrangements, pre-existing policies and organisations of parties can 
affect the influence of l o b b y i s t s . T h e  key to effective lobbying is 
knowledge of the rules of the game and how best to play the game within 
those rules. Rules differ in each network. Effective lobbyists are 
knowledgeable about the rules of the dominant games played in each 
policy arena. In different policy settings there will be different clusters of 
game players with their own rules and operating procedures. A lobbyist 
must know the rules of the game in each network.
Events rarely arise from purposive c h o i c e s . M o s t  theories of 
organisational decision-making use the concept of rationality.^®® However, 
the limits to human capacity suggest bounded rationality is more 
appropriate.^®^ Perfect information does not exist in practice. Complex
March, J., and Olsen, J., (1984)
'“ Allison, G„ (1971), p 67
Amata, E., and Zylan, Y., (1991)
Few neo-statists have worked with rational choice theory. Skocpol, T., (1979); Krasner, S., (1978) 
Steinbruner argues the concept of rational behaviour is drenched with normative connotations. See 
Steinbruner, J., (1974), p27
167 Comprehensive rationality involves organisations choosing the best option taking account of consequences.
their probabilities and utilities. Bounded rationality recognises the physical and psychological limits of man’s
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problems are disaggregated and passed to different units. Each option 
and its consequences are not considered by decision-makers -  the action 
considered ‘good enough' is often applied. Under comprehensive
rationality the search for all available choices is unimportant because all 
are considered, while under bounded rationality the order of search is 
crucial because the first ‘good-enough’ option is accepted.^®®
Organisations do not consider broad consequences of all possible 
actions. They have certain procedures with short-run feedback 
mechanisms to ensure prompt corrective action and prevent crystal-ball 
gazing. Organisations have SOPs that constrain effective choice in 
recurring issues. Responses are often steps learned by previous 
experience.^®® Decision-makers have to deal with the problem of 
uncertainty. To control uncertainty actors are sensitive only to
information processed by focused channels.
Allison presents a paradigm of ‘organisational process’ that can be 
applied to lobbyists’ a c t i v i t y . T h e  basic unit of analysis is governmental 
action not as deliberate choice, but as organisational output. Whilst 
actual occurrences are organisational outputs, some of which may be 
altered by government actors, most behaviour is determined by 
previously-established procedures.
Organisational procedures constitute a range of choices open to 
decision-makers. Cybernetic theory rests on a decision-maker having “a 
repertory of operations which he performs in sequence while monitoring a 
few feedback var iables.Organisat ional  outputs structure issues within 
constraints within which leaders must decide -  they rarely write on a 
clean s l a t e . P e c u l i a r  to central government is that each department
capacity as option generator, information processor and problem solver. These limits require simplified 
models to extract the main features of the problem without capturing all its complexity. Allison, G., (1971), p 71 
Steinbruner says in reality the decision process "proceeds sequentially to examine a set of alternative 
actions until one with an outcome valued as acceptable is found.” p62. He says the “cybernetic theorist doubts 
that decisionmakers engage in sophisticated outcome calculations with any degree of regularity or 
consistency” Steinbruner, J., (1974), p66. Dowding argues the contrary. He suggests rational choice provides 
the mechanisms to explain policy development within policy networks. See Dowding, K., (1995a)
Steinbruner mimics Cyert and March who term the application to a problem of an option currently in use 
elsewhere ‘mating’. Cyert, R., and March, J., (1963) in Steinbruner, J., (1974), p75 
Steinbruner, J., (1974), p67
Allison, G., (1969, 1971); Allison, G., and Halperin, M., (1972); Allison, G., and Szanton, P., (1976) 
Steinbruner, J., (1974), p55
Incremental decision-making was defended against the rational comprehensive model. See Lindblom, C., 
(1959) and Wildavsky, A., (1964)
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runs its policy in a quasi-independent way -  ‘factoring’ permits 
spec ia l i sat ion.Since factoring encourages parochialism, lobbyists can 
be effective because they range across institutions. They hold 
information about the stance of institutional players. They understand 
that the structure of the issue is determined by organisational output. The 
lobbyist can be well co-ordinated on issues. Because established groups 
and government sometimes galvanise parochialism, thereby ensuring 
high-entry barriers to policy-making, lobbyists can be useful facilitators as 
well as players in their own right.
Organisational activity is often the enactment of pre-established 
routines. Such activity is characterised by:
1. goals emerging as a set of constraints defining acceptable 
performance;
2. sequential attention to problems as they arise;
3. standard operating procedures making responses to problems 
formalised and often sluggish;
4. established repertoires of rehearsed procedures which once triggered 
cannot be substantially changed;
5. the establishment of a negotiated environment to regularise the 
actions of other actors in the game;
6. the search for solutions to problems being largely determined by 
existing routines;
7. learning and change, which evolve from established procedures.
SOPs and repertoires of organisations may be affected by the 
intervention of senior government actors, but complete control is not 
possible. Lobbyists can encourage ministers to break procedure. If 
senior politicians are unable to force changes in standard operating 
procedures they may still be able to decide which organisations are 
involved in which games and at what level. Lobbyists may also introduce 
new issues to certain organisations.
Allison, G.. (1969), p700
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The descriptive power of this model for lobbyists is based on them 
understanding organisational routines that produce outputs. Reaction to 
problems is rarely the consequence of far-sighted and flexible analysis. It 
is determined chiefly by operating procedures. Procedures and routines 
allow bureaucrats to deal with similar policy matters day after day with 
little thought. To business, procedures seem complex and formal, but 
they are the lobbyists' stock in trade. Effective lobbyists are familiar with 
those routines. They know when and how to intervene.
Contacts and Coalitions: Hypothesis Seven
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good 
contacts and can spot connections to potential allies 
and can construct coalitions.
Governmental-politics model
The model is principally dependent upon internal factors such as 
the lobbyist’s contacts and knowledge. However the behaviour of other 
players also affects the ability to form coalitions; therefore external factors 
are present. Graham Allison developed the governmental-politics 
mode l ,bu i l d ing  on the work of Richard Neustadt.^^® Although Allison 
applied the model to policy crises, it can be used to explain routine policy 
development. The model understands events as neither choices nor 
outputs but as outcomes. What happens is the consequence of various 
bargaining games, compromises, coalitions and competition. Allison 
poses the question: “which results of what kind of bargaining among 
which players yielded the critical decisions and actions?”^^  ^ This model 
concentrates on perceptions, motivations, positions, power and 
manoeuvres of the actors. The model has been little applied since 
Allison’s seminal study.^^®
Policy analysis should consider personal interactions.^^® Viewing 
an action at the micro-level as the product of bargaining between actors
''"Allison, G.. (1969, 1971)
Neustadt witnessed first hand the bargaining games entered into by the US President. Holding power was 
not enough to achieve objectives. Neustadt, R., (1963 ,1964,1970)
Allison, G., (1971), p7
See Rhodes, E., (1994); Dunleavy, P., (1995b); Parsons, W., (1996)
See Parsons, W., (1996), pp 336-342
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in the game helps understanding of how lobbyists can be effective. 
Events can be explained when it is discovered who did what to whom and 
when. The governmental-politics model denies players plan their moves 
rationally and accepts players have imperfect information. Lobbyists tend 
to be effective because they know the personalities. Heinz et al suggest 
that lobbying representatives “who have frequent contact with influential 
representatives [decision-makers] are themselves likely to be 
i n f l u e n t i a l . T h i s  ‘knowledge’ allows them to understand the history 
and personal preferences of actors. Their contacts allow them to devise 
effective tactics. Lobbyists are detached players who can stand back and 
plan strategy.
The Allison model has pluralist roots. Since he recognised 
government organisations are not monolithic, the model is compatible 
with reformed pluralism where different sub-units of government can have 
different preferences. Government actors are the more powerful actors 
and provide strategic d i r e c t i o n . T h e  governmental-politics model 
argues that policy is an outcome of bargaining between actors within 
bureaucratic procedures.
Governmental politics is messy. Actors do not make decisions by 
a single rational choice; rather they negotiate and bargain. Different 
actors have different preferences. Government actors have one set of 
preferences and interest-groups another. Lobbyists act as a bridge -  
they bring the players closer together by identifying common ground. The 
need to secure effective representation “is a motivating force in the 
formation of alliances and the recognition of a common interest.” ®^^ 
Lobbyists spot connections with potential coalition partners to present a 
‘broad front’ to government.^®^ To be effective lobbyists rely on coalitional 
lobbying.
Heinz, J.. et a! (1993), p350 
Allison, G„ (1971), p144 
Stewart, J., (1958), p46
The ability to present a broad coalition improves effectiveness. See Herring, P., (1929); Wilson, J., (1973); 
Salisbury, R., Heinz, J., Laumann, E., and Nelson, R., (1987); Berry, J., (1989b); Furlong, S., (1997) 
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986), p278
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Constructing coalitions is an important determinant of 
effectiveness.^®^ The ability and willingness to form coalitions influences 
the ability of lobbyists and interest-groups to influence policy.^®® Similarly 
both Schlozman and Tierney and Knoke give examples of interest-groups 
forming coalitions to achieve their objectives.^®^ In addition to the
importance of personal contacts “the more coalitions that an organization 
builds with other groups, the greater its success at influencing public- 
policy decisions."^®® Coalition building is depicted as a cause of policy 
effectiveness.
To explain why a certain decision was made or why a certain 
pattern of activity emerged it is necessary to identify the games, the 
players, the coalitions, and the operating procedures. Effective lobbyists 
can be the locus of initiative; elevating ideas and identifying links and 
connections. As substantive problems make disagreement likely,^®  ^
consensus-building becomes more important, lobbyists are more valuable 
because they can spot themes in their client's case on which it can play 
with a reasonable chance of success/^®
To improve the analysis of policy decisions it is useful to 
“distinguish among governmental actions that are: agglomerations of 
relatively independent decisions and actions by individuals and groups of 
players; formal governmental decisions or actions that represent a 
combination of the preferences and relative influence of central players in 
the game; or formal governmental decisions and actions that represent a 
combination of the preferences and relative influence of a special subset 
of players in the game.””'®’'
The ‘governmental actor’ can be visualised as a host of individual 
players. Only issues of supreme importance attract the attention of the 
busiest players. Individuals are players because of their occupation -  
their position often defines their impact. The resolution of problems also
Sabato, L , (1990), p i36 
Furlong, S., (1997)
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986); and Knoke, D., (1990)
'“ Knoke, D„ (1990), p208-9
Allison, G., (1971), p157. A bargaining advantage may be important and comes from formal authority, 
control over resources necessary for implementation, responsibility for implementation, control over 
information and persuasiveness. See Aiiison, G., and Halperin, M., (1972)
Allison, G„ (1969)
Allison. G„ (1971), p i 64
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depends on personalities. Many lobbyists have worked in government 
and the parties: they know the personalities within government. This 
information cannot be gleaned in any other way. Knowledge of the 
stance, mannerisms, beliefs and convictions of key players endows 
privilege.
A definition of the issue will differ by the position from which the 
policy is considered. The organisation’s orientation will determine its 
involvement and priorities. Decisions and actions advance and impede 
each player’s conception of the organisational, the personal and the 
national interest. Action can be necessitated by deadlines, speeches by 
key political actors or crises. Players will approach the issue from 
different viewpoints. However the power -  the effective influence on 
government decisions -  of actors depends on bargaining advantages, 
skill in using those advantages and other players’ perceptions of 
advantages and skill.
Effective lobbyists help knit actors into action-channels, which 
structure the game by pre-selecting major p layers .Lobby is t s,  because 
they have navigated these channels countless times before, confer 
advantage on their c l i e n t s . E a c h  player will ‘pull and haul’ with the 
power at his discretion for outcomes that advance his interest. Effective 
lobbyists tend to know at what point to play to avoid being over-powered 
by others. Lobbyists help clients find other options and arguments to put 
to decision-makers.
The explanatory power of the governmental-politics model opens 
up to scrutiny the game that yielded the action -  the players and their 
preferences, their positions and action channels. Lobbyists are at the 
centre of planning the client’s strategy, policy and location. Lobbyists are 
neither ‘of government’ nor ‘of the client’; they can take a detached view 
of the game.
Allison identifies several relevant factors.
Allison, G„ (1971), p171
Karl Deutsch refers to these channels of communication as the nerves of government. Whilst other political 
scientists are concerned with the muscles (power) or skeleton (institutions), Deutsch examined the nerves. He 
suggested government is a problem of steering, and that steering is about communication. Deutsch, K.,
(1963)
Aiiison, G„ (1971), pp167-180
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1. The stance of actors has a significant effect on governmental action. The 
advantages of each player will differ depending on the action-channel, the mix of 
players.
2. Action does not presuppose government intention. Players with different intentions 
will contribute to a policy action. Policy emerges from games where players 
perceive different faces of an issue.
3. Players do not focus on the grand strategic problem but on immediate decisions that 
must be taken. Lobbyists apply knowledge of previous experience.
4. Diverse demands on players shape perceptions, priorities and issues.
5. Vertical and horizontal demands on actors are distinct. Problems are framed and 
options specified by lowly actors. They compete to attract the attention of senior 
actors.
6. The rules of the game affect the strategy of the players.
7. There is not perfect information in games; misperception is a part of bargaining and 
allows co-operation among people who, had they full knowledge, would not co­
operate. Miscommunication between players is also likely in fast-moving games.
8. Multiple games allow limited attention to individual games.
9. Involvement in multiple games means reticence is advantageous. Reticence 
reduces the likelihood of harmful leaks and gives opponents an ill-focused target of 
attack.
10. Players have different styles. Officials will adopt a code of conformity to withstand a 
change of administration. Political actors and lobbyists are more interested in 
policy.
information about perceptions, priorities and personalities is not 
available through documents. Indeed, documents obscure such 
information. Because lobbyists know actors they can gather intelligence 
and disentangle preferences. Their contacts are crucial. Their clients 
enter the game with an advantage.
Policy choices emerge not from rational choice but from 
negotiations undertaken within SOPs. Allison’s work helps the 
understanding of lobbyists’ effectiveness because he presents the 
organisational process model (which sees policy as an output largely 
determined by SOPs) and the governmental politics model (policy is the 
outcome of bargaining between players) as frameworks explaining and 
predicting. The models complement one another. The organisational 
model analyses the routines of bureaucracy and highlights the aggregate
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behaviour of organisations, whereas the governmental-politics model 
emphasises the actions of individual players and the politics between
themJ^^
Resources: Hypothesis Eight
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has 
abundant resources and is skilful in deploying them.
The significance of resources is widely recognised.^®® Clients can 
affect policy only to the extent they can afford to.^ ®^  Resources influence 
group strength. The size of the membership, internal discipline, financial 
support, the potential for mobilisation and how seriously they are viewed 
by officials are important resources influencing client effectiveness. 
Political resources are not limited to one group: their distribution takes the 
form of ‘dispersed inequalities’. “[N]o group of more than a few 
individuals is entirely lacking in some influence resources.” ®^® However, 
the larger, better-organised and well-financed groups are likely to 
succeed at the expense of smaller less well-resourced groups.
The level of resources can be an ingredient of successful 
lobbying.^®® Smith argued “the availability of the requisite resources for 
the acquisition of information about the consequences of various 
positions on a proposal and the presence of creative, experienced people 
who can transform information about consequences into interpretations 
that are appealing."^®® Similarly, Schlozman and Tierney note the 
importance of finance as a variable that affects an interest-groups’ ability 
to participate in, and influence policy-making.^®^ Low-profile lobbies 
require resources because of the need to undertake research, hire skilled 
staff, and to build up expertise. Langbein and Lotwis suggest resources 
are a determinant of effectiveness, pointing out “that relative wealth does
197
Allison, G.. (1971), p275
Dahl, R., (1961): Truman, (1951); Lindblom, C., (1977) 
Salisbury, R., (1984), p68
'®®Dahl, R„ (1961)
Smith, R„ (1984)
Smith, R., (1984), p49 
Schlozman, K., and Tierney, J., (1986)
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not determine overall effectiveness but rather affects how groups chose 
to exercise influence.
However, the amount of time available to the lobbyist is another 
variable, and the transformation of resource advantage into policy 
effectiveness is conditional upon the time for lobbying. “Because of the 
lack of time available to develop advocacy efforts, the advocate will find it 
difficult to use its resource advantage e f f ec t i v e l y . . . L ob by is t s  need 
time to turn their resource advantage into policy effectiveness.
Skill in deploying resources and knowledge might be more 
important than the quantity of resources. This conclusion may explain 
why some well-resourced groups are defeated by interest-groups with 
limited resources. Groups with small resources can have a greater 
impact on events than those with large resources: “The use of resources 
depends on context and strategy.” ®^"^  So “looking at these resources is 
not enough to measure their [actors’] capacities, for those resources will 
only allow actors to bring about outcomes under certain conditions.” °^^  
Although Rush expresses concern that money secures the expertise 
necessary to win the argument he recognises the quality of the expertise 
is not in direct ratio to its cost.^°® Some interest-groups have developed a 
degree of expertise in lobbying equal to if not greater than the expertise 
of professional lobbyists. It is not always that the more wealthy groups 
are the most effective.
The skill of players in deploying resources influences policy 
outcomes. A client with limited resources might be disproportionately 
effective because its lobbyist uses resources in an adroit manner. 
Rhodes’ work on policy-making and bargaining concentrates on 
resources. His model of resources available to actors in a game can be 
merged with Allison’s models and set in the context of reformed pluralism.
Rhodes suggests five resources are central to effective bargaining 
and negotiation. They are constitutional and legal, hierarchical, financial.
Langbein, L., and Lotwis, M., (1990), p434 
"“ Smith, R., (1984), p51 
Smith, M„ (1999), p53
205
"“ Rush, M„ (1990b)
Dowding, K., (1991), p5
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political and i n f o rm a t io n a l . T h e  definition of resources is subjective 
because resources are variable, depend on actors’ perceptions and their 
value is relative over time.^°® The impact of resources depends on the 
rules governing the exchange relationship and the skill with which they 
are deployed. Power dependency means the lobbyist depends on the 
resource commitment of his client. He seems to support the concept of 
government autonomy when he argues that one body (government) can 
be dependent on another (group) for information and services, yet still 
have power over that organisation.^®^ But his theory of power- 
dependence does not adequately recognise that certain resources decide 
others. Legal powers determine finance, access to information and 
hierarchical relations. Although Rhodes declares the primacy of policy 
networks over relationships between institutions, Loughlin suggests policy 
network and institutional analysis are mutually reinforcing forms of 
investigation.^^® Rhodes’ concentration on informal rules seems to be at 
the expense of formal rules. However, informal rules require formal rules 
and authority to sustain them. Both are equally important.
Therefore resources do not guarantee success, but neither do 
deficiencies spell doom.
Conclusions
The risk of a multi-theoretic approach is it becomes “descriptively 
comprehensive but theoretically incoherent, and incapable of being 
generalised to apply to different issues and d e c i s i o n s . H o w e v e r ,  
because politics is a “multi-level, multi-arena game’’^ ^^ , a macro, meso 
and micro-level is an appropriate framework to understand the 
effectiveness of lobbyists. The organisation of this thesis reflects the 
framework outlined in this chapter.
“^"Rhodes, R.. (1992a)
^  Rhodes. R.. (1992a)
^  Rhodes, R„ (1980)
Loughlin. M.. (1996)
Dunleavy. P., (1995b)
Dudley. G., and Richardson. J., (1998)
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This chapter has shown the importance of attention to context. To 
explain the context within which lobbyists can be effective it is valuable to 
utilise a macro-level concept (recognising external constraints on 
government, factors internal to government, and government autonomy), 
a meso-level concept (policy networks) and a micro-level analysis (the 
merged Allison and Rhodes models examining rules, actors and 
resources). This framework recognises the complexity of decision­
making.
Both government action and social context are important in 
explaining how, why and when lobbyists are effective. If the external 
context (i.e. constraints outside and within government’s control) is 
favourable, then lobbyists have the opportunity to be effective. 
Effectiveness then depends on internal factors, such as tactics, contacts, 
knowledge of rules, and the amount and deployment of resources.
At the macro-level this framework presents the wider context and 
government autonomy as key external factors. Both lobbyists and 
government can be restricted by external constraints. Merging reformed 
pluralism and weak government autonomy presents a more sophisticated 
approach.^^^ Government players with their own objectives can steer 
groups, develop their own policy and mould their environment.^^"^ There 
is no over-arching single government interest; the interests of government 
actors do not develop in isolation from groups, and it may even be that 
government initially responds to groups.
But effectiveness is curbed if the aim of the lobbyist is to achieve 
change which ‘goes against the grain’ of current political, ideological, 
societal or organisational trends. The reformed pluralism model allows 
influence to be conceptualised in the policy-network model.^^® Policy 
communities are a source of influence for officials because they limit the 
options for change. The thesis will test whether within the policy 
community lobbyists use their resources to manage their client’s
See Smith, M., (1993), p47
214
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performance to improve its effectiveness. Effective lobbyists also adopt a 
multi-faceted approach.
Within the policy community options are limited by standard 
operating procedures, which for government actors are more important 
than rational assessment. Organisational activity is, more often than not, 
the execution of pre-established routines. Effective lobbyists understand 
and empathise with the organisational tendencies and standard scenarios 
used by policy-makers -  they know, and can anticipate how, the ‘official 
machine’ works.
Lobbyists are effective if they ascertain who the key players are, 
their motivations, their public position and their private objectives and 
their relative influence. The effective lobbyist comprehends the power 
relations (how ‘the process’ works informally within the formal routines) 
and can predict how the games will be played. They have this 
information because they are ‘close to the ground’ and know the players, 
often because they are associated with parties and consequently trusted 
by politicians. The lobbyist seeks out connections and affiliations with 
third parties.
During the game the level and the deployment of resources might 
prove decisive. Lobbyists know how to use resources effectively. An 
effective lobbyist uses his skill and experience to ‘punch above his 
weight’.
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4 . Simday Trailing
Sundays are special. Sunday trading was a high-profile issue 
fought over the long-term at many different levels by two main interest- 
groups -  one lobbying for deregulation of trading laws, the other 
campaigning for a day of rest and religion. This chapter examines the 
effectiveness of lobbyists campaigning for both sides. Before 1994, 
Sunday trading laws were embodied in the Sunday Fairs Act of 1448 and 
the Sunday Observance Acts of 1627 and 1677. These Acts were 
updated by the Shops Act of 1911, 1928 and 1936% which in turn were 
consolidated as a ‘temporary measure’ in the Shops Act 1950.^
The Act was riddled with anomalies and complications leading to 
inconsistencies. It was subject to many attempts at reform, including 
three Departmental Committees^ and nineteen Private Member’s Bills. 
Until the 1980s governments believed Sunday trading law should be 
changed by Private Member’s legislation. The Thatcher government 
favoured public legislation. However, ministers were shaken by the loss 
of the government’s Shops Bill (1985) at Second Reading, which 
disrupted its deregulatory agenda.
The subsequent inability of successive Home Secretaries to 
liberalise Sunday trading was embarrassing. This chapter examines the 
interest-group activity on the issue from the defeat in 1986 to the 
enactment of the Sunday Trading Bill in April 1994. There were two 
campaigns. The first began with an attempt to reintroduce immediately 
the Shops Bill, and involved lobbying government, which accepted the 
principle of the desirability of change, but lacked a parliamentary majority 
to pass this legislation. Government feared another defeat. The pro­
liberalisation lobby was included in the real centre of policy-making whilst
 ^ Namely the Shops (Hours of Closing) Act 1928 and the Shops (Sunday Trading Restrictions) Act 1936. 
2 Brown, P., (1990)
 ^Diamond, P., (1991a)
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the anti-liberalisation lobby was excluded. The latter was 
disproportionately weak. As a peripheral player it was consulted but had 
little impact on the policy outcome.
The second phase was the Lloydian period (1992-94 which 
coincided with Peter Lloyd MP’s tenure as Parliamentary Under­
secretary of State at the Home Office). A government majority of twenty- 
one, continued interest-group intransigence, and a Sabbatarian rump of 
Tory MPs forced inventive thinking by officials. Consequently policy­
making was devolved to key interest-groups to produce an options Bill. 
The process was made transparent to an unprecedented degree. 
Parliament was presented a choice of different regimes. Government’s 
power was limited. Lobbying focused on parliament as the ultimate 
arbiter. The final outcome was close. The regulatory option was defeated 
by 304 votes to 286; a majority of only 18. The partial deregulation 
option was later approved by 333 votes to 258, a majority of 75^
* Total deregulation was defeated by 404 votes to 174, a majority of 230. “MPs pass six-hour Sunday 
shopping for stores", Financial Times, 9 December 1993
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Interest-groups and lobbyists
Conflict between the groups was intense and sharply defined. 
Two groups dominated the campaign. The Keep Sunday Special 
Campaign (KSSC), was opposed by the Shopping Hours Reform Council 
(SHRC). Three satellite groups circled on the fringes: Outlets Providing 
Everyday Needs (OPEN), Retailers for Shops Act Reform (RSAR) and 
Sort Out Sunday (SOS).
Keep Sundav Special Campaign
The Jubilee Trust, a charitable organisation, housed KSSC.^ It 
pursued collective objectives. Its priority was to ensure the Shops Act 
was enforced without creating a backlash, which would deliver 
liberalisation by default. It had no reforming intentions -  it wanted to 
keep shops shut. Later it was forced to create an alternative to 
deregulation, and the REST proposals (Recreation, Emergencies, Social 
Gatherings, and Travel) were launched in May 1987.®
The Daily Telegraph described KSSC’s bizarre nature: an “alliance 
of Seventh Day Separatists: Labour MPs for the shop-workers, Tories for 
the family unit and churchgoers from all quarters.”  ^ It portrayed itself as 
the voice of middle England.® KSSC was not solely religious. It 
represented national retailers, trades unions and trade associations.
KSSC’s intellectual and religious elements were torn between an 
anti-liberal socio-economic analysis on the left, and conservative moral 
commitments pulling to the right. KSSC tried to keep these two themes 
in parallel, but it continued to be perceived as Sabbatarian. 
Subsequently, as employment rights became important, KSSC’s tradition 
of one-nation conservatism, which developed into communitarianism.
® The Jubilee Trust was registered as a charity on 5th March 1984, Reg. No. 288783. Its stated aims were to 
carry out research into biblical teaching on politics and economics
® The REST proposals were based on exempt shops rather than exempt goods, unlike the Shops Act 1950 
which forbid the sale of specific goods. Outlets offering services covered by the acronym REST were to be 
allowed to open. Recreation "sports, outings visits and fun. Certain goods might be allowed which help the 
main activity, such as fishing bait, tennis balls and ice-cream"; Emergencies "Emergencies can happen at any 
time, and to anybody. Legislation must make allowances for situation where pain or hardship occurs. Goods 
such as medicines, petrol and vital car parts need to be available"; Social Gatherings "Sunday is a day for 
peopie to relax, to meet with family and friends, to talk and share a meal or a drink, to spend time together. 
Goods such as restaurant meais obviously enhance special gatherings"; and Travel "We ail have to travel 
some time on Sundays, for recreation, in emergencies or to attend social gatherings. It seems sensible that 
goods which aid a journey should be made available." See KSSC "Consensus on New Sunday Principles" 20 
May 1987
 ^“Commons Sketch: Rumbo buys time in shopping row". Daily Telegraph, 28 November 1991 
® William Oddie, “Never Ever on a Sunday”, The Spectator, 14 December 1991
114
Chapter Four
meant Christians and Socialists found a common denominator in dislike 
of exploitation.
KSSC used a political adviser. Though most work was done in- 
house, he contributed strategic guidance, political intelligence, drafted 
documents, and advised on resource prioritisation. The adviser 
undertook no advocacy. KSSC “made a conscious decision not to 
employ professional lobbyists... because the image of the campaign was 
grass roots up.” KSSC did not want to “come over as a bunch of smart- 
arsed lobbyists... [and] cherished its homely, amateur approach.”®
Shopoino Hours Reform Council
Following the defeat of the Shops Bill, the Sunday trading lobby 
disintegrated. In 1987 the DIY groups and the garden centres 
reconstituted.^® Although initially a splinter from die-hard retailers, SHRC 
became the main pro-deregulation group lobbying for the right for all 
shops to trade for limited-hours on Sundays.^^ DIY businesses and peak 
associations supported SHRC. Food retailers joined later, when a 
loophole in the law allowed them to trade on a Sunday.
GJW and Burson-Marsteller were SHRC’s lead lobbyists. GJW 
was described by the SHRC as “our eyes and ears wherever they 
went.”^^  GJW’s forte was lobbying national politicians and civil servants.''® 
The campaign was also advised by Lowe Bell Communications, Des 
Wilson who later joined Burson-Marsteller, and a Labour consultant.
SHRC harmonised the lobbying of its member companies. Ian 
Greer Associates worked for Kingfisher.^"^ Political Profile worked for WH 
Smith and Charles Barker worked for Tesco. Lowe Bell provided public 
relations and strategic advice to SHRC.^® The lack of progress between 
1986-90 and Lowe Bell’s high cost meant it was removed whilst GJW 
was retained.^® SHRC’s believed “it was like having a Rolls Royce sitting
® KSSC director, interview, 17/3/1997 
B&Q, Wickes and Homebase. B&Q estimated sales of £168 million (23% of turnover) were carried out on 
Sundays. Because companies costed themselves on a six day basis the marginal turnover of 23%  
accounted, arguably for the whole of the company’s profit.
"  SHRC, (1991)
Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997 
Chairman of SHRC, interview, 22/7/1997
Jon Craig, “Poll boosts campaign for opening shops on Sundays”, The Sunday Times, 12 February 1989 
A senior retailer commented “people thought Tim Bell was so good, had such good contacts with the Tories 
that he was the man to go for.” Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997 
Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997
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in the garage. You didn’t need it. All you needed was a good Mini 
Cooper."^’’
Burson-Marsteller was hired in 1993.^® Wilson continued the 
public communications brief and focused third-party support by adding a 
strategic overview, pooling resources of SHRC members, and 
orchestrating a grassroots campaign.
Outlets Providing Evervdav Needs
OPEN sought to protect the interests of the small store sector. It 
wanted the law to allow small retailers to open, but to keep the large 
traders shut. OPEN’s aim was to “minimise the damage that would 
accrue if SHRC [won] on one hand or KSSC kept us closed on the other. 
Both were disaster s c e n a r i o s . O P E N  represented small retail outlets, 
including over 10,000 small shops, occupying the ‘middle-ground’. The 
group was a “very minor player.
Burson-Marsteller was hired in 1986, but OPEN changed to 
Rowland Sallingbury Casey (RSC) in 1990 supported by a public 
relations team. Two lobbyists ran the OPEN secretariat.^^ There was no 
permanent s t a f f . T h e  executive council agreed general policy and 
funding. A lobbyist said “All the campaigning was done by us, including 
drafting letters, meeting MPs, meeting civil servants, putting out press 
releases, and talking to the trade press. We did everything. We ran it.’’^ "^
Retailers for Shops Act Reform
RSAR was a late entrant into the debate. It wanted to prevent 
large out-of-town stores from opening and campaigned to stop SHRC 
because of the potential damage to its members’ town-centre 
businesses.^® RSAR was a cover for Marks & Spencer.^®
ibid
The £150,00 account was won on a non-competitive pitch
“B-M is called up in Sunday trading war”, PR Week, 3/6/1993 and “Diary”, The Spectator, 6 May 1989 
OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997 
OPEN lobbyist, interview, 17/3/1997
The chairman was impressed that the senior lobbyist “worked in Conservative Central Office and was well 
connected - speech writing for various top ministers."
The chairman used colleagues from member businesses for meetings with ministers.
OPEN lobbyist, interview, 17/3/1997
Most M&S and House of Fraser stores are in town centres, but SHRC retailers were based mainly in out-of- 
town complexes.
^  It also included Budgen, Burton Group, Iceland, Next, Gateway, House of Fraser, Aldi, Sears, and WM 
Morrison amongst others.
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RSAR used Market Access for political research and intelligence. 
The lobbyist “did not lobby on [RSAR’s] behalf, because we do our own 
representations and our l o b b y i n g . T h e  consultancy provided “strategic 
advice on campaign management and advice and guidance on who the 
key players were.” ®^ Shandwick, a PR firm, undertook media work 
because RSAR “needed to get our stories into the newspapers at every 
opportunity.” ®^
Sort Out Sundav
SOS advocated total deregulation. Chaired by Lord Boyd- 
Carpenter, it was the political vehicle of the DIY, garden-centre and video 
industries.®® It shared members with SHRC. SOS “did not run a whole­
hearted campaign because... there was a risk of upsetting the apple cart 
of the SHRC.”®^ SOS’s strategy was to “appear to be wanting to change 
the law, but in fact to render the current law unenforceable.”®^
SOS remained a fringe group -  its natural constituency being the 
Conservative Party. SOS hired the Public Policy Unit. The lobbyist’s 
“feeling was to lie low. Government was not going to do anything for 
quite a while.”®® SOS lawyers stimulated test cases. The PPU lobbyist 
said SOS “decided it was going to do everything but lobby government.”®"^
RSAR Co-ordinator, interview, 3/6/1997 
ibid 
29 ibid
99 Sort Out Sunday Co-ordinator, interview, 1/7/1997 
9’ ibid 
92 ibid
99 PPU lobbyist, interview, 7/3/1997 
9^  ibid
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Macro-level
Profile, technicality and poiiticaiity: Hypothesis 
One
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on 
low-profile, technical and non-political issues.
Sunday trading was a big policy issue. Public-interest was great. 
There were thousands of written representations to the Home Office and 
MPs, acres of press coverage and hundreds of interest-groups agitated. 
Between 1986-92 campaigning was directed at government. After 1992 
more high-profile lobbying was directed at parliament, based on letter 
writing, petitions, demonstrations and using the media. As the Sunday 
trading campaign evolved, its profile increased. Government lost control 
of group politics. Policy was contracted-out to interest-groups. The 
government’s role was passive. It put the options together and let 
parliament decide.
Dozens of lobbyists were active on Sunday trading. By and large 
they remained in the shadows and were a minor influence on the 
debate.^^ They briefed MPs, the press and helped mobilise constituency 
support. But this issue was decided on conscience and other factors like 
ideology, morality, constituency, and the views of peers. Lobbyists had 
no direct effect, though they had some indirect influence. The lobbyists’ 
strategic approach was valuable, but their contribution to the campaign 
was limited.
Decisions on non-controversial issues tend to be made within 
small groups which lobbyists can permeate, but in Sunday trading 
lobbyists lacked control over events. The game was big and control over 
players and knowledge of personalities was difficult. This case study was 
about ideological conflict between the two main groups. Although SHRC 
possessed financial and organisational advantages enabling it to ‘shape’ 
public opinion, and had media support, it still could not win quickly. 
These advantages made little difference because the context was hostile.
However, both former Home Office Ministers recall holding meetings with two most prominent SHRC  
professional lobbyists. Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 10/6/1997
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A former minister claimed the most effective lobbying was 
parliamentary assistance -  providing MPs with intelligence, briefs, 
speeches and lists of people for MPs to contact.^® “Lobbyists knew how 
to put the information into palatable and consumable packages for 
Members of Parliament.”®^
Lobbyists were cautious when assessing their effectiveness. They 
qualified their ‘successes’. When the OPEN lobbyist was asked whether 
he was effective, he answered “No, not totally. We had a partial success. 
We got the best we could out of the final deal... We got a concession.”®® 
Contextual variables were important: “it’s arguable whether we did that 
or whether it would have happened anyway.”®® The lobbyists were 
effective in providing the small-store sector with a voice louder than it 
would otherwise have had.
The deregulation lobbyists perceived themselves to have been 
effective. The GJW lobbyist claimed effectiveness because of client 
satisfaction, arguing “we were working with hard-headed commercial 
people and if they had not thought we were doing a reasonable job they 
would have had us out in no time.”"^® His colleague was forthright: the 
SHRC “would never have got it without us. We started it. We educated 
them politically -  they were terribly naive.”^^^
GJW provided contacts, knowledge of parliamentary procedure, 
advocacy services and strategic advice to SHRC and lobbied MPs 
directly to confront KSSC. The risk of an intense parliamentary campaign 
is over-kill. A former Home Office Minister argued lobbyists were
regarded by many Members of Parliament as a nuisance, constantly 
ringing them up to ask them to commit themselves to one side or the 
other, which would then produce letters from supporters of the other 
side complaining about the position they took."^ ^
A former minister argued KSSC was “remarkably effective... [in] 
representing the inchoate fears of a large number of people.”'*® However, 
one lobbyist from another group considered KSSC to have been
Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 10/6/1997 
ibid
OPEN lobbyist, interview, 17/3/1997
ibid. The lobbyist argued he was successful by giving OPEN “a role and an influence far in excess of their 
actual importance, because we were lobbying on their behalf."
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997 
GJW Labour lobbyist, interview, 9/7/1997 
Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 10/6/1997 
Former Home Office Minister 1, interview, 26/6/1997
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“extraordinarily ineffective”, arguing its ‘all or nothing approach’ meant it 
was unable to compromise.
Conclusion
This issue was high-profile, general, and political in the first phase. 
A civil servant suggested “the whole point about the Shops Bill -  the 
absolute agony -  was that everyone is their own Home Secretary.”'^® The 
Home Office dealt with a range of views, from the Lord’s Day 
Observance Society to Sort Out Sunday. Everyone had an opinion, and 
no one felt obliged to justify their views. There was little to be gained 
from attempting reform because it encouraged protest and won little 
support for government. The issue was non-political after 1992 because 
of contextual changes.
Lobbyists were relatively unimportant and were minor players. 
They did not influence policy directly. Nevertheless, lobbyists were 
valuable in the communication of policy and internally within the 
coalitions. They helped explain policy to parliament and the media and 
helped groups refine their objectives. The evidence supports the 
hypothesis
OPEN lobbyist, interview, 17/3/1997
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98
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External and contextual factors: Hypothesis Two
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no 
disadvantageous external or contextual constraints 
beyond the control of government players.
External factors affected lobbying. Advice and action were 
influenced by external circumstances. A good example is SHRC’s view 
that it got “no value for money whatsoever” from Lowe Bell because 
lobbyists “cannot make government do things government does not want 
to.”^ ®
There are several important factors:
• Retailers
• A changing society
• Business profile
• Parliamentary change and ministerial turnover
• Labour modernisation
Retailers
Consumers increasingly shopped on Sundays. Change to the law 
was easier following societal changes. The Conservative government 
aimed to decriminalise Sunday shopping and leave regulation to the 
market. The SHRC argued 29% of shops opened on a Sunday in 
England and Wales compared to 25% in Scotland (In Scotland shops 
could open legally)."^  ^ The majority of shops trading every Sunday were 
small shops. The four leading supermarkets served 3.5 million 
customers each S u n d a y /^
There was cross-ownership between the different retail sectors."^ ® 
A key moment came in winter 1991 when food retailers opened, thereby 
undermining the ‘regulation’ groups. One participant argued “once 
people got used to shopping on a Sunday the battle was almost over.” °^ 
The retailers’ illegality changed the status quo. In 1986 KSSC had 
defended the status quo, but by the early 1990s the status quo had
'‘® Former SHRC Research Director, interview, 28/10/1996 
SHRC Sunday Shopping Update, The Case for Change, nd, SHRC archives 
ibid
Between DIY chains and food retailers. Sainsburys owned Homebase, whilst Wooiworth and B&Q were 
part of Kingfisher.
OPEN lobbyist, interview, 17/3/1997
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changed. SHRC was portrayed as defending people’s right to shop, 
whilst KSSC wanted to turn the clock back.
A Chancina Society
The workforce was changing.®^ The 1975 Labour Force Survey 
found 3.4 million people worked regularly on Sundays (15% of the 
workforce). By 1987 the figure was 5.6 million working at some time on 
Saturday and Sunday or on Sunday.®^ In 1950 26% of married women 
worked, by 1986 the figure had risen to 61%. Catering, leisure and 
transport sectors had worked on Sundays for decades.
Consumers had a different set of priorities from those in the 
1950s. In 1950 only 26% of married women worked outside the home. 
The figure in the early 1990s was 70%.®  ^ 73% of unmarried women 
worked full-time. By the 1980s the UK was the most irreligious country in 
Europe. Church attendance was 20%.
“The reason SHRC was more successful is that the tenor of its 
campaign and the message it preached was more in-line with reality.”^  
The SHRC’s messages were closer to people’s material instincts. KSSC 
tried to save a society that no longer existed. Public support gave 
government the credibility to back Sunday trading since it could argue it 
was not going against the grain.
The UK’s business profile had also changed. The Auld Report 
noted that in the 1970s small businesses closed at a rate of forty-five a 
day.®® Multiples increased their market share. Five big retailers 
controlled the food market.®® The consequence of the 1990s recession 
was fierce competition between larger retailers for diminishing consumer 
disposable income, and some retail chains opened on Sundays to 
increase turnover.
Reforming the Law on Sunday Trading: A Guide to the Options for Reform, HMSO, July 1993 
Lord Caithness, Committee Stage of Sunday Sports Bill, House of Lords, 5 November 1987 
SHRC Sunday Shopping Update, The Case for Change, nd, SHRC archives 
Deputy General Secretary of USDAW, Interview, 9/6/1997
The Shops Acts. Late-Night and Sunday Opening. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into proposals to 
amend the Shops Acts (The Auld Committee), Cmd 9376, November 1984, para 291. The committee was 
established by the Home Secretary in 1983, chaired by Robert Auld QC, to consider what changes were 
needed to the Shops Act.
Verdict Research 1986, cited in Diamond, P., (1991a)
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Parliamentary change and ministerial turnover
The 1992 General Election delivered John Major a parliamentary 
majority of only twenty-one, and with many Conservative MPs actively 
supporting both sides, Sunday trading could not be resolved by a 
whipped Bill. Therefore government devolved the process to the groups, 
which benefited SHRC. SHRC was able to shift its campaign to 
parliament and broaden its coalition. KSSC remained stuck in an 
‘opposition mindset’ and failed to hold its allies together or widen its 
appeal.
Ministerial turnover irritated interest-groups because they were 
forced to begin again from ‘square one’. Following a new ministerial 
appointment meetings took 3-4 months to arrange. A reshuffle propelled 
David Waddington (Secretary of State) and David Mellor (Minister of 
State) into the Home Office. SHRC hoped the Waddington-Mellor team 
would be dynamic.®^ But, despite having ‘friendly’ ministers, SHRC was 
ineffective because ministers were restricted by parliament. Government 
acted when circumstances changed. A civil servant argued “Peter Lloyd 
was not more effective than his predecessors. In a sense he was lucky. 
Circumstances were more favourable.’’^ ®
Labour Modernisation
KSSC was the natural home for Labour MPs of the old style, but 
Labour’s internal reform, modernisation and ideological realignment 
drove it to attract the southern, middle-class voter and business, more 
likely to sympathise with SHRC.®®
KSSC lobbied the sympathetic parliamentary body, whilst SHRC 
concentrated on the head. SHRC companies learned their way around 
the networks of party-modernising apparatchiks. “KSSC concentrated on 
backbench people who were individually sympathetic, rather than 
working out who were the coming people.’’®® Labour was “lobbied
Evidence of the new approach was witnessed by Mellor’s refusal to condemn B&Q  for trading illegally. HO 
Deb Vol. 163 col 453, 7 December 1989 
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98 
59 Radice, G„ and Pollard, S., (1992, 1993, 1994)
5° KSSC adviser, interview, 17/3/1997
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tremendously by SHRC, they were taken for meals... and functions were 
held. They got a barrage of propaganda from SHRC.”®^
In 1989 Labour and USDAW opposed deregulation.®^ But as 
modernisation progressed, Shadow Cabinet members no longer 
defended existing law.®® Labour MPs aired their support for Sunday 
trading.®"^  SHRC hired a consultant to lobby Labour because “the 
traditional lobbying companies had expertise dealing with technical 
issues, civil servants and government ministers, but were less developed 
on Labour lobbying.”®®
Former KSSC president. Lord Graham, broke ranks in 1992, 
arguing out-of-town stores should be allowed to open.®® When Roy 
Hattersley retired from the Home Office brief he publicly supported 
Sunday trading.®^ If retailers backed the European Social Charter 
protecting workers’ rights. Labour argued it could support liberalisation.®® 
SHRC policy was tweaked to accommodate Labour concerns.®® 
Following the 1992 Election Labour offered to “co-operate positively with 
the government to get legislation through the House.
Blair’s appointment as Shadow Home Secretary moved Labour 
further towards liberalisation, with Blair showing himself as a moderniser 
and consumer-friendly. Whilst Blair was “assiduous in not hitting a lobby 
[KSSC] which had Church support,”^^ his Home Office team refused to 
support Ray Powell’s KSSC-drafted Bill.^ ®
SHRC meetings between Blair and Baroness Jay, SHRC 
president, produced indications of support. SHRC acted as an informal 
channel of communication between Blair and Home Secretary, Kenneth 
Clarke. In preparation for a Labour government SHRC sought a Labour
Deputy General Secretary of USDAW, interview, 9/6/1997 
“  Ttiere was an USDAW-inspired NEC proposition 
See Martin Jacques, “Labour and the Sabbath”, The Times, 26 December 1990 
^  “Labour Shifts on Sunday Law”, Retail Week, 5 May 1991.
Labour Public Affairs Consultant, interview, 19/3/1997. He talked directly to Labour MPs “to present 
arguments in a way that would appeal to Labour MPs.”
Lord Graham was formerly KSSC’s lead Labour supporter. “Sunday switch by Graham”, Retail Week, 21 
February 1992
“Hattersley’s trading places”, Sunday Express, 12 July 1992 
“  “Toughening of the Law”, Retail Week, 12 April 1991 
“New Tories back Major on Sunday trading”. Daily Telegraph, 25 June 1992.
Offers of co-operation were made before and after the 1992 Election; Labour was keen to forge an 
agreement between retailers and shopworkers. “Labour Shifts on Sunday Law”, Retail Week, 5 May 1991. 
“Labour moves towards deal on Sunday trade”. Retail Week, 3 July 1992 
OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997
“Labour can update policies without losing its roots”, USDAW  Today, June 1993
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figurehead/^ Jay was ideal: she was at the heart of the Labour party, 
Lord Callaghan’s daughter, a key moderniser, close to Blair and a 
working woman/"^
GJW was also acceptable to Labour because its lobbyist, a former 
adviser to Callaghan when Prime Minister, was close to John Smith, 
Labour leader, and “knew all the people well. She was well liked and well 
respected.” ®^ SHRC attached itself to the right-wing, modernising, 
feminist element which included the Emily’s list network.^® The PLP’s 
shift, driven by modernisers, Scottish MPs, and a wish not to have to deal 
with Sunday trading in government, was confirmed by a survey in 1992.^^ 
Supporting deregulation was arguably the first act of ‘New’ Labour.
KSSC hoped the Conservative Sabbatarians would ally with old- 
Labour to hold the conservative retailers to their alliance. “If the old- 
Labour majority had stayed solid, the aspirant payroll vote had not 
implicitly been directed to the modernising agenda and modernisers 
hadn’t been dominant, KSSC could have had a re-run of the first case.’’^ ® 
Short-term concessions to the SHRC business alliance, however, were a 
politically-astute long-term strategy to re-position Labour.
The shift in Labour ideology was critical. Modernisation split the 
Labour vote. Elements of the Labour party were managed effectively by 
SHRC. Lobbyists used the modernisers to exploit the party’s desire to be 
perceived as pro-business and pro-consumer. They understood how the 
elite teams operated.
Labour broke from the top-down, not bottom-up. KSSC believed 
“nothing, at that point in political history, could have over-turned this 
balance offerees.’’^ ®
Conclusion
Despite SHRC lobbying, government could not introduce 
legislation in the 1987-92 parliament because the context was
Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997 
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997 
Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997
Emily’s List was an informal network of female Labour MPs. Chairman of SHRC, interview, 22/7/1997 
“Sunday trading”. Retail Week, 11 September 1992. “Scot MPs have vital role in shopping vote”. The 
Herald, 1 November 1993 
KSSC adviser, interview, 17/3/1997
KSSC adviser, correspondence, 27/2/1998
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inappropriate. Failed lobbyists admitted ineffectiveness was the 
consequence of factors beyond their control. The PPU lobbyist said “I 
wish we had been able to do more, but in the end you can only do as 
much as circumstances and your client allow you to.”®° The EuroShop 
lobbyist said “one can never be sure... one has done a brilliant job. 
Whether you were effective or not depends on so many other factors.”®^ 
The KSSC adviser was “relatively ineffective when faced by the external 
circumstances with which we had to contend.”®^
By the early 1990s regulationists were hampered and the 
deregulationists aided by social and economic factors. The 
deregulationists were with the ‘spirit of the times’. SHRC lobbyists were 
effective because of contextual factors. Although KSSC’s post-modern 
call for a break in the weekly rhythm was powerful, it was ineffective 
because of broader changes beyond its control. Retailers opening, 
changing society, changing business profile, the government’s majority 
and the modernisation of Labour all undermined KSSC. A civil servant 
argued “developments could only weaken KSSC.’’®®
The evidence shows the importance of contextual factors and 
supports the hypothesis.
PPL) lobbyist, interview, 7/3/1997 
Chairman of EuroShop, interview, 14/5/1997 
“  KSSC adviser, correspondence, 27/2/1998 
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98
126
Chapter Four
Pre-existing poiicy and experience of government 
players: Hypothesis Three
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of 
political decision-makers, pre-existing policy and 
previous experience of government players are 
congruent with the lobbyist's objective.
Group Objectives
KSSC launched the REST proposals to challenge the 
Conservative party to clarify its manifesto pledge, and to attract broader 
support.®"^  However, the proposals to restrict Sunday trading to a limited 
range of shops were as complicated and irrational as the 1950 Shops 
Act.
The SHRC agenda amounted to the privatisation of the 
government’s electoral programme.®® The central theme was to 
distinguish between small and large traders. Retail units over 3,000 sq. ft 
could open between 10am-4pm. Shops of less than 3,000 sq. ft were to 
be allowed to open all day and workers would be protected.®®
OPEN wanted its retail sector to be allowed to trade longer than 
others by restricting trading to shops under 3,000 sq. ft. Independent 
retailers made profits when the multiples were shut. Competition on 
Sundays would destroy them.
RSAR’s objectives were more liberal than those of KSSC. The 
size of retailer allowed to open was 3,000 sq. ft and the conditions small 
shops had to satisfy in order to open were more vague than KSSC’s 
proposals. Large shops, with some exemptions, would remain closed. 
SOS favoured total deregulation.
Government Obiectives
The Conservative government was divided. It failed to overcome 
the paradox of supporting a deregulationist free-trade agenda, whilst 
supporting the family and church. The 1987 campaign guide read “The 
Government remains committed to the principle of liberalising Sunday 
shop opening hours, but sees little purpose in introducing a Bill until clear
^  REST - Keep Sunday Special Press Conference on 20 May 1987 at Charing Cross Hotel transcript. 
“  Diamond, P., (1991a)
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support for change can be guaranteed in the House of Commons.”®^ 
Under Margaret Thatcher free trade generally triumphed over family and 
religion, except over the 1985 Shops Bill.
The Conservative government’s third term was characterised by a 
commitment dating back to before 1986, which was entangled with 
memories of burned fingers. The loss of the Shops Bill at Second 
Reading made government wary of reintroducing reform. The late 1980s 
were spent hunting for a solution. By the 1990s the debate shifted to the 
need for compromise.
Deregulation was the fashion in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, launched a crusade 
against red tape in 1992. Deregulation of Sunday trading hours fitted this 
policy backdrop. A civil servant suggested the SHRC was the “strongest 
deregulatory group at a time when the initiative was a deregulatory 
one.’’®®
Conclusion
Given the ideology and pre-existing policy commitments of 
government, it was more difficult for KSSC to achieve its objectives than 
SHRC. In the pre-Lloydian period the government’s free-market ideology 
supported Sunday trading. Regulation and restriction were excluded 
from its agenda. Prime Minister, John Major, and Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, like many of their parliamentary colleagues, supported 
total deregulation. The preferences of government and SHRC were non- 
divergent. They shared a similar ‘world view’.®®
The government objected to KSSC policy. Ministers opposed the 
REST proposals. A former minister argued an effective lobbyist should 
have a case “within the thrust of government policy. If you’re going with 
the flow of government policy, you are alright.’’®® KSSC believed “by the 
time the issue was resolved, opposition to Sunday trading had become
Worker protection included a right to premium pay and protection against being forced to work on Sundays. 
Conservative Party, (1987), General Election Campaign Guide 1987, Conservative Party, London 
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98 
Smith, M„ (1993)
Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 10/6/1997
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SO out-of-joint with the mood of the time that continued, assertive support 
for opposition was a barrier to political elite decision-making...”®^
KSSC swam against the political tide by “moving against a 
government machine that... had positively decided it wanted this 
[reform].”®^ OPEN’s case was disadvantageous. The argument was anti­
competitive and anti-deregulation. OPEN’s lobbyist asked “why should 
small shops have concessions? We were starting on the back foot.”®^
In most cases lobbyists tend to be effective if their case is 
congruent with government beliefs and pre-existing policy. SHRC was 
close to government in the pre-Lloydian period because of its access and 
intelligence. However, government lacked the power to deliver 
deregulation. Success is authorised by government players except when 
the government’s majority is small, or when the issue is a matter of 
conscience. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
KSSC adviser, correspondence, 27/2/1998 
KSSC adviser, interview, 17/3/1997 
OPEN lobbyist, interview, 17/3/1997
129
Chapter Four
Meso-level
Involvement in the policy-making process: 
Hypothesis Four
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can include 
their client in the policy community and manage their 
client's activity within that network.
Lobbyists follow rules of the game to enter the policy network. 
There were two networks -  a closed policy community and a secondary 
broader network which changed overtime.®"^
After 1986 SHRC presented its strategy to the Home Office.®® 
“The government made clear if a policy was going to be delivered it was 
up to [SHRC] to deliver it and sell it. They would have nothing to do with 
promoting it.”®®
In the first phase ministers were the fulcrum of the small and tightly 
integrated primary community. Government restricted entry to those 
players who shared its views. KSSC and OPEN were overlooked whilst 
SHRC was authoritative. SHRC’s relationship with government was 
institutionalised. Relations with the Home Office were “sometimes in 
conflict, often in agreement, but always in touch and operating within a 
shared framework.”®^ The relationship fits the Marsh-Rhodes typology of 
a policy community.®®
Secondary groups had sufficient resources to be included in 
policy-making but their ideas were disconsonant with government. KSSC 
was part of this sub-sectoral issue network that was neither cohesive nor 
integrated. Gaining access to this network was not difficult, but 
participants had limited influence on policy. There was little 
interdependence and often outright hostility between members.
^  Smith, M„ (1993)
^  Former SHRC Research Director, interview, 28/10/1996 
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997. The Home Office minister, Tim Renton said “we have no intention of 
riding into the valley of Parliamentary death again” although he regarded Sunday trading as “important 
unfinished business.” “As you are on Sundays”, East Grinstead Courier, 24 November 1988.
Helco, H., and Wildavsky, A., (1974), pXV 
Rhodes, R., and Marsh, D., (1992b)
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KSSC was excluded from a Home Office working party looking for 
workable solutions.®® KSSC lobbied for inclusion in the working group 
and argued the consensus sought by government was precluded by its 
exclusion. Though KSSC spent considerable time in the company of 
Home Office civil servants, in an attempt to win serious support for its 
proposals, it believed policy was established and consultation constituted 
procedural etiquette.
Tim Renton, Home Office Minister, in February 1989 failed to 
convince a Cabinet committee that the SHRC option would command 
parliamentary support.^®  ^ The Prime Minister accepted she had failed to 
reform Sunday trading and the immediate prospect was of shelving 
reform indefinitely.^®^ The pre-1992 campaign effectively died when the 
government refused to put a Bill in the 1989 Queen’s Speech. There was 
no prospect of reform between 1990-92 because of the proximity of an 
Election. Another palliative’ consultation round was launched.^®®
After Mrs Thatcher’s resignation the problem became less a matter 
of doctrine and more a problem of governance. Support for deregulation 
continued under John Major. He said “[ejxperience in Scotland does 
suggest that a suitable consensus is possible. I hope one can be found 
south of the border.” ®^"^ Yet another session of round-table talks with 
ministers began in Spring 1991.^ ®^  Major pledged publicly that reform of 
Sunday trading would be included in the Conservative Party manifesto.^®® 
The pledge was not the consequence of effective lobbying -  it was a 
rolling commitment.^®^ Major continued the previous government’s policy.
Members of the working group included representatives lobbying for liberalisation: Sir Basil Feldman and 
Roger Boaden of SHRC, Dick Clark (Wickes), Alistair Grant (Argyll Group) and Geoff Mulcahy (Kingfisher). 
Trades unions and KSSC representatives were excluded.
President of KSSC, interview, 25/2/1997. “Keeping Sunday Special”, Asian Trader, 29 September 1989
“Radical Cabinet defies jitters”. The Independent, 7 March 1989
“Ministers prepare burial of Sunday trade reforms”. Marketing Week, 12/5/1989 and “Sunday Trading Issue 
is Dropped, The Times, 26/5/1989
“No end likely for shop hours chaos”. Retail Week, 24 February 1989. Between January 1988 and October 
1990 there were forty-five meetings between the Home Office and interested parties. HC Deb 24 April 1991 
col 1195
HC Debs, PMQ, 7/5/1991, col 621
ADC acted as an honest broker. “Rumbold in push for shops reform”. Local Government Chronicle, 1 
March 1991. KSSC; SHRC; SOS; OPEN; ADC; USDAW; GMB; British Retailers' Association; Retail 
Consortium; National Institute of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and many others were consulted by 
the Home Office
“Sunday trade law reform planned”. Daily Telegraph, 12 September 1991
Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 10/6/1997. The manifesto stated “The law on Sunday trading is 
not observed and not enforced and risks bringing the whole of the law into disrepute. We will therefore place 
measures before Parliament to provide reasonable opportunities for shopping on Sundays.” Conservative 
Party Manifesto 1992. There was no mention of Sunday trading in the Liberal Democrat or Labour manifestos.
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The second period of the campaign coincided with Peter Lloyd’s 
tenure in the Home Office, after the 1992 General Election.^®® Lloyd was 
a respected parliamentarian and widely liked across the parties. He was 
less partisan than his predecessors. The Election result confirmed full 
deregulation was impossible.^®® Big business claimed influence. Dixons’ 
chairman said he received a personal promise “from a politician higher 
than Kenneth Clarke” that government would introduce reform.''^®
Under Lloyd the policy community was broken apart. As external 
circumstances changed, government recognised it could not negotiate a 
settlement. A Shops Unit of six officials dealt with consultation, 
correspondence and legislation. The imperative of the Lloydian period 
was to create a policy to deliver a choice between effective workable, but 
wholly different, reform options.^^^
From the government’s perspective the old insider-outsider 
distinction dissolved. Officials needed partners in interest-groups with 
whom they could talk formally and informally to construct choices. 
Government required parliament to make a positive choice rather than a 
negative one. “The object of the exercise was to make sure the Bill 
reflected what the groups r e q u i r e d . C i v i l  servants did not question the 
views of groups or whether the options were workable. The Home Office 
found a willingness to negotiate in OPEN, RSAR and to some extent the 
SHRC, irrespective of the underpinning political differences. Lobbying 
ministers became irrelevant. Government had opened the door. Civil 
servants were “working for the main g r o u p s . I t  was the first and last 
government bill where officials and parliamentary counsel were loaned to 
interest-groups to design law. Ministers wanted deregulation, but they 
wanted the issue settled even more.
Lloyd’s official statement read “we have been given a mandate for reform by the country and we are keen 
to get that reform right and in place as speedily as we can.” “Minister pledges to update Shops Act”, Sunday 
Express, 19 April 1992
“Clarke poised to ease the ban on Sunday trading”, The Independent, 9 July 1992; “Sunday trade law 
change planned to end confusion”. Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1992; ‘Tories to reform Sunday trading”. The 
Times, 9 July 1992.
110 "2C Court likely to back ban on Sunday trading”. Financial Times, 9 July 1992
The formula of mutually exclusive options had been used before on the Second Reading of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (HC Deb 2 April 1990 col 914-1005) offering a choice between 36, 38 or 40 
weeks. The Sunday Trading Bill offered totally different regimes.
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98 
ibid
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KSSC lobbied government too long after the focus had shifted to 
parliament. It saw conspiracy everywhere. It did not believe the Home 
Office tried to put a workable regulatory option in the Bill. KSSC had 
become accustomed to opposing and wasted energy worrying about the 
politics being played by government when, in the second stage, there 
was none.
Conclusion
Government provided SHRC with privileged access to the policy 
community in exchange for it leading the public campaign for 
liberalisation. There was an inner and an outer circle -  a primary and a 
secondary community. The primary community was small. The 
secondary community often involved consultation, but little influence.
In the Lloydian period lobbyists were not necessary for access to the 
primary community because the government was open. Lobbyists 
cannot take credit for SHRC’s position at the policy community core in 
phase one either, because SHRC was in league with government. In 
phase two the community was accessible to all groups.
The history of closeness and exclusion in the pre-Lloydian period 
conditioned players’ expectations in the Lloydian period. SHRC and 
ministers formed a key network before 1992 because their goals 
converged and KSSC was actively excluded because of its aims in a way 
that was less true subsequently. After 1992 KSSC preferred to think of 
itself as the down-trodden victim of conspiracy. Its failure to compromise 
or develop a workable solution and its unwillingness to let anyone help 
was fa t a l . Lobby is t s  played little role in helping their clients access the 
network but did manage their clients’ activity effectively. Groups are 
more effective if they are in the policy community. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis.
Smith, M.. (1992)
One solution would have been for KSSC to stipulate all shops over 3,000 sq. ft could not open.
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Multi-faceted lobbying: Hypothesis Five
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi­
faceted approach and facilitate access to multiple 
points in the decision-making process.
Parliament
All sides targeted parliament in the Lloydian period. Sympathetic 
MPs initiated Early Day Motions (EDM), questions and debates. Up to
1992 SHRC concentrated on Tory MPs, whilst KSSC held together a 
coalition of Labour and Conservative MPs. SHRC’s campaign to 
broaden its appeal led it to a multi-party lobbying strategy.
Labour MP Ray Powell tabled a Private Member’s Bill in January
1993 which re-introduced an earlier KSSC-d rafted Ten Minute Rule 
Bill.^ ^® The Bill presented a challenge to SHRC.^^^ SHRC-friendly MPs 
tabled over one hundred technical amendments at report stage, some 
drafted by GJW.^^® Angela Rumbold MP led the campaign and co­
ordinated SHRC’s ‘parliamentary pushers’, which successfully defeated 
the BilU^^ Lobbyists relied on procedural knowledge to defeat the Bill.^ °^ 
Retail concern that the campaign was too low-profile was unwarranted.
A public campaign would have unsettled the Home Office. Lobbyists 
knew parliamentary procedure provided them the opportunity to defeat 
the Bill without delivering KSSC publicity.
KSSC also lobbied MPs.^^  ^ KSSC benefited from feedback from 
informal discussions between members and ministers. “An enormous 
number of MPs were willing to go to the wall” for KSSC.^^^ Whilst it “did 
not lack ‘heavy-weight’ support. We could get members to speak for 
KSSC in the House,” it did lack the support of party elites.
The Shops (Amendment) Bill (Bill 14) presented by Ray Powell was based on KSSC’s proposals. A 
second, the Shops Bill (Bill 25), presented by James Couch man followed the policy of the SHRC.
The Bill won a second reading by 173 votes. “Powell's progress”. Retail Week, 29 January 1993 
SHRC “Sunday Shopping Update - Powell Bill - Report Stage” nd. Of the 135 amendments tabled, the 
majority was put down by former Home Office Minister, Dame Angela Rumbold MP (the former Home Office 
Minister, now returned to the backbenchers). The SHRC planned wrecking tactics. “Ban sex on Sundays”, 
Mail on Sunday, 17 October 1993
It can be important to get a legislative sponsor -  a horse. Wittinberg, E., and Wittinberg, E., (1989)
SHRC retained the bulk of amendments for the Third Reading because amendments introduced at 
Committee stage cannot be tabled during Third Reading.
“Under the counter”. Retail Week, 1 March 1993 
Principal of KSSC, interview, 4/2/1997 
OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997
Alan Beith and David Alton from the Liberal Democrats, Conservative MPs Ivor Stanbrook and Michael 
Allison and Labour MPs Ray Powell, Audrey Wise and Derek Foster provided "quality, reliable, verifiable 
information...” KSSC director, interview, 17/3/1997
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There was little lobbying of the upper chamber. KSSC “ignored 
the Lords completely until we lost in the Commons, so we had four weeks 
to do anything we c o u l d . A  last-minute effort could not match the 
sustained lobbying by SHRC. SHRC briefed Peers assiduously and 
encouraged its allies to brief other Peers.
Parties
KSSC held over 500 constituency meetings and supported the 
Christian Election Forum, which pressured candidates on religious issues 
like Sunday trading. Some vulnerable candidates committed themselves, 
if elected, to vote against Sunday trading.
Retailers had a strong presence at party conferences. A senior 
retailer argued “the purpose is not necessarily to influence MPs; you 
have dinners and lunches with MPs but you can do that easily in 
Westminster. It is to create the right climate amongst party members and 
local councillors.”^^®
Lobbyists questioned the value of attending party conferences. 
However, if one interest-group attended, the others felt obliged to. OPEN 
found attendance a “soul destroying experience” but being there was 
important because “if everyone else is there you have to be there. 
The GJW lobbyist argued “if you are involved in a campaign, a healthy 
presence at party conference shows you are on the map. We knew if we 
weren’t there KSSC would be.”^^® Attending conference seems 
worthwhile to raise profile and to influence party opinion.
Media
Media enthusiasm for deregulation cannot be credited to SHRC 
lobbyists. Support dated back to Baroness Trumpington's 1981 Bill and 
had been strong during the Shops Bill 1985. SHRC pushed at an open 
door. Many journalists supported liberalisation. Media support created a 
context in which it was easier for politicians to make SHRC-friendly 
decisions.
Principal of KSSC, interview, 4/2/1997 
Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997
He likened it to “pushing water uphill.” OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997 
’28 GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997
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Support may have been the consequence of journalistic work 
patterns, or pressure on editors from proprietors and retailers. 
Newspapers supported liberalisation because it was popular with the 
public. The tabloid press supported Sunday trading. The Sun wrote “The 
government must immediately legalise Sunday opening. Religious 
fanatics and stroppy unions preventing us from shopping when we want 
must be ignored.Simi la r ly  the Sunday Mirror published the names of 
all 144 MPs who voted against an SHRC-sponsored Private Member’s 
Bill and encouraged readers to complain.
KSSC struggled to get its agenda adopted by the national media. 
Whilst the Daily Telegraph and Evening Standard were supportive, 
KSSC would have been helped by “an education campaign by 
professionals in the media. We felt that the media was biased against 
us... We were portrayed as a bunch of k i l l j o y s . “Professional lobbyists 
might have helped KSSC.”^^  ^ KSSC found the local press more 
amenable because “a local newspaper struggles to find material... to fill 
the pages. If we prepared articles and sent them to the local 
newspapers, they were delighted to publish them.”^^"^
Lobbyists’ contacts helped them place stories, but the media 
represented the ‘new-consumerism’ and reflected opinion polls showing 
the popularity of Sunday shopping. The press linked its agenda to 
societal trends and the shift of opinion within Labour.
Public Opinion
Public opinion was the most valuable and difficult form of support 
to g e n e r a t e . L o b b y i s t s  stirred up support in the constituencies. 
However, there were no ‘real’ grass roots organisations, despite the term 
being widely used. This campaign activity has been characterised by US
‘The Big DIY Divide”, Marketing, 9 May 1991. DIY and electrical and food retailers advertised heavily in the 
tabloid press. B&Q spent £16 million on advertising in the press, other DIY chains such as Do It All spent 
£3.2 million during the campaign.
“Ring the Bells”, The Sun, 15 December 1990. The Sun established a Sunday Opening database and 
provided its readers with a telephone number to call for them to find out if stores in their area opened on 
Sundays.
“144 MPs who defied public”, Sunday Mirror, 10 March 1991
KSSC director, interview, 17/3/1997
ibid
John Lewis Partnership Representative, interview, 4/3/1997  
135 OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997
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observers as ‘astro-turf lobbying. It is artificial and manufactured but 
looks like the real thing.
SHRC established a variety of front bodies, including the All-Party 
Group on Sunday Trading; Council Leaders in Favour of Sunday 
Shopping;^^^ and purported grass-roots organisations like Working 
Women for Sunday Trading, Consumers for Sunday Trading and the 
Sunday Shopping c a m p a i g n . T h e s e  campaign groups exaggerated 
the issue’s electoral salience.
SHRC was initially out-manoeuvred by KSSC. KSSC used its 
Church network, circulating draft sermons, parish newsletters, 
correspondence and signature campaigns. It leafleted customers of 
stores that broke the law. It wrote to clergymen to encourage their 
congregations to write to MPs, causing SHRC to mail Britain’s 18,000 
clergymen.
SHRC established a network of regional organisers. GJW advised 
concentrating on constituencies to buttress the London-based 
c a m p a i g n . T h e  regional campaigners, a group of amateur politicians, 
were assisted by over 400 local voluntary co-ordinators.""*^ A ‘Sunday 
Shopping Bus’ toured the country. A ‘sign-up’ campaign collected one 
million s i g n a t u r e s . S H R C  companies orchestrated their employees 
and customers to write to MPs.^ "*^  Store managers helped staff write 
letters that looked “diverse and heart-felt.’’*"*^
Retailers were advantaged by their closeness to the consumer. 
Retailers built an alliance with consumers. “There was an extensive 
programme of getting MPs in the stores.’’*"*® GJW lobbied prospective 
candidates in key seats and invited them to local stores.*"*® KSSC, RSAR
see Jeffrey Birnbaum at http://pathfinder.com/fortune/1997/971208/was1.html 
"Cross-party backing for shopping on a Sunday”, Daily Telegraph, 8 November 1993 
138 Working Women for Sunday Trading was headed by Mo Mowlam MP, Baroness Flather and Baroness 
Hamwee. “Sunday shop reformers moot pre-Bill ad burst”, Marketing Week, 29 October 1993 
“Sunday Trading”, The Independent, 21 January 1989 
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997
Chris Davies, eiected Liberal Democrat MP for Littleborough and Saddleworth; Nick Harvey, elected Liberal 
Democrat MP for North Devon in 1992; Eleanor Laing elected Conservative MP for Epping Forest in 1997; 
and Janet Anderson, elected Labour MP for Rossendale and Darwen in 1992. “Retailers recruit Sunday 
shoppers”, Marketing, 24 September 1992
The petition was presented to the Home Office on 21 February 1992. “Petition on Sunday trading 
presented”. Financial Times, 21 February 1992 
Principal of KSSC, interview, 4/2/1997
A letter to branch managers from Boots HQ recommended giving staff “pens of assorted colours, a range 
of notepaper but not company headed notepaper and guidelines on writing letters.” “Boots tells staff how to 
lobby for Sunday trading”. The Independent, 6 November 1993 
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997 
Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997
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and OPEN wrote to MPs in whose constituencies they had a presence 
and invited them to members’ stores.
SHRC commissioned 37 polls, and found consistent majorities of 
two-thirds favouring Sunday trading. In the run-up to the government 
Bill’s second reading the media were bombarded with p o l l s . A  final 
crescendo of lobbying culminated in National Sunday Shopping Day in 
September 1993.^ ^^ ®
Lobbyists helped mobilise public opinion. “MPs are actually 
neurotically attentive” to opinion p o l l s . T h e  tactical value of polls was 
not lost on the deregulation lobby. They provided SHRC a peg on which 
to hang news stories. Surveys helped form and lead public opinion and 
were mutually-reinforcing.
Conclusion
Lobbyists were active on several fronts proving the hypothesis is 
valid. However, the concentration on the constituency campaign could 
require the hypothesis to be modified. Effective lobbying, especially on 
issues of conscience, seems built in the locality. KSSC used the church 
network and invited MPs into its retailers’ stores, whilst SHRC used its 
stores to lobby MPs. SHRC also ran a media strategy based on opinion 
polls, the uneven application of the law, and consumer demand.
Parliament was the key target. Both main interest-groups 
attempted to introduce change from the back-benches. A multi-faceted 
approach was used by all groups in this campaign and seems a pre­
requisite for effective lobbying. Whilst one route may be pre-eminent, like 
constituency lobbying, other avenues were pursued simultaneously. The 
evidence supports the hypothesis.
“Sunday laws still a load of tripe”, The Guardian, 6 November 1993 
“Sunday lobbyists put pressure on”, Super-Marketing, 3 September 1993 
Former Home Office Minister 1, interview, 26/6/1997
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Micro-level
Routines and Standard Operating Procedures: 
Hypothesis Six
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar 
with routines and standard operating procedures and 
know when and where to intervene in the policy-making 
process.
Rules and procedures are learned through experience. Lobbyists 
have often worked within the system. The informal rules and rhythm of 
policy-making are difficult to learn by simple observation. A premium was 
placed on those who had worked within government
After the 1986 defeat, and until 1992, knowledge of civil service 
and government procedures was important. Government had an 
established policy. Civil servants were involved in formal consultation 
with groups and drafting the legislation. Government was the focus of 
lobbying. After 1992 knowledge of parliamentary procedure became 
important as the focus shifted from government. A civil servant argued 
the lobbyists were not “heavily involved in dealing with ministers -  more 
advising the client. I was not exposed to them.” ®^°
Civil servants are “used to a situation where they advise the 
minister and they drive through legislation on a three-line whip. They’re 
not very good at understanding the mood of the House - what will work 
and what won’t."^ ^^  SHRC had the advantage in the first phase, because 
it hired advisers with knowledge and experience of the civil service 
procedure.
It is useful to distinguish between lobbying aiming to shape 
‘political policy’ and that focussing on t echn i ca l . D i f f e ren t  types of 
lobbying require different techniques. Officials “are amenable only to 
intellectual argument. It’s all about probability and exposure, especially 
exposure of their m i n i s t e r . D e s p i t e  GJW and SHRC’s knowledge of 
rules, and their effectiveness in delivering the perception of widespread
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98 
Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997 
152 p p y  lobbyist, interview, 7/3/1997 
Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997
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support, the Home Office could not deliver legislation because it risked 
exposing the government. Because ministers needed support to get the 
policy through, civil servants worked with SHRC lobbyists and wanted to 
be aware of their activity to ensure their minister was not exposed.
For ministers to accept political risk in proposing Sunday trading 
they required lobbyists to ‘deliver’ -  to lobby other ministers, MPs and 
others to build support. The minister should not be left exposed. Though 
GJW and SHRC knew their way around Whitehall, they could not deliver 
support.
SHRC’s greater resources allowed it to buy a greater level of 
expertise than KSSC. Knowledge of procedure allowed SHRC lobbyists 
to operate with confidence. But there is little evidence to suggest the 
lobbyists’ knowledge of rules helped their clients. The issue was so 
general and, later the process so transparent, that effective lobbying did 
not require knowledge of technical or complex procedures.
There was little arcane or mysterious to the work of officials. But 
understanding the internal mechanisms of organisations was important. 
Miller argues “friends in high places are no match for an understanding of 
the mechanics of the decision-making process’’ because government 
must justify its decisions and prove it has consulted widely.^ '^  ^ SHRC’s 
knowledge of procedure, rules and rhythm was essential during the first 
phase, allowing it to maintain pressure on ministers. These rules were 
either learned through insider-experience, or developed by lobbyists as 
they dealt with the system.
Consultancies understood the rules because of the background of 
their staff. They had a mixture of people who ranged from ex-civil 
servants, ex-political people, advisers, researchers, and people from 
business and industry.
Conclusion
SHRC lobbyists knew the personalities and the informal rules. 
Many had worked within the system, which enhanced their effectiveness.
Miller, 0 ., (1991)
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997
156 PPU lobbyist, interview, 7/3/1997, Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997, GJW lobbyist, interview, 
9/5/1997, GJW Labour lobbyist, interview, 9/7/1997, Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997
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KSSC lobbyists did not ‘work the system’ as effectively as their 
opponents. With some exceptions their staff and advisers had not 
worked in the civil service or the political arena -  they were outsiders in 
experience and contacts. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Contacts and Coalitions: Hypothesis Seven
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good 
contacts and can spot connections to potential allies 
and can construct coalitions.
Contacts
Contacts are an additional research attribute for lobbyists -  they 
deliver information. They are the lobbyists’ unique selling point. 
Government contacts were valuable between 1986-92. Parliamentary 
contacts became more important over time. Contacts were insufficient to 
persuade decision-makers of the merits of a case, but they provided the 
intelligence necessary for effectiveness.
SHRC “had access to the people who were making the decisions 
within the political p a r t i e s . L o b b y i s t s ’ contacts helped SHRC access 
Labour. Lobbyists organised contact-building programmes, acted as an 
introductory service, picked-off key individuals, built relationships and 
explained internal party politics. SHRC networked furiously: it “worked 
hard at developing a contact list. Everywhere we went, they appeared. It 
was like Hitchcock in his films.
SHRC had a good relationship with the Conservative party, and 
looked like a Conservative club. Conservative insiders (the party’s 
Treasurer and former Central Office employees), advised by 
Conservative strategists were managed by a steering committee of 
Conservative businessmen led by a chief executive claiming to be on 
first-name terms with two-thirds of the Cabinet.'’ ®^ Information rarely 
came from officials, but more often from ministers at social occasions. 
Intelligence was “good because there were quite a few ministers that
Chairman of SHRC, interview, 22/7/1997
Deputy General Secretary of USDAW, interview, 9/6/1997
“Open up Sunday”, Sunday Mercury Birmingham, 19 February 1989. Principal of SHRC, interview, 
5/5/1997
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were sympathetic and they were helpful in keeping us in the p i c t u r e .  
This Conservative bias became a liability after 1992, when SHRC donned 
a Labour cloak provided by Baroness Jay. GJW claimed front-bench 
Labour spokesmen contacted it. Party spokesmen would allegedly call 
and ask “’I want to learn very quickly about ‘X’, have you got someone I 
can have a meeting with?’ If they trust you to do that, it proves you are 
effective.
However, access to ministers was not the consequence of 
effective lobbying. Ministers “never refused to see anybody.” ®^^ A civil 
servant suggested “Peter Lloyd was very available to the groups -  he 
would see all of them.” ®^® Similarly, the PPU lobbyist argued access to 
ministers was ‘easy’.^®"^ But KSSC’s relations with ministers remained 
frosty. KSSC described Home Office ministers as “Rotweilers being 
tamed."^ ®®
Civil servants were anxious to know the internal politics of the 
different lobbies.^ ®® The civil service was active in dealing with interest- 
groups, therefore they did not fight for access. SHRC was locked into the 
civil service and had excellent intelligence. Civil servants briefed SHRC 
in off-the-record discussions away from the Home Office.^®  ^ GJW knew 
and briefed members of the No 10 Policy Unit. When SHRC set up 
meetings with civil servants, it “always used to take [the GJW lobbyist] 
with us, or [he] would set up the meeting and he would go. He would be 
instrumental in setting them up.” ®^® The relationship between SHRC and 
Home Office paralleled the relationship between MAFF and farmers. 
Producer interests, claiming to speak for the public-interest, were 
permitted easy access to policy formulation.
KSSC’s access to Whitehall varied. It was good during the Powell 
Bill. KSSC believed it was given a ‘fair hearing’ by civil servants, but 
never believed the civil service was neutral. KSSC argued “on balance it
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997 
GJW Labour iobbyist, interview, 9/7/1997 
Former Home Office Minister 1, interview, 26/6/1997 
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98 
164 p p y  lobbyist, interview, 7/3/1997 
KSSC Barrister, interview, 23/5/1997 
GJW iobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997 
Principai of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997 
ibid
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was a question of being tolerated than [having] a real impact.” ®^® A KSSC 
adviser argued meetings with civil servants “were always unpleasant. It 
was never an equal meeting of minds.
OPEN developed a more effective rapport with Home Office 
officials. Their lobbyist spoke “on a daily basis with the Home Office 
drafting team... [the official] felt he could have an impartial conversation 
with [the lobbyist] about the issues. There was a two-way flow of 
information.
Good contacts were essential. Closed networks were difficult to 
enter. SHRC’s Conservative contacts and GJW’s Labour contacts 
allowed access to the key party networks.
Coalitions
The debate over whether lobbyists should focus on allies or 
adversaries c o n t i n u e s . S H R C  lobbyists undermined KSSC by 
recruiting those initially opposed to SHRC -  trades unions.
Groups manoeuvred to strengthen themselves, undermine their 
opponents and jockeyed to build alliances. For either side to emerge 
victorious it had to persuade a parliamentary majority it was 
representative of mainstream thought. That meant constructing a broad 
coalition. SHRC was more effective at portraying its option as a 
quintessential compromise.
Trades Unions
SHRC split USDAW from KSSC. Whilst the Labour front-bench 
supported SHRC, backbench support was disparate. USDAW would 
deliver enough Labour support for SHRC to ignore the obstructive 
Sabbatarian Conservative MPs. SHRC turned USDAW by:
• portraying KSSC as religious extremists and separating the goals 
of KSSC and USDAW: the religious and the social case;^^^
• convincing USDAW leaders they could trust SHRC;
KSSC director, interview, 17/3/1997 
KSSC Barrister, interview, 23/5/1997
OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997 
Austen-Smith, D., and Wright, J., (1994, 1996)
SHRC Sunday Shopping Update, Keep Sunday Special Threatening Jobs and Choice, nd, SHRC archive
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• exerting pressure on USDAW;
• mobilising the work force against the union;
• opening stores to ‘prove’ demand for Sunday trading.
First, USDAW was never comfortable with its association with 
KSSC’s religious element.^^"  ^ KSSC needed USDAW to avoid 
perceptions of religious extremism. However, KSSC’s separation of the 
biblical and labour elements, paid insufficient attention to employment 
issues opening a chink in KSSC’s armour. In February 1992 KSSC 
abandoned employment provisions in the Powell Bill to broaden its 
parliamentary appeal and made overtures towards RSAR.^^® KSSC’s 
move threatened USDAW’s interests.
Second, SHRC used GMB, T&GWU and MSF support to convince 
USDAW to leave KSSC.^^^ SHRC opposed the Employment Bill to 
protect its coalition-building with USDAW. It feared Sunday trading could 
be seen as part of a strategy that left workers v u l n e r a b l e . T h e  DoE 
refused employment concessions necessary to secure USDAW 
support.^^® To compensate, SHRC offered voluntary employment 
protection whilst KSSC ignored the issue.
Third, Tesco’s role in USDAW’s volte face was total. Tesco was 
asked to “to have a go at USDAW.’’ ®^° Tesco co-operated closely with 
USDAW and helped it recruit. In 1993 USDAW needed Tesco’s support 
to conduct a re-authorisation exercise to guarantee its income. 
Although there was no direct threat of non-co-operation USDAW came 
under indirect pressure. “It was said to us as a caution, there was never 
anything specific.’’ ®^^ Because USDAW had a large percentage of its 
assets (union members) in one company the leadership was susceptible 
to pressure.
Deputy General Secretary of USDAW, interview, 9/6/1997
Negotiations covered opening before Christmas, the relegation of employment issues, and allowing DIY 
shops and Garden Centres to open. USDAW EC Minutes October 1993
The new KSSC policy meant the only retail chains that would remain shut on a Sunday would be those 
with USDAW members as employees.
The MSF, T&GWU and GMB were not opposed to Sunday trading.
“Sunday reform faces pay hitch”. Retail Week, 31 July 1992
“Clarke to resist call for Sunday safeguards”. The Independent, 9 July 1992
GJW Labour lobbyist, interview, 9/7/1997
A reauthorisation exercise is an administrative exercise, whereby the trade union is obliged to re-authorise 
its members.
Deputy General Secretary of USDAW, interview, 9/6/1997
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Fourth, Tesco informed employees that USDAW was not 
representing their i n t e r e s t s . S t a f f  petitions flooded the union. 
USDAW’s leadership met ninety-six Tesco shop-stewards in mid-1993 
and was told its policy was untenable.
Finally, USDAW realised its policy of opposition to liberalisation 
would lead to total defeat. Workers were keen to work.^ ®® Consumer 
demand was evident and stores were trading. The leadership formalised 
its support for SHRC weeks before the government’s bill appeared.^®®
Whilst the votes of USDAW-sponsored MPs were not affected by 
the union’s new policy, the PLP more generally could support SHRC. A 
mixture of stick and carrot turned USDAW. The union’s capture was a 
political coup for SHRC and holed KSSC. It was the most important 
development of the campaign.
The Groups
SHRC made limited compromises by dropping full deregulation 
early on, then moving from eight to six hours. These compromises 
broadened the number of SHRC supporters, but did not allow for 
alliances with other groups. One interest-g roup described the SHRC as 
‘Mafia hitmen’ arguing the principal “could have got people to do things to 
our business... He was just that sort of person.” ®^^ In spite of these 
skirmishes, the key developments in inter-group politics took place within 
the regulation lobby’.
KSSC was forced onto weak ground by contradictions in the REST 
proposals, and at every stage KSSC acted too slowly to prevent its 
support haemorrhaging.^®® In December 1991, under commercial
ibid. A rival candidate, centring his criticism on the “untenable” Sunday trading policy, challenged the 
General Secretary, Garfield Davies, for the leadership of the union. “USDAW Sunday line under attack”. Retail 
Week, 9 July 1993
“Biggest shop union makes a U-turn on Sunday trading”, Sunday Express, 11 July 1993. Ninety-three 
voted in favour of Sunday trading.
“Anti-Sunday trading groups plan enforcement action”. Local Government Chronicle, 8 January 1993 and 
“Shops staff back Sunday opening”. Financial Times, 11 January 1993
The 1993 ADM granted the leadership the power to change Sunday trading policy without reference to the 
membership. (USDAW ADM 1993 (48) , Report of Proceedings, pp 131-139). USDAW formalised its break 
with KSSC in October 1993, weeks before the vote on the Bill. The policy shift was approved by the ADM in 
April 1994. Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, ADM 1994 (49), Report of Proceedings, pp128- 
140. The critical proposition was defeated by 116,520 votes to 99,773.
OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997
KSSC finally abandoned its 500 sq. ft shop to coax OPEN. “Man about the House”, Retail Week, 10 May 
1991
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pressure, KSSC retailers opened their stores on Sundays/®® The 
coalition began to crack as KSSC retailers fled to RSAR/®°
There was pressure on KSSC to compromise from government 
and its business supporters/®^ Aware of its diminishing support, KSSC 
began formal talks with RSAR in July 1993^ ®^  and later abandoned its 
central policy by accepting pre-Christmas Sunday trading/®® Despite 
these discussions, the Sunday Trading White Paper contained four 
options -  deregulation, SHRC, RSAR and KSSC. Having danced and 
spat at one another for so long, only days before the government’s Bill 
was published, KSSC, OPEN and RSAR merged. Their options would 
be presented as one.
OPEN and RSAR moderated KSSC by pulling it away from an 
extreme position. At the time the move was seen as a masterstroke, but 
it produced a fudged policy. By merging, the groups conceded their 
proposals could not individually secure a majority and they hoped an 
amalgam of their ideas could muster support to defeat deregulation. The 
late concessions destroyed the regulators’ integrity.
Conclusion
Contacts with MPs were important because there was a scramble 
for the last available vote. Personal friendships were used to gain 
access, to obtain information, and to ask questions. SHRC hired 
lobbyists that understood the parties’ policy-making systems. The 
SHRC’s Conservative bias, initially important, changed as it needed to 
influence opinion within Labour. KSSC’s political contacts were less 
effective. Contacts with civil servants and government were less 
relevant.
Whilst coalitions were important, lobbyists played little role in 
building coalitions. Groups sought to attract the support of MPs who 
were predisposed to opposition. SHRC was more successful than KSSC
“Legal threat for Sunday traders", Retail Week, 6 December 1991
Including C&A, Iceland, CWS. A key KSSC backer, C&A, turned in late 1993 . “C&A in Sunday trading U- 
turn”. Retail Week, 19 November 1993.
Peter Lloyd said ‘The Government would prefer that instead of adding options the interested parties tried to 
reach agreement among themselves about what form the two options which fall short of total deregulation 
should take.” “More options on Sunday trading”, Super-Marketing, 1 February 1993 
^^2 “Opponents of Sunday trading seek merger”. The Times, 13 July 1993
“KSS agrees to Xmas Sunday shops spree”. Marketing, 7 October 1993
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at lobbying its opponents. KSSC was ineffective in protecting and 
broadening its constituency. The regulators’ coalition came together too 
late and in desperation. The regulators’ lack of will, expressed in their 
dilatoriness in coming to a deal, their lack of drive, and their reluctance to 
provide adequate resources, prophesised their defeat. Contacts and 
coalitions were important. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
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Resources: Hypothesis Eight
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has 
abundant resources and is skilful in deploying them.
Resources, whether financial, human or geographical, were 
important. The Economist noted “millions are being spent on lobbying. 
The alliances are waging fierce c a m p a i g n s . T h e  imbalance in 
financial resources between the two interest-g roups was significant.
The John Lewis Partnership, USDAW and Milwards were the main 
funders of KSSC.^ ®® KSSC was a charity run on a shoe-string.^®® It 
“never had the resources or the management skills to construct the sort 
of lobbying campaign that might have had an effect.” ®^^ Though KSSC 
thought it could do without lobbyists, a more convincing reason for the 
lack of professional assistance was insufficient resources. KSSC “got 
reasonable funding from retailers and trade unions and more from the 
churches. But it takes a lot of £5 donations from members of churches to 
compare with the millions [of the SHRC].” ®^®
KSSC relied on part-time volunteers who were not driven by the 
same motivations and management techniques of the corporate world. 
Because KSSC was based on charity, voluntarism and faith, inefficiency 
and mental rigidity were the price of these staff. Despite most staff 
working on a semi-volunteer basis, SHRC’s private investigators 
estimated KSSC staffing and occupancy costs for two offices exceeded 
£800,000 per annum.^ ®® The likely figure was a peak of £350,000 a year 
with a norm between £2-300,000.^®° Although high-calibre volunteers 
offset KSSC’s financial weakness, as the campaign moved into a war of 
attrition, the lack of funds undermined its effectiveness.^®^
Multiple retailers spent millions of pounds funding SHRC, hiring 
lobbyists, forming front organisations and sponsoring a legal challenge. 
GJW acknowledged high funding levels were important because “we
“Sunday shopping -  Day of unrest", The Economist, 27 December 1993 - 3 January 1994 
John Lewis Partnership Representative, interview, 4/3/1997 
KSSC adviser, interview, 17/3/1997 
ibid
KSSC director, interview, 17/3/1997
Confidential briefing memo to SHRC on Michael Schluter and Keep Sunday Special, no date no author. 
200 Deputy General Secretary of USDAW, interview, 9/6/1997. Principal of KSSC, interview, 4/2/1997 
KSSC used the Church Estates Commissioners to lobby the leading food retailers. The Church used its 
position as the largest shareholder in some companies to attempt to influence retail policy. “Church presses 
big stores over Sunday trading”. Financial Times, 30 December 1991
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needed to do a lot of polling to track attitudes... We needed to have 
campaigns in the stores and a high visibility because... the people in 
favour of doing something are the worst people at bothering to be 
coun t ed . Resou r ces  helped motivate people.
A senior retailer argued “an effective campaign means having an 
effective client.” °^^  SHRC lobbyists used the internal resources of the 
retailers and their managers. Their strategies depended on the 
resources of huge commercial organisations.^®"^
The companies ran grassroots campaigns, devised by lobbyists in 
London. Store managers lobbied MPs locally.^®  ^ “There was a sea 
change the moment they [the retailers] began to devote internal 
resources, both in terms of a campaign manager, funding for materials 
and a determination that they were going to involve people on the 
ground.” ®^®
SHRC’s resources allowed it to raise its profile.^®  ^ Its lavish 
campaign was downgraded at times to avoid offending Labour. KSSC 
estimated 25% of the time of retail branch managers was dedicated to 
promoting Sunday trading, which “adds up to millions of pounds worth of 
man hours. I have privately estimated that they spent at least £60 million 
on that campaign.” ®^® SHRC estimated it spent £6 million.^ ®® Even if 
SHRC accounts existed, they would not reflect the true cost of its 
campaign.
SHRC, unlike KSSC, could purchase professional specialists. 
OPEN retained close links with its members to ensure funding.^^® RSC 
charged a below-market-rate because the food-retail sector was an area 
they could exploit. They serviced OPEN as a ‘loss leader’ to win new 
business.^ ^^
RSAR resources were low compared to the SHRC. Marks & 
Spencer “made a contribution which would have been between £100,000
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997 
Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997 
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997 
Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997 
Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997 
Ctiairman of SHRC, interview, 22/7/1997 
Principai of KSSC, interview, 4/2/1997 
Principal of SHRC, interview, 5/5/1997 
OPEN Chairman, interview, 24/3/1997 
OPEN lobbyist, interview, 17/3/1997
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and £200,000.” But its campaign lasted only a few months. The 
RSAR co-ordinator argued “effectiveness does not depend on resources 
per se. Of each hour spent I would like to think lobbyists are as effective 
over one hour, as they are over 25 hours. But, you can do very little in 
one hour. If you have money you can buy more hours.
The economic power of the big retailers intimidated ministers. 
One minister said “Rick Greenbury was frightfully rude to me and... 
[asked] why I was being so stupid?”^^"^  Similarly Tesco’s Chief Executive 
“used bully-boy tactics of s h o u t i n g . A f t e r  their conversations with 
ministers, senior retailers “picked up the telephone and rang someone 
further up the line and said ‘that bloody person is getting in our way’. To 
what extent I was supported I have no idea. The big boys try and trample 
over government to get their own way. Does it work? Sometimes it does, 
yes.”^ ®^
Conclusion
The financial resource disparity was significant, whilst the human 
resource disparity was less obvious. SHRC hired professional advisers 
whilst KSSC could not. SHRC’s strategy utilised the considerable 
resources of client companies, allowing it to fight on several different 
fronts. KSSC used the church’s support and the network of
congregations to counter the SHRC’s regional campaign. Until 1993 
USDAW also provided KSSC with a national reach.
KSSC’s ineffectiveness was caused by the lack of large-scale 
financial backing and ‘enforced’ and purchased’ human resources. 
SHRC had far more resources than its opponents, which aided its 
effectiveness. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
RSAR Co-ordinator, interview. 3/6/1997 
ibid
Sir Rictiard Greenbury was ttie Ctiairman of Marks & Spencer. Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 
10/6/1997
lain McLaurin is ttie former CEO of Tesco. Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 10/6/1997 
Former Home Office Minister 2, interview, 10/6/1997
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Low-Profile Outsider Tactics: Hypothesis Nine
Lobbyists will tend to be effective if they pursue 
low-profile 'external' tactics.
Another hypothesis, not discussed in chapter three, presented 
itself for consideration. The existing literature fails to recognise the use 
of low-profile external tactics, but both the main groups pursued low- 
profile external strategies to increase pressure for action. The SHRC, 
frustrated at government impotence, supported its retail members in 
breaking the law. KSSC, enraged by its belief that it was excluded from 
the real centre of policy-making, turned to Europe.
Legal Lobbying
SHRC retailers, as a corporate policy, co-ordinated opening times 
to orchestrate a legal challenge. They launched a comprehensive 
assault on the Shops Act 1950 based on spurious defences.^^^ It was 
more economic for retailers to open and pay fines rather than obey the 
law.^ ^® Their disregard for the law made the Shops Act unenforceable.
Opponents saw the challenge as a sham.^^® It was, however, 
effective. Because the legal position was complex and fast-moving, large 
retailers manufactured a ‘culture of normality’. SHRC hoped to reform 
the law by ensuring it was vigorously enforced, thereby mobilising the 
dormant public majority. But, there was no ‘vigorous enforcement’ of the 
Shops Act because legal challenges caused chaos allowing de facto 
deregulation and food retailers to enter the fray.^^°
From November 1991 the Sunday trader was effectively free from 
prosecution pending an ECJ ruling. The legal process was neutralised. 
There were various themes to the legal campaign.
First, retailers appealed to the ECJ alleging Section 47 of the 
Shops Act 1950 was a measure having an equivalent effect to a 
quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 30 of the
The motor accessory defence, used in 1987, was premised on the fact that most DIY items (such as paint, 
tools, tiles, carpets etc) could be used in Caravans. Motor accessories were exempt under Section 47 of the 
Shops Act.
218 “Open defiance”. Local Government Chronicle, 24 February 1989 
Diamond, P., (1991a), p78
Ian McClaren, Tesco chairman, met the Home Secretary to inform him that the Tesco’s board of directors 
could not be held together over the issue.
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Treaty of Rome.^^  ^ In three years there were two references to the ECJ 
on Sunday trading. The first judgement in November 1989 was unclear.^^^ 
The ECJ passed the issue back to national courts to decide.^^^
Because UK courts reached conflicting judgements retailers found 
guilty were encouraged by uncertainty to appeal.^ '^  ^ A Crown Court ruling 
in February 1990 stated local authorities had a duty to prosecute.^^^ Only 
months later, however, companies successfully argued the Shops Act 
contravened the Treaty.^^® The final decision in the ‘Euro-defence’ 
confirmed the Act did not conflict with the Rome Treaty.^^^
Second, enforcement agencies, aware of the impotence of 
criminal law, resorted to civil injunctions.^^® However, because an ECJ 
ruling was pending, local authorities risked having to compensate 
retailers if the Shops Act were subsequently found to breach the Treaty 
of Rome. In January 1989 injunctions were rejected until the ECJ ruled 
on the Article 30 defence. Prosecution was effectively held in 
abeyance.^^® In July 1990 a permanent injunction was granted against 
B&Q,^®° which spurred a resumption of injunction applications.^®^ 
However, retailers retrieved their principal weapon, cross-undertakings in 
damages, in April 1991. Thereafter, because local authorities were 
required to set aside funds for cross-undertakings, enforcement became 
financially hazardous.^®^ One year later the House of Lords over-ruled
Article 30 provides “quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between member states”. The Article has direct effect and gives rights for individuals which 
national courts must protect and enforce.
^  The Shops Act was within ‘the rule of reason’, but the question of proportionality was a problem. UK 
Sunday trading law was potentially a breach of Article 30 although technically the Shops Act 1950 did not 
breach the Treaty of Rome. Torfaen BC v B&Q Pic 145/88 [1990] 1 All ER 129, 158, para 17
The eleven other references to the ECJ cases were then withdrawn from the court. SHRC Memorandum 
on the ECJ ruling on 2 June 1992
“Sunday trading laws in turmoil”. Daily Telegraph, 24 November 1989 
“Prosecute Sunday shops Councils told”. The Times, 7 February 1990
Peterborough City Council v Do It All and Payless DIY, [1990] 2 CMLR 577 QBD. The High Court 
concluded the Shops Act 1950 did conflict with Article 30 and was a trade rule capable of hindering trade and 
having the potential to act as a quantitative restriction. “Sunday trading and Europe”, New Law Journal, 22 
November 1991
The ECJ ruled that while Sunday trading rules were “measures of equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions” that were relevant to Article 30, they did not make the sale of imported goods more difficult than 
the sale of domestic goods. The judgement was unexpectedly clear. Cases 0-306/88 Rochdale Borough 
Council V Anders, C-304/90 Reading Borough Council v Payless DIY and others. “Sunday trade ruling faiis to 
end open-and-shut case”. Financial Times, 17 December 1992.
The use of civil law was approved in Sunday trading cases in Stoke City Councii v B&Q (Retail) Ltd [1984] 
2 All ER 332. Diamond, P., (1991a)
Courts adjourned cases pending the ECJ ruling. “Enforcement of the Shops Act”, Local Government 
Review, 3 June 1989. “Trouble in Store”, Local Government Chronicle, 24 February 1989.
Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B&Q pic [1990] 3 CMLR 897
“Sunday trading law decision goes to the High Court”, Financial Times, 10 July 1990.
The Times, Law Report, 1 May 1991. Dillon LJ said it was a universal practice to require cross­
undertakings however over-whelmingly strong the plaintiffs case might appear to be, since it was the court’s 
function when hearing an interlocutory injunction to not anticipate the outcome of a trial.
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the Court of Appeal, ruling local authorities seeking injunctions would not 
be liable for compensation. The matter was referred back to Europe.^^^ 
Third, local authorities were pawns in the battle between the two 
main groups. Local authorities were under a duty to prosecute.^^ 
However, some were reluctant to prosecute because it was unpopular. 
KSSC threatened local authorities with writs forcing prosecution, whilst 
SHRC criticised strict law enforcers for wasting public funds and 
threatening employment.^^® Local government had two concerns: first the 
legal costs. Retailers called for lengthy trials to hear evidence, knowing 
local authorities could ill afford expert witnesses. Local government 
spending was under ever closer scrutiny because of the Community 
Charge. Second, the risk of cross-undertakings. There was pressure not 
to seek temporary injunctions if they risked exposing the authority to 
damages for lost trade. By 1993 90% of local authorities had adopted a 
passive or inactive stance to enforcing the law.^^^
Despite undermining the law, SHRC lobbyists enjoyed good 
relations with Home Office ministers and officials even though they aided 
and abetted law breaking. The Euro-defence delayed the administration 
of justice, allowing traders to trade in breach of the criminal law.^^*
This low-profile external strategy produced a procedural quagmire 
disproportionate to the likelihood of its ultimate success. The tactic was 
effective: the legal chaos was deliberate, planned and resourced. 
Breaking the law was perceived to be more effective than lobbying. 
Legal procedures were used to keep stores open to encourage latent 
demand. The tactic was a means to an end. It was never likely to 
succeed, but it created political pressure on government.
Diamond, P., (1993a)
Under the Shops Act Section 71 and subsequent edicts. House of Commons Library, (1993)
Report of the Committee of inquiry into proposals to amend the Shops Acts (The Auld Committee), Cmd 
9376, November 1984, para 52.
^  They claimed “vast sums of public money and hours of valuable court time have been spent in argument 
on legislation that all agree is beyond its useful life in its current form..." SHRC, (1991), Parliamentary Brief, 
Shopping Hours: Putting the Record Straight, January 1991, SHRC archives.
Institute of Public Finance report October 1993. “Councils support Sunday shopping". Financial Times, 15 
October 1993
Diamond, P., (1991a)
239 p p y  lobbyist, interview, 7/3/1997. Sort Out Sunday Co-ordinator, interview, 1/7/1997
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The European Agenda
KSSC wallowed in its ‘outsider’ status and liked being “an amazing
irritant” to government.^"^® As a consequence of its ‘exclusion’ KSSC
turned to Europe where it found the “issue more in line with Brussels’s
thinking than Westminster’s.” "^^  ^ SHRC launched ‘Euroshop’ to “bring
together retailers, consumers and other groups who wish to liberalise
shop hours in Europe.” "^^^
The European Parliament harboured a supportive climate of
opinion for KSSC, which with its European allies sought to outlaw Sunday
working through an amendment to Article 4 in the Social Affairs
Committee of the EP?^ The Social Affairs Committee did not adopt the
amendment but in December 1990 advocated member states adopt the
necessary measures to ensure each worker was, ‘in principle’, entitled to
a free weekend.
The Commission published a draft Directive in October 1990 
recommending a minimum one day off in every two weeks. The German 
delegation proposed the ‘weekly day’ be Sunday/^^ The compromise 
read “as a rule” the weekly day off should be a Sunday?^'
The following year the Netherlands and Germany proposed that 
the mandatory thirty six-hour continuous rest period include Sunday. 
Though the proposal was included at German insistence, KSSC believed 
it was its doing: “we fought like tigers to get the Sunday issue in the 
working time directive and succeeded.” "^^^
The Employment Secretary, Gillian Shephard MP, argued “there 
was general acceptance that the proposal that Sunday should ‘in 
principle’ be the weekly day of rest but should not be obligatory.” '^^ ® The 
Ministers’ meeting in May 1992 agreed Sunday need not be an obligatory 
day of rest as proposed initially in the Working Time Directive. The 
phrase ‘in principle’ allowed the UK leeway.^ "^ ® Therefore, despite supra-
KSSC Barrister, interview, 23/5/1997
KSSC director, interview, 17/3/1997
"The man of many parts". Retail Week, 20 March 1992
The amendment stated: “Member States will take the necessary steps to ensure that on Sundays and bank 
holidays no work shall be carried out.”
Except in sections where cultural, emergency, security or technical restraints exist and where weekly leave 
days must be subjected to negotiated agreements.
"Battlelines drawn on Sunday Shopping", The European, 21 December 1990 
“Sunday row over workers’ rights”. Men’s Wear, 6 December 1990 
KSSC director, interview, 17/3/1997
“Shepard returns with EC delay on work hours ruling". Financial Times, 6 May 1992 
Chairman of EuroShop, interview, 14/5/1997
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national lobbying and a broad-based coalition transcending national 
boundaries, the British government neutralised KSSC at the EU level.
KSSC’s strategy did not have an adverse affect on its relations 
with the Home Office but weakened its parliamentary support because 
many Conservative Sabbatarians were Euro-sceptics. Europe was a 
weapon KSSC was ‘forced’ to use. Most participants believed the tactic 
was part of the ‘game’ to keep pressure on government.
KSSC’s ‘outsider’ strategy did not exclude it from the policy 
process. The European strategy was to be expected and groups used 
Europe “whenever it suited their short-term a d v a n t a g e . K S S C ’s tactic 
was a recognition of its failure. The strategy was only effective in 
opening another front against SHRC, forcing the retailers to react.
Conclusion
A spectrum of tactics was employed by the interest-groups, 
ranging from insider to outsider. Insider techniques included negotiation 
and the provision of research data and services for officials. Outsider 
techniques included lobbying European institutions to bypass the 
government and the campaign to undermine an Act of Parliament.
Only one of these tactics was effective. It may be that low-profile 
external tactics are only effective if the interest-g roup enjoys good 
relations with government. The evidence partly supports the hypothesis. 
Low-profile external tactics are ineffective when deployed by outsider 
groups, but effective when employed by insider groups.
Conclusions
Lobbying on Sunday trading was atypical. The issue was initially 
intensely political. The focus of lobbying shifted from government to 
parliament as circumstances changed. Government moved from
searching helplessly for a solution in a web of interacting groups to a 
passive role where policy development was handed to interest-groups. 
Parliament was given a genuine choice.
Former Home Office Minister 1, interview, 26/6/1997
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The issue was long-fought and high-profile. The Times’ 
sketch writer wrote
In the public galleries sat legions of professional lobbyists. Talk 
about shopworkers’ rights, but what about lobbyists’ rights? Any 
outcome to this debate doomed hundreds of these to 
unemployment.^®^
Because lobbyists were so active, this case study is a good test of 
their activity. The evidence suggests that lobbyists were not important. 
They were minor players. External variables determined the dependent 
variable, including social change, government majority. Labour party 
modernisation, and new unionism. Context was key. Internal variables 
including resource disparity, the ability to construct and maintain 
coalitions, the ability to mobilise wider opinion and the media, contacts, 
knowledge of procedure and low-profile external measures were all 
relevant, but operated within a wider environment in which contextual 
factors held sway.
Lobbyists over-estimated their impact. A civil servant believed 
“lobbyists will always claim success even it if was in the natural course of 
events. You can claim anything as a lobbying s u c c e s s . I n  1986 and 
in the 1987-92 parliament KSSC was successful in preventing change, 
but it failed in the long-term largely because it was politically naïve. 
Though it was tenacious and built up ferocious loyalty, KSSC could not 
extend its reach outside its minority parliamentary and public supporters. 
Because of its earlier exclusion, KSSC’s lack of objectivity and its 
inflexibility infuriated potential allies. The rickety concordat, which existed 
for a brief moment in April 1986, could not be maintained over the longer- 
term. That government had to wait seven years to legislate, and then do 
so with an ‘options bill’ does not prove KSSC’s influence, but rather 
shows that government and SHRC had to wait for the context to change.
“Democratic ideal crashed headlong into old buffer", The Times, 9 December 1993 
Former senior civil servant 8, interview, 22/04/98
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After 1992 external factors favoured SHRC and disadvantaged 
KSSC. Changes within Labour, changing society and a narrow 
government majority helped SHRC. It negotiated with decision-makers, 
and was engaged in a partnership. Its policies were congruent with 
government objectives, so government readily accepted SHRC’s use of 
external tactics. SHRC adapted to changing circumstances by 
compromising and broadening its appeal.
External variables
A sense of historv. SHRC was on the crest of the ideological wave: the 
‘spirit of the age’ worked in its favour. There was a gradual erosion of 
KSSC’s ideas.
Partv ideoloQV. SHRC did not have to lobby government for its case to 
be accepted. Deregulation was fashionable to Conservatives, and SHRC 
linked its policy to liberty and freedom. Whilst for Labour, SHRC 
promoted consumer sovereignty.
Government’s confidence returned as memories of the 1986 defeat 
faded. A turnover in backbenchers gave government more confidence.
Government maioritv. After 1992 policy-making was devolved to the 
interest-groups, and government became a broker. Government was 
weak. Strength lay with the groups. SHRC effectively promoted its 
solution, whilst KSSC was more effective in its oppositional mode -  it was 
ineffective in an inclusive process.
Labour. Eighty-nine Labour MPs helped pass the Sunday Trading Bill. 
Labour modernised itself and Blair as Shadow Home Secretary portrayed 
the party as consumer-friendly and ‘modern’, and supported SHRC. The 
high number of Scottish frontbenchers, and the 1992 intake of 
modernisers helped SHRC.
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Social change. The workforce and society had changed. Millions of 
people worked on Sundays, the majority of married women worked and 
the UK was irreligious.
Quality of the Case. KSSC’s ideas were old-fashioned and complicated. 
In the early 1990s the status quo changed, so that KSSC was seen to be 
negative, whilst SHRC was defending the new reality. SHRC’s objectives 
were easy to understand and chimed with society.
Internal variables
Within the interest-groups lobbyists were not dominant. Full-time 
officials ran the campaigns. Industry leaders were policy drivers. 
Lobbyists were strategic advisers. The following variables were within 
the control of the interest-groups and lobbyists. Those variables 
included:
Contacts. Lobbyists facilitated SHRC’s access to Labour. GJW lobbied 
MPs directly and facilitated contact with MPs and provided intelligence. 
After 1992 government contacts became less relevant because the policy 
community was made transparent. Because SHRC consisted of staff 
who were also professional politicians and campaigners, it is difficult to 
separate their closely-entwined roles.
Knowledce of procedure. Lobbyists’ understanding of procedure was 
somewhat important in parliament. However, civil servants were open 
and ready to help groups, so this resource became less important.
Coalitions. KSSC’s inability to form a broad front was deleterious. It 
failed to maintain and expand its coalition. SHRC’s success lay in 
compromise which, although appearing to be a concession to Sunday 
sensibilities, was congruent with what retailers suspected the market 
would tolerate.^®^ USDAW’s turn was a political coup. Top-down and 
bottom-up pressure co-ordinated by SHRC, Tesco directors and
' ‘The Sunday trading trap that means shop till you drop”, The Guardian, 7 December 1993
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employees coincided with customers shopping. USDAW delivered 
SHRC Labour backbench support. SHRC deprived KSSC of middle- 
ground support from trade unionists, Labour MPs and shop-workers.
Multi-faceted lobbvina. Lobbying was complex and multi-faceted, but in 
the Lloydian period it concentrated on the constituency link. Therefore 
though one approach was more effective and dominant, other tactics 
were used. The companies mobilised their staff and customers to contact 
MPs.^ "^^  There was a campaign to get MPs into stores and use the media 
and opinion polls. The mail-bag was important on a free vote. The ability 
to simulate hand-written letters to MPs was potent.
Resources. The disparity between the resources of the groups was 
notable. Though KSSC had volunteer workers, the resources of SHRC 
clients enabled it to run an effective regional and national campaign, hire 
lobbyists, advertise, and fund ECJ cases.
Legal challenge. Opening stores whetted consumers’ appetites. SHRC 
aided and abetted law-breaking by adopting a strategy designed to 
undermine the law, which spawned de facto deregulation, changing 
habits and expectations.^^^ Once retailers had started trading, KSSC 
could not put the genie back into the bottle.
An assessment of the hvpotheses
The evidence suggests:
1) Lobbyists tend to be relatively unimportant on high-profile, general 
and political issues because of the number of other actors and 
external contexts.
GJW lobbyist, interview, 9/5/1997
Torfaen BC  v B&Q pic [1990] 145/88 1 All ER 129. Of references from Bodmin and Stirewbury Crown 
Courts: Woodbridge, Mansfield, Gateshead, Wakefield and Derry Magistrate’s Court; and the High Court the 
ECJ chose Torfaen as a sample.
159
Chapter Four
2) Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no disadvantageous 
external or contextual constraints -  KSSC was ineffective and SHRC 
was made effective by contextual factors.
3) Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs and previous experiences 
of political decision-makers and pre-existing policy are congruent with 
the lobbyist’s objective -  all these factors helped SHRC and hindered 
KSSC.
4) Interest-groups are more effective if they are involved in the policy 
community. Lobbyists played little role in involving their clients in the 
community. Lobbyists did however play a role in managing their 
clients’ activity.
5) Lobbyists pursued a multi-faceted campaign, but one dominated by 
constituency-public-media led tactics. Whilst other tactics were used, 
lobbyists were effective by focusing on one.
6) Familiarity with routines and standard operating procedures was not 
very important. It was useful and did play a role at times, for example 
SHRC’s work against the Powell Bill. Overall, knowledge of 
procedures is an important but not a significant determinant of 
effectiveness.
7) The contacts of lobbyists were useful in gaining access to MPs, but 
more effective was pressure placed on MPs through constituents. 
KSSC was unable to build a long-term coalition, whilst SHRC was 
effective in broadening its appeal.
8) The resource disparity had an effect. Resources allowed SHRC 
companies to fund an expensive legal challenge to the ECJ, hire 
specialised advisers, and manage an intense campaign.
9) Both groups pursued low-profile external tactics, but only the SHRC 
was successful. Perhaps low-profile external tactics are effective only 
when used by insider groups.
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5. CrossRail
This chapter examines a middle-profile policy issue. CrossRail was 
a proposed railway under central London linking Paddington and 
Liverpool Street stations.^ After a tortured birth a CrossRail Bill was 
rejected by parliament. The chapter focuses on the initial decision to 
approve CrossRail and the subsequent battle to stop it. It examines the 
stop-start nature of CrossRail’s progression, and explains that whilst on 
paper the government’s policy did not change, in practice Treasury 
hostility, weak political commitment and ineffective lobbying undermined 
CrossRail.
To understand the policy-making process, it is necessary to set the 
period in context. London Regional Transport became a nationalised 
industry in 1984 when control was transferred from the Greater London 
Council to the Department of Transport (DTp).^ DTp had grown rapidly, 
and faced intense pressure over transport infrastructure.^ It was keen to 
prove itself.
After years of decline, the population of London unexpectedly 
began to grow in the 1980s. Public transport congestion became a policy 
problem."^ There was a “dramatic mood for change.”  ^ DTp’s answer was 
to instruct London Underground Limited (LUL) and British Rail (BR) 
planners to identify cost-effective improvements to relieve congestion.® 
So, panic, a need for information, and the desire to avoid spending money 
motivated the Central London Rail Study (CLRS). It was “an excuse for 
not being able to do something now, which is a common response in
' DTp, (1996)
 ^House of Commons, (1986-87a); and House of Commons, (1986-87b), p259 
 ^ Parkinson, 0 ., (1992), p 283
" The number of people crossing the Circle Line (commuting into central London) grew by nine per cent 
between 1984-89. ‘The Tube's Response to Over-crowding: Raise Fares - the trouble of over-crowding". 
Financial Times, 19 June 1989.
® Dr Tony Ridley, Chairman of LUL, in ‘Ticket to a 21 Century Tube”, Daily Telegraph, 15 August 1988. 
®LT, (1993)
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government.”  ^ CLRS bought short-term peace at the expense of 
increased medium-term pressure. CrossRail’s profile was heightened 
when ministers published the study.
CLRS articulated the case for transport improvement more 
effectively than either BR or LUL alone could have. “It helped their 
position because a reputable group had come up with these conclusions 
and this information was in the public domain.”® The study was a quasi­
consultation paper and proposed an upgrading programme and three 
schemes to ease east-west axis congestion, one of which was CrossRail.®
Lobbyists
Those promoting and opposing CrossRail used lobbyists. 
CrossRail used public money to employ a lobbyist to help it make its case 
in parliament and public and to get around Treasury. Ian Greer 
Associates (IGA) was hired to assist the in-house public affairs team. The 
parliamentary office accounted for half the entire project. It included 
petition managers, lawyers and draftsmen. Around seven staff lobbied 
MPs and local government.^® Many were consultants working on a 
permanent basis.
The remit of the in-house PA team was unclear. One recalled 
“when I arrived they did not know what public affairs was. They wanted 
me to do reactive work.”^^ Their IGA lobbyist concurred: “public affairs 
people were brought in whenever there was a problem or a crisis and 
were told what needed to be done.”^^  There was, however, a need for 
assistance because of the lack of government support.^® The minister 
recognised the value of the lobbyist
The professional lobbyist was there to advise an organisation 
which are (London Transport is an example) good at what they
 ^senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
® ibid
® CLRS proposed six single line schemes in total -  two tubes, upgrading of an existing BR line and the 
CrossRail options. The most promising new lines with the highest benefit/cost ratios were: East-West 
CrossRail (EWC) and Chelsea-Hackney Line (CHL). "The Central London Rail Study: Transport Options Ruled 
Out by Cost", Financial Times, 27 January 1989 
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98; CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98 
”  CrossRail lobbyist 1, interview, 15/01/98 
IGA lobbyist 3, interview, 27/05/98 
CrossRail parliamentary manager, interview, 29/01/98
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do, but they are not necessarily adept at Identifying which MPs 
would have an interest and who ought to be brought on/'^
CrossRail’s lobbyists were required to maintain a high-profile for 
the project^^ as well as provide basic services such as “intelligence 
gathering and monitoring at European, national, regional and local level 
as appropriate [and] advice on parliamentary procedure and 
convention.” ®^
CrossRail demanded “a specialist consultancy with an 
understanding of major public service infrastructure projects and the 
empowering legislative procedure. This is targeted at the parliamentary 
f i eld. . .Fol lowing a competitive pitch IGA was hired to
• Have CrossRail designated a scheme of ‘national significance’ by the Secretary of 
State for Transport^®
• Minimise opposition to the project at both national and local levels
• Progress through the Transport & Works Act (TWA) process
• To build public and private support from HM Treasury for CrossRail
• To build confidence on the part of the potential financial backers that there was 
sufficient parliamentary and Government support^®
IGA was hired because it “seemed to have good credentials, 
knowing the relative importance of people who needed to understand 
what the project offered.” ®^ Charles Barker provided public relations 
support. Burson-Marsteller ran the CrossRail Coalition. Shandwick 
advised the City of London Corporation -  supporting CrossRail was part 
of its survival strategy.^^ Tower Hamlets, which opposed CrossRail, hired 
GJW and later Market Access.
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98 
Internal CrossRail Guidance notes, Pitch Document, nd 
ibid 
ibid
The designation of the project as one of national significance is relevant to the Transport and Works Act 
process. Were the Secretary of State to designate the project one of national significance, legislation would 
have related to the detail, not the principle, of the Bill.
IGA Proposal, (nd)
former BR director 2, interview, 01/12/97
former City of London Corporation lobbyist, interview, 09/03/98
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Macro-level
Profile, technicality and poiiticality: Hypothesis One
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on 
low-profile, technical and non-political issues.
The CrossRail concept had lain dormant in LT's archives for years, 
but was reactivated by the six-week CLRS. It was a technical proposal 
with wider political implications. It had low-profile and high-profile 
elements.
Overall lobbyists had little impact. Apart from undertaking a basic 
political audit of CrossRail’s supporters^^ they were invisible to civil 
servants and ministers. A former minister said “I was not even aware of 
who was lobbying for London Transport. They certainly played no part in 
any of the machinations I was involved with.”^^  He argued
Nobody in the department was interested in who was lobbying 
for what. W e were all entirely consumed with what the
economics were and what the logistics were.^'*
The minister argued IGA “failed to anticipate the dangers that I too 
failed to anticipate. I do not regard that as dreadfully culpable. 
Lobbyists may have helped their client by advising them on parliamentary 
machinations, but had no impact on policy outcome. A senior Treasury 
official argued lobbyists had no impact on CrossRail.^® Another official 
argued lobbyists were “utterly unimportant" and “did not impinge. 
Lobbying DTp ministers and officials was ‘froth’ because they were 
convinced of the case. IGA pursued a parliamentary-based campaign, 
and failed to educate its client about the real influence of Treasury. An 
official closely involved with CrossRail concluded “IGA, because of its
style, was unhelpful to London Underground. I don’t think they did
anything for them.’’^ ® CrossRail was a clumsy campaign. It was unsubtle. 
“There were things that were said and done that grated with government.
“  IGA proposal, (nd) 
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98 
ibid 
ibid
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
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If you annoy the Treasury and the Department of Transport it is not the 
best way to get the result you want.”^^
The CrossRail public affairs team was ineffective because “they 
had the wrong skills and were drawn from the wrong sources. They made 
the wrong contacts with decision-formers.” °^ Ministers perceived 
CrossRail as controversial and were not obligated morally, as they felt 
they were with JLE [see chapter six].
Whilst decision-makers questioned the value of lobbyists, the client 
was satisfied with IGA. CrossRail’s manager says “the lobbyists we used 
provided value for money.”^^  An in-house lobbyist argued IGA effectively 
monitored parliament. They helped CrossRail understand the mood of 
MPs and provided general advice.^^
CrossRail believed IGA provided
eyes and ears and manpower. They were able to go out and
talk to people. It is too grand a statement to say ‘they
influenced public policy’. They helped us put our case.^^
IGA’s remit was to “identify opinion formers and discreetly lobby 
them [...] their brief was to i n f l u e n c e . W h e n  asked whether IGA 
achieved that brief the respondent replied “No I do not think they did. I 
am not sure they were the right firm. I was not particularly impressed. 
The project manager did not know enough to check whether they were 
really being e f f e c t i v e . T h e  lobbyist was ineffective, and the client 
incapable of judging its activity.
When asked whether he achieved his client’s objectives the IGA 
lobbyist answered “No. It was impossible to change Treasury’s mind.’’^ ®
The lobbyist blamed his ineffectiveness on his client’s management
structure and competing agendas. His advice was ignored. He produced
proposals for CrossRail all of which were read and very of 
little of which was enacted upon [...] It was the one account 
where we could never get to see the people at the top, never 
get to have a frank discussion and never get them to agree 
the forward strategy.^^
former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98
Corporation of ttie City of London representative 2, interview, 09/03/98
CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98
CrossRail lobbyist 1, interview, 15/01/98
ibid
former BR director 1, interview, 31/03/98 
ibid
IGA lobbyist 3, interview, 27/05/98 
ibid
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The in-house public affairs team was ineffective. It was 
dysfunctional. Its position was complicated by prevarication by ministers 
and by their own managers.
Conclusion
CrossRail was a technical, low-profile and non-political policy, but 
lobbying on that basis was ineffective. Lobbyists did not impinge on day- 
to-day policy-making. They were partly effective in organising limited 
media and third-party support to engineer short-term political support.
CrossRail was initially advantageous to government. The impetus 
for CrossRail came from within government. However, there was no 
organised and continuing high-level support for CrossRail.^® DTp looked 
for outside assistance; it “wanted support for the Central London Rail 
Study and CrossRail. We wanted it very badly.”®®
In sharp contrast to JLE, the lack of a real champion doomed 
CrossRail. To persuade Treasury to fund a project of this size, CrossRail 
lobbyists needed to show there was more at stake than the comfort of 
Essex commuters. Its technocratic approach crumbled when faced by 
fickle political fashion. CrossRail and IGA failed to raise CrossRail’s 
profile within government. Its fortunes followed a familiar pattern: initial 
political enthusiasm, which waned as the focus of political attention 
moved to other priorities. The absence of a determined champion, and 
IGA’s failure to link CrossRail to government’s broader themes [see pages 
171-177] and to raise its profile to broaden its appeal meant the weight of 
advocacy fell almost entirely on DTp ministers who lacked influence and, 
later, interest.
The evidence does not support the hypothesis. Furthermore it 
suggests the opposite is true. Lobbyists could have been effective had 
they taken the low-profile, technical and non-political proposals and made 
them high-profile, understandable to a wide audience and political.
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
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External and contextual factors: Hypothesis Two
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no 
disadvantageous external or contextual constraints 
beyond the control of government players.
Economic Context
The squeeze on public expenditure, the battle against inflation and 
the recession of the early 1990s weakened the case for CrossRail. CLRS 
was undertaken against a background of financial deregulation and 
London’s blossoming international status. It assumed the growth of the 
1980s could be susta ined.H ow ever, the recession’s impact in South- 
East England was severe. Over five years growth was 0.8% and rail 
commuting fell sharply."^  ^ CLRS’s employment projection of 100,000 
additional jobs in central London by 2000 was replaced by a 150,000 
fall."^  ^ The economic context reduced the requirement for additional 
transport capacity. Despite the 1990 Autumn Statement providing for 
CrossRail,"^^ Treasury hinted the plans would be delayed because of 
financial uncertainty."^"  ^ In the post-General Election PES round the 
Chancellor admitted there was blood on the carpet because of the 
recession and to restrain the pre-Election spending boom. Although £200 
million was earmarked for CrossRail, rail and LUL improvements were 
dropped. BR’s spending plans were cut by half and LT’s budget was 
cut 10%."^
Transport expenditure was low-priority and an easy target. There 
was a preference to deflect pressure for spending cuts to capital 
p r o j e c t s . “The PSBR was out of control” recalled one senior official; “the 
hunt was on to find money everywhere. We kept saying [to ministers] ‘if
DTp, (1996) 
ibid
Employment figures are from 1988 to 1992. O&Y briefing note to Westminster Council, (1992)
‘The settlement also provides for the cost of the proposed east-west CrossRail as announced by the 
Secretary of State for Transport on 5 October. This will connect Paddington and Liverpool Street with stations 
in between at a cost (in March 1990 prices) of £1.4bn over a number of years." Autumn Statement, (1990), 
pp16-17
** ‘Timing doubt clouds rail link go-ahead: Funding uncertainty after Parkinson announcement". The Guardian,
10 October 1990
“‘Back to work’ plan by Lamont: Squeeze on public sector pay, interest cut and aid for industry cheer Tories”, 
Daily Telegraph, 13 November 1992. In the 1992 Autumn Statement the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
authorised the JLE.
“Autumn Statement: Road plans accelerate but BR feels the pinch”. Daily Telegraph, 13 November 1992; 
“Clarke cuts ‘will cause rage’”. Dally Telegraph, 4 October 1993 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98; senior civil servant 3, interview, 10/02/98
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you want to save money then stop this project.’"^® Whilst Treasury publicly 
extolled the project’s virtues it undermined it in private. The 1993 Budget 
Statement reflected this approach by reaffirming Treasury’s commitment 
to CrossRail, but announcing a review to determine private-sector finance 
potential.
CrossRail lobbyists were impotent when faced with a slate of 
government reviews. A review of project cost and opportunities for 
private-sector involvement in 1993 concluded CrossRail had no ‘fatal flaw’ 
and was well-conceived, being an attractive project to the private-sector. 
Simultaneously, SG Warburg examined options for privatising CrossRail, 
concluding around 40% of the capital cost could be privately financed. 
Treasury bombarded the promoters with questions about cost and 
technical details.®^ A Railway Operators’ report concluded CrossRail 
“attains a range of benefits going beyond its stated purpose as a transport 
function" and validated the project for the third time in twelve months.®® 
Nevertheless, weeks later Treasury demanded another study, which 
aimed to improve cost-effectiveness and reduce public-sector cost.®  ^ The 
report played into Treasury hands by noting CrossRail was “a visionary 
project which may be ahead of its time in view of the change in 
employment and commuting patterns...’’®® It argued CrossRail be delayed.
These reports should be seen as an attempt by Treasury to stop 
the policy. “No matter how good these consultants were, the idea that in 
4-6 weeks they could work magic, and find truths that the Secretary of 
State’s agents would not have found in years, is unconvincing.’’®® 
Although DTp officials described the reports as ‘a bit of silliness’ they 
delayed the project long enough for circumstances to change.®^ Treasury 
ministers, although guilty, were left with no blood on their hands. For 
Treasury
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
“Budget ’93: Tighter rein to be put on public spending -  Red Book details'". Financial Times, 1 December 
1993
Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick, (1992). The Bechtel report was undertaken in 1993, (May 1993), p i 
SG Warburg, (May 1993), Part 2, p3 and pp 51-53 
®2LT, (1993)
Railway Operators, (1993), p53 
Bovis et al, (1993)
“  Bovis et al, (1993), p4 
senior civil servant 1, interview, 04/02/98  
ibid
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it was hard to kill CrossRail cleanly when you had got public 
statements from John Major. Given what John Major had said 
to the OBI it was jolly hard to get a minister to stand up in 
public and say ‘we have the authority to kill the CrossRail 
project.’®®
The case for CrossRail, initially strong, weakened as the economy 
dipped into recession and congestion faded. There was inevitability in the 
argument against CrossRail: employment in London had been falling for 
decades; the 1980s were simply a blip.^ ®
Political Considerations and the Conservative Partv
The 1990 local elections took place in remarkable circumstances, 
because “the poll tax fiasco was at its full intensity.”®® The poor state of 
London’s transport system was a factor in the Conservative’s 
unpopularity.®^
In the 1990 London borough elections the Conservatives and 
Labour were roughly neck and neck. Major’s intervention to secure 
CrossRail’s Second Reading was made against a backdrop of 
government unpopularity. Senior ministers feared outright rejection would 
damage Conservative candidates in the May local and June European 
elections in 1994, and harm the City of London’s reputation.®^ The 
decision enabled the Bill to enter its Committee stage in July 1993.®® The 
government supported CrossRail up until the elections.®"^
Disarray in the Conservative parliamentary party caused by 
Europe, weak leadership and low morale threatened parliamentary 
business. Withdrawal from the ERM undermined popular and market 
trust in the government, and the coal-pit closure programme triggered 
media and popular opposition. The Prime Minister’s determination to 
ratify the Maastricht Treaty convulsed the parliamentary party. Its right 
wing blamed the ERM for magnifying the recession. As the party
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/1/98
Employment In ttie 1960s and 70s tiad been falling as a consequence of government policy. Government 
had restricted new development in the central area by using DTI Industrial Development Certificates.
Travers, T., (1994); Minors, M., and Grenham, D., (1990)
Travers, T., (1994)
62 "Why Tories fear they will lose London: From the capital to the coast, the Conservative’s’ election hopes are 
in turmoil”, Sunday Telegraph, 24 April 1994 
“PM backs CrossRail despite Treasury opposition”. Financial Times 22 January 1994 
^  “CrossRail hits buffers: £2bn London train link plan ‘on verge of collapse’”, London Evening Standard, 22 
March 1994
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splintered into factions, it grew increasingly nervous because falling 
unemployment and economic growth failed to deliver political rewards. 
John Major was wounded and his government vulnerable.
An early sign of Major’s fight-back to reassert his authority over a 
divided Cabinet and party was the decision to reject the pleas of leading 
right-winger Michael Portillo, Chief Secretary, and to press ahead with 
CrossRail despite Treasury resistance.®^ The decision indicated a tougher 
stance in settling Whitehall disputes.
Conclusion
This section has described how one part of government wanted 
CrossRail stopped, whilst others promoted it. Despite broad support and 
DTp advocacy, lobbying by CrossRail and other third parties was 
ineffective because of the recession. The context changed: the fall in 
employment undermined CrossRail’s rationale. One external variable -  
concern about Conservative performance in local and European elections 
-  reprieved CrossRail temporarily.
Lobbyists did “not have a lot of power up against the wheels of 
government...[and] the Treasury. They were on a hiding to nothing.”®® 
IGA was hamstrung. Lobbyists were ineffective because there were 
disadvantageous contextual constraints beyond government’s control. 
The evidence supports the hypothesis.
“  “Major fights to reassert his authority”, Daily Telegraph, 27 January 1994 
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98
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Pre-existing policy and experience of government 
players: Hypothesis Three
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of
political decision-makers, pre-existing policy and
previous experience of government players are
congruent with the lobbyist's objective.
Lobbying and the Choice of CrossRail
Before the Treasury rearguard action CrossRail was approved not 
because of effective lobbying but because of partisan advantage. In 1988 
the Prime Minister chaired a meeting, attended by the Transport 
Secretary and civil servants, to decide on CLRS priorities. Several 
reasons explain CrossRail’s prioritisation.
First, it was the least bad option because it gave both BR and LUL 
a pet project’. London Transport alone would have found it difficult to 
promote an additional scheme. BR could share the burden. However, 
CrossRail was the priority of neither: LUL favoured the Chelsea-Hackney 
line whilst BR favoured ThamesLink.®^
Second, CrossRail was cheaper than CHL. CrossRail cost £870m, 
whilst CHL was estimated at £1bn.®® Benefit-cost analysis established 
CrossRail as the stronger project.®® CrossRail’s benefit-cost ratio was 
1.7:1.'°
Third, party advantage is a convincing explanatory variable. A 
junior DTp official presented CrossRail to Thatcher. “She would have 
been interrupting Parkinson all the time. It would have been a barrage of 
complaints that he had not thought things through.'"^ The discussion 
progressed
Margaret Thatcher just dismissed Chelsea-Hackney with one 
sweep of her hand, and said, ‘Hackney! Hackney! Do you 
know what sort of people live out in Hackney? They are not 
Conservative voters! Who wants to go to Hackney? These 
are not our people! No! Tell me about CrossRail Cecil.’ And 
that was it.^ ^
CHL would be the sole responsibility of LUL, whilst BR would be solely responsible for ThamesLink 
G8 DTp, (1989)
DTp, (1996)
DTp, (1996)
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98. Confirmed by two subsequent interviews -  former Minister 
of State for Transport 2, interview, 05/02/98; former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
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LT believe CrossRail “was not imposed from politicians or the 
cabinet.”^^  However, the decision was taken at the highest political level. 
It was based on political calculations. An official commented “it is a 
classic example of where a year’s work boiled down to a ten second 
political p r e ju d i c e .D T p  announced CrossRail would be prioritised.
Once approved, CrossRail competed with the Jubilee Line. The 
1980s dilemma of ‘which one first’, by the early 1990s became ‘which 
one’. The 1980s “was a happy time in the Department of Transport. We 
had an enormous roads programme and we had every conceivable 
railway as a candidate. In our naivety we thought CLRS was additional to 
Jubilee Line.’’^  ^ Supporters hoped to build the two schemes 
sequentially.^®
However, CrossRail was introduced only once the JLE Bill had 
completed its parliamentary stages. DTp then faced the challenge of 
progressing CrossRail, but the delay allowed Treasury to undermine 
CrossRail; it indicated one scheme would succeed/^
Treasurv
Understanding the interaction between Treasury and DTp is central 
in assessing the circumscribed effect of lobbyists. Several factors explain 
the Treasury’s role. First, the operating assumptions, that once a project 
or activity was approved the Treasury would find the required resources, 
changed. Previously the key objective for departments and lobbyists was 
to have projects approved. A Treasury official argued “once you get an 
announcement, come hell or high water, you are tied in.’’^ ® There was a 
belief in Whitehall that projects which “could not be afforded one year 
could be put in the budget in one or two years’ time.’’^ ® The reward 
system focused on approval and announcement, not on delivery. It
London Transport executive 3, interview, 25/03/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
Former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
former No 10 Policy Unit member, interview, 02/03/98 
senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/04/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/04/98
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encouraged over-emphasis of benefits and under-emphasis of costs and 
risk.
Whilst there was a belief that announcements became self-fulfilling, 
departments could not claim success until a project was complete. 
Treasury can over-turn decisions. “Treasury knows, and have been 
proved right, that many things get announced but not everything that is 
announced happens. There is no reason why they should give up 
hope.”«°
When CrossRail was approved there was no apparent fiscal crisis. 
Public-sector debt was being repaid.®  ^ Pressures for flexibility in the 
planning total, and for increased spending were accommodated within a 
growing GDP.®  ^ In the following months. Treasury, under intense 
pressure to control public expenditure, moved to block CrossRail. 
Treasury’s power deepened and widened after 1990. A new planning 
total was effective from 1989-90.®  ^ Top-down totals were made to stand. 
Additional departmental bids were ruled out. This new approach reflected 
the new personalities and priorities of government.®"  ^ Major was the first 
ex-Chief Secretary, and one of the few ex-Chancellors, to become Prime 
Minister.®® He worked with Treasury to exclude opportunities for ministers 
to appeal from one to the other.
The New Control Total meant PES became more sophisticated.®® 
A new Cabinet committee, EDX, imposed decisions upon ministers.®^ 
When the Transport Secretary appeared at EDX, Treasury sent “briefings 
-  not only for our ministers, but also for the other ministers -  saying ‘if you 
want to save money, here is something to get rid of.”’®® There was an 
institutional opposition within Treasury to mega-projects.®®
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
Thain, C., and Wright, M., (1995), p496
Spending was consistent with medium-term objectives. Thain, 0 ., and Wright, M., (1995), p489-91 
The new total included only Whitehall spending. HMT, (1988a). Chapman, R., (1997), pp81-86 
^  senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
“  John Major was the first Prime Minister since Harold Macmillan who had recently become Chancellor. 
James Callaghan had a gap of ten years.
it aimed to hold public spending at a level less than the trend growth of GDP over the economic cycle. 
Thain, 0 ., and Wright, M., (1995), p289 
EDX members were from non-spending departments, or spending ministers who favoured restraining public 
expenditure: “it was a rigged jury”, senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
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Second, there was a clear Treasury view’. Treasury was shielded 
from, and irritated by, lobbyists. It believed it assessed issues objectively 
and ministers decided the ‘incommensurables’. Officials saw this 
‘institutional view’ as an aversion to ‘bad economics’.®® Treasury believed 
it had no pressure groups, allowing it to act as a catalyst spurring on the 
spending departments, which resisted change because of special 
interests snapping at their ankles.
Treasury’s relationship with DTp was arms-length and mutually 
suspicious.®^ Treasury characterised DTp as producer-led, soft, and in its 
operators’ pockets. A Transport official commented “Treasury said to me 
the problem is that Transport has been the voice of BR in government, as 
opposed to the voice of government in BR.’’®^ The affliction was 
diagnosed as the ‘Today Programme syndrome’, which Treasury officials 
defined as curing any problems with government policy “by a little bit more 
of the same and a little bit more money.’’®® Treasury deployed several 
counter-lobbying tactics. It pitted DTp projects against one another, by 
hinting competing schemes were more viable.®"^  It tried to push DTp past 
the annual deadline for submitting Private Bills, to buy time to undermine 
the project. It used assessments as delaying mechanisms, [see pages 
174-175]
Third, government wanted to involve the private-sector. In 1992 a 
private-public mix was proposed to fund CrossRail.®® The Autumn 
Statement changed the rules about public-private co-operation. Lamont 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer) said
the Government will actively encourage joint ventures with the 
private sector, where these involve a sensible transfer of risk 
to the private sector. We may be prepared to consider such 
an approach, when the time arises, for projects such as east- 
west CrossRail...®®
CrossRail became the centrepiece of a strategy to involve private 
money and expertise in major projects.®^ Although the Private Finance
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
former senior civil servant 7, interview, 29/04/98 
“  senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98 
^  “£2.5bn London rail project faxes the axe”. The Guardian, 4 March 1993 
HO Debs, Vol 213, 12/11/92, Col 993
The desire to involve the private-sector can be traced back to the CLRS. DTp, (1989)
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Initiative was floated by Treasury in 1988,®® it was officially launched in 
1992.®® PFI abandoned the Ryrie Rules and sought new ways of 
financing worthwhile public investment outside PES.^°°
Whilst DTp projects were promising for PFI, they presented two 
difficulties. PFI undermined a strategic approach in the pursuit of private 
money, because private-sector cherry-picking weakened government’s 
ability to shape coherent policies. Second, PFI allowed Treasury to 
“intervene on any significant capital project in the public sector...
Because capital projects were easier to postpone than current 
spending, political priorities dictated demand-led programmes took 
precedence.^®^ Indeed, the 1992 policy of protecting capital projects in 
the pipeline’ was abandoned in 1994.
Departmental Agendas
By the early 1990s railway privatisation moved up the political 
agenda and became a higher priority for the deployment of political and 
financial resources. Privatisation disrupted CrossRail because it was 
conceived as a publicly-funded scheme; consequently it soon fell outside 
government’s agenda.
The Railways Act (1993) vertically separated the BR network.^ ®® 
Following the 1992 White Paper BR’s planning capability was wound 
down.^ ®'^  The privatised network did not provide a framework in which 
major projects such as CrossRail, could be identified, developed, planned, 
financed, implemented and managed. Privatisation prevented systematic 
consideration of new investment.^®® Thereafter no single railway authority 
was responsible for developing new projects.
9» HMT (1988b, 1991)
99 HMT, (1992)
™ The Ryrie rules required projects to be evaluated against a theoretical public-sector alternative: joint 
ventures led by the private-sector were encouraged subject to competition by private-sector bodies; and public 
bodies were encouraged to enter into operating leases. Treasury insisted commercial sponsors should not be 
allowed to make a return without risk. It was believed that government’s “commercially-unpalatabie rules and 
labyrinthine approvals procedures” had hamstrung private-sector participation. Newchurch & Co, (1994) and 
Heald, D., and Geaughan, N., (1997)
'9’ Bailey, A., (1996)
'“ Terry, P., (1996)
The decision to separate infrastructure from services had been decided in early 1992. DTp, (1992). See 
Harman, R., (1993)
former BR director 2, interview, 01/12/97. As DTp’s attention was devoted to selling the rail industry.
Terry, P., (1994), p313
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CrossRail complicated privatisation because it linked separate 
franchises and threatened Railtrack.^°® CrossRail jeopardised Railtrack’s 
floatation because it would have cost more than the paper assets of 
Railtrack/°^ Because asset value affected track charges Railtrack was 
desperate to abandon CrossRailJ°® IGA’s effectiveness was diminished 
because its advice “had to go through Railtrack’s privatisation lawyers to 
be cleared. It would take days. There was no ability to react swiftly.’’ °^®
Civil servants neglected new rail projects because the political 
priority was to produce a workable privatisation schedule. One senior 
official recalled
it was a busy time at the department. There was the biggest 
ever road building programme, railway privatisation under 
way, the Channel Tunnel was still not open, the CTRL as well 
as aviation and shipping issues. There was not the focus on 
one scheme as there perhaps would be now.^^°
“Departments shift not only numbers of people but also quality of 
people into sexy areas.’’^ ^^  By the early 1990s privatisation was the ‘sexy’ 
area: the talent pool working on new projects was diluted. One former 
civil servant recalls
There was a colossal number of civil servants working on 
privatisation. The privatisation side was weighed down, and it 
was very light on new projects. Each was headed by a 
Deputy Secretary, but one had constant access to the 
Secretary of State and the other did not.^^ ^
The labour-intensive and politically-sensitive privatisation process 
ran to a tight parliamentary timetable and faced anti-privatisation publicity 
so that even Conservative MPs had to be dragged kicking and screaming 
into the lobby to support the Bill.
Privatisation coincided with John MacGregor replacing the public 
transport-friendly Secretary of State Malcolm Rifkind. MacGregor, from a 
Norfolk constituency where mobility meant roads and cars, was less 
willing to fight for CrossRail in the annual public expenditure rounds.
Linking 3 (Thames, Chiltern and Great Eastern) franchises needed complex letting contracts.
“Report set to put London’s £2.6bn CrossRail project back on track”, The Guardian, 18 October 1995; “Rail 
Campaign”, Daily Telegraph, 11 October 1995
108 “CrossRail link puts Railtrack sell-off at risk”, Independent, 22 November 1995.
IGA lobbyist 3, interview, 27/05/98 
former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98
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Conclusion
CrossRail began life congruent with government objectives and 
pre-existing policy. IGA failed to emphasise CrossRail’s connections with 
the government’s programme. It failed to provide the Prime Minister and 
DTp ministers with political arguments to allow them to challenge 
Treasury.
Treasury intransigence is a key determinant of the policy outcome. 
It “fought a war of attrition on CrossRail. We doggedly fought it all the 
way. We went for every opportunity to cutback CrossRail’s resources. It 
was not glorious but I believe it was right.”^^  ^ Tension between DTp and 
Treasury increased because of informal and institutional changes in 
Treasury and conflict with political priorities. CrossRail lobbyists were 
ineffective partly because political considerations and previous experience 
impinged. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
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Meso-level
Involvement in the policy-making process: 
Hypothesis Four
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can include 
their client in the policy community and manage their 
client's activity within that network.
The ‘client’ and the ‘policy community’ were all government. This 
case exposes the fiction of a single government view. The CrossRail 
policy community, centred on DTp, numbered around twenty government 
actors. It included officials in grades 7, 5, 3, 1 and two ministers in DTp, 
Treasury and DoE, the Prime Minister and key advisers from the No 10 
Policy Unit.” "^
Not all was well at DTp. Parkinson, rather like the old lady who 
witnessed road accidents when out driving, found in 1989 “a department 
that had felt under siege waiting nervously for the next disaster and the 
next bout of c r i t i c i s m . T h e  DTp was not a visionary department: “the 
vision came from ministers. Privatisation was their idea. The department 
was not really in favour of privatisation.’’^^® Nor was the department much 
interested in new railways. One former official argued
Transport has never been interested in new rail development 
or had a great role in it. DTp never really had a transport 
planning capability. They did on the highways because they 
are in charge of the national road system, but in terms of 
other infrastructure, it never had a transport planning 
capability.^^^
Big public transport projects were also politically unpalatable 
because they usually took over a decade to construct, were costly and the 
electoral rewards difficult to quantify. DTp also had two structural 
weaknesses: limited budgetary autonomy and less political influence. Its 
projects became second-best compromises -  the outcome of battles with 
Treasury. Outsiders and lobbyists played little role in these machinations.
senior civil servant 1, interview, 04/02/98 
Parkinson, C., (1992), p 283 
former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98 
former senior civil servant 5, interview, 21/01/98
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Although the CrossRail Bill was introduced in November 1991, it 
did not receive its Second Reading for another eighteen months.” ® 
Lobbying helped DTp deliver Second Reading, but failed to see the Bill 
through parliament.
CrossRail lobbyists worked to a tight deadline to mobilise the policy 
community. Private Bill legislation delayed after June 1993 would fall 
under the untested Transport and Works Act (1992). Lobbyists feared it 
would take five years to pass legislation.” ® The objective of the campaign 
was to discourage Treasury from opposing CrossRail, or persuade the 
Cabinet Committee to overrule it.
DTp relied on business and local authority support to keep 
CrossRail alive. MacGregor appealed directly to the Ministers
discussed CrossRail in the London Cabinet sub-committee (EDL[L]), 
chaired by the Prime Minister.^^^ An intense campaign, focused at the 
PM, guaranteed his support and, despite Treasury opposition. Major went 
directly from Downing Street to confirm that legislation would be 
resubmitted to parliament.^^^ However a Treasury proviso required “the 
private-sector be fully i n v o l v e d . W h i l s t  full Cabinet approved the 
decision,victory was hollow because it left unanswered the question of 
f und ing .T reasu ry  had ensured CrossRail proceeded as a joint-venture, 
and DTp “did not at that stage realise was how perilous it was as a joint- 
venture."^^®
Nevertheless, orchestrating the policy community to pressure Major 
to deliver his backing was “a triumph because it raised the political stakes 
and tied him in. Steven Norris (Minister for Transport in London) used it 
ruthlessly again and again and directly to John Major.”^^  ^ CrossRail was
1992 was spent carrying out design work and detailed planning. “Ministers delay London rail plan”, 
Financial Times, 5 March 1993
A letter to The Times from 13 business leaders on 19 May 1993 complained about the lack of progress 
“Cabinet ignores Major unity plea”, Sunday Telegraph, 16 May 1993 
“Major gives go-ahead for CrossRail”, The Independent, 19 May 1993 
“CrossRail wins pledge from PM”, Financial Times, 19 May 1993
“CrossRail link wins pledge from PM”, Financial Times, 19 May 1993. The decision was reiterated in the 
Commons on 20 May 1993. Conservative backbenchers thanked the Prime Minister for his intervention. See 
HC Debs, OA, Vol 225, 20/05/93, Col 367.
Cabinet approved the decision in May 1993. HC Debs, WA, Vol 225, 24/05/93, Col 405. The Bill proceeded 
to Second Reading, which it obtained with no division in June 1993.
“CrossRail cost savings soughf. The Times, 25 March 1993 
senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98 
127 ib id
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approved in a Cabinet sub-committee.^^® An alliance of MacGregor, John 
Gummer (Environment Secretary), Tim Sainsbury (Industry Minister) and 
Steven Norris defeated Treasury.^^® “It was that committee which kept the 
commitment going and stopped CrossRail being pushed out. It was a 
battle between everyone on the sub-committee and the Treasury.” ®^®
Among the personalities of the policy network LUL had few friends. 
Ministers and officials believed LUL demanded resources but delivered 
aggravation. One former minister felt LT “spent money like water, 
expected billions from taxpayers, and always gave you a cost over-run in 
r e t u r n . T h e r e  also was “a combined view that London Underground 
was run by a bunch of comedians” and “as individuals they are second 
rate.” ®^^ Even their own ministers lacked confidence in them, arguing 
“Whitehall was jaundiced about London Underground. With justification. 
They were hopeless.” ®^® Treasury ministers in particular were irritated by 
LUL.^ ®"^  “Clarke believed London Underground were just a bloated 
bureaucracy full of lefty do-gooders. He was personally enormously 
hostile.” ®^® A LUL executive believed that Conservative ministers thought 
his team was “a bunch of wankers who could not make it in the private- 
sector.” ®^®
CrossRail did not lobby civil servants directly, and was reticent to 
encourage third-parties to lobby. In IGA’s 15-page strategy programme 
officials merited only two paragraphs. Those paragraphs refer to junior 
ministers and special advisers. At no point in the document are senior 
civil servants mentioned.^®^ DTp officials dealt with only senior BR and LT 
managers.''®®
Finally, government distanced itself from LUL after the 1987 Kings’ 
Cross fire to clarify that operational responsibility lay with LUL. LUL
“MacGregor in Treasury battle over London CrossRail plan”, The Guardian, 13 January 1994 
“Portillo at the centre of latest Tory Infighting”, Financial Times, 26 January 1994 
former Cabinet Minister 2, Interview, 24/02/98 
former Minister of State for Transport 1, Interview, 05/01/98 
senior Treasury civil servant. Interview, 23/01/98 
former Cabinet Minister 2, Interview, 24/02/98 
^  former Minister of State for Transport 2, Interview, 05/02/98 
former Minister of State for Transport 1, Interview, 05/01/98; confirmed by former Cabinet Minister 2, 
ntervlew, 24/02/98 
former managing director of London Underground, Interview, 09/02/98 
IGA proposal, (nd)
CrossRail lobbyist 1, Interview, 15/01/98
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recognised it was “not well liked. It took a long time to build ourselves up. 
We were the bad guys. We killed thirty-three people. Ministers were 
happy for us to be distanced on an organisational l e v e l . L U L  was 
found to have been derelict for not bringing to the government’s attention 
its full requirements. Thereafter, LUL presented its case forcefully and 
publicly, which irritated government.
Conclusion
Lobbyists played little role in policy-making. LT and BR had 
access to the policy community by virtue of their public-sector status, but 
their activity was circumscribed. They did not deal with Treasury officials 
or ministers. Only Transport officials dealt with Treasury. CrossRail was 
one-removed from the decisive policy arena. Its case was filtered through 
BR and LT, then through Transport officials to Treasury. IGA did nothing 
to help CrossRail in this environment and did not manage its activity or 
offer advice how to act. Whitehall networks were anathema to IGA. Its 
expertise lay in the personalities and politics of Westminster. The lobbyist 
was ineffective. It played no role in installing its client in the community, 
and failed to manage CrossRail’s activity in that network. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis.
London Transport executive 3, interview25/03/98
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Multi-faceted lobbying: Hypothesis Five
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi­
faceted approach and facilitate access to multiple 
points in the decision-making process.
Parliament
LT asked DTp to promote CrossRail as a Hybrid Bill, which implied 
government commitment; but government refused. Treasury’s script was 
evident from Private Bill introduction in November 1991;^ "^ ° the Deputy 
Speaker framed the debate around an instruction so the Committee had
particular regard to the financial justification for CrossRail in the 
light of the proposals for the privatisation of British Rail, to the 
proposed method of financing CrossRail in the light of the 
Government’s announcements that it should be substantially 
funded by the private sector, and to its interrelationship with 
other rail projects across London which have been put forward 
since the Central London Rail Study was completed[i.e. JLE]
CrossRail targeted MPs on the route and classified them by “their 
ability to approach ministers and Opposition spokesmen as individuals 
with a legitimate interest in CrossRail’s s u c c e s s . T h o u g h  the network 
of important Whitehall players was small, IGA recommended a superficial 
target audience of:
•  Route MPs
• Greater London MPs
• Members of pertinent backbench and select committees: Transport, Environment, 
Trade and Industry and Treasury
• Other MPs with an appropriate interest: e.g. the M25 Group
•  Parliamentary Private Secretaries to ministers in the four key departments, 
particularly Transport and Treasury: similarly. Special Advisers, including those to the 
Chief Whip in the House of Lords and the Leader of the House of Commons;
• Opposition spokesmen for the four key departments and their research teams
• Government and Opposition Spokesmen in the House of Lords
• 63 interested non-route MPs. '^*^
• London-based Peers, as well as those with an interest in the four key issues
• Councillors on the route, and in London and the South East more generally
The petition period was from 27 November 1991 until 30 January 1992. The First Reading was on 22 
January 1992. After January 1993 Transport and Works Act procedures applied to transport projects. The 
CrossRail Bill was introduced in time to qualify under the conventional Private Bill mechanism. Second 
Reading held in June 1993.
HC Debs, Vol 226, 08/06/93, Col 201 
IGA proposal, (nd)
HC Debs, Vol 224, 06/05/93, Col 296; Debs Vol 224, 13/05/93, Col 955; Debs, Vol 224, 13/05/93, Col 957; 
Debs, Vol 224,13/05/93, Col 960. There was a co-ordinated series of questions in May 1993.
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Parliamentary lobbying was amateur. The in-house team “dealt 
with letters and went to public meetings to talk about the project. The
project director went to see MPs and other interested g r o u p s . A
damning verdict of CrossRail’s lobbying was that it admitted most MPs 
remained “relatively ignorant” about the scheme and “did not know 
anything about it.” "^^^
IGA briefings and presentations to backbench committees and 
interested Peers and MPs started late, after the Bill’s i n t roduct i on . IGA 
suggested after a formal lunch briefing most MPs would refuse to spend 
time being updated, so IGA urged CrossRail managers to make
themselves available in the Commons for 20-30 minutes “to conduct
informal conversations [...] on one of the Committee c o r r i d o r s .  
Following CrossRail’s briefings IGA verified the effectiveness of its client’s 
lobbying by speaking to MPs briefed by CrossRail to “identify 
shortcomings in the briefings...
CrossRail’s internal lobbying guidance recommended MPs be 
presented with a one-page written brief as an aide m é m o i r e . When 
encouraging MPs to speak, IGA counselled “bullet points [need to be] 
provided, if not speeches w r i t t e n . I G A  recommended CrossRail 
organise a reception at the Palace of Westminster.^^^ Guests were vetted. 
Receptions allowed discreet selective lobbying of a targeted audience. 
IGA recommended “telephone canvassing to establish likely voting 
patterns.” ®^^ It later suggested CrossRail establish a parliamentary 
‘hotline number’ to help MPs answer constituents’ problems.
During the Bill’s parliamentary stages IGA led an ineffective ‘War 
Cabinet’ to co-ordinate activity. The Bill Committee members were 
mavericks dissonant with the leadership of their respective parties.^®  ^ [see
** London Transport executive 2, interview, 14/01/98 
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98 
CrossRail lobbyist 1, interview, 15/01/98 
IGA proposal, (nd)
IGA proposal, (nd)
Internal CrossRail Guidance notes. Briefings, nd 
IGA proposal, (nd)
A reception was suggested to thank supporters: to mark CrossRail’s launch; to mark the start of the 
parliamentary processes; and to brief the press. IGA proposal, (nd)
“  IGA proposal, (nd)
CrossRail Private Bill Committee member 3, interview, 19/03/98
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pages 188-190] The Committee concluded the preamble to the Bill not 
p r o v e d T h e  MPs were unconvinced by the evidence, the minister’s 
cavalier attitude, and the government’s lack of commitment/®® When it 
gave its judgement the committee provided no reasons for its decision.
Although there was a fierce parliamentary campaign to relaunch 
the project,^ ®® since government could not prove the Committee acted 
outside procedure or there had been a material change in circumstances, 
the Bill was killed on 5 July 1994."'®^  MPs signed an EDM, tabled in 
support of CrossRail, because there was no associated political risk.^ ®® 
Cabinet decided soon after that CrossRail should proceed through the 
Transport and Works Act Order.^ ®® In January 1995 CrossRail was 
delayed indefinitely.^®®
Public and Partv
There were formal consultation exercises, but no attempt to build a 
strong coalition. There was no endeavour to fire public imagination or to 
build a groundswell of support. IGA believed mobilising public support 
was dangerous because of the project’s nature, arguing “it was difficult for 
a nationalised organisation to prompt the public to write to government to 
get something for itself.”''®^
IGA considered party conferences to be an opportunity to 
“consolidate the support... built up over the previous year and to generate 
post-Summer Recess enthusiasm...’’ ®^^ IGA advised MPs needed their
On 10 May 1994 the Committee decided by three votes to one that CrossRail should not proceed to full 
parliamentary scrutiny.
The minister comments “I was not able to give an absoiutely unequivocal commitment to the money being 
there.” former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98. Confirmed by CrossRail Private Bill 
Committee member 2, interview, 18/02/98; CrossRail Private Bill Committee member 1, interview, 17/02/98; 
CrossRail Private Bill Committee member 3, interview, 19/03/98
The Prime Minister said "I share the disappointment that the Select Committee has rejected the CrossRaii 
Bill. We have consistently made clear our commitment to the project and I am pleased to tell the House that 
the commitment remains. The promoters are now urgently considering the position and we are in discussion 
with them on how to proceed.” HC Debs, OA, Vol 243,17/05/94, Col 669. "Loophole from 1836 could save 
CrossRail project”. Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1994
“CrossRail Bill fails in the Commons”, Financial Times, 6 July 1994.
By late June 1993 288 signatures had been collected. (“CrossRail revival backed by 130 MPs”, Financial 
Times 18 June 1994). PPSs were given permission by Whips to sign the motion. (“Revival of CrossRail 
moves a step closer”. Financial Times, 28 June 1994) Parliamentary Private Secretaries, as part of the 
Government "payroll vote’ do not normally get involved in signing Parliamentary motions.
159 “Revived CrossRail project may take ten years to finish”. Financial Times, 9 July 1997
The Montagu Report raised the thorny issue of "affordability". DTp, (1996). Sir George Young, Transport 
Secretary, ordered the Promoters not to go ahead with plans “for the time being”. ""CrossRail project to be 
shelved”. Financial Times, 30 March 1996 
IGA lobbyist 3, interview, 27/05/98 
IGA proposal, (nd)
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memories refreshed and their resolve inured to support CrossRail. 
CrossRail had stalls and receptions at Labour and Conservative 
conferences. Its objectives were to raise its profile, foster high-level 
political contacts, reach ‘target audience’ MPs, maintain a position on the 
political agenda, and to meet new MPs and Peers.
CrossRail attended local government conferences to meet local 
politicians. “Local councillors can be primed to approach their local 
Member and Peers [at national party conference] with a view to 
encouraging them to be supportive.
IGA held its own reception at party conferences, where it showed 
off its contacts to clients. CrossRail was encouraged to attend, because 
the reception afforded “a useful opportunity to meet senior politicians in 
an informal setting.
Media
LUL’s managing director was an ardent briefer of the Evening 
Standard. T h e  media campaign aimed to persuade the PM and 
ministers of the political advantages of the scheme. IGA’s Media Unit 
claimed to ‘assist’ CrossRail by pre-empting ill-informed speculation and 
agreeing a ‘line-to-take’.
A press conference was organised to campaign for Second 
Rea d in g . Ma t e r ia l  was distributed and journalists briefed in advance. 
Transport correspondents from national broadsheets were lobbied in 
writing and by telephone. ‘Pegs’ were found to hang stories on. 
Lobbyists and London First secured a promise of support from the 
Evening Standard’s editor."*®®
The weekend before the Cabinet sub-committee met, IGA placed 
stories in Sunday broadsheets, setting the political agenda. London First 
leaders wrote to The Times. The CBI increased the pressure by publicly 
criticising government, accusing the Cabinet sub-committee of behaving
Internal CrossRail Guidance notes, Party Conferences, nd 
IGA proposal, (nd)
IGA proposal, (nd)
Senior London Transport Manager, interview, 13/05/99 
^®Mn May 1993
Wilson, D., and Andrews, L., (1993)
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secretively.^®® It is unlikely, however, that positive media coverage was 
the consequence of effective lobbying. The Evening Standard particularly 
promoted London issues, and its Transport correspondent was a 
supporter in his own right.
The Evening Standard campaign may have been ineffective. It 
riled Treasury ministers and officials. A senior Treasury official said LT
conducted a lobbying campaign, not just on CrossRail but on all 
their activities, through The Evening Standard. Ministers took 
the view that we are not prepared to reinforce bad behaviour. If 
people think they can win by slagging us off in The Evening 
Standard, everyone will slag us off in The Evening Standard.
W e don’t want that. We want to see people lose if they start 
slagging us off. If LUL think they can roll us over by hacking at 
us through newspapers they have got another thing coming
Though this Treasury view' appealed to non-Transport members of 
EDX, DTp informally approved of CrossRail’s media campaign. One 
former political adviser argued;
If you were me in the Department of Transport wanting to do 
CrossRail you were thrilled there were people on the 
bandwagon. You could say in a note to the Prime Minister and 
copied to the Treasury ‘Prime Minister, I am inundated. It is 
awful. The pressure is relentless.
LUL recognised it risked irritating officials and knew “it made the 
Treasury apoplectic."^^^ But, it believed “ministers sought to minimise 
opposition. If you do not heap pain on them they do not notice. The 
Standard helped heap pain."^ ^® Ministers read their press cuttings and 
leaders every morning and were influenced by what they read. The 
campaign bought a stay of execution -  Treasury was temporarily defeated 
and Second Reading assured. The Evening Standard’s support raised 
CrossRail’s profile, delivered public, local authority and elite political 
support and isolated Treasury.
Conclusion
IGA’s strategy was simplistic and lazy. It was easy to tell the client 
to undertake high-profile low-influence activity like briefing MPs and party
“CBI chief attacks London strategy”, Financial Times, 19 June 1993
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
former managing director of London Underground, interview, 09/02/98
senior LT manager, interview, 13/05/98
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98
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conference stalls, rather than face the unpleasant task of recommending 
difficult, low-profile and tedious, but potentially high-influence, activity 
such as research, case-building with Treasury officials and orchestrating 
senior political support. The important policy activity took place inside 
Whitehall -  arenas inaccessible to IGA.
CrossRail lobbyists failed to pursue an effective multi-faceted 
campaign. However, at moments of crisis (second reading and before 
Committee Stage) DTp, CrossRail and London First built a coalition of 
interest-groups and media to pressure the Cabinet. At these times the 
strategy was multi-faceted, involving elite-centred lobbying, media, and 
third-party suppod/^ But, IGA’s role in the campaign was limited. The 
effective short-term activity was co-ordinated by London First under the 
umbrella ‘CrossRail Coalition'.
Whilst Treasury never changed its mind, the CrossRail Coalition 
bought a stay of execution by effectively heightening the profile of the 
issue. Had it remained a technical matter confined to the policy 
community. Treasury would have won earlier. A multi-faceted campaign 
would have helped CrossRail. IGA’s misdirected effort and poor advice 
meant the CrossRail lobby was ineffective. The evidence supports the 
hypothesis.
Wilson, D., and Andrews, L., (1993)
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Micro-level
Routines and Standard Operating Procedures: 
Hypothesis Six
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar 
with routines and standard operating procedures and 
know when and where to intervene in the policy-making 
process.
IGA failed to demystify the process. “Lobbyists can do an 
important job. Never underestimate their ability to say to an organisation 
that believes it wants to see the minister -  ‘You do not want to see the 
minister -  you want to see the grade 7 or grade 5.”’^^® Civil servants 
believed important lobbying targets are middle rank officials: “the thirty- 
somethings who are the basic policy analysts -  get hold of them and 
persuade them.”^^  ^ IGA failed to do that.
IGA’s advice was poor. CrossRail’s Bill Team planned to defend 
the Bill by preparing to negotiate minor amendments to passify objectors 
without increasing costs -  a procedure that had worked successfully in 
the past. This approach depended on government support and a 
satisfactory committee chairman. Given IGA knew that elements of 
government were ambivalent, committee membership was crucial. The 
chairman, Tony Marlow MP, had his own maverick agenda and during the 
Committee stage became the first MP for fifty-four years to call from the 
floor of the House for his own leader and Prime Minister to resign.
Transport ministers knew Marlow was risky, commenting “I tried to 
nobble him as hard as I could”^^® but no-one else was willing to take it on. 
If there was one point where IGA really failed CrossRail it was the 
selection of committee members. IGA, which prided itself on its behind- 
the-scenes contacts at Westminster, must have known there was a
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98. Grade E is formerly a Principal or Grade 7 
Confidence in the Prime Minister amongst some Conservative backbenchers was undermined by a 
compromise over EU voting arrangements. HC Debs, Vol 240, 29/03/94, Col 802. Mr Marlow said “my right 
hon. friend has no authority, credibility or identifiable policy in this vital area of policy, why does he not stand 
aside and make way for somebody else who can provide the party and the country with direction and 
leadership?”
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98
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problem. It had time to help as well as the support of DTp ministers. IGA 
either failed to recognise the danger, or failed to find a better candidate. 
Either way, it failed CrossRail at this key moment.
IGA suggested that following the defeat of the Private Bill MPs and 
Peers should be briefed on procedural and technical issues. IGA 
emphasised the importance of telling targets something new on each 
occasion. Because the Transport and Works Act was a new process, IGA 
argued “Members will not be familiar with its procedures and would 
welcome the opportunity to understand precisely how it operates.
A senior official argued knowing process is important -  “meeting 
and greeting is counter-productive particularly p o s t - N o l a n . C i v i l  
servants were not explicit; they gave clues and because some lobbyists 
had worked in government they could “read the tea-leaves.” ®^^ 
CrossRail’s routine lobbying was ineffective because IGA was unfamiliar 
with routines and procedure and continued to advise ‘meeting and 
greeting’ MPs. Officials tend to be more comfortable with lobbyists who 
have experience of the system. They are more open if “they know they 
are not going to get embarrassed and are not going to be put into an 
awkward position by some ill-informed lobbyist asking questions.
Burson-Marsteller’s knowledge of informal rules and its experience, 
informed its management of the Coalition. It recognised it could not win 
by lobbying civil servants, and targeted senior government decision­
makers: the PM, Cabinet, and the Chancellor. The objective was to 
portray the strength of feeling in the City, CrossRail’s economic case and 
the potential damage to the government’s PFI scheme.^®®
There was an increase in ‘shadow lobbying’. Supportive MPs were 
used as ‘secondary lobbyists’, and the Bill’s promoter David Lidington was 
a conduit between ministers and promoters. IGA met MPs alone in 
addition to the client’s meetings. IGA proposed parliamentarians be 
briefed “in groups over lunch at 55 Broadway, within walking distance of
IGA proposal, (nd)
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98  
Tower Hamlets Adviser, interview, 25/03/98 
ibid
Wilson, D., and Andrews, L., (1993)
Wilson, D., and Andrews, L., (1993)
189
Chapter Five
the Palace of Westminster.” ®^® IGA advised some formal meetings: 
“Labour Members, in particular, tend to prefer this a p p r o a c h . T h e y  
were less willing to be ‘wined and dined’ and IGA suggested CrossRail 
“play down references to Labour bugbears -  tourism, the City, Canary 
Wharf, markets, stuffy economists’ terms, London’s status and 
prosperity.” ®^®
IGA worked with parliamentarians to:
• raise CrossRail at relevant Questions and in debates and, informally with Ministers
• put down Parliamentary Questions, EDMs and seek an Adjournment Debate
• take a delegation to the Prime Minister and/or the Chief Secretary to the Treasury or 
Transport Secretary
• speak in support of the project in parliamentary debates as part of the TWA  
procedure
Conclusion
All of IGA’s knowledge was directed at the processes and 
personalities of Westminster. CrossRail believed IGA had an excellent 
knowledge of parliamentary procedure.^®® IGA provided CrossRail with 
Hansard cuttings and spotted forthcoming relevant legislation.
However IGA did not understand the technicalities of its client’s 
policy. Nor did it understand civil service procedure. “IGA -  all they ever 
did was wine and dine MPs. What is the point? It was mind bending in its 
simplicity.” ®^® IGA’s lobbying was shallow.
IGA may have understood informal rules, like the need to tell MPs 
something new on each occasion and Labour MPs’ unwillingness to be 
wined and dined, but this ‘knowledge’ was irrelevant to the arena where 
CrossRail was really decided -  Whitehall. IGA had weak links into 
Whitehall, and its lack of technical knowledge of both its client’s case and 
official procedure hampered its lobbying. The client was poorly served by 
IGA’s inability to operate in Whitehall. The evidence supports the 
hypothesis.
IGA proposal, (nd) 
ibid
Internal CrossRail Guidance notes, Briefings, nd 
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
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Contacts and Coalitions: Hypothesis Seven
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good 
contacts and can spot connections to potential allies 
and can construct coalitions.
Contacts
The work of the CrossRail team depended on success at the 
political level, but they had neither the skills nor the personalities to 
contribute at that level. Its approach was technocratic.
IGA believed it had “an extremely effective network of contacts 
among Ministers, Opposition Spokesmen, Members of both Houses, Civil 
Servants and Party o f f i c i a l s . T h i s  network supposedly provided clients 
with timely political intelligence and access to policy-makers. IGA was 
hired because of its contacts with Conservative m i n i s t e r s . I G A  
portrayed itself as an insider with access. “Everybody knew who IGA 
were. You had to be able to be continually whispering in ministers’ ears 
at every function they went to, particularly the private ones.” ®^^
IGA was cautious about burdening its contacts. A balance was 
needed between briefing MPs, which risked inducing CrossRail fatigue 
among those who felt they had already contributed, and pursuing a low- 
key campaign, calling on MPs as necessary, which threatened 
momentum.
To know the processes and people of Whitehall, lobbyists needed 
co n t a c t s .K n o w le d g e  of process and procedure was a function of 
contacts. Contacts allow lobbyists to know “who are the right people to hit 
and when to hit them.” ®^^ IGA focused on MPs. Greer was able to get 
‘names’ to attend meetings. But IGA ignored the civil service. An official 
recalls “I spoke to a number of official colleagues. IGA had never been 
anywhere near them. That is their brand of lobbying. But in that case it 
was wholly inappropriate.’’ ®^® Their lack of contacts in Whitehall was 
crippling.
IGA proposal, (nd)
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98 
CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
185 ibid
18® former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
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IGA arranged for CrossRail directors to meet with “ministers and 
with route MPs that we normally would not have been able to get hold 
of ”197 QrossRail was impressed by IGA’s access to MPs, its ability to 
arrange meetings, and its conduct at party conferences. One says
They were fantastic at party conferences. They got us into 
lots of events. They had a huge lunch and we would be put 
on a table with route MPs and council leaders and people 
from London First.^ ®®
It is unclear why CrossRail did not expect to achieve this level of 
access as a matter of course. CrossRail believed that “Greer in person 
had access to the Prime Minister. He used it only sparingly. There is no 
doubt whatsoever the fact that we were allowed to proceed into 
Committee was a result of Ian Greer seeing John Major.” ®^® There is little 
evidence to support this contention. This chapter shows the stop-start 
progress of the Bill was the consequence of several variables -  not least 
the PM’s determination to reassert his political authority. However, 
CrossRail directors believed
Ian Greer was seeing John Major on behalf of his clients at 
least once a week. It was amazing. He would ask if we felt 
that the time was right for him to speak to the Prime Minister.
There is no doubt that man had tremendous access. Greer 
could move amongst virtually the whole of the Cabinet how he 
wished, and he did.^°°
There is no evidence to suggest IGA’s access influenced policy. 
Hints of privileged access, which were later to lead to Greer’s downfall, 
over-awed clients and were a valuable marketing tool. The evidence 
suggests they played no part in CrossRail’s fate.
Coalitions
There was no initial coalition for CrossRail because it was 
unnecessary, since there was political support early on. °^  ^ As political 
support waned a coalition would have helped, but outside the times of 
crisis no broad support existed. Whilst there was a sense of approval, the 
support was intangible.
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98 
ibid
CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98 
200 ibid
20’ former BR director 1, interview, 31/03/98
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There was a lack of Conservative MPs in London to support the 
scheme publicly. There was also no political consensus in London. 
Parties were beset by factionalism. CrossRail campaigners “could not get 
Tories and Labour to work together. You could not get Bromley Tories 
and Westminster Tories together and you could not get Labour in 
Hounslow and Labour in Camden t o g e t h e r . “Labour versus Tory 
versus Liberal Democrat. We tried to get them together. It was hopeless. 
Even the Tory MPs split between inner and outer London.
The twenty-nine local authorities affected supported the project. 
The Labour Association of London Authorities and the Conservative 
London Boroughs’ Association issued a rare joint statement attacking 
government’s lack of commitment.^^"^ The commuter counties were 
supportive. Although IGA proposed liaison with local authorities there 
was poor communication. IGA admitted “nothing was being co-ordinated 
on a political level.
Tower Hamlets, the City of Westminster and the City of London 
Corporation were the most important local authorities because of 
tunnelling impact. Tower Hamlets opposed CrossRail. Westminster was 
supportive as was the City of London Corporation to protect the City 
against D o c k l a n d s . I t  lobbied for CrossRail because it owned land at 
each of the four proposed central stations, which presented 
redevelopment opportunities.^®^
The 1992 Conservative government magnified the voice of London. 
It instituted a Cabinet Sub-Committee for London and a London Transport 
Minister.^ ®® London First was formed to represent London business (made 
up of 59 companies), and chose CrossRail to cut its campaigning teeth.^ ®® 
These organisations had limited impact on policy. Whilst ministers “made 
a habit of lunching in the City and hearing what groups of people thought.
former managing director of London Underground, interview, 09/02/98 
Corporation of the City of London representative 4, interview, 19/02/98 
“Cross-party plea on London’s transport”. Financial Times, 25 October 1989.
IGA lobbyist 3, interview, 27/05/98
Corporation of the City of London representative 4, interview, 19/02/98
Bond Street, Tottenham Court Road, Farringdon and Liverpool Street/Moorgate. Confirmed in a telephone 
conversation with the Surveyors’ Office, Corporation of the City of London 
Norris, S., (1996), p i87
former BR director 1, interview, 31/03/98. “CrossRail link gets massive boost from London First”, London 
Evening Standard 25 March 1993
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London First was not a particularly influential lobby in this case.”^^ ° An 
official recalled “the City was not particularly noisy.” ”^
When Treasury attempted to block the Second Reading a 
‘CrossRail Coalition’ was organised to shore up DTp.^^  ^ A broad front was 
presented to promote the scheme. Letters to decision-makers were 
followed by parliamentary questions about representations received. 
DTp officials and ministers were provided with evidence and “would be 
offered every encouragement.”^^"^
The CrossRail Coalition was “an attempt to persuade Londoners, 
London business, local authorities, pressure groups and government.”^^® 
It effectively amplified ‘third party noise’ to make it easier for key 
government ministers to over-rule Treasury. This said, apart from key 
moments of effective campaigning, broad external support for CrossRail 
drifted.
IGA identified some targets and advised on briefings. Groups that 
could endorse private-finance proposals were particularly important. 
However, the coalition was weak since members did not deliver anything 
in exchange for a favourable policy output. Officials believed coalition 
members did not bring ‘something to the table’. “Ministers always listened 
politely but the CrossRail Coalition was not particularly influential.’’^ ®^ A 
senior Treasury official argued “for lobbyists to say things which are 
demonstrably in their self-interest cuts little ice.’’^ ^  ^ Officials rejected the 
coalitions using a Whitehall colloquialism: the ‘Mandy Rice-Davies
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
former senior civil servant 7, interview, 29/04/98
Amongst many others, the coalition included Network South East, London Regional Transport and 
Transport 2000, City of London Corporation, London Boroughs Association, Association of London Authorities, 
London Planning and Advisory Committee, Buckingham, Berkshire and Essex County Councils, City of 
Westminster, and district and borough councils. Land Securities, Regalian Properties, Grosvenor Estates 
Holdings. CBI, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, CENTEC, West London Partnership, East London 
Partnership, Camden Leadership, London Enterprise Agency, Grand Metropolitan, Taylor Woodrow, John 
Mowlem, John Laing, Robert McAlpine, Wilmott Dixon, Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick, British Airports Authority, 
Eurotunnel, London Tourist Board, British Airways, AA, F^C, National Freight Consortium, TGWU and Friends 
of the Earth
HC Debs, WA, Vol 225, 25/05/93, Cols 369 and 536. Wilson, D., and Andrews, L., (1993)
Wilson, D., and Andrews, L., (1993) 
former BR director 2, interview, 01/12/97 
senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/04/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
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dismissive’.^ ®^ Officials, especially those at Treasury, were used to 
lobbies pursuing selfish objectives.
Opponents
“There was an informal Mafia out to kill CrossRail. [Members] all 
stayed in touch with each other.”^^® A collection of interest-groups 
opposed CrossRail. O&Y opposed CrossRail because it competed with 
Docklands-related spending.^^°
Perceptions about opposition made the scheme less attractive 
politically. Steinbruner labels this perception an “assumption of sensitivity 
to pertinent i nformat ion.Pol i t i c ians’ perceptions of construction ‘horror 
stories’ were deleterious.^^^ A former Cabinet Minister argues “CrossRail 
floundered because of the weight of objection against it which made it 
unreasonable to proceed with.’’^ ^^  A minister recalled “the idea of digging 
up Oxford Street was daunting. We had been badly scarred in Kent with 
the Channel Tunnel Rail Link.’’^ "^^  A political adviser continued “I cannot 
begin to tell you the problems. You had people screaming, particularly all 
the posh folk in Belgravia and Mayfair.
The route alignment took little account of political reality. The 
Opposition Transport spokesman said the alignment passed “the doors of 
just about every influential interest group in the country and, as everyone 
knows, many of them do not like it.’’^ ®^ A former Cabinet minister says 
“CrossRail was ill-thought out. It went from nowhere to nowhere. No 
sane person has ever wanted to go to Shenfield.”^^  ^ It is evidence of 
CrossRail’s lack of political savvy that when the congestion case 
weakened in the early 1990s, it resisted switching its case to emphasise
‘They would say that wouldn’t they.” Mandy Rice Davies was an acquaintance of Christine Keeler and, 
through the osteopath Stephen Ward, was introduced to influential London society. She was a witness at 
Ward's trial for living off the immoral earnings of Keeler and Rice-Davies. In reply to a suggestion that Lord 
Astor denied knowing her, she gave the celebrated retort: "He would, wouldn't he?'
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98 
22° ibid
221 Steinbruner, J., (1974)
222 former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
22° former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
22^  ibid
22° former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
226 HC Debs, Vol 226, 08/06/93, Col 208
222 former Cabinet Minister 2, interview, 24/02/98. Shenfield was where CrossRail terminated in the east.
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connections to Heathrow, the Eurostar terminus at King’s Cross and 
Docklands, which would have broadened its appeal.
Although 314 petitions were lodged against the Bill, there were two 
main opponents.^^® The Residents’ Association of Mayfair was run by a 
retired businessman who devoted significant time to its campaign. RAM 
was supported and financed by local residents and business.^^® Public 
meetings were organised, a regular newsletter was published, and 
petitions and letters to MPs arranged. It placed stories in the local and 
national press, and met ministers, but with little effect.^ ®®
Tower Hamlets Council took a parochial stance towards CrossRail. 
LBTH’s opposition was based on anticipated disruption; it felt “LT looked 
at east London and thought ‘low value -  good place for a work site’.” ®^^ 
LBTH bordered the City and Docklands, but had gained from neither, and 
decided costs outweighed benefits. LBTH’s policy was driven by its new 
devolved structure. Politicking between neighbourhoods and the pockets 
of minority communities complicated matters.^®  ^ Experienced officers left 
as a consequence of reform and relations between government and 
councillors deteriorated.^®® A former Cabinet minister recollects the 
councillors “were appalling people. Dreadful. So bad as to be almost 
indescribable.’’^ ®"^
Treasury allied with LBTH to promote the northern alignment 
through King’s Cross -  the former to reduce cost and disrupt progress 
and the latter to change the proposed tunnel alignment. LBTH’s lobbyist 
dealt directly with officials and sought to “undermine the scheme with civil 
servants and the press.’’^ ®® LBTH’s advisers persuaded Treasury to insist 
on a study comparing the costs and benefits of the northerly surface 
routing with CrossRail’s preferred tunnel. But the lobbyist said “’that
“Moguls rattled by tunnel vision”, Daily Telegraph, 16 August 1991 
™  Residents’ Association of Mayfair organiser 2, interview, 28/01/98
Residents’ Association of Mayfair organiser 1, interview, 10/11/97; Residents’ Association of Mayfair 
organiser 2, interview, 28/01/98
transport consultant 2, interview, 02/04/98 
^  CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98 
^  former BR director 1, interview, 31/03/98 
former Cabinet Minister 2, interview, 24/02/98 
Tower Hamlets adviser, interview, 25/03/98
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meeting’ from Treasury’s perspective never took place, they found the 
information incredibly helpful.
Conclusion
Whilst there is no evidence to suggest Ian Greer’s supposed 
access to the Prime Minister was effective, it would be facile to suggest 
contacts were unimportant. IGA’s contacts were one-dimensional -  they 
were party based.
Some argue lobbyists may be effective for business, but they are 
not valuable to public bodies because
people like BR and LUL have good links into Whitehall and 
also into the Department which owns them and whose role in 
life is to take the ambitions of their nationalised industry and 
translate them in a way to win the day.^^^
However, public bodies may need lobbyists because their contacts 
in Whitehall are not sufficient to push a policy. Because Whitehall is often 
a mess of conflicting interests, lobbyists help their clients appeal to senior 
politicians. Had IGA really had influence and access to Major, it would 
have been useful in these circumstances.
The coalitions reflected the divisions within government -  groups 
formed around both Treasury and Transport. Proving to decision-makers 
there existed support and consensus was not sufficient to secure 
success. Whilst coalition support is useful, campaigns can succeed 
without it provided there is political commitment. CrossRail believed 
opponents presented little threat. However, whilst they were small and 
poorly resourced they had a powerful ally in Treasury which used the 
flaws exposed by the groups to attack CrossRail.
CrossRail’s support although broad was shallow and hazy. It failed 
to create a tight group of supporters. The CrossRail Coalition rescued the 
project twice: yet it was short-term and reactive. CrossRail needed a 
long-term proactive group of supporters. IGA and CrossRail were 
ineffective because they lacked a broad range of contacts and long-term 
allies. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
ibid
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Resources; Hypothesis Eight
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has 
abundant resources and is skilful in deploying them.
Financial Resources
Financial resources are important for long-term campaigns. A 
minister argued “to indulge in a long-range ‘five-years-before-you-put-a- 
spade-in-the-ground' type project you need deep p o c k e t s . C r o s s Ra i l  
devoured money: by 1998 it had absorbed £123 million.^^® Given its stop- 
start nature it was sensible to spend eighty per cent of the total budget on 
external consultants.^"^®
IGA charged CrossRail £5,000 per month for consultancy services. 
This figure fell as the campaign progressed to £4,000 then £2,500. The 
fee for monitoring, a separate activity, was £1,000 per month.
Although a former Transport minister argued “London Transport 
would have been better advised to put more resources into lobbying 
rather than less."^ "^  ^ CrossRail felt constrained from launching a 
comprehensive lobbying campaign. Indeed, The Evening Standard 
reported ministers were “livid that LT has spent £250,000 on professional 
lobbying through a public relations firm that they believe is designed to 
discredit the Government.” "^^^
Manaaerial Resources
The lack of a real champion had important consequences for the 
way CrossRail was managed. Management was weak, uncoordinated 
and divided. The BR and LT chairmen had agreed to promote CrossRail 
jointly, but they soon lost interest.^ "^ ® A committee managed CrossRail.
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98
Investment Expenditure: CrossRail. (1997/98 prices, £m). London Transport, correspondence with author 
The Labour Opposition demanded a Public Accounts Committee investigation into the hiring of consultants. 
“£120m paid for advice on shelved rail project". The Independent, 18 June 1996 
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98
‘The Chairman now arriving... Peter Oborne on the intrigue and in-fighting in the hunt for a new head of 
London Transport”, London Evening Standard, 8 February 1994
For LT, CrossRail ranked below JLE, preservation of LT as the regulator of London's buses and the 
provision of resources for the existing network. For BR, CrossRail scarcely registered as a priority -  in the 
London region a higher priority was the replacement of the old slam-door rolling stock.
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Poor management “was debilitating. It lacked focus and it lacked 
agreement. There was no one person in charge.” '^^ '^  The two 
organisations soon lost control and CrossRail “became a mini empire in 
its own rig ht.
CrossRail was not a natural team. There was no loyalty or 
commitment. Staff had diverse backgrounds and were often temporary 
secondees. There was no shared background or cohesion. The project 
manager said “the vast majority of people in the project team had no 
interest in it at all” because they were consultants.^"^®
Poor management and a lack of client commitment undermined the 
effectiveness of the campaign. “If the client does not provide a full 
commitment to the project to respond to the advice and work their 
lobbyists are providing then it is doomed to f a i l u r e . I G A  said “it was 
hard because we did not know our client’s strategy. It was because 
CrossRail did not know themselves what the agendas of BR and LUL 
were.” "^^® An internal paper warned of the
heavy constraints in the marketing of the scheme, i.e. it must 
be low-key and subject to the sensitivities of all three 
promoters, but the control of the information supporting the 
CrossRail case is also in the hands of the promoters. Where 
evidence emerges to support CrossRail but conflicts with 
existing interests it is not unreasonable to assume it will be 
suppressed. The project cannot bite the hand that feeds 
it...249
Freedom to Operate
Even had CrossRail been well resourced and managed, its 
lobbying would have been cautious. An official said “it would have 
worried me if the CrossRail project team had been lobbying hard. 
Campaigning for a project when funded by departmental expenditure is 
extremely doubtful.” ®^® The CrossRail account was atypical
because being a public-sector organisation they were not 
happy for IGA to be seen to be working on their behalf in the 
House. They were quite happy to be directed by us, but they 
did not want it done by us.^ ^^
CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98 
London Transport executive 3, interview25/03/98 
CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98 
Tower Hamlets adviser, interview, 25/03/98 
IGA lobbyist 3, interview, 27/05/98 
CrossRail briefing paper. Hurdles, no date 
former senior civil servant 7, interview, 29/04/98 
IGA lobbyist 3, interview, 27/05/98
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IGA sometimes stayed in the shadows. Project managers were 
advised by lobbyists and told what to say. It was mainly the client that 
delivered the message, although IGA lobbyists did deal directly with MPs 
with whom they were familiar.
Some CrossRail managers believed using lobbyists was improper. 
“We were not allowed to use lobbyists in the way we wanted to. We 
wanted them to be much more active than they were. They did provide 
advice, most of which we were not allowed to act on.” ®^^ Therefore, in 
some respects, CrossRail prevented IGA from lobbying effectively.
Conclusion
Despite the substantial financial resources possessed by the 
supporters of CrossRail, the campaign failed. Financial resources alone 
do not guarantee effectiveness. In two senses CrossRail was resource- 
poor. It had poor managerial resources and lacked a sense of ownership. 
Jealousies between the promoters were debilitating and injured 
CrossRail’s policy and momentum. Lobbying was ignored or tolerated by 
management. Only too late did management recognise selling the project 
politically was more important than design or engineering. Second, 
CrossRail lacked autonomy. It was inflexible and could not deal with 
officials. The lobbyist’s advice was ignored and it was fearful of 
encouraging third-party support. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Low-Profile Outsider Tactics: Hypothesis Nine
Lobbyists will tend to be effective if they pursue 
low-profile 'external' tactics.
There were no external measures used in the lobbying campaign 
for CrossRail. “You would not expect it where the promoters of the 
schemes were public corporations. It would be inconceivable.’’^ ^^  The 
evidence neither supports nor rejects the hypothesis.
CrossRail manager 1, interview, 30/03/98 
former BR director 2, interview, 01/12/97
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Conclusions
External and internal factors affected the policy outcome. Whilst 
the context was disadvantageous to CrossRail, the client and lobbyist 
were ineffective. They failed to achieve their objectives. The most 
important variable was Treasury, not outside interest-groups.^®"^ The 
battle was “trench warfare between Treasury and Transport.” ®^® The irony 
of this case is that IGA was employed by a branch of government to lobby 
government in support of government policy, and it still failed.
IGA was relatively unimportant. The best it can claim is partial 
credit for having helped engineer a stay of execution. But even then 
contextual variables explain the outcome. IGA was ineffective. It failed to 
achieve its objectives: it failed to have CrossRail designated a scheme of 
national significance by the Transport Secretary; it failed to minimise 
opposition to the project; it failed to see the project progress through the 
TWA process; it failed to gain Treasury support and failed to organise 
financial backers.
External variables
Economv. CrossRail was conceived as the economy entered recession. 
By the early 1990s CrossRail’s imperative vanished. Tax revenue dried 
up. The dispassionate observer witnessed falling employment and 
congestion, and other projects increasing east-west capacity. The case, 
initially strong, weakened overtime.
Treasurv. The fingerprints of the Treasury’s ‘hidden hands’ are all over 
CrossRail’s defeat. The real campaign was one within government. 
Though the Bill Committee was the vehicle for CrossRail’s death, the real 
assassin, which killed the project by a thousand cuts, was Treasury. 
Lobbyists were unable to overcome Treasury.
Despite being over-ruled by the Prime Minister, Treasury damaged 
CrossRail at every opportunity. Major’s public statements were mood
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
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music to disguise Treasury mischief. A senior DTp official argued 
“Treasury do not care about a Prime Ministerial commitment. If they think 
something is ill-founded they will gun first and worry about presentation
later. ”256
Spending departments became weaker and dependent on 
Treasury patronage.^^^ DTp could not publicly blame Treasury for 
CrossRail’s demise. A civil servant argued “once there is a collective 
decision, you have to go with it. You cannot blame the Treasury, 
tempting though it is.”^^® However, there was no collective decision 
against CrossRail. In fact, the opposite was true. Cabinet Committee 
approved CrossRail. Treasury officials carried their public expenditure 
powers very far indeed.
London Politics. There was no political consensus in London -  not only 
did different political parties in London disagree, but there was 
disagreement within parties. CrossRail also lacked heavy-weight 
advocates. There were no senior Conservative MPs in London to 
promote CrossRail.
Political Preferences. Ministers took a complacent view of the City of 
London, viewing it as successful and preferring to leave it alone.^^® 
Ministers felt no moral obligation to deliver CrossRail. Government 
ministers and Treasury officials held the nationalised industries in disdain. 
There was also a perception of broad opposition -  making CrossRail 
politically unpalatable.
The project was conceived as a public-sector funded scheme just 
when the trend was in the opposite direction. The scheme clashed with 
railway privatisation and failed to find a private-sector partner.
senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98
Treasury is all-powerful. Its agreement is needed before A) a department enters into a new policy 
commitment with expenditure implications; B) any policy paper goes to Cabinet, Cabinet Committee, the Prime 
Minister, or an informal group chaired by the Prime Minister. Bailey, A., (1996) 
former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98
so argued a Corporation of the City of London representative 4, interview, 19/02/98
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Internal variables
Whilst most ministers and officials interviewed discounted 
lobbyists, the client believed the lobbyist was effective. Indeed, IGA 
reborn as AS Biss & Co is still retained by the CrossRail project. IGA 
claimed to be
committed to achieving a satisfactory resolution to the 
campaigns that it conducts for its clients...[o]ur clients can be 
confident that by purchasing our services they are subscribing 
to the outcome rather than to a collection of individual 
actions.
However, the evidence suggests that though IGA was working for a 
fragmented client, whose components had different agendas, it failed to 
understand its client’s problems sufficiently to advise it sensibly. Its 
standard approach of briefing MPs over dinner and attending party 
conferences was inadequate. No serious effort was made to build wider 
support to counter Treasury’s wholly negative influence. No major project 
would ever succeed were cyclical downturns used to argue against them. 
IGA deserved little credit. It targeted a limited range of opinion-formers 
who lacked influence. Though some events were held to broaden 
support, internal failings prevented effective lobbying.
Coalitions. Coalition support for CrossRail was weak and transient. The 
diffuse support for CrossRail was not transformed into political capital. 
This failure can be attributed in part to IGA.
Poor co-ordination. One lobbyist recalled the campaign “was not co­
ordinated at all.’’^ ®^ There was a lack of direction and enthusiasm. IGA’s 
role should have been to direct and co-ordinate the campaign.
Contacts. At moments of drama IGA helped convey messages to the key 
people. Its access, through its existing client base, to the CBI and big 
business helped orchestrate letters to The Times, which kept alive 
political perceptions of the project. However, the strategy was superficial
2®° IGA proposal, (nd). The consultancy also offered “a monthly review with each client at which the progress of 
any public affairs activity is measured against the objectives set at the previous month’s meeting.”
CrossRail lobbyist 2, interview, 06/04/98
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because it attended to the symptoms not the causes of the problem. The 
political commitments London First and IGA engineered were not durable.
Procedure. Though CrossRail believed IGA knew the process its 
knowledge was one-sided. It understood the working practices of MPs 
and parliamentary procedure, but not Whitehall. This weakness 
prevented the campaign from being active in the arena where the key 
decisions were taken.
Media Campaign. IGA understood a high-profile campaign would irritate 
Treasury. The choice was to upset Treasury and fail, or ‘go around’ 
Treasury by appealing to the Prime Minister. Though the CrossRail 
Coalition engineered media support, IGA and CrossRail failed to shore up 
media and public support behind key ministers to aid them in their battle 
with Treasury.
Poor Marketing. The scheme was not sold effectively to politicians. The 
project team was engineer-led and politically naïve. Lobbyists failed to 
emphasise CrossRail’s structural and regional benefits and its general 
quality.
Manaaerial weakness. The promoter organisations had different corporate 
objectives and competing priorities. A multi-headed directorate made 
cohesive management difficult. CrossRail was the first priority for none of 
the clients. Joint advocacy weakened promotion. There was no 
institutional champion for the scheme.
Political Realitv. The route alignment was politically naïve. The 
government affairs team was allotted a low status. LUL and BR lacked 
effective advocates in Whitehall.
Inabilitv to act on advice. CrossRail chose to be restricted from lobbying 
actively because it was publicly-funded. The nationalised industries dealt 
with government through formal channels in the sponsor department. IGA 
and CrossRail failed to explore other avenues.
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An assessment of the hypotheses
The evidence suggests:
1) Lobbyists were generally unimportant. At times lobbyists helped raise 
the profile of the campaign to prevent Treasury blocking it, thereby 
challenging the original hypothesis.
2) Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no disadvantageous external 
or contextual constraints. CrossRail was undermined by the 
recession, and lobbyists were left powerless.
3) Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of political decision-makers, 
pre-existing policy and previous experience of are congruent with the 
lobbyist’s objective. This case shows it is important to recognise the 
fragmented nature of government. Treasury obstruction was central.
4) Lobbyists did little to insert their client into the ‘real’ policy community. 
CrossRail did not deal directly with officials. Lobbyists failed to 
improve communication with Treasury officials or ministers. The 
lobbying of MPs was simplistic.
5) Lobbyists failed to pursue a multi-faceted campaign. They ignored 
Treasury officials and ministers. They briefed MPs and local 
authorities. A short-term media campaign was effective in achieving a 
stay of decision.
6) Familiarity with routines and standard operating procedures was 
important, and IGA’s unfamiliarity with Whitehall procedure contributed 
to CrossRail’s failure.
7) The contacts of lobbyists were useful in gaining access to MPs but not 
officials. IGA and CrossRail failed to construct an effective coalition, 
which was debilitating.
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8) CrossRail’s weak managerial resources did not allow effective 
lobbying.
9) CrossRail and other interest-groups did not pursue low-profile 
‘external’ tactics.
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6. Jubilee Line Exienslen
One reason for the failure of CrossRail was the government’s 
adoption of the Jubilee Line Extension (JLE). Government transport 
decisions in the late 1980s were based not on socio-economic benefits 
and costs but on political factors which over-ruled the Department of 
Transport’s (DTp) own studies.
This chapter examines the JLE as a middle-profile issue with 
technical elements, which became political as its profile heightened. The 
influence of Olympia and York (O&Y), developers of Canary Wharf, and 
its lobbyists distorted policy. Their effective lobbying and political factors 
meant solving the central London transport crisis was postponed to build 
JLE. By the benefit-cost ratio JLE did “not meet the established criteria 
for approval.’’  ^ The JLE outcome is testament to the effect of a well- 
researched and well-executed lobbying campaign. This case shows the 
defeat of the lead department and the success of O&Y and Lowe Bell.
This chapter challenges Fanstein’s assumption that “government’s 
reluctance to shoulder the full cost of the Jubilee Line extension and build 
it in advance of development reflected a half-hearted commitment to 
Canary Wh a r f . . . I n  fact once O&Y arrived, contrary to the popular myth, 
government did not respond tardily.^ Whilst for CrossRail government 
studies were a delaying ploy, in JLE government-commissioned research 
legitimised O&Y’s demands.
Lobbying by O&Y and its consultants sent shock waves through 
government. Lowe Bell was influential in planning and executing an elite- 
focused lobbying campaign, which over-ruled the policy community. O&Y
 ^ Steve Norris MP in “Sinking Link”, New Civil Engineer, 21 May 1992 
 ^ Fanstein, S., (1994), pp 209-210
 ^Public investment in Docklands transport was massive. Around £4.615bn of public money was used to 
improve transport links to Docklands (compared with £780m private-sector). Investment Programme (in 
millions): Total Road Schemes: £1411; Total Rail Schemes: £3939. Other schemes, £45. Total of Docklands- 
related transport spending, £5395m. See LDDC, (1997)
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executives were in regular contact with senior politicians and advisers, 
and ignored or sidelined unhelpful civil servants and public-sector bodies.
History
In his role of inner-city saviour Michael Heseltine attempted to re­
orient London's development to the east. Heseltine wanted to create an 
eastern corridor -  echoing the M4 / Heathrow corridor -  focused on the 
Isle of Dogs and the Thames Gateway.
The London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) was 
established to encourage private-sector and development-led 
regeneration."^ Docklands was designated an enterprise zone, thereby 
removing local authority obduracy. Authorities had neither the 
wherewithal nor the political will to act.^ A former cabinet minister argues 
“it was not the money that was the problem. It was the statist psychology 
of Tower Hamlets. Heseltine had given up any chance of working with 
these boroughs.’’®
Regeneration depended on transport. However, an inevitable 
consequence of market-led development was the absence of strategic 
transport planning. LDDC enhanced the local road network and built a 
light rail transit system: the Docklands Light Railway.^
Between 1981-85 LDDC’s achievements were modest.® Olympia 
and York rescued it. O&Y’s high employment predictions forced LDDC to 
re-evaluate transport provision.® O&Y first tied DLR into the transport 
network, contributing £69m to extend and upgrade the railway and £25m 
to Canary Wharf station. Second, it lobbied for an underground line. 
Canary Wharfs success depended on public transport. LUL’s lack of 
interest forced O&Y to develop its own scheme. O&Y drafted and 
referenced a parliamentary Bill for a stand-alone line.^® It offered to plan.
“ UDCs were non-elected statutory bodies, established to focus on regeneration, provided with powers of 
planning permission, vesting rights and compulsory purchase.
The Enterprise Zone, created on 26 April 1986 with a 10-year life, allowed looser planning regulations, no 
business rates and 100% deduction of capital expenditure on industrial and commercial construction from 
income tax and freedom from rates and a simplified planning process.
® former Cabinet Minister 2, interview, 24/02/98
 ^DLR was planned and was to be funded jointly by GLC and LDDC. Docklands Public Transport and Access 
Steering Group, (1982) and Willis, J., (1987)
® By 1985 only 1.8m sq. ft of low-density warehouse units had been constructed. LDDC, (1997)
® LDDC, (1986) and Steer Davies Gleave (nd -  a)
Steer Davies Gleave, (1988) O&Y proposed this line because the Waterloo and City line was effective in 
delivering commuters from a mainline station to the City; second, O&Y had completed the successful World
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construct and pay for the entire railway, estimated at £700-800m.^^ 
Although, DTp rejected O&Y’s offer, it bounced back with another policy -  
the Jubilee Line Extension.
The Lobbyists
O&Y hired Lowe Bell Political to provide political strategy advice. 
O&Y required assistance handling the media. Given the policy 
implications of the development for London in general, O&Y had a broad 
requirement for access to politicians to promote not just Canary Wharf, 
but regeneration.
Although the DoE was responsible for Docklands the scale of the 
development implied more extensive political interest. One O&Y 
executive recalled “it seemed to us that the issues we faced stretched 
from Environment, to Transport, to Trade and Industry. We understood 
from the beginning there was the need to access politicians at the right 
level and as foreigners new to this country, it seemed sensible to work 
with people who had access already, rather than us trying to create 
them.”'^
O&Y described the brief for the lobbyist
It was none of this fancy business, ‘can you?’ It was ‘How do 
we get it?’ ‘What do we need to do?’ ‘Who do we need to 
meet?’ ‘How do we go about it?’ ‘What is the strategy?’
‘What are the tactics?’ The objectives were clear.
Finance Center served by PATH (Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation) and a shuttle on the Pennsylvania 
Railway from New Jersey bringing professional, white-collar commuters from the New Jersey suburbs.
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98 
O&Y executive, interview, 07/03/97 
ibid
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Macro-level
Profile, technicality and politicaiity: Hypothesis 
One
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on 
low-profile, technical and non-political issues.
Large infrastructure policies have both technical and public-interest 
elements. The cost of constructing new railways automatically increases 
the issue’s profile. So too does construction impact.^"  ^ The issue’s 
importance was intensified by the status of London and later by the 
Millennium celebrations.
Because CLRS was based on employment projections which 
ignored Docklands, an East London Rail Study was commissioned. It 
legitimised the earlier political approval of JLE, and attempted to make a 
political issue technical. LT believed government was “saying to us ‘You 
do not have a choice. Build the bloody railway and write a report that 
justifies it.”’^^  Because government rejected O&Y’s earlier offer to build, 
finance and operate its own railway, O&Y needed the JLE ‘approved’ by 
government research.
ELRS was undertaken by the private-sector and was the 
consequence of pressure from O&Y.^® O&Y shaped ELRS, so that the 
JLE alignment followed O&Y’s recently-rejected line.^^ An O&Y adviser’s 
job “through the winter of 1988/89 was to ‘schmooze’ the consultants and 
the government.’’ ®^
ELRS sanctioned O&Y’s proposals. The only difference from 
O&Y’s earlier proposal was that civil servants had cost the public-sector 
£500m. The taxpayer would now pay for most of the scheme. O&Y 
lobbied furiously for Bill introduction and offered to pay government’s 
costs for preparing a Bill. DTp rejected its advances. However, in 1989
The JLE was the biggest project undertaken in London since the construction of the Victoria Line in 1969. 
senior London Transport Manager, interview, 13/05/98. The stated objective of the study was to identify “the 
best options for further improving rail access from central London to Docklands and east Thameside in order to 
accommodate the rapid pace of development in Docklands.” DTp, (1989a)
London Transport executive 1, interview, 11/12/97; senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
The ELRS extended the JLE and followed the precise alignment of the Waterloo and Greenwich Railway. 
The benefit-cost ratio was assessed at 1.8:1. DTp, (1989a)
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98
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“a joint O&Y/LRT/LUL team was set up to manage the further design and 
bill preparation.”’'®
O&Y recognised JLE competed against the CLRS CrossRail 
option favoured by LT and DTp. To O&Y “it was clear the chances of 
getting both funded were very low” for both budgetary and practical 
reasons.^® The DTp recognised it had “a very limited pot of money.”^^  It 
was important for O&Y “to ensure ministers in the respective departments 
understood the strengths and weaknesses of both c a s e s . T h e  project 
approved first was more likely to succeed.
Consequently O&Y adopted ‘reverse tactics' and raised JLE’s 
profile within government, from being a technical policy so it became 
high-profile, general, and political. O&Y recognised “government wanted 
it at top level. The Prime Minister wanted it and London Underground did 
not. This is where lobbyists came in. Tim Bell’s job was to keep it on the 
agenda and go to Margaret T h a t c h e r . O & Y ’s lobbyists targeted senior 
politicians.
O&Y recognised it had the DoE’s and Thatcher’s support. It 
overcame reticence and institutional inertia by harassing DTp officials. 
O&Y directors “would be on the telephone two, three, four times a day. 
They would not let go.” "^^  A former political adviser argued moving high- 
profile to pressure politicians was effective: “If you are irritating you are 
winning. If you do not irritate, they are not listening and they will not do 
it.”25 O&Y certainly irritated DTp officials.
It “irritated government and transport providers. [Its] only mode of 
operation was to be contentious. It works in North America -  it does not 
work here.” ®^ Officials complained about O&Y’s discourtesy. “They 
would come screaming to me saying ‘that man is so rude.’”^^  Lowe Bell 
helped smooth relations with officials and ministers.
"W illis. J., (1997)
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
O&Y executive, interview, 07/03/97
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
ibid
26 ,
27
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
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Michael Portillo, Minister for Transport, announced government 
was minded to approve JLE, even before D ip  received ELRS, but with 
full knowledge of CLRS.^® Despite recognising central London 
congestion Portillo argued curing it was expensive, complicated and 
disruptive.^® Government wanted to “see a new underground line to 
Docklands and east London” to help 0&Y.^° JLE was approved in 
principle before the Commons rose in 1989.
Parkinson was appointed Secretary of State for Transport in July 
1989, and in a bilateral meeting the Prime Minister was convinced of the 
case for JLE.^^ It would be built only if “sufficient contributions are 
forthcoming from property developers and other landowners who would 
benefit.”^^  In principle negotiations over the contribution did not prevent 
legislative approval. In reality Treasury was dissatisfied with O&Y’s offer 
and tried to stall the process until after the November deadline. A former 
Cabinet minister recalled “the Treasury’s game was to try and spin it out 
beyond [Bill introduction] and there would be another year lost -  another 
year for arguments for not having it.”^^
Parkinson recollected an “argument had been under way for many 
months and little progress had been made, so I decided to invite Paul 
Reichmann, the head of Olympia and York, to meet me to see it we could 
negotiate an agreement.” "^^  Reichmann made his offer. Treasury again 
rejected it.^^
O&Y lobbied for introduction in 1989. Tim Bell, of Lowe Bell, 
through contacts learned that the Transport Secretary was attending a 
party at the Chancellor’s constituency home. There the Transport 
Secretary received
a dispatch rider carrying a House of Lords envelope from 
Keith Joseph saying Paul Reichmann was absolutely horrified 
at the cavalier treatment Treasury had given his final offer.
Because it was a Friday evening (he is an orthodox Jew), he 
got another not orthodox Jew, Keith, to write in his place. It 
was a brilliant move. I read the letter, then showed it straight 
to John Major. So Reichmann got his point of view straight
' “Channon go-ahead for new London Tube line”, The Times, 20 June 1989 
' HO Debs, Vo! 155, 19/06/89, Col 45 
' HO Debs, Vol 155, 19/06/89, Col 46 
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
“East London rail link unveiled". The Times, 27 July 1989 
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
Parkinson, C., (1992), p290 
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
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into the hands of the Transport Secretary and the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in the same day.^®
Reichmann refused to increase his offer during a meeting with the 
Transport Secretary the following week, although terms were relaxed. 
The matter was finally settled on the day of the Autumn Statement. The 
Transport Secretary informed Treasury that no more private-sector 
money was available.^® Predicting the Chief Secretary’s rejection, the 
minister “arranged for both of us to see the Prime Minister at 8pm 
tonight.”^^
An attendee at the meeting recalled its progress
It was an amusing meeting. She started in a wonderful way.
She said to Norman Lamont (Chief Secretary) You have 
never made any money have you Norman?’ It was wonderful 
-  you knew the result at that point. 'How much did Paul 
offer?’ Note Paul. I said ‘£400m in cash.’ And she said 
‘£400m! Have you any idea Norman what a large sum of 
money £400m is. £400m of your own money! It is amazing.’
Then she said ‘you are not really rejecting this offer are you 
Norman?’'*®
Unlike in CrossRail, Treasury was over-ruled. “It was dragged 
kicking and screaming by a combination of the Prime Minister, Secretary 
of State for Transport and the Secretary of State for the Environment.”"^  ^
On 16 November Parkinson said “I welcome this contribution, which is of 
an unprecedented scale. This is a further example of public and private- 
sector contribution to the mutual benefit of both.”"^ ^
The Times recognised the outcome was “the result of intense 
Whitehall lobbying by Olympia & York.”"^  ^ LDDC admitted O&Y’s effect on 
governmental decision-making
without O&Y’s initiative in campaigning for and part funding 
for the new line, there would not have been such strong 
government support for the proposal.'*'*
Sir Keith Joseph was a non-executive director of Bovis, which was working with O&Y. former Cabinet 
Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
Parkinson, C., (1992), p291 
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
senior civil servant 1, interview, 04/02/98 
HC Debs, Vol 160, 16/11/89, Col 398.
“Gone to the dogs”. The Times, 12 May 1992 
LDDC, (1997)
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A representative from the City Corporation argued “Tim Bell in 
those days had the ear of the Prime Minister and he was a hired gun for 
O&Y. He did his job successfully.'"^^ Another player argued “at that time 
the lobbying market was new and it may have been particularly effective 
because it was novel.
D ip  officials were sceptical about JLE. However, in hindsight 
some argued its choice was the “right decision for the wrong reasons ", 
noting “there may have been some serendipity.’’"^  ^ Other officials believed 
“O&Y and their lobbyists were pushing at an open door.’’"^® One minister 
believed lobbyists had “no impact whatsoever” because JLE “did not 
require lobbying.”"^® Likewise a former political adviser says of the PM, 
lobbyists “did not have much impact on her. She had no hesitation about 
seeing Paul Reichmann or other major outside investors. I would only 
have had to say to her that Paul Reichmann wanted to see her for her to 
have agreed to it. I do not recall the request came from Tim Bell.”®°
However, whilst some officials regarded lobbyists as over-rated, 
they believed that because they “were close to Margaret Thatcher they 
might have got the door of No 10 opened to Paul Reichmann. But it 
was Paul Reichmann who “was an effective and good lobbyist at all levels 
of government.”®^ O&Y drove the policy process. “Without O&Y and their 
advisers it would not have happened. It would not have come from 
Government.”®®
A Cabinet Minister argued lobbyists “had a catalytic effect. They 
helped their client be more effective. If the client had not been impressive 
they could not have made the difference.”®"^ Another Cabinet minister 
said that whilst “Tim Bell knew how the system worked -  he could talk to 
people and soften people up and make sure a point of view was heard -  
there was a limit to what lobbyists could achieve. They were not decisive.
Corporation of the City of London representative 4, interview, 19/02/98 
Corporation of the City of London representative 2, interview, 09/03/98 
former senior civil servant 1, interview, 13/03/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98 
“  former adviser to the Prime Minister 1, interview, 30/04/98 
former senior civil servant 5, interview, 21/01/98 
“  former senior civil servant 7, interview, 29/04/98 
”  former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
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I do not think they would pretend to have too much influence. I do not 
recall Tim ever coming to see me about the Jubilee Line.”^^
O&Y’s strategy was “direct lobbying -  mainly by us with a little 
door opening by Lowe Bell -  based on hard facts or researched 
o p i n i o n . O & Y  “worked very hard. It was an example of where 
professional and informed lobbying made a difference.”^^  Lobbyists may 
have had an effect on the policy-making because they got the policy onto 
the political agenda.
Without lobbyists O&Y would never have been able to keep 
the Jubilee Line on the agenda until it got approved. Without 
professional lobbyists an outsider would not have been able 
to get it on the agenda. O&Y were outsiders.®®
O&Y believed lobbyists were the key to achieving their objectives. 
A former O&Y executive argued the campaign “would not have been 
successful without them.’’^ ® Lowe Bell were “able to get us an audience 
with, and a hearing by, the key people at the right time. There is no merit 
in life being right too late.’’®° A colleague adds “I do not think we could 
have done it without them. They could not have done it without us. It was 
a great team.”®^
O&Y had vision, it had money, it had a project close to the heart of 
government and dear to the leader of the party. It was a golden 
combination.
Conclusion
Treasury fought the project, and DTp officials resisted JLE. They 
were over-ruled by the PM and Transport and Environment Secretaries.®^ 
The decision was a leap in the dark, which required political risk. One 
former official argued “the initial decisions on JLE were taken when there 
was not that much constructed. O&Y could have backed off and 
government been left with an embarrassing building site.”®®
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98 
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
ibid
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98 
O&Y executive, interview, 07/03/97 
ibid
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
former senior civil servant 5, interview, 21/01/98 
ibid
215
Chapter Six
Therefore the issue was initially highly political. O&Y encouraged 
government to dampen the controversy by having JLE approved by an 
official study. JLE moved to become a technical, non-political issue 
because it was legitimised by experts. But JLE would have died at 
Treasury and DTp hands had it remained a decision for technocrats, 
which O&Y and Lowe Bell recognised. They took the technical 
recommendations and heightened the issue’s profile and political nature 
within government by emphasising the project’s political benefits and its 
connections with the government’s programme.
Lobbyists may be effective if, when facing ‘blocking players’, they 
take a low-profile, technical and non-political issue and heighten its 
profile, and its general and political case within government. The 
evidence refutes the hypothesis.
External and contextual factors: Hypothesis Two
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no 
disadvantageous external or contextual constraints 
beyond the control of government players.
There were disadvantageous factors affecting the approval of JLE, 
but effective lobbying and political commitment mitigated their impact. 
Other constraints disrupted its progress, most notably a recession which 
caused O&Y’s collapse.
From Canary to Albatross
O&Y entered London hoping to repeat its recent success at the 
World Financial Center. But Canary Wharf was completed at the depths 
of recession and, though it planned a cash cushion to survive through two 
recessions, the internationalisation of property investment meant the 
markets in London, New York and Toronto moved together. The 
recession’s depth and length meant there was no counter-balance 
precipitating O&Y’s collapse.^
^  O&Y first admitted its liquidity crisis on 22 March 1992. On 15 May, O&Y granted protection under Canadian 
bankruptcy laws and file for protection in US.
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Despite DTp trying furiously to bring the deal to a close, when O&Y 
went into administration it had not completed a funding agreement.®^ 
Although government gave the impression of a public-private partnership, 
it had committed itself to build JLE without a binding contract. Treasury 
jumped at this window of opportunity to kill JLE.
Treasury, under pressure to cut public expenditure, “could not care 
less about JLE. It wanted to pull the plug. It was hundreds of millions 
ringfenced that could come back into the public expenditure 
programme.”®® In the middle of the 1992 General Election campaign 
O&Y failed to deliver the seed-corn £40m payment. JLE was halted on 1 
April 1992.®^
Government and the banks played a game of poker. Government 
warned in stark terms that JLE would not go ahead unless the 
contribution were forthcoming. Transport Secretary John MacGregor said 
“I see no prospect of my authorising a start on construction until and 
unless the agreed contributions are assured.”®® It would have been 
irresponsible for government not to require the £400m.®® The Prime 
Minister reinforced the message: “our policy at the moment is to build the 
Jubilee Line when we have the contribution of a stated sum from the 
private-sector.” ®^
The banks remained unconvinced.^^ A former official said “the 
banks thought government was b l u f f i n g . T h e r e  then followed a 
grotesque dance during which the banks realised their asset would either 
be the subject of a fire sale or they would have to find £400m. 
Government restated that public money would be released only when the 
private-sector contribution was guaranteed.^®
67 u
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HC Debs, WA, Vol 209, 08/06/92, Col 24
senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98. The JLE was one of the biggest spending items in 1993-94. 
Canary Wharf Tube plan is halted”. The Guardian, 1 April 1992 
O&Y warned on Jubilee line cash". The Independent, 19 May 1992 
HC Debs, OA, Vol 227, 28/06/93, Col 560 
HC Debs, Vol 208, 02/06/92, Col 707
“Canary Wharf: Docklands Tube Link derailed”. The Independent, 29 May 1992 
former senior civil servant 1, interview, 13/03/98
The 1992 Autumn Statement reserved funds (£1.4bn) for JLE’s construction: ‘The Government’s 
Expenditure Plans for Transport 1993-94 to 1995-96”, cm 2206. The Chancellor said “One major project for 
which we have expressly reserved provision is the Jubilee Line extension. Subject to satisfactory completion 
of negotiations, the line will be able to go ahead.” See Chancellor of the Exchequer, HC Debs, Vol 213, 
12/11/92, Col 993
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Treasury opposed any form of ‘lame-duck’ rescue/"^ A Treasury 
official said “we thought JLE was dotty. When Canary Wharf went down 
we were quite keen to pull the plug on it.”^^  The contribution became the 
albatross that Treasury attempted to wring around the Department of 
Transport’s neck. By this stage DTp was fully committed to JLE, and LT’s 
chairman and director of HSBC (a major funder of Canary Wharf) was 
convinced of the importance of the scheme. Treasury pressed DTp 
“remorselessly in the hope that we might actually get rid of it.” ®^ The 
minister described the renegotiation as ‘Kafkaesque’.^  ^ DTp officials 
recognised that “if the JLE were allowed to go down the plug hole no 
private-sector partner would ever come in with government a g a i n . T h e  
DTp minister
outrageously stressed our commitment to the Jubilee line at 
every public opportunity. I had a right to do it because it was 
part of our manifesto commitment. I felt strongly that my job 
was to fight for the project and to move so far ahead that it 
would be inconceivable that I could have the ground cut from 
underneath me.^®
MacGregor admitted a ‘terrific battle’ to keep the JLE on course.®® 
Treasury came under pressure from ‘general City interests’ and Cabinet 
Office to rescue JLE. The Treasury’s response was “’Absolutely not. We 
had a deal. £400m or we are not shifting a bucket of sand.’ That was 
difficult to sustain. Most ministers were saying we should give them it.’’®^
In 1993, as tenants moved into Canary Wharf, the banks agreed to 
commit £400m.®^ The money depended on a £98m EIB loan to Canary 
Wharf.®® EIB approved the payment and committed itself to lend a further 
ECU5bn by 1995.®"^  However, one month later Transport, supported by 
Treasury, refused the ‘drop dead’ clause demanded by the banks, which 
would ensure the return of their contribution if the line were delayed.®® As
“Olympia & York: Government—  Flagship failure would embarrass”, The Independent, 16 May 1992 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98 
”  ibid76
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98
senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98
former Minister of State for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98
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“Jubilee Line link gets the go-ahead at last”. Evening Standard, 29 October 1993 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
“Jubilee Line go-ahead as stalemate is broken”. Evening Standard, 22 February 1993 
“Jubilee talks at critical phase”. Financial Times, 22 February 1993. HC Debs, WA, Vol 223, 20/04/93, Col 70 
^  “£98m Euro loan for Jubilee line”. The Guardian, 20 April 1993; “EIB agrees £98m funding for Jubilee Line 
extension”. Financial Times, 20 April 1993
“  “Bankers’ demand puts Jubilee Line in crisis”. Evening Standard, 21 May 1993
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momentum sagged, Treasury threatened the banks that if they did not 
sign up to the deal it would withdraw its support.®® Consequently, 
progress made in the summer of 1993 allowed MacGregor to approve 
JLE.®  ^ In September Canary Wharf was financially reconstructed and 
emerged from administration in October.®® The existing arrangement with 
O&Y was accepted by the banks, which provided for £98m immediately, 
and a further £300m over twenty-five years. The Transport Secretary 
gave his
approval for London Underground Ltd to let contracts for the 
construction and equipment of the Jubilee Line extension.
This reflects the fact that in anticipation of their release from 
administration, and with the permission of the Court, Olympia 
& York as the developers of Canary Wharf have entered into 
agreements to make a contribution of some £400 million 
towards the cost of the extension as previously envisaged.
Conclusion
This case study shows the divisions within government and the 
external constraints impacting on policy-making. Lowe Bell’s 
effectiveness was hampered by the recession and O&Y’s collapse. JLE’s 
survival is testament to political commitment and effective lobbying in the 
face of external variables. When O&Y collapsed, LDDC hired Lowe Bell 
to ensure continuity. The political commitment in No 10 and DTp resisted 
Treasury. The presence of negative external factors did not prevent 
Lowe Bell and GJW from being effective. Though lobbyists are most 
likely to be effective when contextual factors are advantageous, they can 
be effective when there are disadvantageous contextual variables. The 
evidence does not support the hypothesis.
“Banks boost hope for Jubilee extension deal”, Evening Standard, 9 July 1993
“Jubilee Line extension set to go ahead in new deal”, Evening Standard, 16 July 1993. HC Debs, WA, Vol 
225, 27/05/93, Col 661
“Jubilee Line extension looks set for go-ahead”. Financial Times, 10 September 1993; “Canary Wharf deal 
breaks new ground” and “Canary Wharf banks in £1.1 bn rescue plan”. Financial Times, 11 September 1993 
HC Debs, WA, Vol 230, 20/10/93, Col 810
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Pre-existing poiicy and experience of government 
piayers: Hypothesis Three
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of 
political decision-makers, pre-existing policy and 
previous experience of government players are 
congruent with the lobbyist's objective.
Redevelopment
Government in the early 1980s made a decision to promote 
Docklands rebuilding. Thatcher wanted redevelopment of London’s 
Docklands to succeed to vindicate the notion that the private-sector would 
invest on the back of pump-priming by government, and that her 
government succeeded where Labour local authorities failed. The 
government and O&Y needed one another. O&Y’s development was a 
monument to the vitality of Thatcher’s free-market philosophy.
In 1990 the Minister for Transport wrote JLE “will assist 
regeneration of the area in line with our Inner Cities policy and improve 
the labour supply to Docklands further assisting regeneration there. 
His successor argued “the case for the Jubilee Line extension depended 
not just on the measurable benefits but to a significant extent on the 
regeneration benefits which are not captured in the conventional cost 
benefit procedure.
Ministers wanted Urban Development Corporations “to fly. They 
did not want it to be a failure. It had to succeed. O&Y was coming to 
make a Tory policy a success.’’^  ^ UDCs were an ornament to 
Thatcherism.®^ Mrs Thatcher began the 1987 General Election at Canary 
Wharf and hailed it as ensuring the future of London as a world financial 
centre.®"^  When she officially launched its construction, she said it was a 
‘bold’, ‘ambitious’ and ‘far-sighted’ scheme.®^
Michael Portillo, Minister of Docklands Transport, was ordered 
personally by Thatcher, to resolve the problems of Canary Wharf and
^  Letter from Roger Freeman, Minister of State, to Norman Lamont, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 27 
September 1990, private archive 
HC Debs, Vol 208, 18/05/92, Col 126. Glaister, S., and Travers, T., (1993), p53 
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
senior civil servant 3, interview, 10/02/98 
^  Brownhill, S., (1990)
Mrs Thatcher’s speech in response to Paul Reichmann at the Banqueting House, 11 May 1988
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wanted to encourage Londoners “to focus on a new centre of population 
and b u s i n e s s . T h e  political commitment was obvious. He said “there 
must be more work per square mile being done on transport infrastructure 
in Docklands than in any other area in the country.
Ministers were under pressure to deliver because “what was 
happening there was a triumph of our policies. Right across the whole of 
government, we were keen on regeneration, business success and a 
strategy for east London.”®® Michael Heseltine, re-appointed Environment 
Secretary in 1990, built on earlier programmes by launching a plan to 
regenerate the area east of London.®® He said “there is no urban project 
in the world that should command more notice and imagination.” ®^®
Private-Sector Involvement
Ware Travelstead's donation to the DLR extension established a 
precedent.^®^ O&Y’s contribution added a new dimension to 
government’s efforts to involve the private-sector in public projects. Its 
agreement to provide £400m provided for a step-change in the 
government’s programme to involve private-sector expertise and 
finance.^®^
The contribution was an essential lever in delivering JLE, and 
though not the clinching argument, JLE would not have proceeded 
without it. The contribution made the benefit-cost ratio acceptable. There 
was also a belief within government that because it was “bending over 
backwards to make a success of Canary Wharf, the developers ought to 
cough up.” ®^® The contribution was a “quasi-commercial deal in which 
both parties got something they wanted [...] At least O&Y put millions of 
pounds on the table. Reichmann put his entire business on the table.” ®^"^
“Docklands boost: City Viewpoint", The Sunday Times, 11 June 1989 
ibid
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
“Heseltine spells out grand plan to revive London”, The Sunday Times, 24 November 1991 
The London Weekend Television lecture “Heseltine sees Euro-boost to eastern city dream”. The Guardian, 
13 December 1991
Ware-Travelstead headed a consortium to redevelop Docklands, but passed the project to O&Y 
Following the O&Y offer, developers of Bishopsgate offered £50m towards extending the East London Line. 
“Developers offer £50m to help fund Underground line”. Financial Times, 6 September 1990. 
former senior civil servant 5, interview, 21/01/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
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The contribution was good value for O&Y and a bad deal for 
government. O&Y may have been politically naïve, but it recognised JLE 
would be built for political reasons. Although forced to contribute, it 
avoided paying a significant proportion of c o s t s . “Government made it 
clear [to O&Y] that without it nothing would happen. We accepted that 
and reluctantly a g r e e d . W h i l s t  initially thought to be 40% of total cost, 
the net contribution is worth between £120-150m to the project, around 
5% of the outturn c o s t s . I t  is possible that the costs incurred by the 
delay caused by the private-sector renegotiation were greater than the 
contribution and that the relatively small offer caused “a disproportionate 
diversion of public funds from projects which would be of more general 
benefit."'"’^
Officials rightly regarded the contribution as notional. It would 
have been harder “for government to justify the JLE had they not had the 
fig leaf of a private-sector c o n t r i b u t i o n . M i n i s t e r s  talked of the 
contribution only in ‘cash’ terms. There was smoke and mirrors used in 
parliament. The contribution was helpful because it allowed ministers to 
“refute the suggestion that this was a private favour line being built for a 
bunch of Canadian Jewish millionaires.”^ T re a s u ry  “felt the Department 
[of Transport] could have negotiated much more effectively with O&Y and 
got a lot more out of them.”^^  ^ Transport ministers had also hoped for 
more. The minister responsible says “it was a good deal less than I had 
hoped. Originally I had hoped for a really large amount of money.”^^ ^
Despite being trumpeted as a lassiez-faire triumph, Canary Wharf 
represented central government intervention on a huge scale. Docklands 
was never a private-sector development. Developers were enticed by 
tax-breaks. LDDC consumed £1.37bn of the £1.8bn paid to UDCs
Canary Wharf paid £98m in 1993-94, whilst government allocated £1 ,844m ringfenced over seven years. 
See Transport Select Committee, (1997), p i 1 
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98
It was anticipated O&Y would pay £40m in March 1992 followed by £60m in March 1993. The remaining 
£300m would be paid over twenty years after completion. The penalty charges included in the re-negotiated 
private sector contribution meant that the private-sector would pay £2m less each month the JLE opening is 
delayed. London Transport executive 4, interview, 11/03/98 
Glaister, S., and Travers, T., (1993), p 53 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
senior civil servant 1, interview, 04/02/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
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between 1981-92^^^ It received £3.5bn more in government grants to 
meet infrastructure costs, excluding JLE. Add the JLE, and the public- 
sector has paid approximately one third of the total £12bn investment.^ 
Docklands was one of the most intensively subsidised ‘private’ 
developments in Western Europe.
Svmbolism
Although Harold Macmillan once said “if people want a sense of 
purpose they should get it from their archbishop. They should certainly 
not get it from their politicians” some politicians operate viscerally.^^^ 
Margaret Thatcher and Michael Heseltine both operated on political 
emotion.
Government, embodied by the PM, believed Docklands would 
propel London into the 21st Century. She was personally committed. 
She argued “where there is no vision, the people perish. And we started 
to provide the v i s i o n . M i n i s t e r s  “recognised that we had potentially a 
success on our hands which if we were not careful we would convert into 
a disaster.
The Prime Minister enthused about the “biggest commercial 
development in the world” and congratulated
Mr Reichmann and Olympia & York for their vision. W e have 
to thank them for their faith in Britain. [...] And I hope that 
won’t be the end; that this new spirit of enterprise, of 
adventure, will continue in this country, because I believe that 
with the renewal that we have seen in Britain, we should be in 
perhaps the best position to lead Europe.^
There was huge enthusiasm to demonstrate that the Docklands 
project could work. Canary Wharf was a flagship. “There is a point in 
politics I have come to recognise when all barriers break down. The sky’s 
the limit -  we will go for it. Forget the benefit-cost analysis. It becomes a 
political gesture.
“State poured millions into Docklands dream", The Times, 16 May 1992
‘Too big a gamble for Major to lose —  the Government is bluffing when is says there will be no public 
rescue of Canary W harf’, The Sunday Telegraph, 17 May 1992 
Harold Macmillan in Fairlie, H., (1968)
The Prime Minister’s commitment was symbolised by her laying the foundation stone.
Mrs Thatcher’s speech in response to Paul Reichmann at the Banqueting House, 11 May 1988 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
Mrs Thatcher’s speech in response to Paul Reichmann at the Banqueting House, 11 May 1988 
former political adviser 1, interview, 14/11/97
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Ministers and advisers recognised Reichmann offered government 
a vision. Political passion helped create a momentum for JLE. “Passion 
is very important. If politicians become passionate about a particular 
project, it does not matter what it is, they have the ability to talk directly to 
the people.”"’^^  O&Y gauged government’s mood successfully. The 
contribution was important psychologically and symbolically.^^^ 
Government had much to play for. The appeal of the Reichmanns to 
governments everywhere was noted by Business Week
Perhaps the most distinctive Reichmann trademark is the 
brothers’ willingness to take huge gambles that only pay off 
way down the line. That’s what endears them to 
governments. In massive public-private partnerships like the 
World Financial Center, they put up the financing, the 
government provides cheap land, and together they create 
whole new urban centers.
Conclusion
Politicians “went with [the project] that delivered other parts of the 
government’s a g e n d a . O n e  civil servant argues, lobbyists must
try and present the case in such a way that whatever the 
position -  government cannot lose. Tying it in to government 
policy is very very important. [...] You help the government to 
help themselves. I think O&Y were pretty effective at that.^^®
JLE was not, many at the time believed, justified by its objective 
merits, but succeeded because of its connections with the government’s 
programme and experience -  redevelopment, private-sector involvement 
and symbolism. O&Y based its lobbying on how its entire development 
delivered broad policy objectives. Redevelopment was a long-standing 
objective of the Conservative governments. Ministers were eager to 
assist O&Y because it made their policy a success.
Private-sector involvement proved public-private projects could 
succeed. The contribution “made life easier with the Treasury. It made 
presentation easier. Also to some extent it ushered in a new dawn -  the 
idea of public-private partnerships.’’^^ ® Although ministers
former No 10 Policy Unit member, interview, 02/03/98 
ibid
Business Week, 28 January 1990, p 99 
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
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misrepresented the value of the contribution, JLE would not have been 
built were not private-sector money forthcoming/^^
Finally O&Y’s commitment to the UK was important symbolically. 
Rational decision-making was replaced by gesture-politics. Almost 
everything about O&Y fitted the government’s agenda. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis.
Meso-level
Involvement in the policy-making process: 
Hypothesis Four
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can include 
their client in the policy community and manage their 
client's activity within that network.
In 1992 modifications to London’s governance built a policy 
community around a Cabinet Commi t t ee , be l ow which was a policy 
community for London’s transport, which revolved around the Minister for 
Transport in L o n d o n . F o r  JLE a transient community of players was 
established, access to which was restricted. A formal network existed 
around the minister who chaired an “action committee of all the 
p l a y e r s . I t s  membership included the LDDC, other affected London 
Boroughs, developers, contractors, statutory undertakings and 
representatives of local business.
DTp blocked the O&Y proposal because it did not fit with the 
department’s schemes and ran counter to the views of policy officials. A 
former adviser claims “the smart lobbyist moves immediately to the 
Treasury and often to the Policy Unit.’’^^  ^ On CrossRail IGA was not
 ^ O&Y legal adviser, interview, 13/02/98
Representatives from Transport, Environment, Home Office, DTI, Social Security, Health, Employment, 
National Heritage, OPS and Treasury attended a Cabinet sub-committee for London, chaired by the Secretary 
of State for the Environment. Glaister, S., and Travers, T., (1993), plO
The Minister for Transport in London established the Transport Working Group that brought together 
representatives from LUL, LDDC, London Buses, NSE, the Traffic Commissioner, the Traffic Director, the 
LRPC, LCCI, LPAC, and the London Tourist Board, 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
HC Debs, Vol 155, 19/06/89, Col 46 
former No 10 Policy Unit member, interview, 02/03/98
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‘smart’; whereas on JLE Lowe Bell and O&Y were. Lowe Bell 
recommended that, because of D ip ’s views, O&Y approach others.
There were three relevant political camps outside DTp -  No 10, 
the Department of the Environment, and Treasury -  all cultivated 
assiduously by O&Y and Lowe Bell. O&Y lobbyists did not focus on civil 
servants because they believed them to be immune to their arguments.^^^ 
A former official argues “the most important thing was to make sure that 
ministers were getting access to alternative views that they would not 
normally have got from the traditional method of LUL briefing civil 
servants and civil servants briefing ministers.’’^^ "^
O&Y and Lowe Bell found these established networks 
impenetrable. Changing the officials’ agendas proved impossible. This 
intransigence led Lowe Bell to contact politicians directly. For several 
months JLE occupied the attention of the Prime Minister intensely.^^® 
Even officials in ministers’ private offices were unaware of some of the 
confidential briefings Transport ministers received from O&Y.
Lobbyists provided information to ministers that they were unable 
to obtain from civil servants. GJW lobbyists briefed special advisers. An 
official recalls
In the run up to the decision on JLE, [lobbyists] focused 
almost exclusively on politicians. I think they came to the 
conclusion that civil servants were not the right audience for 
the particular issue in question which was about getting 
political backing for a project that the system did not want and 
had not thought of. They had to get political commitment.^^®
Reichmann enjoyed a personal chemistry with Thatcher. There 
was empathy between the two because Reichmann was a risk-taker, self- 
made, an outsider and J e w i s h . S h e  afforded Reichmann greater 
access than the chairmen of nationalised industries. A political adviser 
recalled “Thatcher was pushing it like hell. She just loved the Reichmann 
brothers.’’^
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
former adviser to the Prime Minister 1, interview, 30/04/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
former adviser to the Prime Minister 1, interview, 30/04/98 
former political adviser 1, interview, 14/11/97
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Reichmann circumvented the policy community, and at some 
stage obtained an informal oral commitment to improve transport 
infrastructure and to link the development to the Underground network 
personally from Thatcher.”'^ ® Such a swift agreement to major public 
expenditure was uncharacteristic of the PM. She also expanded, as a 
consequence of meeting Reichmann, the Minister for Transport’s brief to 
include responsibility for transport in L o n d o n . H e r  “authority was very 
much behind it and it lingered on into 1992. It was seen as a done 
deal.”''^ ^
JLE was cemented into the government’s programme. The 
conventional policy-making process was subverted. A former Cabinet 
minister says
it was part of the deal on Docklands, that they [O&Y] would 
contribute to the cost of the line, but Docklands and Canary 
Wharf would have access to the underground. That was 
agreed actually when the Reichmanns agreed to develop 
Canary Wharf.
This informal understanding was not specific. The deal was a 
hook to catch Whilst the deal may not have been a “cast-iron
copper-bottomed guarantee that a particular project would be finished by 
a particular date” Reichmann would have left “confident that he had 
engaged her attention and would regard it as a case of very successful 
l o b b y i n g . O & Y  recognised “Paul did rely on government commitment 
and it would have been a verbal commitment. He decided ‘if the Prime 
Minister gives me that sort of assurance that is good enough.
Treasury suspected a deal had been struck with Reichmann. One 
official thought “there probably was [a deal]. Reichmann would have 
been barmy to go ahead with Canary Wharf without it.” "^^® The deal was 
eventually formalised. In return for a developer contribution the 
government would build an Underground line. A heads of agreement’
senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/04/98. O&Y executives insist when Reichmann signed the deal to 
develop Canary Wharf in July 1987 the only two formal transport conditions were a DLR contribution and the 
construction of the Limehouse Link.
former adviser to the Prime Minister 1, interview, 30/04/98. Michael Portillo instantaneously became 
Minister for Docklands Transport.
senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98 
former Cabinet Minister 3, interview, 19/05/98
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
former adviser to the Prime Minister 1, interview, 30/04/98 
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
senior Treasury civil servant, interview, 23/01/98
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letter was sent to ministers and “was then handed to lawyers and the half 
dozen sentences that were acceptable to Reichmann and ministers were 
subject to an amazing amount of work by l a w y e r s . L U L  was culpable 
for the delay, which meant that by 1992 O&Y had not signed a contract 
with DTp.'‘‘®
Department of Iransport
Senior officials in the DTp disliked O&Y. LT’s reaction to O&Y 
constituted outright o p p o s i t i o n . D T p  was wedged in CLRS’s furrow 
and did not wish to be forced onto other issues. Although CLRS was not 
an operational matter, officials relied on LT for analysis upon which 
subsequent policy decisions were made. DTp was reluctant to challenge 
the CLRS’s findings.
O&Y believed DTp “did not want to do anything that might involve 
them taking responsibility for the operators. There was a tendency to be 
palmed off to LT.’’^^ ° O&Y recognised LT as the transport authority. 
“Government said you had better go and talk to London Transport. O&Y 
came to LT and they put quite a bit of pressure on us to look at their 
s c h e m e s . S e n i o r  LT managers loathed O&Y because it spoiled LT’s 
agenda and threatened its monopoly over London’s railway. An O&Y 
executive comments “LUL were opposed to JLE at the beginning. They 
fought it all the way. They fought it not because they did not want the 
Jubilee Line but because they had their preferred options.
Whilst the majority of civil servants were antagonistic, some 
welcomed O&Y, believing it to be a ‘breath of fresh air’ after having to 
deal with LT: “I was the policy official responsible and I had no respect for 
LT. They were incompetent.’’^ O & Y  and its lobbyists benefited from the 
support of a handful of key officials and advisers in DTp. They acted as 
informal pushers of the O&Y case inside government. A former political
’ former senior civil servant 1, interview, 13/03/98. See O&Y internal memo, subject Funding Agreement, 31 
January 1990, private arctiive
“Room at the Top in Tower of Mammon: Remember the Eighties optimism and expansion”. Independent on 
Sunday, 29 March 1992. LUL wanted O&Y to make its contribution without any assurances that a JLE would 
be built, that it would be on the agreed route or that train services would actually be provided.
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former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
London Transport executive 1, interview, 11/12/97 
O&Y executive, interview, 07/03/97 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
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adviser argued “I would certainly help them in meetings [and advise O&Y] 
how they should approach meetings.”
The political adviser continued, O&Y provided
intelligence about what they were up to, which meant I could 
sit in meetings and I could contribute to those meetings, 
helping my boss. At the end of the day -  it is your boss 
versus officials. Just my man and his juniors versus 
officialdom. The officials would line up in legions around the 
table.154
Department of the Environment
DoE, as Docklands’ sponsor department, supported O&Y and was 
a lobbyist on its behalf inside government. A former cabinet minister says 
“in the Environment ministry we thought it was very important because it 
seemed to us that this was a restatement of the importance of London as 
a centre. London was beginning to have its day again and we were 
beginning to win the battle internationally. Docklands was crucial for 
that.”'"®
DoE had a different agenda from DTp. DoE had part-funded DLR 
to aid regeneration. DoE campaigned for JLE because it would not be 
funded from the DoE budget but from DTp’s. O&Y’s lobbyists ensured 
DoE officials were comfortable with the arguments, presentation and logic 
of its case. Having the DoE ‘on side’ was critical in the campaign with 
DTp officials.
When asked about the effectiveness of lobbying, a former 
Environment minister said “I did not need much representation. They 
recognised that we were determined to get the Jubilee Line.”^^®
Treasurv
Treasury often refused to examine new projects. Those improving 
existing services were more likely to receive attention. However, in the 
late 1980s Treasury was not hostile to DTp bids (for CrossRail nor JLE) 
because of pressure on the transport system. The Transport Secretary
156
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
former Cabinet Minister 2, interview, 24/02/98 
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submitted to Treasury an outline for a twenty-year programme of 
investment in
By October 1989 the Treasury had told DTp to halve its £3.5bn bid 
for rail schemes and £12bn for road schemes, because they exceeded 
long-term spending t a r ge t s / T r easu r y  refused to approve the rail Bills 
due for introduction in November 1989. To proceed with the JLE, DTp 
delayed the other schemes. The Times explained “The Department of 
Transport has been told to choose between the proposed Paddington to 
Liverpool Street rail link and the extension of the Jubilee Line from Green 
Park to Stratford, because the Treasury cannot afford both schemes.
Treasury refused to fund both projects because of cost. Parkinson 
launched a counter-offensive following the 1989 Party Conference to 
protect JLE.^®° The JLE gained Treasury approval only because of the 
PM’s involvement and the private-sector contribution.
Conclusion
The number of influential government players was small: the PM, 
Secretaries of State and ministers in Departments of Transport, 
Environment and Treasury, and relevant Permanent Secretaries, Deputy 
Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries in each department.^®^
The DTp made it clear the JLE decision was not of its own. A 
Times editorial noted “The transport department has never denied that 
the Jubilee Line queue-jumped the London investment list on Margaret 
Thatcher’s instructions, only to help make Canary Wharf v i a b l e . O & Y  
and Lowe Bell were effective because they were not a member of the 
closed consensual network. They went around the policy community to 
the Prime Minister to force change.
Lobbyists can be more effective if they extract their client from the 
policy community. Lowe Bell was effective because it did not include its 
client in the policy community. O&Y ignored the London and transport 
policy communities, and took its campaign to a political level to over-rule
‘Ticket to a 21st century Tube”, The Daily Telegraph, 15 August 1988
“Cash brake on rail and road plans", The Guardian, 4 October 1989
“Funds for only one rail link”. The Times, 6 October 1989
“Parkinson In fight for two Tube projects”. The Daily Telegraph, 16 October 1989
senior civil servant 6, Interview, 15/04/98
“No Canary rescue”. The Times, 18 May 1992
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the traditional policy-making streams and target the top political 
executive. The evidence refutes the hypothesis.
Multi-faceted lobbying: Hypothesis Five
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi­
faceted approach and facilitate access to multiple 
points in the decision-making process.
Parliament
O&Y’s tactics emphasised the wider political benefits of JLE and 
targeted the Prime Minister and some ministers. However, O&Y pursued 
a limited multi-faceted campaign and did lobby parliament. It targeted 
MPs on relevant committees, other advisers and decision-makers. When 
GJW briefed interested MPs on the Canary Wharf project it included in 
those discussions debate on JLE.^®^
O&Y brought MPs, decision-makers and journalists to the 
development to lobby them. O&Y seconded key personnel to the LUL Bill 
preparation team. The Bill received its first reading in January 1990.^ ®"^  
The legislative process was made easier by O&Y’s earlier lobbying, and 
its decisions about alignment.^®^ In committee the Bill attracted 96 
petitioners, and additional provisions deposited attracted a further 60: 
consolidation meant only 24 were presented to Committee.^®® In general 
parliament was not important. Most MPs were not interested in JLE. 
Lobbying concentrated the Bill’s legislative stages to ease its passage. 
Even so, parliamentary approval was seen as a technicality.''®^
The Media
O&Y invested time and effort in an attempt to improve the 
development’s perception by City, financial and property journalists. 
There was a full-time long-term programme of taking journalists down to
GJW memo to O&Y, 28 September 1988, private archive 
“MPs iine up a ‘Nimby’ alert". Financial Times, 31 January 1990
The JLE designed to run underground under existing rail corridors, thereby limiting potential opposition. 
Sir Michael Neubert MR chaired the Bill Committee. The Bill completed its Commons stages on 24 June 
1991. Lord Elibank chaired the Bill Committee in the Lords. The Bill passed with minor alteration and gained 
Royal Assent on 16 March 1992.
167 senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/05/98
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the development to show them the quality of design and construction to 
encourage them to write favourable pieces.
Local Government
O&Y briefed affected local authorities to ensure “all relevant 
officials and councillors are aware of the implications and benefits of the 
rail line so that during the parliamentary passage they are able to provide 
informed support.” ®^® The City of London Corporation opposed JLE 
because it threatened its interests. It preferred to see JLE re-routed or 
dead.^®  ^ The City was split between those “delighted to see anything 
threaten Docklands and others who had decided to relocate to 
Docklands.
O&Y lobbied Tower Hamlets, and its regeneration, employment 
and training contributions helped ‘oil the wheels’ of support for the whole 
project. O&Y attempted to convince local people of its case. It financed 
a construction training college and established a £2m fund for local 
schools and c o l l e g e s . O & Y ’s contractors were required to employ ten 
per cent of their workforce locally.^^^ O&Y’s community programme and 
training commitments were in the original ‘master building agreement’ 
signed before JLE was conceived. O&Y believed detailed consultation 
with local authorities and community groups would help it “sort out who 
will be obstreperous and oppose the line under any circumstances, from 
those who have legitimate c o n c e r n s . . . A n  LRT executive commented 
O&Y “did an enormous amount of work with community groups. 
LDDC was also an active lobbyist for JLE, arguing regeneration required 
the area be accessible by underground.
GJW memo to O&Y, 28 September 1988, private archive 
north of the Thames so it served the City 
senior civil servant 2, interview, 28/01/98
Independent on Sunday “A High Risk Business”, 16 December 1990 
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98
O&Y memo. Consultation with Local Authorities, 25 November 1988, private archive 
London Transport executive 1, interview, 11/12/97
letter from LDDC to Department of the Environment, Jubilee Line: Docklands Transport Capacity and 
Developments, 18 May 1992, private archive.
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Conclusion
Some politicians and advisers in Downing Street, DoE, DTp and 
Treasury believed JLE was the right policy. There was an informal 
grouping, constantly thinking “who else are we going to talk to? What 
meetings are we going to facilitate?”^ T h e s e  internal advocates worked 
closely with O&Y and their lobbyists. O&Y were effective because they 
dropped the idea in several different places in government. In addition to 
No 10, O&Y talked to DoE, Cabinet Office as well as DTp.^^^
Lobbyists targeted campaign elements carefully. A No 10 adviser 
argued the lobbyists
built the story on every point along the path as to why it was 
good for government. They built the story within the Treasury 
and said ‘we will give some cash’. They built the story in the 
PM ’s mind in the sense that ‘this is helping create the vision’.
All around they had a reinforcing vision. It almost became 
received wisdom.
O&Y did not really run a multi-faceted campaign, though it did put 
effort into lobbying key MPs and sections of the media. JLE was really 
decided by senior ministers. O&Y lobbied MPs, journalists and local 
government not because it had to, but because it wanted to minimise 
opposition. Lowe Bell and its clients were effective because their 
campaign was multi-faceted, but it is possible to speculate that they 
would have ‘won’ without that extra effort. Though the evidence supports 
the hypothesis, a multi-faceted campaign may not always be necessary.
former No 10 Policy Unit member, interview, 02/03/98
ibid
ibid
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Micro-level
Routines and Standard Operating Procedures: 
Hypothesis Six
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar 
with routines and standard operating procedures and 
know when and where to intervene in the policy-making 
process.
A civil servant described O&Y as “peculiarly bloody-minded" with 
“little idea how to handle us. They believed a bit of North American ‘know 
how' would fix it.”^^ ® To prevent this perception spreading O&Y hired 
lobbyists who understood the system.
Knowing informal rules was important. Lowe Bell helped O&Y 
avoid defeat at an early stage. Lobbyists had learned from DTp that LT 
were about to present its ‘priority list’ of ten schemes, which did not 
include JLE. Bell advised “you must accept that if you do not do 
something you will lose because they will have made the decision. You 
have to change it and stop it now.” ®^° Bell recommended O&Y send a 
cash offer directly to the minister. He cautioned “if you send a letter to 
the department you may find it is not reviewed until after the meeting with 
ministers.
Reichmann agreed a letter offering a £100m contribution. O&Y in 
London “had it signed by Reichmann who was in Canada, and had it 
hand-delivered to the Transport Secretary at a dinner that night. I would 
never have done that myself because I would have thought I had time. 
But Tim advised we would have lost it.” ®^^ This intervention ensured JLE 
was discussed when LT and DTp briefed ministers. This bypassing of the 
civil service annoyed officials. The lobbyist’s understanding of individuals 
and policy-making in practice prevented O&Y from losing. “It was tactical 
nous, a knowledge of individuals, knowledge of process and knowledge 
of people, which kept us in the game.’’^ ®^
former senior civil servant 1, interview, 13/03/98 
' O&Y executive, interview, 07/03/97 
ibid 
ibid 
ibid
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Lowe Bell took a foreign client, unfamiliar with British politics, and 
ensured it performed at the standard of its home environment. It was 
important for O&Y “not to commit gaffes. It is very important in order to 
make you look serious that you have a thorough understanding of the 
local environment including its p o l i t i c s . L o b b y i s t s  brought an 
understanding of how government worked and an understanding of 
government policy.
LUL remained obstructive after DTp approved JLE and the Bill was 
i n t r o d u c e d . D T p  policy officials relied on LUL for information, but LUL 
was a “reluctant promoter of that Bill and that project.” ®^® At Second 
Reading GJW briefed “MPs and made sure they understood what the 
issues were and how important the scheme was.” ®^^ O&Y and DTp made 
sure appropriate members were approached for the Bill Committee and 
appropriate “suggestions were made to [the Chairman of the Committee 
of Selection] about how important it was to get the selection rig ht. 
O&Y says “On the Jubilee Line we fixed our Bill. We fixed it. You put a 
safe Tory MR in the chair, and if you do not your Bill may fail."^ ®®
DTp felt LUL “dealt with petitioners badly and slowly. They were 
dragging their feet.” ®^° O&Y also believed LUL were “not managing their 
Bills properly.” ®^^ GJW used its knowledge of parliamentary processes to 
act as a channel of information to inform DTp officials about what 
happened in Westminster. Whilst government remained technically 
neutral on Private Bills “clearly it was a Bill that ministers wanted to see 
pushed t h r o u g h . G J W  advised officials about the Bill’s progress. A 
senior official recognised “if GJW had not been involved, and I had not 
known GJW well by that stage, I think government could have been 
seriously embarrassed on one or two occasions. We needed information 
to know what was going on. GJW were very effective.
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
ibid
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180 O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
O&Y legal adviser, interview, 13/02/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98 
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A senior official argued GJW made “an effort to understand the 
issues and therefore their lobbying was more effective, particularly in the 
way they recognised that the key person they needed to speak for the 
Jubilee Line project was myself.
Conclusion
One former adviser argued “It is useful for lobbyists to know the 
system, but they can have someone to tell them how it works -  someone 
from inside the system. Lobbyists do not have to be of the system.
One lobbyist argued “One has seen politics, so you understand 
what makes these people tick. There is nothing new there... [I] 
understand how the system operates, how to frame your arguments, how 
to prepare yourself, and how to communicate what you are trying to 
do."'^
Lowe Bell’s knowledge of informal rules and GJW’s knowledge of 
parliamentary process helped ensure JLE progressed though important 
stages. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Contacts and Coalitions: Hypothesis Seven
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good 
contacts and can spot connections to potential allies 
and can construct coalitions.
Contacts
Lowe Bell’s Conservative contacts were legendary. A former 
Cabinet minister recalls “A friend of mine [...] who is still working for Lowe 
Bell and was representing O&Y, said ‘would you mind coming to a 
presentation given by these two people?”’ ®^^ The minister attended the 
meeting and recalled “I have never seen such a slick performance before 
-  absolutely astonishing. These people had their act together. These 
people were like a tornado that arrived in town.’’ ®^®
ibid
former No 10 Policy Unit member, interview, 02/03/98 
lobbyist 1, interview, 11/02/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
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Lowe Bell “had contacts at every level. They believed in working 
at every level. That is something O&Y never could have done 
o u r s e l v e s . L o w e  Bell organised lunches to meet decision-makers.
A political adviser comments
Lowe Bell and the team was trusted by all of us. W e knew 
they were good guys. When they said we must see these 
people we said ‘okay’. Because of the status of Tim Bell and 
the team it was a third-party endorsement that O&Y needed.
Lowe Bell would not work for third-rate people so you felt you 
were safe. 200
Minister and special advisers were comfortable working with Lowe 
Bell. Friendships delivered information. One lobbyist suggested 
“contacts were important to pick up intelligence about the way things 
were moving, which influenced strategy significantly.” °^^  One lobbyist 
commented “a lot of people I was at the Department of Transport with are 
my chums. They are friends of mine.” °^^  Having a network of friends 
allowed lobbyists to be in the information loop -  “you come across it in 
the course of day to day events. You get a sense of it. You just pick it 
up... You keep in touch with people.
GJW knew decision-makers personally. An official recalls “the real 
trick GJW brought to the party was they knew people like Michael Portillo 
personally. They were very effective at lobbying Portillo and myself when 
I became the responsible official.
O&Y had substantial political influence. It was an outsider in two 
senses and an insider in another. First, it was a property developer not a 
developer of urban railways. Second, O&Y was Canadian -  it was 
perceived as a “foreigner in a foreign land.”^°  ^ But O&Y was an insider 
because it had high-level access to ministers and political support. Whilst 
executives in London had easy access to senior decision-makers with 
GJW’s help, much contact was undertaken personally by Paul 
Reichmann.^°® An O&Y adviser says of Reichmann’s access: “I have
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98199
former poiitical adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
iobbyist 1, interview, 11/02/98
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98
lobbyist 1, interview, 11/02/98
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
London Transport executive 3, interview, 25/03/98
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
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never seen anything like it. He would ring up Thatcher from his portable 
phone driving around in his limo.” °^^
Civil servants thought O&Y believed “they could get in anywhere” 
and thought they could “bang the table then God help you.” °^® Officials 
had the Prime Ministerial deal ‘thrown’ at them by O&Y when obstacles 
arose.^°^ “They had a great ‘card’ which they would play whenever there 
was a problem -  ‘you and us have a deal and we should be pulling in the 
same d i r e c t i o n . T h e  Reichmann-Thatcher deal gave O&Y credibility. 
An LT manager says of the Thatcher-Reichmann connection “I rather 
despised it all and I did not like Reichmann’s personal s t y l e . O & Y  
believed the reason DTp and LT talked to it “was that they knew that if 
they did not we would go straight to Downing Street.”^^ ^
Coalitions
There was no broad coalition of supporters. O&Y’s campaign 
focused on three central departments (DTp, DoE and DTI), the Cabinet 
Office and No 10.
Some civil servants thought O&Y was ‘ghastly’ because 
“everything about them was a l i e n . D T p  officials were shocked by 
O&Y’s aggressive attitude. Relations between LT, DTp and O&Y 
remained tense after government had approved JLE. Ministers believed 
LT and DTp officials were “bloody-minded”^^  ^ and became impatient at 
the bureaucracy and lack of vision.^^^ O&Y “were given the minimum 
possible assistance” by DTp and LT.^ ^®
Some opponents of JLE lobbied government. Docklands 
threatened the City of London. The Corporation relaxed planning 
guidelines, allowing a further 20m sq. ft of office space within the City.^^^
209 ,
transport consultant 2, interview, 02/04/98
former senior civil servant 1, interview, 13/03/98
' senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/04/98
former senior civil servant 1, interview, 13/03/98
senior London Transport manager, interview, 13/05/98 
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senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98
"Canary comes home to roost: Olympia & York’s brave adventure developing Docklands has ended in 
tears". Independent on Sunday, 29 March 1992
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
former senior civil servant 4, interview, 25/03/98
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The Corporation believed “JLE was only built as a tax-break for 
Docklands.
Conclusion
Effective lobbyists distinguish between those who decide and 
those who inform. Lower down the hierarchy are those with no power of 
assent, but significant power of dissent and the ability to block. “The 
Olympia & York philosophy was whatever barriers you come across you 
either go around them, under them, over them or finally, through them.”^^ ® 
O&Y had a reputation for success, which was shared by Lowe Bell. 
“Lowe Bell’s contacts in the Conservative world were superb” and they 
were hired because “they were deemed to be the best.”^^ °
O&Y’s two lobbyists -  Lowe Bell and GJW -  complemented one 
another. O&Y recalls “Tim Bell did not know the process very well. GJW 
would give us papers on the process. Bell just knew how to get in to see 
p e o p l e . B e l l  understood Thatcher: “He really understood her and what 
made her tick.”^^  ^ His role was to introduce ideas and his clients to the 
system.
Conventionally third-party endorsement is regarded as essential to 
an effective lobbying campaign. This campaign was atypical: a quasi­
commercial deal, senior political commitment and its centrality to the 
government’s political agenda cemented JLE. Coalitions were not 
important in O&Y’s lobbying.
One senior civil servant commented
Coalitions can be important but it depends on establishing 
links with the agenda. East London was a top priority at the 
time and it did not matter particularly that there was not a 
broad coalition of support. The most important thing was JLE 
fitted the government’s wider objectives.
Contacts were important and lobbyists effectively spotted allies in 
government -  allies outside government and broader coalitions were not 
important. The evidence partly supports the hypothesis.
Corporation of the City of London representative 2, interview, 09/03/98 
* senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
' ibid
O&Y adviser, interview, 13/02/98 
■ former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
' senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/04/98
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Resources: Hypothesis Eight
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has 
abundant resources and is skilful in deploying them.
Economic Might of O&Y
O&Y was run with obsessive secrecy by three brothers.^^"  ^ It 
moved into property development in 1965, and developed Toronto’s First 
Canadian Place in 1974. The project was massively profitable, and the 
family soon became the world’s largest property developer and was listed 
amongst the ten richest in the w o r l d . T h e  company reputedly had 
assets worth $25bn.^^®
The Reichmanns’ reputation for trustworthiness enabled them to 
“consummate deals with a handshake and to obtain non-collateralized 
loans from usually wary b a n k e r s . B a n k e r s  jockeyed to lend O&Y 
money, allowing the company to obtain funds whilst providing the minimal 
financial information. O&Y had an established record in speculative 
development, including the World Finance Center in Manhattan. It was 
the largest single office landlord in USA, owning 40m sq. foot of office 
space.^^® Canary Wharf was the largest development in Europe.
O&Y was not only the biggest; it was the best. It led new 
construction and financing techniques.^^® Its commitment to quality 
design and public amenities, innovative building techniques, encouraged 
good relations with host governments.^^° The company had the Midas 
touch.^^^ Its economic might was awesome.^^^ O&Y had invested more 
in Britain “than all the Japanese automobile manufacturers put 
together.
Albert, Paul and Ralph Reichmann224
“Bumpy ride to Canary Wharf’, The Sunday Times, 8 September 1991 
^  ibid
Fanstein, S., (1994)
“Canary comes home to roost: Olympia & York’s brave adventure developing Docklands has ended in 
tears”. Independent on Sunday, 29 March 1992 
^  Fanstein, S., (1994) 
ibid
“Gotham City, E14: A canary or a turkey?”. The Independent, 13 July 1991
O&Y Enterprises held stakes in the following companies: Abitibi-Price, 82%; Gulf Canada Resources, 74%; 
Trizec Corporation, 36%; Stanhope Properties, 33%; Landmark Land Company, 25%; Santa Fe Pacific, 19%; 
Trilon Financial, 14%; Campeau, 10.5%; Rosehaugh, 8.2%; and 89% of GW Utilities which had the following 
interests - Consumers’ Gas Co 82%; Interhome Energy, 41%; and Allied Lyons, 10%. “Reichmann fights 
Canary gloom”. The Sunday Times, 9 February 1992
“Administrators move in at Canary Wharf’, The Times, 29 May 1992
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A former Cabinet Minister argues “unless a client is impressive, the 
lobby firm cannot rescue him. The lobby firm cannot make an
unimpressive client i m p r e s s i v e . T h e  lobbyists were helpful, but the 
power and effectiveness of O&Y and Paul Reichmann’s prestige meant 
they had access to No 10 and ministers in their own right.
The Cost of the Campaign
O&Y spent many millions of pounds developing and presenting 
their proposals.^^^ A senior businessman argued the cost of services of 
lobbyists and specialised consultants over two years was “well into a 
seven figure sum.’’^ ®^ LT had never experienced “a scheme which had so 
much political lobbying and tactical meetings about who to lobby next. 
O&Y had a whole unit to influence government and decision-makers.’’^ ^^  
O&Y paid LT for technical advice and research and hired a
transport consultancy to examine the available options. “[W]ork was
largely funded by them. They paid LT to look at their schemes. It was 
positive lobbying. LT could not refuse to do it.’’^ ®^ O&Y
set up a project office to develop this free-standing scheme.
They carried out engineering work. They put an enormous 
amount of money in. [...] It was tens of millions because they
commissioned [technical plans and] environmental work, and 
of course there was a lot of lobbying work.^^®
A former Cabinet Minister noted “they were coming out with an 
idea a day. London Transport were running to catch up.” "^^® It cost LUL 
over £100m to bring the Jubilee Line project to construction.^"^^
Managerial Resources
JLE was given top priority within O&Y. "^^  ^ A senior O&Y executive 
devoted his entire time to lobbying for a transport link. A political adviser 
cautioned “if you want a successful campaign, there has to be a massive 
investment of time from the top people in any organisation. You have to
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
235 Qg^Y executive, interview, 07/03/97 
senior businessman, interview, 30/01/98 
London Transport executive 1, interview, 11/12/97 
ibid 
ibid
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
LUL memo. Jubilee Line Extension, 1 June 1992, private archive
O&Y legal adviser, interview, 13/02/98
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do that for something of that size. Paul Reichmann was back and forth 
across the Atlantic like a y o - y o . T h e  resources O&Y committed to the 
campaign were “very significant”; a former Cabinet Minister argued
There was such a lot of momentum and drive and vision, 
much of which depended on resources. Every day you saw 
that they had a new idea, that they had moved the debate 
forward. Personally I found it very impressive. It could not 
have been generated without resources and not without 
quality people. '^*'*
Conclusion
To be effective clients must resource a lobbying campaign 
sufficiently. One lobbyist argues “if a client is committed to achieving a 
particular outcome on a particular project it has got to resource it 
properly. O&Y certainly did.” "^^ ^
Lobbyists focused O&Y’s activities and made O&Y’s lobbying more 
effective. O&Y’s structure and devotion of substantial financial and 
managerial resources to the JLE campaign was an important factor in its 
success. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Low-Profile Outsider Tactics: Hypothesis Nine
Lobbyists will tend to be effective if they pursue 
low-profile 'external' tactics.
There were no external measures used in the lobbying campaign 
for JLE. The evidence neither supports nor rejects the hypothesis.
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98 
Tower Hamlets’ adviser, interview, 25/03/98
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Conclusions
Political and business pressures supporting JLE meant the routine 
policy system was over-ruled by ministers. ELRS’s sole objective was to 
legitimise the political decision taken earlier to approve JLE. Ministers 
recognised JLE’s transport case was weak, but approved JLE not 
because of its measurable benefits, but because of intense lobbying and 
political factors, especially prime-ministerial support.
JLE underwent formal appraisal processes, but conventional 
evaluation could not account for political and economic factors. Political 
pragmatism ruled. A former minister recognised “the government looked 
very silly having given the go-ahead to a scheme which even by my 
assessment had less of an immediate return than CrossRail.” "^^®
The case study shows the central role politicians played in setting 
departmental agendas, the defeat of Treasury, and the involvement of 
lobbyists. The civil service was over-ridden; “JLE was not something that 
would have got priority funding. It did not stack up in terms of being a 
number one p r i o r i t y . I t  was forced upon DTp. Ministers and civil 
servants were subservient to a high-level political deal. JLE succeeded 
for political reasons.
External Variables
A case in-line with government's agenda. There were other routes to 
senior politicians apart from Lowe Bell because O&Y were making the 
government’s Docklands policy a success. JLE delivered other parts of 
the government's agenda: private-sector involvement in public projects 
and regeneration. Whilst JLE was not approved because of the 
contribution, it would not have gone ahead without it -  the money was a 
tool to justify the decision. O&Y was astute enough to recognise JLE 
would be built for political reasons, and therefore was unwilling to 
contribute a substantial share of costs.
former Minister for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98 
former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98
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The lobbyist fitted their client’s policy into the wider political picture 
and was effective in harnessing the reinforcing supporters and 
arguments. DTp was averse to new ideas because it was comfortable in 
the CLRS agenda. This attitude foreordained O&Y’s modus operandi to 
engage the political level. O&Y’s lobbyists effectively forced the issue 
into the open and onto ministers’ agendas. JLE had support at the 
highest level. The drive from ministers and the PM, who had invested 
substantial financial and political capital in Docklands, assured success.
Economic constraints. External factors were important and did impinge; 
however, despite the recession and the collapse of O&Y, the political 
commitment to JLE remained. Also, the lack of a political consensus in 
London allowed O&Y to ‘divide and rule’ by relying on top-level support.
Internal variables
Whilst contextual variables were important in shaping the policy 
outcome, so were the internal variables within the control of the lobbyist 
and its client. One senior official said “those who wanted JLE built were 
extremely e f f e c t i v e . “They spent a lot of time and money on keeping 
the profile and making sure government did not lose sight.’’^ "^® The 
lobbyist helped build political confidence in a decision that required a leap 
of faith. Lowe Bell’s lobbying was critical. It concentrated on the ‘top’ to 
deliver political support to navigate around ‘blocking’ civil servants and 
their public-sector clients. Lowe Bell’s activity was largely hidden from 
officials and LT as the company lobbied No 10 and senior ministers.
Contacts. O&Y and Lowe Bell enjoyed top-level access, subverting the 
normal policy process. Lowe Bell was a catalyst. It introduced 
information into parts of the system, starting a chain reaction, which it 
reinforced. Lobbyists helped arrange meetings with appropriate 
ministers, civil servants and advisers. Lowe Bell helped Reichmann and 
O&Y gain access to the Prime Minister. JLE was the triumph of internal
senior civil servant 1, interview, 04/02/98 
CrossRail parliamentary manager, interview, 29/01/98
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politics and Margaret Thatcher’s cosiness with the Reichmanns. DTp 
officials and ministers preferred other policies, but the core executive’ 
chose JLE. The oral commitment that Reichmann received from 
Thatcher echoed an earlier deal struck personally by the Prime Minister. 
The DTp Accounting Officer did express doubts to ministers about JLE, 
but his concerns were not as grave as to characterise the project a ‘bad 
buy’.^ °^
O&Y had pushers within government -  special advisers and 
ministers. It had access to, and support from, the right of the 
Conservative party (the Bell-Thatcher connection) by emphasising O&Y’s 
free market and risk-taking credentials, and the left of the party because 
of Heseltine’s commitment to regeneration.
Rules and Procedure. Lowe Bell was effective in advising O&Y to go 
around’ the DTp. They played the department skilfully. Whilst the issue 
was of interest to DTp, Lowe Bell engaged the Prime Minister’s interest at 
moments when the process floundered. Bell helped O&Y understand the 
frailties of the individuals and the system, which if it did not ensure O&Y 
won at least ensured it did not lose at crucial moments in the process.
Policv Network. The number of influential policy-makers was limited. No 
10, Environment, Transport and Treasury were the involved departments. 
The Prime Minister was the most important actor. A small and restricted 
group of senior politicians took the decision to promote JLE. The role of 
the civil service and parliament was limited. O&Y and its lobbyists rolled- 
over official intransigence and sidelined the wider policy community. 
They operated effectively within Whitehall to overcome DTp scepticism 
and Treasury hostility. Lowe Bell provided access to senior ministers, 
and reassurance to operate at a high-level, which allowed O&Y to adopt 
unconventional approaches.
former senior civil servant 7, interview, 29/04/98. The Overseas Development Administration concluded the 
Pergau hydroelectric dam project was a ‘very bad buy’. A high-level understanding, amounting to an oral 
commitment, from Margaret Thatcher to the Malaysian Prime Minister, led ministers to over-rule the advice of 
their officials. The Accounting Officer advised the project should not proceed and required a direction from 
ministers to incur expenditure. The Foreign Secretary over-ruled the advice of the Accounting Officer leading 
him to submit a ‘note of dissent". Foreign Affairs Select Committee, (1993/94); National Audit Office, 
(1993/94); and Evidence of Sir Tim Lankester, Permanent Secretary, Overseas Development Administration, 
Public Accounts Select Committee, (1993/94).
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Coalitions. O&Y did not seek to build third-party coalitions to progress 
JLE through the civil service. O&Y worked closely only with LDDC. A 
former special adviser recalls “LDDC worked hand in glove with O&Y."^^^ 
The JLE campaign’s success suggests a coalition is an unnecessary 
attribute for effective lobbying, once the PM and a leading Secretary of 
State is supportive.
Resources. The JLE campaign was well-resourced. In addition to 
considerable financial resources, which helped O&Y buy its way to 
success, it had less tangible resources like the triumphal mentality of the 
private-sector. It was used to winning. O&Y’s golden touch contrasted to 
the grey, mundane public-sector bodies.
O&Y also had significant managerial resources. JLE had a single 
advocate with one agenda. Because Canary Wharfs success depended 
on it, O&Y devoted substantial time and resources to securing it. The 
management team were single-minded, committed, well-briefed and 
effective advocates. Contrary to CrossRail, government relations had a 
high priority within O&Y. O&Y was helped by strategic advice from their 
lobbyists, Lowe Bell and GJW.
Qualitv of the Case. JLE was planned with political factors in mind. Its 
alignment passed under existing rail corridors to minimise objection. 
Though initially weak, the case grew stronger as consultants showed it 
would relieve congestion.
Multi-faceted campaign. O&Y did not undertake a wide multi-faceted 
campaign, involving parliament, the media, or the public. It did however, 
deal at all levels and branches of government. Lobbying across Whitehall 
was concentrated, intense and bordered on saturation. O&Y recognised 
that complex decisions would not be made by DTp alone, and targeted 
other key players in government, especially actors who were likely to be
former political adviser 4, interview, 25/03/98
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enthusiastic, such as No 10 and DoE. Support from other areas of
government forced DTp to accept a new agenda.
An assessment of the hypotheses
The evidence suggests:
1 ) Lobbyists were important. However, the lobbyists took an issue, had 
it authorised by a technical, low-profile, non-political study, then 
heightened its profile within government to engage senior ministers. 
The evidence refutes the hypothesis.
2) Lobbyists can still be effective if there are disadvantageous external or 
contextual constraints. JLE remained a priority despite the recession 
and the collapse of O&Y -  because of, in part, effective lobbying.
3) Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of political decision-makers, 
pre-existing policy and previous experience are congruent with the 
lobbyist’s objective. JLE succeeded because it delivered parts of the 
government’s programme.
4) Lobbyists were more effective because they removed their client from 
the policy community. The evidence refutes the hypothesis.
5) Lobbyists pursued a restricted multi-faceted campaign. It 
concentrated on senior ministers and special advisers. Although O&Y 
lobbied MPs, local authorities and the media, a multi-faceted 
campaign was not necessary.
6) Familiarity with routines and SOPs was important. Lowe Bell’s and 
GJW’s knowledge helped their client at key moments.
7) Lobbyists were significant in gaining access to ministers, special 
advisers and to some extent MPs. Officials were informed and 
involved, but not key targets. Constructing an effective coalition was 
unnecessary because of political commitment.
8) O&Y’s economic might and its commitment of managerial and 
financial resources helped make its campaign more effective.
9) The evidence shows that neither O&Y nor other interest-groups 
pursued low-profile external’ tactics.
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7. Professional liaMlii»
This chapter examines the accountants’ campaign to change the 
law on professional liability to reduce risks for both firms and partners. 
The issue was technical, non-political and had a low public profile. The 
campaign to limit professional liability began in 1978, but this chapter 
focuses on the big firms’ involvement since the campaign’s concerted yet 
inconspicuous re-launch in the early 1990s.^
Though liability was a most important issue for accountants, 
debate was restricted to journals and technical sections of national 
broadsheets.^ The liability campaign has not previously received 
attention.^ There were two strands to the accountants’ campaign -  (A) 
the risk to the firms and, (B) the risk to partners. Whilst the campaign 
failed to achieve its objectives on the former, it succeeded on the latter, 
principally because of external variables, rather than the activity of the 
lobbyist.
Auditors were allegedly exposed to unreasonable risk because 
various financial crises encouraged plaintiffs to target them."  ^ The 
campaign’s ultimate objective was to limit these risks by replacing the law 
of joint and several (J&S) with proportionate liability (strand A).^
A secondary goal was to protect the assets of partners (strand B). 
Currently partners are personally liable to the extent of their personal 
assets for the firms’ liabilities and debts.® Limited Liability Partnerships 
(LLPs) would limit liability to the firm and the negligent partner.
 ^ The number of global accountancy firms is currently five. The merger between Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers & Lybrand reduced the number from 6 to 5.
 ^Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm 8, interview, 05/08/98
 ^There is a small amount of literature on lobtjying on accounting standards in the US and in the UK . York, S., 
and Larson, R, (1993); Deakin, D., (1989); Sutton, T., (1984); Tandy, P., and Wilburn, N., (1992)
“* Because they are able to fund big claims. Most notably: Barlow Clowes, Guinness, Blue Arrow, British and 
Commonwealth, Maxwell Communication Corporation, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Poly 
Peck, Barings, Lloyds of London, MTM, Queens Moat Houses, British and Commonwealth and Resort Hotels. 
See, Bunn, J., (1996) “Deep Pocket Syndrome”, Accountancy Age, 31 October 1996, pp16-17. See Gwilliam, 
(1992); Hanson, □., (1985); Hardcastle, A., (1988); Singleton-Green, B., (1990)
® "Horrors of the clawback”. Financial Times, 11 March 1997,
® Freedman, J., and Finch, V., (1997)
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Technical Concepts
Under current law a legally-blameless plaintiff does not carry the 
risk of a defendants’ insolvency when another jointly liable defendant 
remains solvent/ The plaintiffs loss is regarded as indivisible if caused 
by the combined action or inaction of more than one party/ J&S applies 
only where all co-defendants are equally and fully liable/ There are 
several strand A reform options.
Proportionate Liabilitv
Proportionate liability would recognise the difference between 
legal causation and degree of blame. Reform would limit a concurrent 
wrongdoer’s liability to its proportionate liability.^® Each defendant would 
be responsible to the plaintiff only for part of the damage he caused.”
Statutorv Cap
A statutory cap on damages would limit liability, and protect 
against ‘Armageddon claims’. A  cap is easy to operate, and a limit 
covering the majority of claims would retain the deterrent effect of tort 
damages.
Contractual Cap
Contractual exclusion clauses would require amending s310 of the 
Companies Act 1985,”  the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994.^® Exclusion 
clauses would be enforceable against parties to the contract, and would 
not protect professional defendants against tort claims by third parties.^®
?ACCA, (1996)
®DoE, (1995)
® DTI Consultation Paper, (1996)
The essence of proportional liability is that a defendant should not be forced to pay for harm they are able to 
prove has been caused by another party.
”  GJW briefing note Joint & Several Liability Defined, nd.
'2 ICAEW, (1996)
The logic of this argument is that “a potential exposure in millions of pounds up to the statutory cap is as 
good a deterrent as one of hundreds of millions of pounds which it is known cannot be met.” in DTI 
Consultation Paper, (1996)
Section 310 makes void any arrangements by a company to exempt or indemnify its auditors from liability. 
ICAEW, (1994)
UCTA prevents a contracting party from excluding or restricting its liability. DTI Consultation Paper, (1996) 
p41; ACCA, (1996). Lawyers can contract to limit their professional liability, provided the cap is not below the 
compulsory minimum level of professional indemnity insurance.
DTI Consultation Paper, (1996)
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Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence is a form of proportionate liability 
permitting auditors to defend themselves by arguing others contributed to 
their negligence/^ Under current law it is difficult for auditors to “argue 
contributory negligence in the shape of the company's failure through its 
directors when the audit function involves just such an issue.
Limited Liabilitv Partnerships
LLPs apply to strand B. They are useful in ‘Armageddon’ claims 
because partners’ assets would be protected. The assets of the 
individual would be ring-fenced, but the assets of the firm and negligent 
partners would remain at risk.^ ®
The Lobbyists
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) co-ordinated lobbying along 
with other Liability Reform Group (LRG) members; Ernst & Young (E&Y), 
Deloitte Touche, Arthur Andersen and KPMG. Ian Greer Associates 
(IGA) won the £120,000 lobbying contract, because according to The 
Guardian, it emphasised its ties with the Corporate Affairs Minister, Neil 
Hamilton. The lobbyists’ remit was
to achieve limited liability status for the accountancy 
profession. In order to meet that objective, primary legislation 
would need to be introduced in the 1995-96 Parliamentary 
Session, which would begin in November 1995. IGA would 
then have followed the legislation through parliament, which 
would have meant another year’s work.^°
Leigh and Vulliamy claim IGA implied that soundings with the 
minister indicated he was ‘sympathetic’.^  ^ Andrew Smith, Managing 
Director, was a ‘former researcher to Neil Hamilton’.^  ^ Hamilton’s brief 
included company law, and IGA was hired “because of Andrew’s and 
Ian’s relationship with Neil Hamilton, on whose desk this lay.’’^ ^
Sikka, P., (1998). See Law Commission, (1993)
Freedman, J., and Finch, V., (1997)
Limited liability legisiation exists but is framed oniy to protect the assets of sleeping partners.
House of Commons, Standards and Privileges Committee First Report. Appendix 114, Statement by 
Andrew Smith to supplement statement dated 28 June 1995 
Leigh, D., and Vulliamy, E., (1997), p142 
ibid
IGA lobbyist 1, interview, 10/3/98
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Smith met Hamilton off-the-record to brief him, whilst senior 
partners met him formally months later. The firms also held a meeting 
with the Secretary of State. IGA undertook a political audit to help it 
understand how ‘the system’ perceived their clients.^"^
IGA was ineffective. Although well-connected, IGA was a 
parliamentary lobbyist and was ill-suited to technical issues. Its contract 
was terminated when IGA was the subject of The Guardian's 
investigation led by David Hencke. IGA’s dismissal was described to the 
Select Committee on Standards and Privileges. IGA representatives
attended a meeting with Mr Brindle [of Price Waterhouse].
There was a copy of The Guardian of 20 October on the table 
in Mr Brindle’s office. [...] Mr Brindle said that he had had 
discussions with the Senior Partners in the other major 
accounting firms and he informed Mr Sweeny and myself that 
the Big 8 had decided to bring IGA’s contract with them to an 
end as a result of The Guardian’s allegations, particularly 
because they involved Neil Hamilton MP, the Minister with 
responsibility for their profession.^®
The minister argued “The Guardian’s conspiracy theories about 
this matter are preposterous and could be seriously advocated only by 
individuals who have little experience or understanding of the workings of 
government -  particularly in a technical area such as this. I was well able 
to evaluate the representations to me on technical issues and could 
identify special pleading without difficulty.” ®^
GJW was invited to tender for the vacant role. A senior partner 
recalls “we had a beauty parade. GJW came along and within ten 
minutes of the presentation we knew he was the guy we w a n t e d . T h e  
ICAEW acted as a client façade. GJW had two tasks: project 
management and advising on campaign tactics. A civil servant argued 
“the firms are very clear with us that the political consultant is there to
give advice, not to open doors and pull strings.” ®^ LRG informed GJW
You are not paid to open doors for us. We will open the 
doors. You are paid to tell us what we do when we get inside 
those doors. There is to be no direct contact between you
and the government. We employ you to help us read 
politics.^®
ibid
HO, Standards and Privileges Committee First Report. Appendix 114, Statement by Andrew Smith to 
supplement statement dated 28 June 1995 
Former minister in correspondence with the author, 12/12/97 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98
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Macro-level
Profile, technicality and politicaiity: Hypothesis 
One
lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on 
low-profile, technical and non-political issues.
Strand A
Liability reform is technical and non-political. It is also perceived 
as low-profile, even though it has a wide impact. One official said “this is 
not front page of The Sun stuff. I have not seen a lot of comment or 
articles in the FT, Observer or Sunday Times. It may be because 
everyone thinks the bloody accountants are making enough money. 
Their campaign has not been s u c c e s s f u l . T h e  nature of the issue 
dictated the type of campaign. “It was difficult to run a high-profile 
campaign on liability, because campaigners will not get tears shed for 
unfairness against lawyers and accountants.”^^
The FT recognised government was “unlikely to see much public 
appeal in an issue that is barely understood within Britain’s boardrooms, 
let alone outside them.”^^  The LRG adopted a low-profile approach, 
shunning media coverage, as requested by DTI. However, the campaign 
was high-profile within a small community. DTI officials believe the style 
suggests since “no-one else has taken up their case, it indicates the 
accountants’ world is not the primary one. The large firms believed 
they ‘owned’ the reform agenda and thought government should have 
been accommodating.
The auditors were ineffective. One senior partner argued “in terms 
of success and our persuasive power, we have been disappointed. 
Following several requests by LRG for stays of decision, LRG finally 
faced the Company Law Review or outright defeat.^^ ICAEW “proposed
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
City Law firm representative 3, interview, 16/09/98
“Limited horizons: Accountants are disappointed by moves to reform the law on liability”. The Independent, 
13 November 1996 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
^  Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98
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the Company Law Review as the long grass, because it stopped liability 
reform being completely shoved off.” ®^ The review process was a defeat 
for LRG /"
Strand B
Government saw LLPs as low-risk, non-partisan with broad 
support from interested parties.^® In the new government’s “arrival pack 
was a note saying This proposal is on the stocks. Are you happy with 
it?’ They were.’’®® Labour carried forward the Bill drafted under the 
Conservative government. LLPs succeeded because they were 
uncontroversial.'*®
Lobbyists were of some value. They acted as translators and 
brokers. Following the Bill’s approval in principle, lobbyists concentrated 
on finding legislative time. GJW cautioned its client to avoid making LLP 
legislation controversial. A senior partner recalled “The minister told us ‘if 
there is something wrong with the Bill I would rather you did not make a 
lot of noise in public. I would rather you went to see officials’. I f  the 
firms did make ‘noise’ in public, they risked losing the legislation.
The Effect of Lobbvists
It is questionable whether IGA was professional, because it fell 
into the ‘Hencke problem’. “When I first joined IGA it had a brand value. 
Politicians and civil servants would trust you. When the Hencke story 
blew that changed, and that affected our effectiveness.’’"^® IGA added 
“not much value. It is not very clear to me what they did for us.’’"^® 
Another senior partner said “Greer was pretty useless. I do not think they 
were highly regarded by the then senior partners.’’"^"^ An ICAEW
ICAEW representative 3, Interview, 06/10/98
DTI, (1998). In March 1998 the President of the Board of Trade announced a major review of company law 
and pubNshed a consultation document, with the aim of ensuring that the UK had a modern, effective and 
clear legal framework that Is accessible and promotes competitiveness, 
senior civil servant 10, Interview, 18/09/98
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98; confirmed by senior civil servant 10, Interview, 18/09/98 
ICAEW representative 3, Interview, 06/10/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
IGA lobbyist 1, Interview, 10/3/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
** Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98
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representative argued “my view is that IGA added nothing and that the 
accountants were wasting their money.'"^^
GJW was more important to the campaign. GJW was 
inconspicuous, but a central player advising on interaction with decision­
makers. The lobbyist “scripted things behind the scenes then pushed the 
client to go out and do it.’"^® GJW believed it was “crucially involved. We 
have a quite central role in all the documentation that goes out from the 
group. Nothing goes out without us looking at the substantial drafting.
Although GJW failed to achieve its clients’ policy objectives it 
added value by advising how civil servants worked, how the Cabinet 
machinery works, and provided an insight into ministerial priorities. GJW 
added a sense of cohesion by establishing a core. Another partner 
suggested GJW gave LRG “vigour and discipline. They have been very 
effective. They have a knowledge of what the papers should look like, 
and their timing. They understand how government w o r k s . G J W  
played the role of the ‘minister’ on the Clapham omnibus.'^^
Some LRG members argued GJW added little value. LRG knew 
how Whitehall worked: it did not need GJW to teach them ‘how to suck 
eggs’.^ ° One partner argued “I cannot see GJW have added anything in 
this c a m p a i g n . T h e  ICAEW believed “GJW did not help us very much. 
They were not e f fec t i ve.One official argued “If you look at the quality of 
the campaign I would not have paid them very much. I think we know 
them, but I would expect them to be operating at a political level. I don’t 
trust many people, and I trust them least of all.’’®^
Civil servants believed the campaign in general was ineffective. 
One official argued “accountants in general and the audit profession in 
particular has been remarkably ineffective in its c a m p a i g n . A n o t h e r  
agreed, arguing “I do not think they have been very effective in dealing 
with government.’’®^ A third contends “the fact that we have said we are
ICAEW representative 1, interview, 13/08/98
Lobbyist, interview 11/2/97
ibid
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm A, interview, 04/08/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98 
ICAEW representative 1, interview, 13/08/98 
City Law Firm representative 2, interview, 28/08/98 
ICAEW representative 3, interview, 06/10/98 
”  senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
ibid
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
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not going to do it implies they have not been effective.” ®^ Civil servants 
were suspicious about the auditors’ motives and concerned about ‘being 
taken for a ride’.®^
Conclusion
There was no ‘public’ element to the liability campaign. It focused 
exclusively on civil servants and ministers. The lobbyist provided 
management consultancy and tactical advice. A partner said “we do not 
blame GJW for the failure, we have all failed.’’®® One concluded
GJW has done everything we have asked of them. But in the
sense of not having achieved our objective then they have not
been effective. I do not think we would be more advanced if 
we had someone else working for us. I would not put the lack 
of progress down to GJW.®®
The campaign for liability reform was ineffective. Although the 
issue is low-profile, technical and non-political in a partisan sense, the 
impact of change is wide, causing complications for autonomous policy 
actors with public-interest concerns. LRG and GJW would not use higher 
profile tactics to raise the profile within government because the low-
profile, technical and non-political LLP objectives were achieved. The
campaign which was more political failed, and lobbyists could do little. 
Lobbyists were more effective on the low-profile, technical and non­
political issue. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
External and contextual factors: Hypothesis Two
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no 
disadvantageous external or contextual constraints 
beyond the control of government players.
This section examines the impact of external constraints on strand 
A objectives. Some external factors beyond the control of players should 
have advantaged the campaigners. The profession suggested it was 
unfairly targeted, pointing to:
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm A, interview, 15/9/98 
Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98
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1. Increased litigation from the late-1980s r e c e s s io n . The 
number of claims against the big firms rose from 3 in 1982-83 
to 627 in 1992-93, and the average claims increased 12 
times.®^
2. Defensive auditing as a consequence ofrisk.^^ Interim reporting 
is given orally and not on paper or electronically.®^ Audit advice 
is hedged with caveats, becoming almost meaningless.
3. Ciient screening has an adverse effect on competitiveness 
because innovative sectors are too risky. Client selection limits 
the availability of audit to particular classes of company.®®
4. Risk to the ‘worid-ciass status’ British accountancy 
pro/ess/on.®® US reform also increases pressure for the UK to 
act.
5. High caiibre personnei refusing to become partners.^^ Potential 
partners prefer consultancy to audit.
6. Increased costs to clients, because the costs of defending and 
settling claims are passed to clients. The firms claim insurance 
premiums rose by a factor of thirty-seven between 1982-92.®®
Despite these external constraints supporting the firms’ cause, 
they have been ineffective. Other factors, such as the litigation cycle, a 
Law Commission study, and the lack of acceptable reform options 
doomed the liability campaign.
Timing
One explanation of the lobby’s ineffectiveness is bad timing. “The 
question why a minister should want to take forward legislation just 
before an election was never answered.’’®® The ICAEW recognised the
Soden, J., (1994), p79. Also see Pressier, L., and Schieffer, K., (1988) for ‘deep-pocket’ issues. 
Freedman, J., and Finch, V., (1997); and Sikka, P., (1992)
“  Morris, P., and Stevenson, J., (1997)
London Economics, (1998)
^  ‘Thinking the Unthinkable on Joint and Several", Accountancy Age, 30 May 1996, p 56 
“  Coopers & Lybrand dropped the computer games software company Eldos in 1997 because it failed to 
improve its corporate governance arrangements. Arthur Andersen no longer audits companies on the 
Alternative Investment Market. London Economics, (1998)
ICAEW, (1996)
Freedman, J., and Finch, V., (1997)
‘The Doomsday Risk”, Financial Times, 4 February 1997 
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
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timing was ‘appalling’/® The campaign geared up when litigation was at 
its lowest. An official argued “the problem with the campaign was they 
got themselves together and ginnied up at the fag end of a 
government.”^^
Since litigation is cyclical, the increase in business failures in the 
early 1990s recession galvanised the big firms to seek reform. One 
senior partner argued
One problem we have is that in the current economic 
environment we cannot sustain the campaign effectively 
because the litigation against the firms is iow. You need lots 
of cases of being sued. A few big claims around your neck 
doesn’t half crystallise the mind to c h a n g e /^
Another senior partner echoed these sentiments, noting the firms 
“tend to see solidarity when they are at the edge of a cliff. We are not 
quite at the edge of a cliff yet.”^^
Official Studies
In 1989 an industry-DTI committee, led by Andrew Likierman 
examined professional liability for negligence.^"^ The committee failed to 
reach firm conclusions, allowing the government to avoid making a 
decision. The Likierman study was followed by a Law Commission 
investigation.
Auditors claimed the Law Commission proved their effectiveness 
because ministers recognised “it was an issue worthy of proper 
examination.”^^  However the Law Commission rejected proportionate 
liability in practice and principle for four reasons.^® The Commission 
kicked the ball into the long grass. A senior partner continued: “when you 
found the ball it was the same ball.”^^  It effectively removed liability from
ICAEW representative 3, interview, 06/10/98 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98
"  Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98
Professor Likierman was Head of Audit and is currently Director of Financial Management Reporting and 
Audit at the Treasury. DTI, (1989)
ICAEW representative 1, interview, 13/08/98
DTI Consultation Paper, (1996). First, under proportionate liability the risk of a defendant being insolvent 
would shift from fellow defendants to the plaintiff. Second, J&S liability already sets formidable hurdles for 
plaintiffs to prove causation: each defendant must be causally responsible for the whole of that loss -  the 
damage caused is indivisible. Third, proportionate liability would mean a plaintiff would be less likely to 
recover full damages by being the victim of two wrongs than if he had been the victim of a single wrong.
Finally, under proportionate liability, if another wrongdoer becomes insolvent a blameless plaintiff would bear
the risk rather than the principal wrongdoer.
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98
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ministers’ desks and effectively silenced the accountants. The outcome 
was seriously damaging to the auditors.
The Law Commission left the door ajar for the reform lobby by 
accepting a strong economic efficiency or public-interest case would 
justify sacrificing sound legal principle.^® LRG tried to convince DTI that 
the Commission’s conclusions were narrow and politically unrealistic, 
whilst also seeking to prove the economic and public-interest case for
change/9
Conclusion
A civil servant argued “given their case and the political context I 
think it highly unlikely that they could have got further than they have got 
on broader liability issues.’’®° The ICAEW argued “GJW were not 
important at all. The success of LLPs and liability reform was determined 
by matters separate from them. The failure of joint and several was 
determined by political forces. The political realities were negative; GJW 
could not change t h o s e . T h e  external context seemed to support the 
firms, however government did not believe the firms. Its scepticism was 
not aided by the firms’ truculent attitude. One significant constraint 
beyond the control of government actors was that, as the Law 
Commission noted, potential solutions were equally as bad. One senior 
official argued “if we had thought there was a really good case but they 
had not made it, we could have made it anyway. We were not convinced 
the problem was sufficiently serious that another bad solution was better. 
Proportionate liability is definitely bad.’’®^
On LLPs (strand B) there were no contextual constraints affecting 
lobbying. Government was sceptical of the accountants’ case on liability, 
unimpressed by its timing, and was restricted by the lack of acceptable 
options. The presence of disadvantageous external factors limited the 
effect of the lobbyist. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
At the time the Law Commission believed “the policy objections to joint and several liability to be, at best, 
insufflcientiy convincing to merit a departure from principle.” In DTI Consultation Paper, (1996), part VII, 
summary of conclusions.
Lobbyist, interview 14/5/97 
senior civii servant 8, interview, 21/10/98 
ICAEW representative 3, interview, 06/10/98 
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
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Pre-existing policy and experience of government 
players: Hypothesis Three
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of 
political decision-makers, pre-existing policy and 
previous experience of government players are 
congruent with the lobbyist's objective.
Because the case was technical and non-political, the views of 
government players were important. A civil servant noted “individuals 
responsible for policy advice have their own views. Government has a 
view. It is not simply a reactive body. On an issue like this, which is an 
important policy area but which is not political, there is a lot of leeway at 
the mirco-level because government is a player in its own right since it 
stands for the public.”®^
Linking the Case to Government Policv
The failure of LRG’s strand A campaign was caused by its 
ineffectiveness in linking its demands into the government’s key themes. 
GJW tried to establish a clear focus and shape LRG’s political message. 
GJW were “close to the ground. They know what the themes of this 
government are, and what messages are likely to work.’’®"^ GJW’s role 
was to argue with their client, but were “inhibited about challenging LRG, 
although they are capable of doing it, because they have a diverse client 
which they want to keep together. A challenge would involve them siding 
with one client against the others.’’®®
Ministers wanted the firms to construct a public-interest case.®® 
The lobbyist said “we are providing ministers with a public-interest 
defence for when they finally legislate.’’®^ Herbert Smith (solicitors) 
compiled a study of case law and settlements, whilst GJW collected data 
on public-domain settlements.®® The lobbyist also discussed with DTI the 
requirements of economic research undertaken by London Economics.®®
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98 
^  Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
“  Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98 
Ministers said ‘we need statistics, we need evidence if we are going to help you. If we are going to help you 
change the law, we basically need you to devise the arguments for parliament.” Lobbyist, interview, 26/11/97 
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98 
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98.
The report concluded that although incentives would be weakened by a softer liability regime, the large
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The report “addressed the new government’s agenda, because the 
previous solution had been tied to the Tory agenda.
However, the firms were “not able to look further than the confines 
of their own commercial d e s i r e s . D T I  believed the firms failed to 
provide conclusive evidence.®^ “They refused to submit evidence for what 
they had to settle claims for. They presented their case on what might 
h a p p e n . T h e  firms failed to put themselves in the position of the 
government. They were slow in submitting papers and were bad at 
addressing government’s concerns. Civil servants “indicated several 
times the issues they had to address, but they never did.’’®"^
The DTI was unimpressed when it discovered the firms had failed 
to limit liability in non-audit work where they were able to do so. DTI 
demanded the accountants limit their liability outside statutory audit, 
through contract and the adoption of aggressive risk-management 
policies. Auditors moved to cap due diligence work at £25m,^® and to cap 
risk on certain bond issues.^® Only late in the campaign did the firms 
meet government’s demands.
A Quid Pro Quo
An official believed accountants portrayed the issue “in terms of 
saying ‘we’ll give you that if you give us this’. It is not a simple give and 
take. We do not strike deals or bargains.’’®^ But government always 
looks for a package. Qn strand A the firms could not agree what, if 
anything, to offer government in exchange for J&S reform. A senior 
partner argued LRG “has not worked out what it wants to give up, nor do 
we have agreement about what we want.’’®® An official argued that to 
have been effective LRG “would have had to make concessions, which
firms’ reputations would act as a substitute. It found Institutional shareholders had little incentive to get 
invoived in the company’s corporate governance because they were implicitly ‘insured’ by the auditors’ deep 
pockets. High-risk sectors were being screened and were finding it difficult to get access to the capital 
market. Unlimited liability is a blunt instrument and does not act as an incentive to act well. Unlimited liability 
encourages defensive auditing. The report concluded J&S liability should be replaced with proportionate 
iiability and a statutory cap. “Cap will bring benefits”, Accounting, May 1998, p i 3 
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98 
^  ibid
“Battle hots up over Big Six ‘cartel’ cap”. Accountancy, March 1997, p i 1
"BVCA set to reject Big Six £25m liability cap agreement”. Accountancy Age, 28 November 1996, p2; “Big 
Six liability stalls venture capital deals”, Accountancy Age, 23 January 1997, p3 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98
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they would have rightly seen as the first step in a negotiating process, 
which would have led them to be pushed to make further concessions.”®®
A list of concessions was drafted and circulated, but some firms 
refused to consider them. Some believed they had “a God given right to 
change.” ®^® Various options were discussed, including expanding the 
scope of audit to comment on corporate governance,^®^ and offering 
assurances on company information.^®^ The firms believe that offer is 
workable because “We get a deal -  limited liability: the public gets 
openness and accountability.” ®^®
On strand B government took transparency in exchange for LLPs 
-  disclosure rules are the same as limited companies. A civil servant 
argued “we could not give LLPs without added responsibilities. We try to 
find a benefit in the same area.” ®^"^
Political Factors
Strand A liability reform was time-consuming and politically 
unattractive, whilst strand B LLPs was quick and involved little political 
risk. DTI had important political issues to deal with, including minimum 
wage, union recognition and welfare to work. Liability reform would “not 
help McCartney get into the Cabinet... It would be perceived as a special 
deal for one group.” ®^® One factor that disadvantaged the firms was the 
large salaries received by partners. Ministers were concerned that the 
salary levels established precedents for industry at large. One official 
argued salary levels were “a worry when you are trying to talk down the 
level of wages.” ®^® Another official said “they are not awake to that. We 
are conscious of it. They earn three quarters of a million -  we think that 
is sufficient reward to outweigh the risk.” ®^^
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98
The Cadbury Report on Corporate Governance, established in response to companies with clean audit 
reports failing, suggested corporate governance reforms to allow auditors to comment on internal processes 
and suspicion of fraud. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992. It wanted 
auditors to report on the effectiveness of internal controls and explain their responsibilities for preparing 
accounts and recommended, but not in the code, that accountants draw up guidelines to rotate partners 
responsible for a particular company.
'“ ICAS, (1996)
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98. Ian McCarntey was at the time of writing Minister of 
State, Department of Trade and Industry 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
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Conclusion
Government had its own objectives. To be effective lobbyists 
must ‘help’ government achieve its aims. The DTI did “not religiously 
follow the lead of outside groups. There has to be a wider public-interest 
angle.
GJW and LRG were perhaps too effective initially in tying their 
case to government’s objectives. They pushed the modernising agenda 
strongly and were out-footed by DTI because LRG “went in and said ‘the 
definition of audit exists under Victorian law’, and Beckett said, ‘I know. 
We are going to reform company law, which is all Victorian’. 
Consequently J&S was included in the review.
Ministers also had more important issues to deal with. GJW 
helped LRG emphasise political messages, but LRG was ineffective in 
linking its case to government because it was unwilling to share 
information with government, and some submissions were poor quality. 
Government forced the firms to act to limit non-audit risk. The firms could 
not agree what to offer government in exchange for reform; finally, J&S 
reform was politically unattractive.
Strand B LLP reform was so uncontentious and the case 
convincing that it was in-line with both Conservative and Labour 
government beliefs. Strand A objectives were not congruent with 
political beliefs and the previous experience of government players. 
GJW failed to tie its clients’ objectives to government. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis.
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98. At the time Margaret Beckett was Secretary of 
State, Department of Trade and Industry
262
Chapter Seven
Meso -level
Involvement in the policy-making process: 
Hypothesis Four
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can include 
their client in the policy community and manage their 
client's activity within that network.
The Policy Network: Lobbying the Opposition
For most of the campaign Labour was in Opposition and Stuart 
Bell MP was Labour’s accountancy s p o k e s m a n . H e  did not share the 
scepticism of auditors held by some colleagues and launched a charm 
offensive.
GJW worked closely with Bell to engineer Labour support for 
proportionality, LLPs and to quieten PLP dissent.^^^ Margaret Beckett, 
the Shadow Secretary of State, was briefed regularly. GJW wanted the 
Opposition team to feel involved in policy development. Bell dined 
regularly with partners from the Big Five f i r m s . I n  August 1996 Bell 
offered government the Opposition’s co-operation on ‘non-political’ J&S 
reform.
Before the Election the Shadow Minister “was trying to be 
approachable and friendly to business -  almost bending over backwards. 
We drafted after the meeting two possible paragraphs for insertion into 
the m a n i f e s t o . S o  GJW drafted paragraphs for the 1997 Labour 
manifesto: the first on LLPs and the second on liability. A covering letter 
later formed two articles, under Bell’s name, which explained Labour’s 
policy.''^®
“Barrister Stuart Bell Appointed Official Labour Spokesman on tlie Accountancy Profession”, Accountancy 
Age, 13 August 1992, p20
“Hard Labour?”, Accountancy Age, 7 September 1995, pi 43
“Self-Regulation’s Defeat and Legislation’s Victory”, Accountancy Age, 18 March 1993, p31; and “Labour 
Goes for Regulation -  Audit Profession”, Accountancy Age, 19 March 1993, p27; “Morrison Hits Back at 
Independence Taunts”, Accountancy Age, 22 April 1993, p21; “Labour In Plan for Institutes’ Regulation”, 
Accountancy Age, 26 May 1994, p23
“Big six Woos Labour In Run-up to Election”, Accountancy Age, 6 February 1996, p36 
Bell, S. ‘View from the House -  Government Paralysed by Threat of Jersey Move”, Accountancy Age, 8 
August 1996, p52
Lobbyist, Interview 14/5/97; “Labour backs liability reform”. Accountancy, April 1997, p11 
Bell, S., “The Zeal of Born-Again New Labour”, Accountancy, April 1997, p75; Bell, S., “Letters -  
Profession Backs Labour on LLP Review”, Accountancy Age, 24 April 1997, p31. In the former article Bell 
wrote “New Labour has consistently advocated reform of joint and several liability law and has even offered to 
assist the passage of this non-polltlcal legislation onto the statute book. The legislation would mean that 
accountants and other professionals could go about their business In a way that enables them to give the best 
advice to their clients.”
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The lobbyist said when “Bell submitted the two paragraphs that we 
wrote speculatively, we did not assume that he would get them past the 
editor.”^^  ^ However, Labour published a Manifesto for Business, which 
included the following paragraph
W e will ensure there is a framework of independent regulation 
for the accountancy profession. We will review the laws on 
joint and several liability so that incorporation in this country 
provides accountants with adequate protection.''^®
The outcome was a jumbled mess.^ ^® As a consequence of 
pressure of space, two paragraphs were merged into one. The second 
sentence confused the risks to the partner and the firm. The Business 
Manifesto was not put before the PLP, unlike in 1992.^^° A Labour MP 
said “I do not know how it got there. [...] The whole thing is a shoddy, 
concealed back door b u s i n e s s . B e l l ’s detailed policy articles could not 
now be taken as Labour policy because they pre-dated the Manifesto.
Bell claimed the muddle demonstrated “the complexity of the 
issues involved...” and restated the broad principles underlying Labour’s 
a pp r oach . Desp i t e  this mistake, GJW was effective in including and 
managing its client in the Labour party network, the consequence of 
which was a manifesto commitment.
The Policv Communitv
The transient liability policy community was built around a DTI 
minister responsible for accountancy. The potential or dormant 
community included the following actors
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
Minister of State for Corporate Affairs 
Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe 
3 DTI civil servants in Company Law Directorate 
DTI special advisers 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury
Lobbyist, interview, 26/11/97
Labour Party Manifesto for Business, April 1997
“Accountancy: Interpreters wanted”. Financial Times, 17 April 1997. Tfie FT  commented “It is also slightly 
worrying that while Mr Bell is widely seen as having grasped the issues, this understanding appears to have 
eluded the writer of the manifesto.”
"Labour Backs Liability Reform”, Accountancy, 23 April 1997, p32 
Labour backbench MP, interview, 29/07/98
“Letter to the Editor: Labour line on accountancy prudent from Stuart Bell MP, Shadow Minister for Trade 
and Corporate Affairs”, Financial Times, 18 April 1997
264
Chapter Seven
•  3 Treasury civil servants in Finance Regulation and Industry (FRI) and
Financial Management Reporting and Audit Directorate (FMRP) Directorates. 
Treasury special advisers 
Lord Chancellor 
2 LCD civil servants 
LCD special adviser
1 DETR civil servant
2 advisers in the No 10 Policy Unit
Non-government actors included the professional bodies, the Big 
Five, the small firms networks and European-level groups. However, the 
number of influential players was smaller.
Officials
Middle-rank DTI officials were the key government actors. Three 
people in DTI were actively involved. No other departments were active 
on liability, although some were interested. The circle of those who could 
have been influential was wide, but their involvement was conditional on 
other factors.
DTI's Company Law Directorate listed approximately 1,500 interest- 
groups, of which several hundred were invited to respond to its LLP 
proposals. 114 did so, and of this number many had no substantive 
comment. The ‘real’ policy community is smaller than most 
commentators assume. Interest-groups are active only when an issue 
concerns them. Otherwise they lie dormant. Communities emerge and 
dissolve over specific issues.
The big firms did not struggle to be involved. They had good links to 
government. Ministers invited them to participate. Lobbyists were 
irrelevant. One former minister recalled
I visited many individual firms of accountants as ‘their’ minister 
and invited many individuals to participate in the generation of 
policy. For example I invited a senior tax partner of Coopers 
& Lybrand to chair a tax deregulation taskforce. I alighted 
upon him because of an article I read in Accountancy Age.
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98
Former minister in correspondence with the author, 9/1/98
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The big firms worked closely behind the scenes with government -  
offering technical advice. An official argued the community included 
interest-groups who sought out civil servants, but noted “the Accountancy 
profession is incestuous -  the same people crop up all the time. We try 
and make it as broad as possible.
Rather than exclude interest-groups, civil servants were busy 
increasing the range of representation.
Consultations are important because government wants to be 
open and ensure everyone is consulted, so that by the time 
you get legislation everyone is cleared. Anyone who rings up 
with an interest will be added to the consultation list and will 
get a copy of consultation papers. That is the limit of our 
powers. It is important for us that people comment on the
draft.126
Even substantive interest-groups, like loD, were invited to 
participate but had no substantive comment. Many responses from 
groups
were unhelpful. On a few questions the answers were 
useless because they misunderstood the point. It just shows 
how little they understand. When we dealt with LLPs we held 
a range of meetings with the accountancy profession, the 
legal profession, investors and clients. We tried to get the 
people who would be interested.
Because the issue was technical and low-profile, DTI officials went 
out looking for commentators. They alerted groups and encouraged 
them to give their views, but found it difficult to motivate them.
Ministers
Labour DTI ministers “had no set answers. There was a genuine 
attempt to try and work out what was best.”^^® The manifesto 
commitment allowed LRG to ask for clarification. The lobbyist argued “it 
is amazing that we got the commitment when the issue did not matter. 
That is our saving grace.”^^®
In the event Bell was not appointed to DTI.^^° Bell was so anxious 
to please, he “may have been seen as going too far in smoothing the
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
2^6 ibid 
ibid
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
Lobbyist, interview, 26/11/97
130 " I Bell Denied Place in Blair Government", Accountancy Age, 8 May 1997, p 23; “Labour Promises Liability 
Review", Accountancy, 13 May 1997, p 33
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fears of the p r o f e s s i o n . T h e  lobbyist argued “one does not see the 
problems when a senior spokesman is turning your way. You think that 
is an element of success. In retrospect he was trying too hard.”^^  ^ Bell’s 
old brief was divided between Ian McCartney and a Blairite Lord 
S i m o n . G J W  drafted a submission on J&S in June 1997 to coincide 
with the minister’s post-election review of departmental priorities. 
McCartney was less friendly and less willing to bend over backwards than 
was Bell.^^  ^ Ministers were sceptical of strand A reform, whilst Secretary 
of State Margaret Beckett had no interest in accountancy.^^®
GJW drafted a letter to DTI asking for a ‘council of war’ to discuss 
matters with ministers in October 1997J®  ^ Partners met officials after the 
October meeting to clarify the conclusions of the ministerial meeting. 
However LRG held a ‘crunch meeting’ with ministers in July 1998, which 
signalled the failure of the liability campaign. In a summer reshuffle Peter 
Mandelson MP became Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.''®® In 
September he announced a Draft Bill.^ ®® But, on the real prize he said
no sufficient basis fiad been identified, of either principle, 
commercial or economic interest, for a fundamental reform of 
the law affecting professional liability. [...] A convincing case 
has not been made for fundamental change. W e will keep the 
situation under review in case new evidence emerges. In the 
meantime I would encourage the accountancy profession to 
contribute to the fundamental review of company law that is 
now underway including on the question of the relative 
responsibilities of auditors, investors and directors.
LRG did not meet for eight months. Its activity had “come to a 
virtual halt.’’ '^'^
“When the bell tolls”, Financial Times, 8 May 1997 
Lobbyist, interview 14/5/97
133 Ian McCartney was Minister of State for Trade and Industry with responsibility for labour market, company 
law/corporate governance, inward investment and the Post Office; Lord Simon of Highbury was Minister of 
State for Trade and Industry with responsibility for trade and competitiveness in Europe.
The paper argued in order for Labour to carry out its programme and fulfil its manifesto objectives, it 
needed to reform J&S. Lobbyist, interview 14/5/97
Lobbyist, interview 14/5/97
ibid
“CCAB to meet with Labour”, Accountancy, November 1997, p i 8
No 10 described Mr Mandelson’s role as "the guardian of business interests in Whitehall.” “Blair tightens 
grip as Brown feels squeeze". The Independent, 28/7/98. Lord Sainsbury took an unpaid ministerial position at 
the DTI. Simon and McCartney remained in place.
139 Q ji Press Release, (1998)
"^0 ibid
Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98
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Conclusion
The clients did not need lobbyists to access the policy community. 
They were firmly ensconced in DTI. Though LRG dominated the policy­
making arena, the department fulfilled its commitment to give “full 
consideration to the views expressed by all interested parties” to broaden 
i n t e r e s t . G J W  was key in building contacts with Labour and delivering 
the manifesto commitment. The lobbyist was also useful in identifying 
the players who needed contacting for the LLP Bill to proceed.
The real policy community was transient. It was small. The 
influential number of players numbered no more than a handful. GJW did 
not help its clients’ into the policy community, but it did improve and co­
ordinate the clients’ activity. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Multi-faceted lobbying: Hypothesis Five
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi­
faceted approach and facilitate access to multiple 
points in the decision-making process.
GJW’s brochure says “the best government relations practice 
operates at all levels - from the grass roots right up to the national and 
pan-national par l i ament s . DTI  recognised the firms “are playing this 
game at various different levels in different a r e n a s . H o w e v e r ,  LRG 
had to close the argument first with civil servants and ministers. 
Parliament and the media were largely absent from policy development. 
On strand A LRG focused on civil servants exclusively, whilst strand B 
lobbying targeted Cabinet Committees and some MPs.
Cabinet Committees
On Strand B, once the LLP bill was approved in principle, GJW 
targeted the Queen’s Speeches and Future Legislation Committee (QFL) 
and the Cabinet’s Legislation Committee (LEG) to ensure a legislative 
slot. DTI was concerned that a Bill would not be prioritised.
HO Debs, Adjournment, 17/6/1997, Col 221, Minister of State DTI 
GJW, Professionals in the World of Lobbying, company brochure, nd 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
The terms of reference of QFL were to prepare and submit to the Cabinet drafts of the Queen’s speeches 
to Parliament, and proposals for the government’s legislative programme.
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QFL demanded the LLP Bill be uncontentious to secure 
parliamentary timeT^ Whilst the Commons was occupied with complex 
constitutional legislation, government hoped to busy the Lords with 
uncontentious Bills. GJW co-ordinated its approach with lawyers and 
ensured the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney General and the Lord 
Advocate had been briefed. GJW briefed special advisers and junior 
ministers at LCD, special advisers in the Treasury and the Head of 
Financial Services in the Treasury. LRG representatives also lobbied No 
10 Policy Unit advisers.
LEG examined draft bills and considered parliamentary 
timetabling. The lobbyist “looked at LEG’S membership, looked at who 
the influential people were and targeted their a d v i s e r s . T h e  DTI, 
although not a member, contributed, so GJW briefed special advisers at 
the DTI, but focused on advisers to the Leader of the House, the 
Treasury and the Cabinet Office because of their overarching roles.
Parliament
The firms barely campaigned in parliament. MPs were 
unimportant. The few questions raised in the House were largely 
arranged by whips to announce government a c t i o n . O n e  LRG member 
said “we never got to the point of cultivating the MP in the street.” ®^°
Austin Mitchell MP initiated the only public scrutiny of LLPs and 
liability.^^  ^ Mitchell attacked the “lovely little racket” operated by the 
f i r m s . H i s  opposition did not concern LRG. They found him a comical 
figure. One senior partner argued “the advice we are getting is that 
having Mitchell against us is a major plus point.”^^  ^ However, the civil 
service was acutely aware of parliamentary opinion: one official said “we 
are obviously going to listen to parliament.”^^"^
The July 1998 reshuffle removed Lord Irvine from the chair of QFL and gave it to Margaret Beckett, former 
DTI Secretary.
Lobbyist, interview, 26/11/97 
ibid
149 For example, HC Debs, WA questioned tabled by Bernard Jenkin MP on 7/11/1996, col 700; a W PG from 
Spencer Batiste MP on 20/2/1997, col 724; a WPG from Stephen Timms MP on 4/11/1997, col 125.
Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98 
“MP keeps up campaign”. Accountancy. July 1997, pi 7
Whilst audit standards are controlled by the audit industry, licensing, monitoring, complaints, investigations 
and appeals are controlled by accountancy bodies which are dominated by the big firms. HC Debs, 
Adjournment, 17/6/1997, Col 218
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98
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Few MPs understood the issue, with one warning most MPs “were 
not interested. Most do not understand it. It is too complex.”^^  ^ Whilst 
No 10, Cabinet Office and Treasury supported the business agenda, 
lobbyists were concerned at parliamentary hostility.
As part of Labour’s drive to ‘modernise’ parliament, draft Bills were 
published to encourage lobbying and more thorough parliamentary 
scrutiny.^^® GJW briefed all parties’ spokesmen about the LLP Bill. The 
seven-page Draft LLP Bill’s public consultation ran concurrently with the 
Select Committee investigation.^®^ DTI warned LRG “if you jump up and 
down now you will lose the Bill.” ®^® If the Bill were criticised, it would be 
removed from the timetable.
GJW prepared LRG for the Select Committee Inquiry by briefing 
Select Committee members, involving Stuart Bell and selected PPSs.’’ ®^® 
The lobbyist established contact with the Select Committee Clerk and 
received assurances that the Committee would not interfere with the Bill’s 
principle. LRG and GJW also squared selected third parties to ensure 
the evidence was predominantly consistent and supportive.
Opponents
Because LLPs were low-profile, technical and non-political there 
was little opposition. On liability (strand A), because the issue was 
complex, detractors used 'The Sun headline’ approach. The issue was 
presented in simple terms: ‘secretive fat cats lining their own pockets’. 
However, officials bemoaned the lack of “a pro-active articulated 
contribution from what you might call the public safety angle.’’ ®^°
Opponents characterised the firms’ objectives as ‘anti-consumer’ 
and argued the campaign was ‘ill-considered’, ‘bad-tempered’ and 
‘selfish’.C o n c e rn e d  about possible opposition, LRG lobbied the DTI to 
publish only firm proposals because if “industry, business and parliament
Labour backbench MP, interview, 29/07/98
House of Commons Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons, Appendix 1, 
Memorandum submitted by Rt Hon Ann Taylor M P President of the Council and Leader of the House, HC 
190, 1997-98
157 -|_|_p layy In Queens’ Speech", Accountancy, 10 March 1998, p i 7 
lobbyist, telephone conversation, 25/09/98 
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98
Labour backbench MP, interview, 29/07/98; ‘‘Big Six proposals ‘anti-consumer’”. Accountancy, October 
1994, p14; Academic commentator 1, interview, 17/06/97. Mitchell, A., (1993) T h e  Liability C h arade-Th e  
Consumers’ View”, Accountancy, December 1993, p75
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do not have time to look at it and if it is not properly scrutinised, it will go 
through quickly.”''®^
Media
GJW and LRG eschewed a media campaign because they wanted 
to avoid controversy. A civil servant noted LRG “used the media 
carefully. It is not something we would encourage.” ®^® The lobbyist 
placed articles in the FT, but articles were shown to, and approved by, 
DTI before publication. DTI clearance was judicious because one senior 
partner recalled “there was a very clear message to us that if we had 
concerns, we should tell them [DTI] directly rather than through the 
columns of the Financial T/mes.” ®^'^  GJW cultivated contacts in the FT and 
The Times. Coverage outside the specialised press was limited.^ ®® The 
lobbyist was “happy having a low-profile media strategy.” ®^®
Conclusion
There was no need for a multi-faceted approach. Indeed, it would 
have been counter-productive. The LLP campaign was effective 
because it concentrated on one element of the policy-making system -  
Whitehall (namely officials and Cabinet Committees), along with limited 
briefing of MPs on the Trade and Industry Select Committee. On the 
liability issue, LRG pursued a low-profile campaign, directed at civil 
servants. Though tempted to raise the profile when defeated in 
September 1998, it pulled back to avoid jeopardising LLPs. A multi­
faceted campaign may be ineffective on low-profile, technical and non­
political issues. The evidence does not support the hypothesis.
Lobbyist, interview 26/11/97
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98
The specialised press has mainly tracked developments. Some media attention was devoted to a MORI 
poll commissioned by KPMG that revealed 65% of companies believed it was unacceptable for accountancy 
firms to become LLPs on the Channel Islands. “KPMG reports a lack of LLP support in UK”, Accountancy 
Age, 7 November 1996, p3 
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98
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Micro-level
Routines and Standard Operating Procedures: 
Hypothesis Six
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar 
with routines and standard operating procedures and 
know when and where to intervene in the policy-making 
process.
GJW’s role was to guide clients “through the procedures of 
government consultation so that you make your case with maximum 
effect.’’ ®^^ The brochure boasted GJW’s staff had worked with politicians 
or were former officials and consequently they had “a comprehensive and 
inside knowledge of the processes, procedures and etiquette of 
government.’’ ®^®
GJW “put in effort, time and resources into identifying what the 
department wanted and what they didn’t want.’’ ®^® An official argued 
“Lobbyists are much clearer about the processes the civil service goes 
t h o u g h . G J W  wanted officials to believe it was “assisting them with 
their brief. They ask for help and then we ask for help back. It’s a 
reciprocal p r o c e s s . B u t  GJW did not need to have proficiency in 
Whitehall mores. A civil servant argued the lobbyist came
to us and said ‘we guess you are going to do X next. What is 
the best way in which our clients can approach you?’ That 
allows us to focus their effort. We do not have to deal with a 
campaign that lobbies ministers and MPs. Such a campaign 
takes valuable resources away from dealing with the subject 
matter, to dealing with correspondence. A lobbyist brings 
advantages for us.^^
The civil service told lobbyists what to do and all about 
departmental interests and the interests of ministerial and official ‘drivers’.
On technical issues the conviction, vigour and perceptions of 
officials are central. A strong and respected supportive official makes 
success more likely. Understanding inter-departmental relations was 
also important because “McCartney and Simon saw the Treasury as
GJW, Professionals in the World of Lobbying, company brochure, nd 
1®® ibid
Lobbyist, interview 11/02/97
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
Lobbyist, interview 11/02/97
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
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more important than their Secretary of State. The Secretary of State 
would go along with the advice of his junior minister on this...”^^ ^
The degree of trust between the lobbyist and the six clients was 
substantial. Each firm entrusted individually to the lobbyist confidential 
financial data about its business. No other co-campaigning firm saw the 
data passed by the others -  only the lobbyist and the lawyers saw 
everything.
The lobbyist also used a BBC journalist and E&Y adviser, Nick 
Ross, to lead a ‘brain storming session’ on repositioning after Labour’s 
victory. Ross was “good value. He had done his groundwork. He had 
good contacts with Lord Simon and Geoffrey R o b i n s o n . J u s t  as GJW 
used Ross as “an independent source to verify what we were saying’’^^® 
the DTI sometimes used GJW to reinforce its advice to LRG. Contrary to 
the conventional responses of civil servants, one official said “you can 
say to them [GJW] ‘this is the message we gave them’ [LRG]. Having it 
come from the lobbyist reinforces it. You may think you have given a 
clear message, but the firms can misinterpret your advice. They are 
more likely to take the advice of the lobbyist because they are paying 
them.’’'""
Shadow Lobbving
The IGA-led campaign failed in part because lobbyists dealt 
directly with decision-makers. “Greer was fronting with ministers.’""® IGA 
adopted a high-profile approach. A former minister recalls “there were 
one or two meetings with the representatives of the Big Eight 
accompanied by their lobbyists, IGA.”'"® Although lobbyists were present
No-one from IGA contributed to the substantive discussions -  
indeed, as the subject-matter was extremely technical it would 
have been absurd to expect that of non-expert lobbyists in the 
presence of experts on both sides of the table. The lobbyists 
had no impact whatever on the policy-making process on this 
issue.''®°
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
ICAEW representative 1, interview, 13/08/98
Lobbyist, interview, 26/11/97. At the time, Geoffrey Robinson MP was the Paymaster General 
ibid
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
Former minister in correspondence with the author, 09/01/98 
'8° ibid
273
Chapter Seven
GJW did not attend meetings with ministers, although it was 
involved in every aspect of their preparation. GJW stayed in the 
background. A senior partner said “virtually all the representation we 
would do o u r s e l v e s . A  civil servant interpreted the relationship: “GJW 
have been more active with LRG who have then played with us on the 
basis that contact was already established.” ®^^
The lobbyist said “we set up the meetings. We tee up officials or 
advisers in advance. Most of the meetings we attend will be with special 
advisers.” ®^® GJW preferred the client to deal directly with ministers to 
avoid ambiguity or confusion. Officials agreed. One argued “it is fatal to 
use lobbyists as an intermediary, because ministers and their advisers 
want to hear from the people on the ground -  from those who have 
actually experienced it.” ®^"^
However, GJW did brief officials and special advisers. For two 
months after the Election, when ministerial responsibilities were unclear, 
GJW dealt with officials directly.^ ®® Also, four firms were distracted by 
merger proposals, so GJW sent policy papers to the Treasury, dealt with 
officials on an off-the-record basis and communicated frequently with 
special advisers.^®®
Although not at the front-line, GJW was central. The lobbyist 
regarded ICAEW as ‘putty in our hands’. The lobbyist noted
We are the origin. Everything that we send out is put though 
other people in the chain. There is a cumulative effect. We  
are the genesis of most of the argument but we are rarely the 
delivery mechanism. We deal with officials directly and they 
always know we are behind activity. But officials are cautious 
and more comfortable dealing with the client. We are not 
going to embarrass them. W e assist them in their agenda.''®^
Conclusion
GJW was pivotal to the campaign’s management. Its knowledge 
of rules and procedures underpinned its ability to draft submissions and 
arrange meetings. Though its impact on the policy outcome was
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
Lobbyist, interview 26/11/97 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98 
Lobbyist, interview, 26/11/97
Lobbyist, interview 26/11/97. One senior partner admitted GJW “have made contact on our behalf with 
special advisers in the No 10 Policy Unit and the Treasury." Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 
26/08/98
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98
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marginal, GJW played a central role within LRG. Without GJW, LRG 
would have been less co-ordinated and lacked the confidence to operate 
effectively in Whitehall. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Contacts and Coalitions: Hypothesis Seven
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good 
contacts and can spot connections to potential allies 
and can construct coalitions.
Contacts
Politicians
A key element in GJW’s campaign was the relationship developed 
with Labour in Opposition.^®® The firms seconded staff to Labour.''®® 
Stuart Bell’s association with the wife of a Big Five senior partner, who 
was his literary agent, facilitated access.^ ®® The lobbyist notes “it was 
always friendly. We had no real need for any lobbying there.” ®^^
When Bell did not become Corporate Affairs Minister, he joined 
Ernst & Young as a parliamentary adviser and Bell Pottinger as a 
consultant.^®^ He advised on New Labour themes.^®® More importantly, 
he reminded “civil servants and ministers of their manifesto commitment, 
because he wrote it. He also helps keep us up to date....”''®'' The firms 
regard him as “a friendly MP who whispers in the ears of Derry Irvine and 
others to remind them.” ®^®
Formal contact with ministers was infrequent: LRG formally met 
ministers twice in twelve months after the Election, but the firms held 
individually and jointly a series of lunches with Beckett. She was content 
to leave policy in the hands of her ministers.
ICAEW representative 1, Interview, 13/08/98
Seconding staff to the Labour Party in the run up to the 1997 General Election was common among the 
Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 companies.
Bell’s son, a partner at a law firm, facilitated access to City lawyers.
Lobbyist, interview 14/5/97
He was paid between £10-15,000 to prepare papers for E&Y and its clients on government policy. “Bell
Named as E&Y Adviser”, Accountancy Age, 23 October 1997, p i 2; “E&Y with Bells on”. Accountancy, 19
November 1997, p i 2.
Bell suggested the case be linked to the political priorities of New Labour and recognise its move away 
from a stakeholder economy
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98 
Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98
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GJW’s brochure claimed it could put clients “in touch with the right 
people in the right places and at the right time.” ®^® The lobbyist dealt with 
politicians and advisers directly mainly at social gatherings, despite the 
client’s back room role’ instructions/^^ There is a discrepancy between 
what GJW did and what the clients admit to. However, direct contact was 
usually undertaken when the target was known personally to GJW. GJW 
ensured staff attended the ‘right’ social events. At the Labour Party Gala 
Dinner, the lobbyist
was on a table with [the Chief Secretary to the Treasury], so I 
broadly floated it across his agenda in so far as saying, ‘is it 
okay Chief Secretary if I go and brief your special adviser 
about accountants' liability?’ He said yes.” ®^®
Furthermore, the lobbyist explained how to approach the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
to get to Mandelson, I will have lunch with his special adviser,
Ben Wegg-Prosser. At the same time I will invite Andrew 
Maugham of the Treasury. The next step is to encourage 
both of them to brief Mandelson to get him to meet directly 
with the accountants. Another way of doing that is to ensure 
Stuart Bell encourages Mandelson to do it. There are lots of 
informal situations where you can raise the possibility.''®®
The firms had good contacts with politicians -  often better than 
those of the political consultant.^®® “If you look at the list of who’s who in 
British politics and you ask the auditors to tick off who they know, you’ll 
have ninety-nine per cent of the people there.’’^ ®^ That partners were “on 
the ‘A list’ for No 10 dinners because they are movers and shakers.” ®^^ A 
senior partner argued the firms did not need GJW to arrange access to 
ministers, because “we know them. You take this firm, every Cabinet 
minister will be known on Christian name terms by someone here. We 
do not need GJW.’’^ ®®
GJW, Professionals in the World of Lobbying, company brochure, nd
“I have told of GJW so many times, that I am not having you go and see ministers or ringing people up." 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98 
199 ibid
The audit industry had formal links with parliament. Before the 1997 General Election six MPs advised 
firms or professional bodies. Following the General Election, in addition to Bell's and Christopher Chope’s 
links with E&Y; Quentin Davies MP was parliamentary consultant to the Chartered Institute of Taxation; Nick 
Gibb MP was a columnist for Accountancy Age\ Jim Wallace was an adviser to I CAS. Register of Members' 
Interests 1997, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk 
Lobbyist, interview 11/02/97 
IGA lobbyist 1, interview, 10/3/98 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98
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The large firms supposed they were important players and were 
taken seriously by government. Another senior partner said “I would be 
staggered if we could not get to a minister that we wanted to get to. It 
may take us three months. We can roll them in usually.” °^'^
Officials
Contact depended on seniority, section and department. The 
lobbyist had good relationships with officials, arguing “we are locked into 
the DTI.” °^® A senior partner noted “DTI officials told me they are very 
comfortable with the use of GJW. They liked us doing it because officials 
normally criticise us for not understanding politics.
GJW dealt directly with middle-rank officials approximately every 
week by telephone or by letter to deal with detailed questions.^°^ The 
client held a series of meetings with officials, and access was never 
problematic. LRG members also enjoyed good relations with officials; 
contact was ‘very regular’.^®®
Letters and submissions to DTI were proof-read by policy officials 
and returned to the lobbyist, allowing them to be amended before being 
sent to ministers. “DTI officials strangely agreed to review the letter and 
the accompanying appendix in draft form. That helped, but there were 
few c h a n g e s . T h i s  degree of trust was a consequence of the firms’ 
long-term links into DTI. One official argued because “the Big 5 are 
involved in government, I do not think the strategy firms are valuable. 
Any of these people could get in to see people from the DTI this week if 
they wanted. [...] Civil servants are quite open about the i s s u e . C i v i l  
servants believed they were “generous to the point of opening doors and 
giving advice on how to do it.”^^ ^
The firms had excellent contacts with politicians and civil servants. 
Their contacts assisted the firms. GJW added an extra layer of contacts, 
particularly with New Labour ministers and special advisers.
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98 
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98
ICAEW representative 1, interview, 13/08/98
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
senior civil servant 8, Interview, 21/10/98
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Coalitions
Changes to liability affect common law. The accountants could 
never win alone on strand A issues. Government told the accountants 
they needed a broad coalition. “The point had been made to them many 
times that they would need some support, off-the-record of course.”^^ ^
There are several elements to the coalition, consisting of five 
rings: at the centre is (A), made up of the Big Five firms. A is
surrounded by the ICAEW (8), which has sought to build alliances with 
other accountancy associations and smaller firms (C). The firms have 
also tried to ally with other professions (D), and to the wider business 
community (E).
On strand A, a rootless coalition existed on the causes of, but not 
the solution to, the liability issue between A, B and C. The coalition 
within A was weak: “they tried to conduct a tight campaign and argue the 
agenda was specific, but when it got to the nitty gritty it fragmented.”^^  ^ In 
8, although ICAEW claimed to be a professional body dedicated to the 
public-interest,^^"^ in practice it reflected and promoted the Big Five’s 
interests. Notionally a regulator, the ICAEW is the profession’s defender 
and advocate.^^®
Many groups in C did not support liability reform because it was “a 
big firm problem, and to middle-sized firms it does not really matter.’’^ ®^ 
LRG was ineffective because its coalition did not include D and E. 
Organisations in D and E did not recognise a problem. LRG “did not 
understand that civil servants had to look at this issue in relation to 
architects, lawyers and other professionals. We were not just dealing 
with a c c o u n t a n t s . T h e  ICAEW organised a Professional Liability 
Group’ to build bridges to other interested groups.^^® A senior partner 
admitted the Big Five
have not done a good job rallying the support of the lawyers 
and the consulting engineers. You cannot expect just the
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
Lickiss, (1990) “Auditing Critics short on fact, long on rhetoric”. The Guardian, 19 December 1990. Under 
the Companies Act 1989 accountancy bodies act to regulate the industry and defend and advance the public- 
interest.
Mitchell, A., and Sikka, P., (1999), p7 
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98
Including the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, National Association of Pension Funds, London Investment 
Banking Association, Institute of Directors, Construction Industry Council and the Building Employers 
Confederation.
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auditors to do it. If I were government I would put two fingers 
up. It looks like a special interest lobby.^^®
Lawyers were slow to organise and the Law Society’s opposition 
complicated ma t t e r s . Lawye r s  had academic and legal objections.^^^ 
City law firms used the City of London Law Society as a mouthpiece to 
bypass the Society’s national policy of opposition. Co-ordination with the 
accountants was poor because “the accountants were blinkered. They 
did not make a great effort to talk to other p r o f e s s i o n s . T h e  coalition 
was weak and ephemeral.
Interest-groups in E were essential to success. An official argued 
“if you cannot persuade your clients, you are going to have great difficulty 
persuading govern m e n t . LRG obtained support from some audit 
clients like CBI, loD, 100 Group, LIBA and NAPF. The lobbyist believed 
“part of the skill of what we have done is to get them [business] to sign up 
to broad concepts and not detail. Proportionality is a nice concept.’’^ "^^  
An official argues “that was quite clever. It did not go beyond fairness. 
There was a high level of generality. The devil is usually in the detail. 
Outside the Big Five there was no agreement on what the answers were. 
It was even unclear whether there was a question.^^®
In Strand B a broad coalition extended across A, B, C, D and E. 
The coalition was not difficult to construct for a low-profile non- 
contentious issue. The lobbyist admitted “once we have the shape of the 
[LLP] Bill, we can jettison the rest of our consortia. We have to carry 
them with us on the basis that they will not object to the Bill.’’^ ^^  The 
clients of professionals had few concerns with LLPs.^ ^®
Conclusion
Though the lobbyist had good contacts, they were matched if not 
bettered by the clients. The accountants had friends in Whitehall and the 
parties. The firms hired GJW because “it is more efficient for GJW to tell
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98
City Law Firm representative 2, interview, 28/08/98
Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm D, interview, 26/08/98
City Law Firm representative 2, interview, 28/08/98
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
Lobbyist, interview, 30/4/98
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
ICAEW representative 3, interview, 06/10/98
Lobbyist, interview 11/02/97
Law Society, (1997)
279
Chapter Seven
me who I should contact and their ‘phone numbers. It is better than using 
our own resources. It is a question of time and money.”^^® GJW was 
especially effective in providing access to Labour.
On LLPs the lobbyist effectively built a coalition, which minimised 
dissent. However on liability GJW and LRG were ineffective in building a 
coalition. There was no agreement on policy. They failed because of “a 
lack of clarity about objectives and the people who need to be picked off. 
They have not done those things effectively.
The coalition was accountant-led, and its policy objectives did not 
invite broad and stable coalitions. The firms’ inability to build an effective 
coalition was the cause of their ineffectiveness. Contacts were important, 
but the failure to spot and cement connections with other interest-groups 
was debilitating. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Resources: Hypothesis Eight
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has 
abundant resources and is skilful in deploying them.
The campaign to limit liability was not restricted to the UK. The 
Big Five campaigned globally. In Jersey two firms contributed over £1m 
to the drafting of the Jersey LLP law, which even acknowledged the 
“contribution of Price Waterhouse, Ernst & Young and others... to the 
structure and detail of the draft law.’’^ ^^
The Big Five in the USA used their massive resources to run 
television-advertising campaigns to secure the support of politicians, 
businesses, journalists and academics.^^^ The profession pumped 
millions of dollars into the campaign funds of key politicians. In the 1994 
Congressional cycle it donated US$3.6m.^^^
The chairman of the ICAEW Audit faculty argued in 1996 “this is 
just the start -  it took the Americans four years to effect change... We
^  Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm A, interview, 04/08/98 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
Draft Limited Liability Partnership (Jersey) Law 1995
232 Sikka P., (1998)
233 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants gave US$3.3m between 1991-95, including 
US$350,000 to members of the House Commerce Committee responsible for pushing the legislation through. 
“Accountants’ Liability Limited”, Accountant, April 1995, p 16
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have completed the first mile of a marathon -  and this is a marathon we 
intend to finish and finish strongly.”^^"^
The IGA account was worth £120,000. An IGA lobbyist argued 
money is important “not because it buys you access, but it gets you basic 
resources, it buys you focus, it buys you expertise.
The ICAEW has an annual PR budget of approximately 
£500,000.^^® The public ‘line’ was that the firms worked ‘in support’ of 
ICAEW. In reality the firms ran the show and a senior partner argued 
“any campaign of this kind has a cost to it in terms of intellectual energy 
and a financial cost as well because we employ people to do analysis. 
The firms have the resources that the Institute does not have.’’^ ®^
GJW’s contract was worth over £300,000 a year.^ ®® This figure 
ignored the time spent by senior partners making representations and 
attending meetings. It excluded the legal advice, the research costs and 
fees of counsel.
Economic Importance
The money spent campaigning is not always a significant 
determinant of effectiveness. The big firms are massive multi-national 
businesses. Their economic value and the number of employees affect 
how intently government listens to their arguments. The UK 
accountancy/audit market was estimated at £7.3bn.^®® UK fee income 
was estimated at £3.5bn a year.^ "^ ° Britain has over 250,000 qualified 
accountants: “the highest number of accountants per capita in the 
industrialised world and more than the rest of the European Union put 
together. "241
Manaoehal Resources
Though firms devoted time to the campaign, the managerial 
resource has been poor because commercial pressures made it difficult 
to obtain agreement. The firms were often unwieldy with competing
‘Thinking the Unthinkable on Joint and Several”, Accountancy Age, 30 May 1996, p 56 
IGA lobbyist 1, interview, 10/3/98 
^  Accountancy, September 1997, p 26
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98 
Lobbyist, interview 26/11/97 
Accountancy Age, 4 September 1997
Financial Times, 19 September 1997, see Cousins, J., et al (1998)
Cousins, J., et al (1998)
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interests. As a consequence LRG was lethargic. Partners found it 
difficult to relate to the political environment.
Officials regarded inability to co-operate as LRG’s principal 
weakness. One argued “they do find it difficult to work together. [...] 
Their inability to get together and share information has delayed reform 
considerably.” "^^  ^ The lowest common denominator became LRG policy: 
“they could never agree what it was they really wanted.
The firms had an informal network. The most senior partners 
dined informally each month to discuss important matters. Below them 
audit, tax, law, and risk partners also dined regularly. LRG was the 
driving force and policy originator, rather than ICAEW, because senior 
partners lacked “confidence in the ability of the profession, through its 
trade association, to get its act together.” '^^ '^  A City lawyer argued “the 
accountants fight like tigers amongst t h e m s e l v e s . I n  fact solidarity 
among the group disappeared when the government demanded 
evidence. "^^® The collection of information caused them difficulties 
because they could not work together as a group. "^^^
Conclusion
The firms threw money at the campaign. Their ability to hire top 
quality political, legal and economic advisers enhanced their 
effectiveness.
However, managerially the campaign was weak. GJW was unable 
to co-ordinate the firms’ activities effectively. They failed to act in 
harmony. Rivalry prevented the adoption of a common policy. The 
campaign would have been more effective had managerial resources 
been stronger. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
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Low-profile Outsider tactics: Hypothesis Nine
Lobbyists will tend to be effective if they pursue 
low-profile 'external' tactics.
Frustrated at the glacial pace of policy-making, some firms 
pursued an insider and a low-profile external strategy concurrently. The 
external strategy had two themes: a threat to move off-shore, and an 
attempt to play governments off against one another. Some firms were 
unwilling to pursue the time-consuming strategy necessary to persuade 
government of their case. They moved to register outside UK jurisdiction 
as offshore centres engaged in a race to provide attractive regulatory 
environments. '^^®
Professions considered registering in the Channel Islands. '^^ ® E&Y 
and PWC offered, at their own expense, to draft a law in Jersey.^®° Amid 
controversy the States approved a LLP law. A Senator who championed 
the law was accused of a conflict of interest for using his influence to 
speed up the drafting of the law.^ ®^  The law politicised Jersey politics and 
the process was investigated by a Committee of Inquiry.^®  ^ The law was 
enacted in June 1998.^ ®®
The move off-shore can be understood only if observers are aware 
of the motives of the firms. Some firms saw Jersey as a viable alternative 
to the UK. One partner argued “we went to Jersey because we thought it 
was the place to go given the UK s i t u a t i o n . P a r t n e r s  believed 
ministers were unwilling to act.^ ®®
Sceptics argued Jersey was never a viable option, but was 
planned strategically as a lever. One senior partner said “we would be 
mad to go to Jersey.” ®^® Mitchell argues “the real intention behind the
"More firms look to off-shore registration”, Accountancy Age, 23 May 1996, p i; “LLP registration tempts 
Guernsey firms”. Accountancy Age, 31 October 1996, p2. “Isle of Man to offer cut price LLPs”, Accountancy 
Age, 29 August 1996, p9
“Partnership law change faces firm reservations: Professional groups have criticised planned safeguards 
for creditors”. Financial Times, 5 March 1997; “Limited Liability Partnerships: Protecting partners from 
Armageddon”, Accountancy, 16 January 1996, plO
Morris, P., and Stevenson, J., (1997). “Offshore Trusts -  Jersey’s Bold Move to LLPs: Limited Liability 
Partnerships are the latest Jersey initiative”. The Lawyer, 26 March 1996, p 26
Jeune had a financial interest in Mourant de Feu & Jeune, the firms’ lawyers. See “Fresh blow to Jersey’s 
Image”, Accountancy Age, 29 August 1996, p i; “Jersey financial scandal is poised to ensnare Coopers”, 
Accountancy Age, 5 September 1996, p2
“^ “Partnership law inquiry”, Financiai Times, 10 November 1996. The legislation’s preface paid tribute to 
price Waterhouse, Ernst & Young for their contribution to the legislation.
“Jersey enacts LLP law at last”. Accountancy, June 1998, p20 
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98 
ibid
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm B, interview, 05/08/98
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Jersey flight is to hold the British Parliament and public to ransom and 
blackmail the UK into extending similar concessions.
However, to argue the move to Jersey was planned as a 
mechanism to pressure the UK government inflates the firms’ 
competence. In reality the firms stumbled to Jersey as a consequence of 
misreading the UK policy process. Afterall, had government “thought the 
action was inappropriate there are many ways government could have 
stopped it. It would not have been difficult to make Jersey unattractive to 
them."258
LLPs were not raised with DTI until Jersey. The concept raised 
little difficulty for officials, but it was not something the firms ever asked 
for. They assumed they would not succeed. “That was a foolish 
a s s u mp t i o n . An o t h e r  official recalled asking a representative of the 
firms “ ‘why didn’t you come to us instead of going to Jersey? We would 
have been happy to run with it.’ The individual was non-plussed. They 
simply did not think of approaching us.’’^ ®°
Mitchell’s argument is incorrect; however, the unintended effect 
was that Jersey became a political catalyst which engaged ministers. 
The threat of moving off-shore alarmed and activated government.^®^ 
The Opposition supported the firms.^®  ^ A senior partner described 
ministers and civil servants as “all running around like space cadets.
An official put it more benevolently: the threat “meant ministers decided 
this area of law reform was a priority, which they had never previously 
seen it as.’’^ ®"^
Michael Heseltine’s proposed quick-fix option, based on 
secondary legislation to be operational by 1998, was dropped because it 
was unworkable.^®® A civil servant said “ministers, who never really
Mitchell, A., (1996) “Limited Liability Through the Looking Glass”, Accountancy, August 1996, p62 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98 
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98
Sikka P., (1998). See Financial Times, 28 June 1996, p 22; 24 July 1996, p 9; HC Debs, WA, 7/11/1996  
Col 700
^  Bell argued “there must be reform of joint and several liability law to stop professions seeking out off-shore 
havens. "Bell, S. “View from the House -  Government Paralysed by Threat of Jersey Move”, Accountancy 
Age, 8 August 1996, p52
“Jersey law’s reception makes Brindle bridle”. Accountancy, September 1996, p29 
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
At the time Heseltine was Cabinet Office Minister. The Cabinet Office housed the Competitiveness
Division. The Labour government returned the Competitiveness Division to the DTI. The plan was dropped
because it would come too late to stop the rush offshore. “Tories plan Jersey quick-fix”. Accountancy Age, 18 
July 1996, pi : “Isle of Man to offer cut price LLPs”, Accountancy Age, 29 August 1996, p9
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understood how legislation worked, seemed to think that with a bit of 
goodwill they would get the whole thing through in 2-3 months. That talk 
was totally uninformed.” ®^® Roger Freeman, junior Cabinet Office 
minister, recognised the case for protection against suits, but warned it 
would require primary legislation.^®^ So a LLP consultation paper was 
published in January 1997.^ ®®
Jersey helped DTI put a LLP Bill in the queue for legislative time. 
“The prospect of a perceived loss of business to Jersey was a powerful 
jolt. [...] Jersey supplied an argument we could use when competing for 
scarce legislative time.” ®^® By recognising the fragmented nature of 
government, it is possible to understand why DTI welcomed the higher 
profile of LLPs because it helped the department promote its legislation. 
The government was not a helpless bystander observing the overtures of 
powerful international accountancy practices.^^® In reality Jersey 
reflected the audit profession’s ignorance of British government.
Plaving governments off against one another
The Big 5 are global players and sought to marshal their 
arguments internationally. The firms “exercised a campaign that keeps 
pressing on one country and saying ‘we are talking to another country 
and they are doing this, that and the o t h e r . A  number of countries 
have introduced some form of reform, including Switzerland, Australia 
and Canada. In Canada a Senate Committee recommended modified 
proportionate liability be introduced. The DTI was aware of the firms’ 
tactic. “The accountants and the audit profession operate on a world­
wide basis very effectively, so we seek the views of the Australian and 
American governments as well as the European Union.
The USA is an important jurisdiction. Following a major litigation 
crisis in the early 1990s American firms sought a safer legal framework.^^®
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98
“Government pledges to resolve LLP problem”, Accountancy Age, 26 September 1996, p2. Heseltine in bid 
to stop Big Six move to Jersey: Accountants ttireaten offshore registration”. Financial Times, 15 June 1996.
“Jersey stirs debate on professional liability -  It seems that Jersey's proposed LLP law has spurred the 
government on the mainland into action”. The Lawyer, 3 September 1996, p3 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98 
As argued by Morris, P., and Stevenson, J., (1997) 
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98 
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98
The seventh largest USA firm, Laventhol and Horwath, collapsed in 1990 amid US$2bn in liabilities and 
growing fears about bankruptcy. The USA savings and loans crisis of the early 1990s saw state governments
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When the company-friendly State, Delaware, recognised LLPs/^^ the big 
firms reorganised themselves at LLPs.^^® 46 states now have LLPs and 
were able to provide an inshore- offshore' solution.^^®
By 1995 proportionate liability was on the legislative agendas of 
approximately half the States.^^^ At least thirty-three states have either 
abolished or substantially limited joint and several l i ab i l i t yAga i ns t  the 
wishes of the President, who vetoed the Bill,^ ^® Congress passed the 
Securities Litigation Reform Act in late 1995.^®° In 1995 the Senate 
approved legislation that established damages (non-fraudulent) 
proportionate to their degree of liability.^®^
The civil service did not want Britain “to get into legislative 
arbitrage" though it recognised the need to ensure a competitive 
environment.^®^ But the civil service was “always being told that other 
countries did this and that and the other. Half the time it was found not 
be true, or the circumstances were limited. You were always being told 
that other people had solved the problem and it was not true.” ®^® In fact 
the firms’ tactics were
not effective because we talk to our counterparts in other 
countries, which neutralises their activity. [...] We are not out 
of line globally. The firms try to play off governments, and the 
first one to fall will put the rest at a disadvantage. So we do
keep in touch. That is a totally informal network.^®'^
Conclusion
The Jersey threat was an unintentional success. The firms had 
not approached government about the possibility of UK LLP. They
began the move off-shore on the assumption they had failed in the UK.
act to limit liability. Anderson, D., et al, (1992). Arthur Andersen estimated USA firms faced claims of 
USA$30bn. Fearnley, S., (1993) “Practical Answers Needed, Not Political Claptrap”, Accountancy, December 
1993, p76
“Auditing firms -  USA Big Six in move to limit liability”. Accountancy, 15 July 1994, pi 1
“USA firms go for LLPs”, Accountancy, September 1994, p i 1
“USA firms protect partners”. Financial Times, 4 August 1994; Hamilton, R., (1995). Under the USA law 
partners’ assets are protected is a lawsuit is brought against one of the partners. The assets of the firm and 
negligent partners are at risk.
McLean, □., (1995) “Auditors’ Liability; all they want is a level playing field”. Accountancy, May 1995, p83
Pressler, L., and Schieffer, K., (1988)
The President opposed aspects of the law reform but he did not attack joint and several reform. The vote 
to over-ride the President’s veto was 319-100 in the House of Representatives and 68-30 in the Senate.
The Act relates to lawsuits over the purchase and sale of securities. Joint and several applies if 
defendants engaged in actual fraud. Proportionate liability applies otherwise, decided by the judge. The Act 
distinguished between consumer actions and larger business claims. “Accountancy: Congress comes to the 
aid of the Auditors. Richard Waters explains why USA firms feel a change in the law has given them some 
respite against liability injustices”. Financial Times, 11 January 1996.
“Senate passes limited liability legislation”. Accountancy, August 1995, p i2
senior civil servant 9, interview, 19/10/98 
283 ibid
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98
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The threat heightened the issue’s profile leading to pan-government 
pressure for a solution. DTI used this pressure to progress legislation. A 
senior partner argued “if we made a reasonable amount of progress quite 
quickly, it has got bugger all to do with the cohesiveness of the 
profession or GJW.” ®^^ The low-profile external tactic to take business 
offshore had the unintended effect of spurring new and powerful 
coalitions within government, allowing LLP legislation to progress. The 
evidence supports the hypothesis.
Senior Partner 1, Big Five Firm D, interview, 17/08/98
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Conclusions
The accountants failed to achieve their primary goal of reforming 
the liability regime, but were effective with the subordinate objective of 
limiting risk to partners.
The ineffectiveness of the liability campaign was obvious for some 
time. Ever since the Law Commission’s report the accountants have 
been losing. The policy outcome was determined principally by external 
factors. Factors within the lobbyist’s control had little impact. An official 
argues “I do not know that a lobbyist would have been able to change 
anything by doing anything differently.” ®^®
This section summarises the external and internal variables that 
affected the policy outcome.
External Variables
Joint and Several Limited Liability Partnership
(risk to the firm -  Strand A) (risk to the partner -  strand B)
Technical issue, but one with broad public- Technical issue -  excited no interest. It bored 
interest, legal and commercial implications. MPs, allowing it to slip by.
More variables made success less likely.
The issue could be characterised politically The issue was non-partisan.
as a concession to a privileged special
interest.
Low-profile, but to raise the profile risked The issue had a low-profile, which was raised 
weakening the fragile coalition, mobilising the effectively within government to engage 
opposition and jeopardising LLPs. ministers. If the issue had remained low-
profile it would not have been effective
Complex and lengthy legislation. Ingrained Short and straight-forward legislation taking 
common law concepts apply to the whole of little parliamentary time, 
tort and contract law -  not just accountants.
Likely parliamentary opposition. No parliamentary opposition.
No broad coalition of support. Narrow Broad and committed coalition of support, 
coalition built on weak foundations.
No consensus on the causes of the problem. Consensus on the problem. All partners from 
Being targeted as a ‘deep pocket’ affects only partnerships of all sizes are subject to 
the bigger firms, inviting opposition from unlimited personal liability, inviting wide 
smaller partnerships. The people who want it support, 
appear to be those who deserve nothing.
Big legal change. There is no agreement on Consensus on the solution, 
the appropriate reform. Lawyers do not want 
s310 reform, business does not want 
compulsory D&O insurance, investors and
senior civil servant 7, interview, 01/10/98
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venture capitalists do not want a statutory 
cap.
Potentially some important opponents, 
including BVCA, ABI, BBA and loD. “A lack 
of clarity and opposition to it by the rest of 
industry signed its fate.”^ ®^
Not politically attractive. No electoral reward. 
Manifesto commitment was fudged -  a review 
will meet the pledge. One senior partner said, 
“it is of absolutely no interest to anyone, 
which is a recipe for a political disaster.”^ ®®
Bad timing -  fag end of a tired government 
that was not interested.
Have not proved case. Government not 
convinced ‘UK Pic’ is disadvantaged by law of 
joint and several.
The alternatives are just as bad. Auditors are 
campaigning to shift the balance of 
responsibilities -  shifting liability to other 
actors.
No significant opponents.
Not politically attractive, but the legislation 
delivers another manifesto commitment that 
can be ‘ticked off.
Good timing. Non-controversial legislation 
could be slotted into the legislative timetable 
around the time-consuming complex 
constitutional legislation.
Case proven. Partnership Act dates back to 
1907 and required modification. “Powerful 
arguments of greater flexibility and
competitiveness."289
Change is relatively simple and does not 
adversely affect third parties.
In no other common law jurisdiction have the 
accountants been successful in achieving 
their objective on proportionate liability.
The Law Commission concluded replacement 
of joint and several with proportionate liability 
was not desirable.
International comparison. The business 
vehicle existed in other jurisdictions, creating 
pressure on UK government.
No official 
reform.
committees have opposed LLP
Reform could be characterised as a 
concession to a privileged vested interest. 
The smaller firms want to retain J&S because 
litigation is deflected to the larger firms.
Reform was out of step with government 
policy. The salary levels of senior partners 
concerned Labour ministers and DTI officials.
LLP reform can be characterised as 
modernising the business environment, 
providing a new trading vehicle.
LLPs can be portrayed as being in line with 
government policy.
senior civil servant 10, interview, 18/09/98 
Senior Partner 2, Big Five Firm A, interview, 15/9/98 
senior civil servant 8, interview, 21/10/98
289
Chapter Seven
Internal Variables
Joint and Several
Unwillingness to work closely 
government and provide data.
Limited Liability Partnership
with The little information that was requested was 
presented.
Poor managerial resources. There has been 
a constant dilemma over tactics. DTI was 
exasperated with the failure of the five audit 
firms to agree a common position. They have 
found it difficult to work together to produce 
an all-embracing campaign. They had 
differing objectives.
The risk to firms is cyclical -  campaign 
geared up when litigation was low.
No serious consideration, and no agreement 
on what concessions the accountants could 
offer government.
No burning platform. There were no low- 
profile external measures for the accountants 
to use to pressure decision-makers.
The joint and several commitment in the 
manifesto was fudged -  government can fulfil 
the pledge by introducing a J&S into the 
Company Law Review
Big 5 had failed to limit their liability by means 
open to them
Good managerial resources. The Big Five, 
bar KPMG, were at one over the benefits of 
LLPs. They had a single objective.
The risk to partners is cyclical -  but it did not 
affect the effectiveness of the campaign.
Government demanded public disclosure 
requirements and creditor guarantee 
procedures. Most firms favoured openness 
and transparency.
Burning platform of Jersey created pressure 
on government to act.
Good relations with Labour in Opposition. 
Relations with Bell were instrumental in 
getting the LLP commitment into the Business 
Manifesto.
There was no action within the firms’ control 
which could alleviate the problem the faced.
The firms had good access to government. The firms had good access to government.
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An assessment of the hypotheses
The evidence suggests:
1) Lobbyists were of some importance. The LLP issue was technical, 
low-profile, and non-political, and when it faced a block the firms 
inadvertently raised its profile within government to engage senior 
players. J&S reform failed because government was hostile and the 
firms lacked recourse to other tactics
2) External contextual factors inhibited the lobbyist’s effectiveness. The 
lobbyist was unable to overcome them.
3) LRG’s objectives did not fit with government’s. There was no political 
advantage from legislating on J&S, whereas LLPs were politically 
neutral. Lobbyists advised how LRG could fit their objectives to fit 
with government’s.
4) The clients were already part of the policy community, but the 
lobbyists managed and co-ordinated their clients’ activity more 
effectively.
5) Lobbyists pursued a restricted campaign. It concentrated on civil 
servants, ministers (and Cabinet Committees), and Labour front­
benchers.
6) Familiarity with routines and SOPs was important. GJW’s knowledge 
helped their client at key moments.
7) Lobbyists were significant in gaining access to Labour ministers and 
special advisers. The clients targeted officials.
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8) The LRG’s economic importance, and the firms’ financial resources 
did not help the campaign. The campaign was injured by poor co­
operation between the firms.
9) LRG pursued, by default, effective low-profile ‘external’ tactics.
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8. Conclusions
Policy-making takes place in a web of government players, outside 
interests and often lobbyists. Whilst researchers can usually spot when a 
decision was taken and by whom, it is more difficult to disentangle the 
contribution of lobbyists from all the other factors impacting on policy­
makers. The difficulty with judging when lobbyists are effective is that policy 
decisions have been explained on various levels. There is often an element 
of truth in the various descriptions. The contradictions in the literature are 
variations that can be explained by attention to context.
The impact of lobbyists is variable. Effectiveness depends on context 
and circumstances. This thesis has elucidated the contexts under which 
lobbyists are effective. Since effectiveness cannot be whittled down to one 
variable, this section examines the hypotheses considered in this thesis.
Macro-level
Profile, technicality and politicaiity: Hypothesis One
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on 
low-profile, technical and non-political issues.
This thesis examined four policy areas. Sunday trading was highly 
controversial, easily understood with a high public profile. CrossRail and JLE 
were medium-profile issues, which had technical and controversial elements. 
Professional liability was highly complex, non-political and not subject to 
much parliamentary, media or public attention.
The lobbyist can be effective on low-profile issues because 
government can deal with more issues simultaneously. Lobbyists tend to act 
as interpreters -  explaining procedures and rules to clients, and their clients’ 
policy objectives to decision-makers. Lobbyists are likely to be more
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valuable to their clients on low-profile technical issues because outside 
organisations are less likely to know whom to approach or how.
In the most part campaigns on technical issues do not focus on 
parliament or the media. On highly technical matters civil servants want to 
talk to outside groups and lobbyists -  they want information to inform policy­
making.^ Lobbyists know how to provide this information to make their client 
look good. A former minister argues lobbyists are more likely to be effective 
on small-scale issues. Lobbyists can “get a lot more small items dealt with 
successfully because they persuade the officials in the department to get it 
right in the first place. That is the best way -  you deal only with officials.”^
Regulations may be of vital importance to a company or sector, but of 
little importance in high politics.^ De-politicisation of issues can help 
negotiations. Lobbyists have the potential to be more effective on issues on 
which the government is unlikely to take a firm political stance. In addition, 
there are less likely to be organised opponents on low-profile, technical and 
non-political issues. The more visible the lobbying the more likely it is to 
produce equal and opposite reactions and bring other groups ‘out of their 
corner’. Bandwagons do not roll in low-profile lobbying.
One minister suggested private lobbying was more effective than 
high-profile lobbying. He claimed lobbyists “under-estimate how much more 
influential they are if they are quieter. As soon as they leap onto a platform 
and yell with a megaphone they do not have the same e ffec t.H igh-p ro file  
games are more complex and there are multiple actors, and only a few 
issues can be handled at a time, making success less likely.^
When an issue is high-profile, civil servants produce for their minister 
a defence of the options available. Holding arguments are drafted to justify a 
range of possible decisions. Likewise, if there are a large number of groups 
ministers will seek to distance themselves from the lobbies. On the more 
important issues both sides of the argument may employ lobbyists, and their 
activities could cancel one another out.®
' senior civil servant 6, interview, 15/04/98 
 ^ former Minister for Transport 2, interview, 05/02/98 
=* Smith, M„ (1986)
* former Minister for Transport 2, interview, 05/02/98 
® Baumgartner, F., and Jones, B., (1993), p236 
® Grantham, C., (1989)
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Professional lobbyists may be effective on high-profile ‘political’ issues 
where there are significant political pressures for change, and they happen to 
be on the right side. In these circumstances the decision will turn not only on 
an analysis of the merits of a case, but on electoral considerations, political 
priorities, personalities and media interest.
Professional lobbyists have little influence on mega-issues like foreign 
policy and big economic changes. They may have some influence on high- 
profile domestic issues. But they tend to have more effect on low-profile, 
technical and non-political issues. On high-profile issues lobbyists are 
unlikely to be able to provide new information; therefore their value lies in 
raising political and emotional issues. Success then depends on whether the 
case is in-line with government policy or political beliefs and on favourable 
external factors beyond government’s control.
The merits of a policy may not be the dominant factor in a large, high- 
profile issue, but they tend to be on low-profile issues. Lobbying on low- 
profile issues is frequently fact-based and concentrates on civil servants. 
Lobbying can encourage officials to think about new aspects of the case. On 
low-profile issues lobbyists do not pressure decision-makers, they improve 
their clients’ presentation of its case.
The survey data confirm hypothesis one. Respondents believe 
lobbyists campaigning on low-visibility technical issues are more likely to be 
effective. On the high-profile Sunday trading campaign, the process spun 
out of control, so that no-one was in charge. As one civil servant said 
‘everyone was their own Home Secretary’. The high-profile, general and 
political nature of the issue meant there were many variables and pressure 
affecting decision-makers and the influence of lobbyists was limited.
CrossRail was a technical policy -  one where observers might expect 
lobbyists to have been effective. However, lobbyists were generally 
ineffective. The only time they were effective was when they participated in 
a ‘coalition campaign’ to raise the issue’s profile. The same is true of JLE. 
Had JLE remained a technical issue locked in the policy community, it is 
likely it would have failed. However, O&Y and Lowe Bell were extremely 
effective in raising its profile and engaging senior politicians. Both middle- 
profile case studies suggest lobbyists tend to be effective if, when facing
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defeat on a technical issue, they raise the profile of the issue within 
government so it spills over the confines of those who conventionally deal 
with the issue and engages senior politicians.
Some issues are genuinely so uncontentious that governments of 
either party feel comfortable promoting them. Limited Liability Partnerships 
is one such issue, and lobbyists were partly effective because they took key 
messages to government and advised their clients how to operate in 
Whitehall. However, on general liability reform lobbyists were ineffective. 
Government was hostile, and the avenue open to JLE lobbyists (raise the 
profile) was not available because to have raised the profile would have 
threatened the LLP Bill.
The profile, the technical or political natures of the issue, though 
important, do not always determine the policy outcome. Other factors may 
predominate. Lobbyists tend to be effective when lobbying on 
uncontentious, low-profile, technical and non-political issues. On some low- 
profile, technical and non-political issues key government actors will have a 
view, which may conflict with the lobbyist’s objective. There are ‘blocking 
players’ in pivotal positions (for example, DTp over JLE and Treasury over 
CrossRail). Lobbyists then face two options -  defeat or adopt high-profile 
tactics. Effective lobbyists raise the profile of the issue within government -  
they engage more senior players to over-rule the blocking players. They do 
not heighten the issue’s profile in the policy network -  to involve more 
interest-groups, the media and parliament would increase the number of 
variables and increase the chances of lobbyists losing control of the game.
On those issues that begin as low-profile, the lobbyist who faces 
defeat can be effective by ‘jacking up’ the issue by adopting high-profile 
tactics and increasing the issue’s profile within government.
The Reformulated Hypothesis is:
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on low-profile, technical and non-political 
issues, but those lobbyists facing defeat can heighten the profile of the issue to increase its 
profile within government.
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External and contextual factors: Hypothesis Two
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no 
disadvantageous external or contextual constraints
beyond the control of government players.
Lobbyists rarely associate the failure of their clients with any error on 
their part. Berry says “policy defeats are usually seen as being beyond the 
control of the lobbyist’s g r o u p . . . I f  policy defeats are beyond the control of 
the lobbyist, then it is possible to argue that policy victories are beyond their 
control. The policy-making system is not a hermetically-sealed box. 
External factors and institutions, and the outside world in general, structure 
the options open to government. Various factors affect a lobbying campaign, 
including changing business and social attitudes, the state of the economy, 
parliamentary make-up, the EU, courts, party reforms or official reports.
This thesis has examined disadvantageous external factors that 
hinder lobbyists, advantageous factors that help lobbyists and 
disadvantageous factors that can be overcome by lobbyists and politicians. 
The survey provides no clear answer about the effect of the lobbyist in the 
absence of contextual constraints -  it suggests contextual factors are 
important variables when lobbying. In Sunday trading the principal 
disadvantageous contextual constraint was the government’s narrow 
parliamentary majority. Lobbyists could do little to overcome the ‘blocking’ 
Conservative MPs. CrossRail lobbyists faced disadvantageous external 
factors, and were incapable of dealing with the challenges they posed. They 
were equally ineffective when facing a factor beyond the control of key 
government players -  Treasury intransigence. The economic context, which 
began positively, changed and injured CrossRail grievously.
In the liability case the economic environment should have helped the 
lobbyist but did not, because civil servants did not believe the lobby’s case. 
If the DTI had believed the firms’ case, it could have ignored the Law 
Commission’s conclusions. The Commission’s report was a useful shield to 
hide behind.
'Berry, J.. (1977), p278
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External factors can assist a lobbying campaign. The Labour party’s 
modernisation and social changes in the Sunday trading case helped SHRC 
and damaged KSSC. Labour and SHRC objectives merged. CrossRail was 
helped temporarily by a mingling of CrossRail and government objectives. 
Government continued CrossRail to show its commitment to London in the 
approach to elections.
Political autonomy and effective lobbying can overcome 
disadvantageous external or contextual constraints. Lobbying and political 
commitments mitigated the impact of constraints over JLE, which included a 
recession and the collapse of O&Y -  JLE’s principal advocate. Whilst 
CrossRail sank, JLE remained afloat despite a rougher storm. There was a 
battle within government as No 10, DoE and later DTp fought to keep JLE
The hypothesis, though mostly valid, does not always hold. Lobbyists 
tend to be effective if there are no disadvantageous external factors. The 
wider economic, political and judicial contexts affect the effectiveness of 
lobbyists. But, effective lobbying and the autonomy of senior government 
players can over-come contextual factors. Political actors can overcome 
negative external constraints. JLE faced similar external constraints to 
CrossRail, made worse by the collapse of O&Y. Lowe Bell ran an effective 
campaign, which involved the PM and defended DTp against Treasury.
The Reformulated Hypothesis is:
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no disadvantageous contextual constraints; but 
disadvantageous external factors can be overcome by skilled lobbying and the support of 
senior political players.
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Pre-existing policy and experience of government 
players: Hypothesis Three
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of 
political decision-makers, pre-existing policy and 
previous experience of government players are congruent 
with the lobbyist's objective.
Lobbying to achieve an objective that corresponds to what the 
government wants to do is likely to be effective. Government players are not 
sponges. Political actors have partisan agendas. Civil servants have public- 
interest objectives. Both have personal objectives. This thesis has shown 
that lobbyists can be helped if their case is congruous with the beliefs of 
ministers or the policy of the government, or undermined if the case is 
incongruous with either. Government autonomy and reformed pluralism 
make a valuable framework for assessing independent variables affecting 
policy outcomes.
Bad' ideas are less likely to succeed, but many ‘good’ ideas are 
passed over. The quality of the case is supposedly an objective judgment. 
However, subjective political or partisan issues can over-rule ‘objective 
merits’. If the implications of a policy change are extra expenditure, it may 
be difficult for lobbyists to achieve their goals. Heinz et al found lobbyists 
pay little attention to the funding implications of their demands, whilst most 
officials give the highest importance to budgets. Lobbyists are not indifferent 
to money, but they do not focus their major effort on it.® The evidence 
suggests they should focus on the cost implications of their proposals. In the 
CrossRail and JLE cases the cost of the policies was the central issue.
The survey found the pre-existing commitments of government 
players affected the effectiveness of lobbyists. Having a case in-line with 
government policy was important for effective lobbying.
SHRC’s objectives were in-line with government’s pre-existing policy 
and the beliefs of ministers. KSSC’s beliefs conflicted with the views of 
ministers and the existing policy and themes of the government. Whilst 
SHRC and its lobbyists worked in support of government -  their agenda
Heinz, J., at al, (1993)
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amounted to the privatisation of the government’s mandate -  lobbyists had 
little effect. Despite ministers’ emotional commitment to SHRC’s objectives, 
government was restrained by hypothesis two’ factors -  those ‘external 
constraints’ beyond its control. Thus, whilst SHRC was advantaged, and 
KSSC disadvantaged, by the association of their objectives with government 
policy, SHRC’s leverage could not be translated into victory because of 
contextual factors.
CrossRail was initially favoured because of the perceived partisan 
advantage the scheme delivered, as assessed by the Prime Minister. It 
succeeded because of a ten second political prejudice’. However, Major’s 
premiership witnessed a strengthened Treasury. CrossRail fell foul of the 
Treasury ‘view’, as its officials and ministers worked to abandon CrossRail by 
arguing it was inconsistent with the government’s medium-term objectives. 
IGA lobbyists were ineffective because the Treasury opposed CrossRail. 
Despite a formal commitment from DTp, there was no senior political 
commitment to CrossRail. This vacuum of support can be explained by 
CrossRail also conflicting with another policy objective -  railway privatisation.
There was senior political support for JLE. Ministers were 
encouraged to assist O&Y because the scheme chimed in with government’s 
agenda -  redevelopment, private-sector involvement and symbolism. JLE 
was successful because of its connections to the government’s political 
programme.
The broader liability campaign failed because neither the client nor the 
lobbyist could link the firms’ objectives to government policy. The firms were 
unable to look beyond their own commercial desires. The issue was of such 
low-profile significance there was no association with political beliefs or pre­
existing policy -  and therefore no partisan advantage to be gained from 
acting. Thus liability reformed failed, whilst LLPs succeeded because it was 
such a non-contentious policy that a government of either party would have 
felt comfortable promoting it.
The civil service prevents lobbyists in the UK from having the degree 
of influence they have in America. A professional and unbiased civil service 
means the opportunities to be effective are limited. However, changes to the 
civil service have implications for lobbyists. The days of the Permanent
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Secretary being the sole channel of advice to ministers are over. There has 
also been a reduction in the number of senior civil servants, and they are 
more policy managers and implementers than advisers.
The move to smaller and more junior teams offers the lobbyist the 
opportunity to weave and tuck to out-play the civil service. The decline of the 
senior generalist policy adviser means fewer officials in Whitehall today take 
the over-all view and examine wider ramifications. Policy advice has been 
‘privatised’; ministers listen to the wider community for advice, including 
lobbyists.^ Because ministers deal increasingly with junior civil servants 
whom they neither know nor trust, lobbyists known to ministers can promote 
their client’s interests more easily, threatening the public-interest and 
increasing the chances of ‘policy disaster’.
Government actors have autonomy depending on context. Lobbyists 
tend to be effective if their objective is in-line with existing policy or political 
beliefs, unless the issue is of such a low-profile and highly technical that the 
political effect (negative or positive) of acting is negligible. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis.
Dargie, 0., and Locke, R., (1999)
301
Chapter Eight
Meso -level
Involvement in the policy-making process: 
Hypothesis Four
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can include their 
client in the policy community and manage their client's 
activity within that network.
The policy-community is smaller than often portrayed in the literature. 
To all intents and purposes the ‘community’ comprised a consultation list. 
However, analysts focus on those groups who are involved in policy-making. 
This thesis challenges the association between insider status and influence. 
Many are considered insiders, but few have real influence. Most interest- 
groups were consulted and enjoyed good relations with government, but 
many of these interest groups did not have influence. The number of key 
players was small. So lobbyists were not important for inclusion, because 
many groups are included. Because so few interest-groups participate 
actively, lobbyists are effective because they can manage and co-ordinate 
their clients’ activity and improve it.
Few groups get involved actively even when government widened the 
community. The survey confirms the hypothesis. Respondents believed that 
effective lobbyists included their client in the policy community.
In Sunday trading the policy-community was broken open. In the pre- 
Lloydian stage SHRC was included in the policy community, whilst KSSC 
was excluded. SHRC was granted access and given confidential information 
by ministers, PPSs and officials. KSSC was kept in the dark. Lobbyists did 
not assist the SHRC in accessing the community, but did help it manage its 
involvement more effectively. In the Lloydian period the government’s slim 
parliamentary majority meant a whipped bill could not resolve the issue. 
Therefore the previously restricted policy community was opened to all 
interest-groups representing the major forces in the debate. Lobbyists 
played no role in involving the groups but made their actions more effective 
by skilful management.
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CrossRail was ‘o f government, and its promoters were ensconced in 
the formal policy community. The lobbyist played little role in involving its 
client. However, the formal policy community was not where the real 
decisions on CrossRail were made. In the main IGA was ineffective. 
Nevertheless at moments of crisis CrossRail and the ‘CrossRail Coalition’ 
mobilised and provided support to the Prime Minister and other ministers 
temporarily to defeat the Treasury. The ineffectiveness of the lobbyists was 
evident because they were unable to sustain the coalition over the long-term. 
The lobbyist’s inability to project its client’s voice in the arena that mattered 
ordained its failure. IGA’s strategy was facile and did not target influential 
actors.
JLE shows that to be effective lobbyists do not have to include their 
client in the policy community. In fact the lobbyist extracted its client from the 
network and took the issue to Downing Street. The policy-community was 
over-ruled. Lobbyists and O&Y cultivated No 10, the Treasury and DoE and 
used them to ‘lobby’ on their behalf inside government. Lobbyists 
circumvented the established networks because they found them 
impenetrable.
The liability policy community was small and transient. It was 
dominated by 2-3 civil servants. The firms already worked with civil servants. 
Lobbyists were irrelevant to gaining access but helped co-ordinate the 
activity of the big firms. Lobbyists were also effective in penetrating the 
closed New Labour network, which helped the firms obtain a manifesto 
commitment. Lobbyist do not play much of a role in inserting clients into 
policy-communities. The client’s status, objectives and behaviour will usually 
determine if it is included. The civil service is now open to representation 
and keen to encourage outside participation.
Lobbyists can be effective by inserting their clients, and managing 
their activity, in the arena where policy is decided. Inclusion in the policy 
community is not essential to effective lobbying. Lobbyists do play a role, 
which involves helping their clients manage their activity in networks, by co­
ordinating activity and improving the quality of submissions and 
communication in general. Since lobbyists can be effective when their client 
is not included in the policy community, and lobbyists play little role
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‘including’ their clients but more of a role managing their activity, the 
hypothesis needs to be reformulated.
The Reformulated Hypothesis is:
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they insert their client in the arena where the policy is decided, 
and manage their activity skilfully.
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Multi-faceted lobbying: Hypothesis Five
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi­
faceted approach and facilitate access to multiple 
points in the decision-making process.
The survey findings did not support hypothesis five. They suggested 
it was more effective to conduct a single method approach rather than 
campaign using a combination of tactics.
In the Sunday trading case a multi-faceted campaign was key for 
effectiveness, though one element was more important than the others -  
constituency pressure. Both main interest-groups lobbied in government, 
parliament, the parties, the press and the public. KSSC was effective in 
mobilising the public minority hostile to liberalisation, creating the perception 
of widespread scepticism. Liberalisation lobbyists were unimportant in 
orchestrating media support because it was already ‘on-side’. But, lobbyists 
helped create the perception of a grass-roots demand for Sunday trading by 
assembling ‘astro-turf organisations. Though both sides pursued multi­
faceted campaigns, they were focused at one target -  parliament.
CrossRail lobbyists lost the battle inside government and were 
ineffective in launching a multi-faceted campaign to compensate. This 
inaction contributed to their ineffectiveness. Their concentration on 
backbenchers and party conferences ignored the real decision-makers and 
their ‘influence-factors’. IGA’s role was limited. A short-term burst of activity 
around the ‘CrossRail Coalition’ was multi-faceted and effective in buying 
stays of decision, but it was not sustained in the long-term.
On JLE the lobbyists and client eschewed a multi-faceted approach. 
Lobbyists concentrated on influential senior ministers and the No 10 network, 
because they recognised the policy would be driven forward by politicians. 
Civil servants, parliament, the media and the public were excluded. Though 
O&Y did lobby affected local authorities, MPs and the media, this activity was 
not to see the project succeed, but to ensure its success met with as little 
organised opposition as possible.
There was no multi-faceted campaign for liability reform. The 
campaign targeted civil servants. Parliament and the media were absent.
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Parliamentary activity was often the consequence of government intervention 
(planted questions) or brief debates inspired by uninfluential but outspoken 
critics. There was no need for a multi-faceted approach -  indeed it would 
have been ineffective and was actively discouraged by ministers and 
officials. Civil servants wanted the issue’s profile to remain low. The firms 
were restricted from adopting a multi-faceted campaign on liability, partly 
because to have done so would have damaged LLPs.
This hypothesis may be more relevant to the USA and other federal 
systems where there are more routes into the diverse centres of power. In 
the UK power is concentrated at the centre. A multi-faceted campaign is not 
a requirement of an effective lobbying campaign. Targeting multiple points in 
the decision-making process can be damaging.
There is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis. On low- 
profile, technical and non-partisan issues a multi-faceted approach can be 
ineffective.
The Reformulated Hypothesis is:
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi-faceted approach on high-profile, non­
technical and partisan issues.
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Micro-level
Routines and Standard Operating Procedures; 
Hypothesis Six
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar with 
routines and standard operating procedures and know when 
and where to intervene in the policy-making process.
Effective lobbyists seemingly know the process. Much of the art of 
influence involves knowing who to contact, when and how, in a myriad of 
complex and compartmentalised public services. Even knowing the basics is 
important -  such as whether No 10 is likely to be involved in a certain issue 
and how an issue links to the government’s wider agenda. It is possible to 
argue lobbyists do not need to be knowledgeable about rules and procedure 
because the system tells them what to do. Procedural information is easily 
accessible. One official said the “market is easily bamboozled. Anybody can 
buy the Civil Service Yearbook but few people do. Those who have taken 
the trouble to work through it and have worked out who does what, may 
appear to have a c c e s s . T h e r e  is no magic to understanding procedures, 
but they are often difficult to understand because the system does not 
communicate effectively. Lobbyists simply take the initiative to ask. They re­
cycle information.
However, the survey showed it was important for lobbyists to know 
parliamentary rules and procedure (see Appendix A). In the Sunday trading 
case there was some evidence to suggest that lobbyists provided any 
advantage to their clients because of their procedural knowledge. The issue 
was highly political, requiring no detailed knowledge of Whitehall procedures. 
However, SHRC advisers had a greater level of expertise. GJW was 
effective because it advised SHRC on tactics to defeat the Powell Private 
Member’s Bill. In general, however, the system was unusually open and 
transparent.
On CrossRail IGA did not understand, or failed to provide a strategy to 
deal with, the informal procedures of the decision-making system. IGA
' former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98
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lacked an understanding of Whitehall processes, and its strategy focused on 
Westminster. Its advice was elementary. An official argued IGA’s style of 
‘meeting and greeting’ was counter-productive after the Nolan Committee. 
IGA’s knowledge of procedure did not extend much beyond the provision of a 
Hansard monitoring service.
In contrast to IGA Lowe Bell was extremely effective in understanding 
the way decisions were really taken inside government. They and their client 
manoeuvred around the machine with skill -  they side-stepped the civil 
service to deal directly with ministers. Lowe Bell helped O&Y avoid defeat at 
an early stage by dealing directly with ministers. O&Y claimed to have 
influenced the selection of a Commons Committee chair. GJW also provided 
information to civil servants about LT’s behaviour in parliament.
Likewise GJW were effective in briefing its ‘liability’ clients on how to 
draft submissions, when to submit them, whom to call, when to call them, 
and how to make presentations to ministers. They understood the need to 
put the client first. GJW attended meetings with decision-makers
infrequently but were involved in almost every aspect of their preparation. 
When necessary GJW participated in the process. GJW was central to the 
liability campaign. Its experience and knowledge of the process were 
important.
Most lobbyists spend their time advising clients how to present their 
case, conducting research, being helpful and maintaining cordial relations 
with decision-makers.^^ But effective lobbyists have a feel for the political 
process: an instinct as to what will work and what will not. They should know 
what arguments will influence politicians and civil servants. Interview 
respondents argued it was important to understand where the actors ‘are 
coming from’ and see them all as players in a game. Effective lobbyists 
understand how the ‘political mind’ works. Lobbyists should “know why a 
minister would want a quick win now, versus a slow long Bill, and what the 
inter-connecting rivalries are. It is psychology of politics which I think is 
important.’’^^
” See what Lewis Dexter wrote about Washington lobbyists in the late 1960s (Dexter, 1969b). 
Senior Retailer, interview, 4/6/1997
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Some ministers and officials prefer to deal with lobbyists. One former 
minister argued “it can be a lot quicker, cleaner, and more efficient to deal 
with a lobbying company on behalf of a client rather than to deal with the 
bloody client.”^^
Since the early 1990s advocacy by lobbyists received unwelcome 
press interest and was seen as increasingly suspect, and the contact 
described by the minister has declined. There has been a growth in shadow 
lobbying -  where lobbyists act as facilitators, providers of contacts and 
strategic advisers, not advocates. Shadow lobbying is more effective than 
direct advocacy. Writing about lobbyist-advocacy Berry argued “if the 
messenger is suspect, the message will be suspect.” "^^  Effective lobbying is 
limited to facilitation.
Clients are more effective because they have a real interest in the 
policy, which delivers credibility. One political adviser warned that lobbyists 
should never “go in [to meetings] and represent your client.”^^  A former 
political adviser believed “the client is much better than the lobbyist. The 
lobbyist usually has several agendas and does not know the detail. I and my 
colleagues would want to get back to the client.””'®
Effective professional lobbyists are those whose presence decision­
makers are scarcely aware of, making it even more difficult for researchers to 
examine their effect. One civil servant commented “a good lobbyist should 
not be seen.”^^  A Cabinet minister agreed: “the best lobbyists -  you are not 
aware of their involvement. Not because they are hidden but simply what 
they are doing is getting the people who ought to be putting the thing 
forward, putting it forward.” ®^ In some of the case-studies, apart from the 
initial introduction, ministers or officials rarely dealt directly with lobbyists. A 
former Cabinet minister said “I do not want to see lobbyists without the client.
I much prefer to see the client without the lobbyist. If a letter arrived from Ian
former Minister for Transport 1, interview, 05/01/98 
Berry, J., (1989a), p143 
former political adviser 2, interview, 11/02/98 
former No 10 Policy Unit member, interview, 02/03/98 
former senior civil servant 3, interview, 19/02/98 
former Cabinet Minister 2, interview, 24/02/98
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Greer or Burson-Marsteller or anybody else I would not put it in my bin, but I 
was always much more impressed when I got a letter from the client.”^^
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar with routines and 
standard operating procedures and know when and where to intervene in the 
policy-making process. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
former Cabinet Minister 1, interview, 29/01/98
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Contacts and Coalitions: Hypothesis Seven
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good 
contacts and can spot connections to potential allies 
and can construct coalitions.
Contacts
The survey showed that good contacts with decision-makers are 
important for effectiveness (see Appendix A). Over Sunday trading the 
SHRC and the retailers had excellent contacts with the Conservative 
government, and the lobbyists’ contacts counted for little. Contacts were not 
important for access, but did deliver information. Ministers often told SHRC 
and its lobbyists informally of recent developments. The lobbyists were 
effective in helping SHRC access the networks of modernising Labour MPs. 
They introduced their clients, built relationships and explained Labour 
politics. KSSC’s contacts were less well developed. It had many supporters 
in all the main parties but they were detached from the party elites.
In the CrossRail case lobbyists were ineffective in providing 
introductions to decision-makers who mattered. IGA had excellent contacts 
in the Conservative Party. It lobbied MPs, arranged briefings and dinners, 
but one civil servant recalled IGA ‘had never been anywhere near’ him or his 
colleagues. Their lack of contacts in Whitehall was crippling. There is no 
suggestion that IGA’s associations with senior Conservatives delivered any 
advantages to its client.
The JLE case shows contacts can be extremely helpful in influencing 
policy-makers. O&Y, an outsider in many senses, was transformed by Lowe 
Bell into a pre-eminent insider. Tim Bell’s access was famed. His contacts 
helped O&Y to enter closed party networks. Politicians trusted Bell and his 
colleagues. Their contacts delivered early access to information.
In the ‘liability’ case the clients had better contacts with officials and 
Conservative ministers than the lobbyist. They were on the ‘A-list for No 10 
dinners’ and partners in the firms knew most Cabinet ministers on Christian 
name terms. However, GJW was effective because of its contacts with 
Labour. Its promotional literature boasted of being able to put clients in
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touch with the right people. It also operated effectively at the official level 
being discreet, trustworthy and professional.
Lobbyists claim to know influential decision-makers and have 
preferential access. Lobbyists consciously build networks. They persuade 
their clients to sponsor events at national and local government party 
conferences; business and political charitable events; political functions at 
constituency level; political seminars and fringe meetings. Consequently 
lobbyists can become useful to parties as a source of income.
Lobbyists probably have more effective contacts with politicians than 
with officials. “Ministers and their special advisers are probably more 
susceptible to lobbyists, particularly with a new government, particularly if 
they are dealing with friendly-faces -  people they have worked with in the 
political environment in the past. They have access others would not."^° 
Lowe Bell was perceived as the most effective consultancy during the 
Thatcher governments because of its access to and contacts with senior 
Conservative ministers. One former public affairs director notes, “the 
strength of Bell was his ability to introduce people to those in the closed 
circle through personal contacts.^^
A lobbyist’s access is, more often than not, the consequence of 
working for significant clients and not necessarily based on their own 
importance. Lobbyists do not have preferential influence. One former 
political adviser, now in business, recalls a take-over battle where the 
“bankers brought in a team of lobbyists from GJW. They were nice 
enthusiastic young men. I thought they were completely useless. They did 
not know anyone I did not know. They did not have a better view of it.’’^ ^
Contacts are not essential, but they deliver intelligence and allow 
lobbyists to have issues and procedures explained to them. So it is wrong to 
claim contacts are not important: they are over-rated. Professional lobbyists 
portray a familiarity with politicians and those involved in politics. Contacts 
make lobbyists seem plausible. One lobbyist argued “knowing the key 
players is our stock in t r a d e . Co n t a c t s  can be important and lobbyists are
former adviser to the Prime Minister 1, interview, 30/04/98 
former BR director 2, interview, 01/12/97 
former adviser to the Prime Minister 1, interview, 30/04/98 
IGA lobbyist 1, interview, 10/3/98
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more likely to be effective with them than without them. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis.
Coalitions
Whilst coalitions are neither necessary nor sufficient for effective 
lobbying, a broad coalition of support is a beneficial attribute. The survey 
showed that coalitions were very important for effective lobbying.
Over Sunday trading coalitions were central, but lobbyists played little 
role in spotting connections or building alliances. Groups tried to win over 
opponents and sceptics. SHRC undermined KSSC by moving onto its 
territory and recruiting US DAW. SHRC effectively portrayed its policy as a 
compromise, whilst KSSC was perceived as intolerant and inflexible. The 
regulators’ merger came too late in the campaign to be taken seriously.
In CrossRail a long-term coalition would have been helpful but the 
client and lobbyists were unable to construct one. The transient CrossRail 
coalition, which was mobilised at critical moments, secured ephemeral 
victories. The short-term CrossRail coalition was rejected by civil servants 
using the ‘Mandy Rice-Davies dismissive’. The coalitions reflected divisions 
with government -  opponents allied with Treasury to heighten the profile of 
opposition.
In JLE there was no coalition; but one was unnecessary. O&Y’s 
campaign was focused, almost exclusively, on three central departments. 
Opponents were limited. Third-party endorsement was not necessary 
because the project was in-line with government policy and had support from 
senior ministers.
In the ‘liability’ case broad support was fundamental, but eluded the 
firms. The firms and GJW managed a broad and united coalition on LLPs. 
On broader liability reform the firms could barely agree between themselves; 
the accounting profession was divided; and there was no harmony in the 
wider business community. Government demanded evidence of third-party 
support, believing if the firms could not persuade their clients then 
government was unlikely to be convinced.
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Lobbyists’ effectiveness depends on the extent of opposition to their 
objectives. Lobbyists can help build and sustain coalitions to convince 
officials they have broad support from important actors. Where the lobbyists 
work for a peak organisation with a sizeable membership or several clients 
on one issue, the lobbyist may be able to ensure cohesion and prevent 
divisions. Company directors, ingrained in their businesses, see other 
companies in their sector as competitors, not potential allies. Lobbyists, as 
observers, are able to spot shared objectives and connections. Lobbyists 
can be effective in bringing people together.
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good contacts. However, 
there is insufficient evidence to support the latter part of the statement. 
Coalitions and third-party allies may be unnecessary.
The Reformulated Hypothesis is:
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they possess the ability to spot connections to potential allies 
and to construct coalitions in cases where there is no political support from senior ministers.
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Resources: Hypothesis Eight
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has 
abundant resources and is skilful in deploying them.
Resources can be structural, and include the economic importance of 
the interest-group. More respondents to the survey (see Appendix A) 
thought the financial resources of the client were unimportant than important. 
Similarly they thought political donations and the lobbyist’s salary were 
unimportant.
The effectiveness of the retail alliance in the Sunday trading case was 
enhanced by the size of their businesses, their number of employees and 
their significance to the British economy. KSSC had little structural resource. 
It relied on part-time volunteers. Its lack of resources prevented KSSC from 
hiring professional advisers early in the campaign, whereas SHRC was able 
to hire experienced lobbyists with contacts and knowledge of the system. 
The resource disparity was significant. SHRC’s campaign utilised the 
massive resources of client companies, allowing it to fight on several fronts 
and be more effective.
CrossRail’s resources were weak. Whilst it had access to money to 
hire lobbyists, one minister argued it would have been better for CrossRail to 
have spent more on lobbying. Ineffectual management caused CrossRail’s 
frailty. It was weak, uncoordinated and divided. CrossRail was also 
constrained by its managing companies in what it could do.
O&Y by contrast, in the JLE case, was resource-rich. Its lobbying 
effort cost millions of pounds. Its management was focused, experienced 
and committed and it was not constrained by convention. It was able to hire 
advisers who recommended unconventional lobbying techniques which O&Y 
pursued with ardour. Because of the abundant resources lobbyists were 
able to add value -  they helped make O&Y’s lobbying more effective.
Similarly, resource constraints were not relevant to those firms 
campaigning for reform of the liability regime. The firms were global 
businesses and immensely powerful. In addition to numerous academic 
studies and the time of senior partners, the firms paid the lobbyist over 
£300,000 a year. However, the firms were weakened by a lack of agreement
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at the senior level between the firms. The Liability Reform Group was 
lethargic and the firms’ inability to co-operate was a principal weakness. 
Despite their resources the firms were ineffective.
Financial resources can be important, and allow the lobbyist to use all 
the tools at his disposal to run a campaign. Financial constraints can limit a 
programme of action thereby hindering effectiveness. However, financial 
resources are not key determinants of effectiveness. Though SHRC out- 
spent KSSC, the outcome was not determined by the groups’ budgets. The 
Big Five firms spent a large amount of money on the campaign, but were 
ineffective. Client commitment is an important resource: lobbyists need 
access to the right people at the right level in the client organisation. The 
commitment of senior executives is necessary. Weak and uncoordinated 
management leads to ineffectiveness.
Resources allow for effectiveness under particular circumstances.^"^ It 
is not always those lobbyists with the greatest financial or managerial 
resources at their disposal that are effective. There are several dimensions 
to resources, including finance, national structure, number of staff, and the 
client’s influence over the implementation of policy. The skill of the lobbyist 
is the deployment of these resources in an efficient manner. “In certain 
contexts, actors have more freedom to use resources than o t h e r s . T h u s  
whilst context is important, evidence suggests the hypothesis is valid -  
lobbyists with more resources are more often effective. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis.
Dowding, K., (1991) 
Smith, M., (1999), p246
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Low-profile Outsider tactics: Hypothesis Nine
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue low- 
profile 'external' tactics.
External tactics can be effectively pursued concurrently with 
insider/internal tactics, only if the external or ‘outsider’ strategy is low-profile. 
This distinction is not recognised in the literature. Restraints on groups, 
which encourage them to pursue low-profile methods, break down when 
groups are discontented, leading them to adopt controversial tactics.
Lobbyists pursuing ineffective low-profile insider strategies have 
several options. They can continue their low-profile strategy in the hope 
government will recognise their case. They can stop lobbying and lose. Or 
they can choose an ‘external’ strategy. There are two types of external 
strategy -  low-profile and high-profile. High-profile external strategies 
involve mobilising electoral blocks: e.g. petitions, a media campaign or 
demonstrations.
Litigation, activity challenging the law and subtle ‘threats’ are low- 
profile external tactics. The evidence suggests ‘external tactics’ must be low- 
profile to be successful. These tactics often run parallel with tactics aimed 
at maintaining close ‘insider’ links with departments. In two of the four cases 
examined low-profile external tactics were used successfully.
Over Sunday trading the pro-liberalisation companies pursued a 
complex, time-consuming legal challenge to the ECJ that brought UK law 
into disrepute. SHRC retailers, frustrated at government’s impotence, co­
ordinated opening times to break the law and then appealed against 
enforcement. Their spurious defences made the Shops Act unenforceable. 
This external tactic was deliberate, planned and resourced. Despite causing 
government embarrassment and civil servants extra work, SHRC maintained 
warm and close relations with ministers and officials. The evidence suggests 
low-profile external tactics are valuable when the interest-group enjoys good 
relations with government.
In the ‘liability’ case the accountants also enjoyed good relations with 
government, but they too engaged in external tactics. They attempted to 
play governments off against one other, and threatened to take their
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business off-shore. Like SHRC, the LRG was frustrated with the glacial pace 
of policy-making. The firms stumbled across Jersey as a consequence of 
their lack of knowledge about UK policy processes. The unintended effect 
was that the threat to move to Jersey became a catalyst, which engaged 
senior ministers who activated the government machine.
This thesis challenges the conventional view that insider groups in
policy communities “respect certain ground rules -  not least of which is
avoiding actions that will embarrass the government.” ®^ The evidence 
presented here shows that groups can maintain insider relations, be trusted 
and be given confidential information in addition to pursuing low-profile 
external tactics designed to embarrass and pressure government.
The tactic must be low-profile, with the objective being to raise the 
profile of the issue within government to involve higher-level political players. 
Lobbyists seek to change elite perceptions about an issue. They deal with 
the issue at the routine, mundane and conventional ‘official’ level until the 
prospect of failure or stonewalling means they have no other options. There 
is no longer the incentive for those losing the argument to continue abiding 
by the insider’s rules. Then, effective lobbyists raise the profile of the issue 
within government.
Using high-profile external tactics is high-risk and usually signals a
failure to achieve objectives within the conventional process. They are rarely
effective. However, when conventional methods have failed lobbyists can be 
effective if they pursue low-profile external tactics to raise the issue’s profile 
within government. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Jordan, G., and Maloney, W., (1997), p568
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Conclusions
Whilst interest-groups may be central to the policy-making system, 
this thesis has shown lobbyists are rarely at the centre of the decision­
making process. Lobbyists are ineffective unless the context is right. 
Effectiveness is often situation-specific and conditional on a host of external 
and internal variables. This thesis explored the influence of structure and 
context and the role of political constraints and government autonomy. It 
examined the influence of lobbyists within those constraints, and has shown 
that all actors, not just lobbyists, face external constraints, such as economic 
factors and judicial decisions, and other constraints (i.e. ultimately within the 
control of politicians), like political trends and perceptions. Lobbyists face 
internal constraints, like resources, their contacts, knowledge and the quality 
of their case.
Lobbyists just run with the crowd -  they add or subtract a little along 
the way -  policy is decided by bigger factors than lobbyists. Though they are 
active on many aspects of policy, lobbyists have little effect on policy 
outcomes. Their impact is at the margins of policy. The evidence suggests 
the ‘communications school of lobbying’ is more convincing, [see pages 5- 
10] Unless external circumstances are auspicious, lobbyists usually fail. 
Although lobbyists believe themselves to be effective, the evidence shows 
the perceptions they hold about their impact on policy-makers is, by and 
large, contrary to their real effect. Much of their influence is illusory. Their 
role is often over-played by the press. Though the number of lobbying 
companies has grown, their activity is concentrated in particular areas of 
domestic policy. A lot of their work is mundane -  either post-box activity, or 
telling clients whom to write and talk to. Many lobbyists are glorified press 
officers -  helping to publicise a client’s case. They often ‘hold hands’; 
accompanying clients that lack confidence into government.
These findings do not assume lobbyists do not add value to their 
clients. They do. Lobbyists can be effective when working on low-profile, 
technical and non-political issues; when there are no disadvantageous 
external factors; and if the issues fits government trends. Lobbyists can be 
successful if they include their clients in the arena where the policy will be
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decided and manage their activity; if they pursue a multi-faceted approach on 
high-profile issues and a targeted approach on low-profile issues; if they are 
familiar with informal rules and SOPs; if they have good contacts and can 
construct coalitions when necessary and if their clients have sufficient 
resources.
It would also be wrong to conclude that lobbyists never influence 
policy, because the evidence has shown they sometimes do. Lobbyists can 
be a worthwhile investment. It is often rational for interest-groups to hire 
lobbyists because they bring economies of scale in services such as 
monitoring and contact-building, and they bring experience and educate 
clients. They introduce new ideas and a sense of realism. Most importantly, 
on occasions their involvement can overturn established procedures and 
affect policy outcomes.
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A. A Suntey of loblwists
Appendix A tests the hypotheses presented in chapter three by using data 
from a survey carried out by the author. The questionnaire was designed by the 
author and sent to the managing director or senior officer responsible for government 
affairs in 935 public affairs consultancies, blue chip companies and some other 
organisations in the UK. Some trade associations and charities were included.
A business newsletter, The Public Affairs Newsletter, provided the survey 
data. Its database contained mainly corporate bodies, so those voluntary bodies, 
self-help groups and charities that are contained in other UK directories were 
excluded. The survey was targeted at consultants and their corporate customers.
A total of 935 questionnaires were sent in January 1998. Following a 
reminder letter, 225 replies were received: a response rate of 24 per cent.^ The 
questionnaires were anonymous. It was not possible to determine which groups 
responded and which did not (though respondents were asked to self-identify). The 
survey’s principal respondents can be placed into three categories -  Public Affairs 
consultants (lobbyists), Public Relations consultants (also do lobbying work), and 
Company in-house teams (those who lobby from within the business).The survey did 
not ask about specific policy issues. It asked respondents to generalise about 
effective techniques and targets and other issues across the range of the issues they 
dealt with.
 ^ Of this number, 17 were incomplete or returned because the person to whom the survey was addressed had left the 
company, or because company policy was not to complete questionnaires.
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Presentation of the Data
Profile of the organisations surveyed
N = 207. Missing = 1 
Table no: A.0.1
Valid
Frequency Percent
Valid 1 Public Affairs
40 19.3Consultancy
2 PR  Consultancy 20 9.7
3 I  rade Association 26 12.6
4 Com pany / pic 75 36.2
5 Charity 9 4.3
6 Trades Union 4 1.9
7 Pressure Group 6 2.9
8 Independent
10 4.8Consultant
9 Other 17 8.2
Total 207 100.0
Missing System 1
Total 208
Figure no: A.0.1
Organisation type
Those who answered the questionnaire were asked to identify themselves by 
selecting one of nine categories. The largest category assessed in the survey are in- 
house company representatives -  accounting for 36% of the sample. These 
respondents head government relations teams within large companies. Public 
affairs consultants make up 19% of the sample. Trade association representatives 
describe 13% of respondents.
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Macro-level
Profile, technicality and politics: Hypothesis One
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are lobbying on low- 
profile, technical and non-political issues.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Lobbyists 
campaigning on low-visibility technical matters are more likely to be effective?
N = 203. Missing = 5
Table no: A.1.1 Figure no: A.1.1
Frequency
Valid
Percen t
Valid no answ er 2 1.0
strongly agree 36 17.7
som ew hat agree 100 4 9 .3
som ew hat disagree 38 18.7
strongly disagree 6 3.0
don't know 21 10.3
Total 203 100.0
Missing System 5
Total 208
don't know
strongly disagree
somewhat disagree
strongly agree
somewhat agree
Table no: A.1.1a Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know N
All 18 49 19 3 10 203
Public Affairs 23 44 23 5 3 39
Public Relations 15 60 15 0 10 20
Company 19 51 17 3 11 75
Trade Assoc. 16 40 28 4 8 25
Independent 23 56 0 0 23 9
Comment
The majority of all respondents believe that lobbyists are more effective on 
low-profile policy issues. 18% strongly agree and 49% somewhat agree. Only 3% 
strongly disagree with the hypothesis.
Independent consultants, company lobbyists and public relations consultants 
are the groups that agree most strongly with the hypothesis, with 79%, 70% and 
75% agreeing with the statement. 67% of public affairs consultants agree with the 
hypothesis.
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When you are lobbying how important is it that you understand the technical 
issues of a policy?
N = 207. Missing = 1 
Table no: A.1.2
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid very important 152 7 3 4
som ewhat important 51 24 6
not very important 3 1.4
not relevant 1 5
Total 207 100.0
Missing System 1
Total 208
Figure no: A.1.2
not relevant
not very important
somewhat important
very important
Title: The importance of understanding technical issues
Table no: A .I.2a Very
important
Somewhat
important
Not very 
important
Not at all 
important
Not
relevant
N
.All 73 25 1 0 1 208
Public Affairs 75 25 0 0 0 40
Public Relations 80 20 0 0 0 20
Company 72 27 1 0 0 75
Trade Assoc. 81 15 0 0 0 26
Independent 60 30 10 0 0 9
Comment
When lobbying it is important to understand the technical detail of policy. A 
massive 98% of all respondents stated it was either very important or somewhat 
important to understand the technical issues of policy. Knowledge of the detail of 
policy is shown by the data to be an important determinant of effectiveness.
All public affairs consultants, public relations consultants and trade 
association representatives regard knowledge of technical detail as very important or 
somewhat along with 99% of company respondents.
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Judgement on Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one is confirmed by the data. All respondents believe lobbyists 
campaigning on low-profile technical matters are more likely to be effective. In 
addition, knowledge of the technical elements of policy is a pre-requisite to effective 
lobbying.
On technical, non-partisan issues of low-profile decision-makers are ‘liberated’ 
from other variables such as mass opinion, economic factors and party-political 
influence.^ On these types of issues decision-makers do not have to choose 
between competing social groups since the issue usually has a narrow impact.
See Souraf, F.,(1992)
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External and contextual factors: Hypothesis Two
Lobbyists tend to be effective if there are no disadvantageous 
external or contextual constraints beyond the control of 
government players.
The survey asked the following question:
In your lobbying how important are factors beyond the control of government 
(e.g. macro-economic factors)?
N = 206. Missing = 2
Table no: A.2.1 Figure no: A.2.1
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid very important 47 22,8
som ewhat important 126 61 2
not very important 30 14,6
not relevant 3 1,5
Total 206 100 0
Missing System 2
Total 208
not relevant
not very important
somewhat important
Title: The Importance of External factors
Table no: A.2.1a Very
important
Somewhat
important
Not very 
important
Not at all 
important
Not
relevant
N
All 23 61 15 0 2 208
Public Affairs 23 63 15 0 0 40
Public Relations 5 75 20 0 0 20
Company 24 62 11 0 0 75
Trade Assoc. 35 50 15 0 0 26
Independent 33 33 33 0 0 9
Comment
External factors are an important determinant of effectiveness. The economic 
environment, or national or supra-national judicial decisions, are significant factors 
when assessing the impact of lobbying. 23% of all respondents rate factors beyond 
the control of government as very important and 61% rate it as somewhat important. 
No respondents rate this external variable not at all important.
Around a quarter of public affairs consultants and company representatives 
regard contextual factors as very important, compared with only 5% of public 
relations consultants. However, around one third of both trade association 
representatives and independent consultants rate factors beyond the control of 
government as very important.
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Judgement on Hypothesis Two
The results are unclear. Hypothesis two is neither proved nor disproved by 
the data. The data simply show that external factors are important. However, it 
follows that advantageous external factors provide the environment in which a 
lobbyist might be effective. Similarly, a disadvantageous environment with external 
variables hostile to the lobbyist’s objectives means success is less likely.
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Pre-existing policy and experience of government players: 
Hypothesis Three
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the beliefs of political 
decision-makers, pre-existing policy and previous experience 
of government players are congruent with the lobbyist's 
obj ective.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Pre-existing policy 
commitments of government players affect the effectiveness of the lobbyist.
N = 204. Missing = 4
Table no: A.3.1 Figure no: A.3.1
Frequency
Valid
Percen t
Valid strongly agree 63 30.9
som ew hat agree 110 53.9
som ew hat disagree 17 8 .3
strongly d isagree 6 2 .9
don't know 8 3.9
Total 204 100.0
Missing System 4
Total 208
Missing
don’t know
strongly disagree
somewhat disagree
strongly agree
somewhat agree
Table no: A.3.1a Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know N
All 31 54 8 3 4 204
Public Affairs 35 55 10 0 0 40
Public Relations 15 55 20 5 5 20
Company 27 59 7 3 5 75
Trade Assoc. 40 48 8 0 4 25
Independent 22 67 0 11 0 9
Comment
The pre-existing policy commitments of government players are an important 
determinant of effectiveness. 85% of all respondents regard pre-existing policy 
commitments as important factors that affect the effectiveness of the lobbyist -  
answering strongly agree or somewhat agree. Only 11% somewhat disagree or 
strongly disagree with the statement.
35% of public affairs consultants strongly agree with the statement, compared 
to 27% of company representatives and only 15% of PR consultants. A quarter of 
PR consultants strongly disagree or somewhat disagree with the statement.
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How important is ‘a case 
organisation’s lobbying?
N = 196. Missing = 12.
Table no: A.3.2
in line with government policy’ for your
Figure no: A.3.2
Frequency
Valid
P ercen t
V a lid  1 not a t all im portant 14 7.1
2 2 1.0
3 10 5.1
4 5 2 .6
5 41 2 0 .9
6 21 10.7
7 36 18.4
8 40 2 0 .4
9 19 9 .7
10 very  im portant 8 4.1
Total 196 100 .0
M issing S ys tem 12
Tota l 2 08
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important
Table no: A.3.2a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very
important
N
All 8 8 32 39 14 196
Public Affairs 21 11 26 26 16 38
Public Relations 16 16 26 42 0 19
Company 4 7 25 53 12 73
Trade Assoc. 0 4 42 46 8 24
Independent 13 0 50 38 0 8
Comment
53% of all respondents regard having a case in line with government policy as 
very important or important. Around one third of all respondents rate this attribute as 
neither important nor unimportant.
Company representatives are the most numerous in believing a case in line 
with government policy is significant for effectiveness. 65% rate it important or very 
important, compared with 42% of public affairs and public relations consultants. 
Whilst only 11% of company representatives think a case in with government policy 
is unimportant or not at all important, almost a third of public affairs and public 
relations consultants hold this view. Companies think a case in line with government 
policy is a more important determinant of effectiveness than do public affairs or 
public relations consultants.
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How important is a case which is politically neutral for your organisation’s 
lobbying?
N = 197. Missing = 11. 
Table no: A.3.3 Figure no: A.3.3
Frequency
Valid
P ercen t
Valid  1 not a t all im portant 17 8 .6
2 13 6 .6
3 18 9.1
4 12 6.1
5 35 17.8
6 22 11 .2
7 16 8.1
8 34 17.3
9 10 5.1
10 very  im portant 20 10 .2
Total 197 100 .0
M issing S ys tem 11
Total 2 0 8
Q. 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Im portance. 1 = not at all Im portant. 10 = very im portant.
Table no: A.3.3a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very
important
N
All 15 15 29 25 15 197
Public Affairs 32 14 32 14 8 37
Public Relations 17 33 33 17 0 18
Company 11 18 20 37 15 74
Trade Assoc. 0 13 46 13 29 24
Independent 20 0 40 30 10 10
Comment
The answers the data provide to this question are less evident than other 
variables. Here, only 15% rate a politically-neutral case as very important, and 25% 
rate it as an important resource. Around 30% of all respondents rate a politically- 
neutral case neither important nor unimportant, whilst 15% think it is unimportant and 
a further 15% rate it not at all important.
The split between the groups is similar to the previous question. Again, 
company respondents think a variable like the political neutrality of their case is more 
important in determining the effectiveness of the lobbying than do public affairs or 
public relations consultants. 52% of company respondents rate a politically-neutral 
case as important or very important, compared with 24% of public affairs consultants 
and 17% of public relations consultants. Similarly, whilst only 29% of company 
respondents think a politically-neutral case is unimportant or not at all important, 
46% of public affairs consultants and 50% of public relations consultants hold this 
view.
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Judgement on Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three is confirmed by the data. A majority of all respondents 
agree that pre-existing policy commitments of government players affect the 
effectiveness of the lobbyist. 53% of all respondents regard a case in line with 
government policy as important or very important for lobbying. It is better to have a 
case in line with government policy, than a case which is politically-neutral. 40% of 
all respondents think a case which is politically-neutral is important or very important.
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Meso-level
Involvement in the policy-making process: Hypothesis 
Four
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they can include their 
client in the policy community and manage their client's 
activity within that network.
How important is it, when you lobby, to get into the network of interests 
involved in policy-making?
N = 206. Missing = 2.
Table no: A.4.1 Figure no: A.4.1
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid very important 133 64 6
som ewhat important 68 33.0
not very important 3 1.5
not relevant 2 1.0
Total 206 100.0
Missing System 2
Total 208
Missing
not relevant
not very important
somewhat important
very important
Table no; A.4,1a Very
important
Somewhat
important
Not very 
important
Not at all 
important
Not
relevant
N
Public Affairs 85 13 3 0 0 40
Public Relations 60 30 5 5 0 20
Company 63 36 1 0 0 75
Trade Assoc. 62 39 0 0 0 26
Independent 44 56 0 0 0 9
Comment
98% of all respondents believe getting into the policy network is somewhat 
important or very important. Only 3% think it is not very important.
85% of public affairs consultants believe getting into the network of interests is 
very important, compared with 60% of public relations consultants and 63% of 
company representatives.
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Judgement on Hypothesis Four
This hypothesis is confirmed by the results. All categories of respondents 
believe it is a necessary requirement for effectiveness that they include themselves 
or their client in the network of interest involved in policy-making.
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Multi-faceted lobbying: Hypothesis Five
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they pursue a multi-faceted 
approach and facilitate access to multiple points in the 
decision-making process.
Respondents were asked to assign each of the following campaign techniques a 
mark out often in terms of their effectiveness.
Briefing MPs privately 
N = 202. Missing = 6.
Table no; A.5.1 Figure no: A.5.1
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all im portant 1 .5
2 5 2 .5
3 6 3 .0
4 7 3.5
5 19 9.4
6 16 7.9
7 31 15.3
8 45 22.3
9 34 16.8
10 very im portant 38 18.8
Total 202 100.0
Missing System 6
Total 208
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Im portance. 1 = not at all im portant. 10 = very Important.
Table no: A.5 .1a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 3 7 17 38 34 202
Public Affairs 0 13 21 29 37 38
Public Relations 0 10 10 45 35 20
Company 0 4 19 48 29 75
Trade Assoc. 12 4 16 40 28 20
Independent 13 13 13 38 25 8
Comment
Briefing MPs privately is rated as very important by 34% of all respondents 
and as important by 38% of all respondents. 10% rate privately briefing MPs as 
unimportant or not at all important.
77% of company representatives think briefing MPs privately is important or 
very important, compared with 66% of public affairs consultants and 80% of public 
relations consultants.
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Briefing ministers privately
N = 203. Missing = 5 
Table no: A.5.2 Figure no: A.5.2
Frequency
Valid
P ercen t
Valid  1 not a t all im portant 3 1 .5
2 1 .5
4 2 1.0
5 13 6 .4
6 10 4 .9
7 17 8 .4
8 4 0 19.7
9 52 2 5 .6
10 very  im portant 6 5 3 2 .0
Total 2 0 3 1 00 .0
M issing S ys tem 5
Total 2 08
a: 0
Im portance. 1 = not at all im portant. 10 = very  im portant.
Table no: A.5.2a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 2 1 11 28 58 203
Public Affairs 0 3 19 39 40 38
Public Relations 0 0 10 30 60 20
Company 1 0 11 28 60 75
Trade Assoc. 4 4 12 15 65 26
Independent 12 0 25 25 38 8
Comment
Almost 60% of all respondents think briefing ministers privately is very 
important. A further 28% regard it as important. Only 3% rate briefing ministers as 
not at all important or unimportant.
Public relations consultants and company representatives hold similar views 
on the importance of briefing minister privately; 60% of both categories rate private 
briefings of ministers as very important, and 30% and 28% respectively rate it 
important. Whilst a majority of public affairs consultants think briefing ministers 
privately is important and very important (79%) a significant proportion -  19% -  rate 
it as neither important nor unimportant, around ten percent higher than the numbers 
of public relations consultants and company representatives.
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Briefing officials privately
N = 203. Missing = 5.
Table no: A.5.3
F req u en cy
V alid
P erc en t
V alid  1 not a t all Im portant 1 .5
2 1 .5
3 1 .5
4 1 .5
5 4 2 .0
6 10 4 .9
7 15 7 .4
8 44 2 1 .7
9 57 28.1
10 very  im portant 69 3 4 .0
Total 2 0 3 100 .0
M issing S ys tem 5
Total 2 0 8
Figure no: A.5.3
40 1------------------------------------------
30
20
10
S. 0
Im portance. 1 = not at all im portant. 10 = very important.
Table no; A.5.3a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neittier 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 1 7 29 62 203
Public Affairs 0 0 16 26 58 38
Public Relations 0 0 15 30 55 20
Company 0 1 5 39 55 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 0 12 88 26
Independent 13 0 12 13 62 8
Comment
Briefing officials privately is an important tactic. 62% of all respondents think 
it is very important whilst a further 29% regard it as important.
Public affairs consultants think briefing officials privately is more important 
than briefing ministers privately. Here 58% of public affairs consultants rate the 
tactic as very important which is similar to the 55% of company representatives and 
public relations consultants rating it as very important. 39% of company 
representatives think briefing officials privately is important and only 5% think it is 
neither important nor unimportant. This figure compares with 16% of public affairs 
consultants, and 15% of public relations consultants who rate private briefings for 
officials as neither important nor unimportant.
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A media campaign
N = 201. Missing = 7. 
Table no: A.5.4 Figure no: A.5.4
F req u en cy
Valid
P ercen t
V alid  1 not a t all im portant 5 2 .5
2 6 3 .0
3 14 7.0
4 18 9 .0
5 21 10.4
6 19 9 .5
7 37 18 .4
8 4 3 2 1 .4
9 21 10.4
10 very  im portant 17 8 .5
Tota l 201 100 .0
M issing S ys tem 7
Total 2 0 8
CL 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Im portance. 1 =  not at all Im portant. 10 = very important.
Table no; A.5.4a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 6 16 20 40 19 201
Public Affairs 0 19 14 46 22 37
Public Relations 0 5 15 50 30 20
Company 8 23 30 34 6 74
Trade Assoc. 8 12 19 42 19 26
Independent 25 13 25 12 25 8
Comment
A media campaign has luke-warm support. Around a fifth of all respondents 
regard a media campaign as very important, with 40% rating it important. A further 
fifth rate a media campaign as neither important nor unimportant, whilst 22% think 
tactics involving the media are unimportant or not at all important.
The split between the categories here is evident. Only 6% of company 
representatives think a media strategy is very important, compared with 30% of 
public relations consultants and 22% of public affairs consultants. Further 50% of 
public relations consultants think a media strategy is important compared with 46% 
of public affairs consultants and 34% of company respondents. Only 5% of PR 
consultants rate a media campaign as unimportant or not at all Important, compared 
with almost of fifth of public affairs consultants and almost a third of company 
representatives.
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Combination of both media campaign and private briefings
N = 197. Missing = 11.
Table no: A.5.5 Figure no: A.5.5
Freq u en cy
Valid
Percen t
V alid  1 not a t all im portant 4 2 .0
2 1 .5
3 4 2 .0
4 7 3 .6
5 14 7.1
6 17 8 .6
7 23 11.7
8 36 18.3
9 45 2 2 .8
10 very  im portant 46 2 3 .4
Total 197 100 .0
M issing S ys te m 11
Total 2 0 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Im portance. 1 = not at all im portant. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.5.5a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neittier 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 3 6 16 30 46 197
Public Affairs 0 3 19 32 46 37
Public Relations 0 0 5 30 65 20
Company 4 10 24 38 24 71
Trade Assoc. 4 8 8 33 46 24
Independent 12 13 12 13 50 8
Comment
A combined strategy is more effective than a media campaign and briefing 
MPs privately, but less effective than briefing ministers or officials privately. 46% of 
all respondents regard a combination of public campaign techniques and private 
briefings to be very important \NhWst a further 30% think it is important.
Again, public relations consultants think a combined strategy is worthwhile -  
with 95% of respondent rating it important or very important. Company respondents 
and public affairs consultants are less enthusiastic, with respectively 62% and 78% 
rating it important or very important. 14% of company representatives think a 
combined strategy is unimportant or not at all important.
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A comparison of means for different lobbying strategies
Table no: A.5.6 All PA PR Comp Trade Assoc. Independent
Officials
privately
8.62 8.39 8.5 8.53 9.46 8.62
Ministers
privately
8.35 7.95 8.65 8.43 8.35 8.35
Combination 7.79 7.95 8.8 6.87 7.79 7.79
MPs privately 7.48 7.29 7.8 7.59 6.96 7.48
Media
Campaign
6.54 6.89 7.75 5.58 6.5 6.54
Judgement on Hypothesis Five
The hypothesis was not confirmed by the data. The most important lobbying 
strategy was to brief civil servants privately. Briefing ministers privately was rated 
second. A public or media campaign was thought to be the least effective campaign 
strategy by all respondents. A multi-faceted strategy combining both high-profile and 
low-profile tactics was rated third. This finding suggests that lobbyists are used to 
using low-profile tactics, like private briefings associated with low-profile, technical 
non-political issues (see hypothesis one).
Analysis of the categories of respondents shows that public relations 
consultants think a combined multi-faceted strategy is most effective -  confirming the 
hypothesis. However, both public affairs consultants and company representatives 
rate private briefings of civil servants as the most effective strategy. Public affairs 
consultants rate a multi-faceted strategy joint second, whilst company 
representatives rate it fourth out of five
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Micro-level
Routines and Standard Operating Procedures: Hypothesis 
Six
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they are familiar with 
routines and standard operating procedures and know when and 
where to intervene in the policy-making process.
How important is knowledge of parliamentary procedure for your 
organisation’s lobbying?
N = 205. Missing = 3.
Table no: A.6.1 Figure no: A.6.1
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 2  not at all im portant 1 .5
3 6 2.9
4 10 4 .9
5 21 10.2
6 21 10.2
7 29 14.1
8 51 24 9
9 26 12.7
10 very im portant 40 19.5
Total 2 05 100.0
Missing System 3
Total 208
a  0
Im portance. 1 = not at all im portant. 10 = very Im portant.
Table no: A.6.1a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 8 20 39 32 205
Public Affairs 0 5 8 36 51 39
Public Relations 0 10 15 45 30 20
Company 0 9 32 43 16 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 28 52 20 25
Independent 0 22 11 33 33 9
Comment
Knowledge of parliamentary procedure is a significant internal variable. 71% 
of all respondents rate it important or very important. A fifth rate understanding how 
parliament works as neither important nor unimportant. 8% think it is unimportant.
Public affairs consultants are the category most likely to think knowledge of 
parliamentary procedure is valuable. 51% of public affairs consultants rate it as very 
important, compared with 30% of public relations consultants and 16% of company 
representatives. Around one third of company representatives are indifferent about 
parliamentary procedure -  rating it neither important nor unimportant, compared to 
only 8% of public affairs consultants and 15% of public relations consultants.
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How important Is knowledge of official procedure for your 
organisation’s lobbying?
N = 205. Missing = 3.
Table no; A.6.2 Figure no: A.6.2
Frequency
V alid
P ercen t
V alid  2  not a t all im portant 1 .5
3 4 2 .0
4 6 2 .9
5 13 6 .3
6 19 9 .3
7 37 18.0
8 53 2 5 .9
9 31 15 1
10 very  im portant 41 2 0 .0
Total 2 0 5 1 00 .0
M issing S ys tem 3
Total 2 0 8 2 3 4 5 6 7
Im portance. 1 = not at all im portant. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.6.2a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neittier 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 5 16 44 35 205
Public Affairs 0 3 8 38 51 39
Public Relations 0 11 26 47 21 19
Company 1 7 24 51 17 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 8 42 50 26
Independent 0 11 22 33 33 9
Comment
The profile of respondents’ answers to the importance of knowing official 
procedure is similar to the importance of knowing parliamentary procedure. 35% 
rate this knowledge as ve/y important, whilst 44% think it is important. 16% regard 
knowledge of official rules as neither important nor unimportant, whilst the remainder 
-  6% -  rate it unimportant or not at all important.
Knowledge of official rules is more important to public affairs consultants than 
any other category of respondent. 51% regard this knowledge as very important 
compared with 21% of public relations consultants and 17% of company 
representatives. Only 11% of public affairs consultants rate knowledge of official 
procedure as neither important nor unimportant or lower. This figure compares to 
37% of public relations consultants and 32% of company representatives.
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How important is knowledge of informal rules for your organisation’s 
lobbying?
N = 205. Missing = 3.
Table no: A.6.3 Figure no: A.6.3
F requency
Valid
P erc en t
V alid  1 not a t all im portant 1 .5
3 7 3 .4
4 9 4 .4
5 15 7 .3
6 16 7.8
7 51 2 4 9
8 49 2 3 .9
9 25 12.2
10 very  im portant 3 2 15.6
Tota l 2 0 5 100 .0
M issing S ys te m 3
Total 2 08
Im portance. 1 = not at all im portant. 10 = very  important.
Table no; A.6.3a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neittier 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 8 15 49 28 205
Public Affairs 0 5 8 47 40 38
Public Relations 0 20 25 35 20 20
Company 0 9 18 57 16 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 8 54 38 26
Independent 0 10 10 60 20 10
Comment
Respondents are less sure about the importance of knowing the informal rules 
when compared to the importance of knowing the formal rules. Only 28% of all 
respondents think knowledge of the informal rules is very important. However, 49% 
regard this knowledge as important.
As with the previous two variables, public affairs consultants rate knowledge 
of informal rules more highly than other respondents. 40% of public affairs 
consultants think it is very important compared with a fifth of PR consultants and 
16% of company respondents. Similarly whilst only 13% of public affairs 
respondents rated the importance of this variable neither important nor unimportant 
or lower, 45% of public relations consultants and 27% of company representatives 
did so.
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A comparison of means for different lobbying knowledge
Table no: A.6.4 All PA PR Comp Trade Assoc. Independent
Official
Procedure
7.75 8.33 7.42 7.03 8.42 7.56
Parliamentary
Procedure
7.51 8.31 7.6 6.77 7.64 7.11
Informal Rule 7.44 8.05 6.60 7.09 8.08 7.60
Judgement on Hypothesis Six
All respondents rate knowledge of parliamentary procedure, official procedure 
and informal rules as significant explanatory variables. Therefore the hypothesis 
was confirmed by the data. Lobbyists rate familiarity with the routines and standard 
operating procedures as an important tool for effective lobbying. Public affairs 
consultants rate them more highly than other categories of respondents.
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Contacts and Coalitions; Hypothesis Seven
Lobbyists tend to be effective if they have good contacts and 
can spot connections to potential allies and can construct 
coalitions.
How important is a good contact network of MPs?
N = 207. Missing = 1.
Table no: A.7.1 Figure no: A.7.1
Frequency
V alid
P ercen t
V alid 1 not a t all im portant 1 .5
2 5 2 .4
3 10 4 .8
4 9 4 .3
5 2 5 12.1
6 17 8 .2
7 3 2 1 5 .5
8 3 5 16.9
9 21 10.1
10 v ery  im portant 52 25.1
Total 2 0 7 1 0 0 .0
M issing S ys tem 1
Total 208
CL 0
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.7.1a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 3 9 20 32 36 207
Public Affairs 3 10 25 13 40 40
Public Relations 5 15 35 25 20 20
Company 0 5 21 44 29 75
Trade Assoc. 8 4 23 31 35 26
Independent 11 33 0 33 22 9
Comment
Good contacts with MPs are regarded as yery important by 36% of all 
respondents, and important by 32%. A fifth think a good contact network of MPs is 
neither important nor unimportant whWst 12% rate contacts with MPs as unimportant 
or not at ali important.
More public affairs consultants rate contacts with MPs as very important than 
any other category of respondent. Two fifths of public affairs consultants, compared 
to one fifth of public relations consultants and around one third of company 
representatives. However, 44% of company respondents do rate good contacts with 
MPs as important compared to 13% of public affairs consultants. Significant 
numbers of respondents are grouped in the centre of the spectrum -  a quarter of 
public affairs consultants, a around a third of public relations consultants and around 
one fifth of company representatives believe contacts with MPs are neither important 
nor unimportant.
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How important is a good contact network of ministers?
N = 207. Missing = 1.
Table no: A.7.2 Figure no: A.7.2
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 1 .5
2 2 1.0
3 8 3.9
4 8 3.9
5 14 6.8
6 12 5.8
7 18 8.7
8 53 25.6
9 33 15.9
10 very important 58 28.0
Total 207 100.0
Missing System 1
Total 208
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very Important.
Table no; A.7.2a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 2 8 13 34 44 207
Public Affairs 3 8 20 40 30 40
Public Relations 0 25 20 30 25 20
Company 0 4 9 43 44 75
Trade Assoc. 0 8 8 15 69 26
Independent 11 22 22 22 22 9
Comment
The spread of responses is broadly similar to the previous answer. However, 
44% of all respondents rate a good contact network of ministers as very important, 
followed by 34% who regard it as important. Only one tenth of all respondents think 
good contacts with ministers is unimportant or not at all important.
Trade associations value contacts with ministers most highly followed by 
company representatives; respectively 69% and 44% labelling it very important.
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How important is a good contact network of officials?
N = 208. Missing = 0.
Table no: A.7.3 Figure no: A.7.3
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 2 not at all important 1 .5
3 4 1.9
4 3 1.4
5 10 4.8
6 8 3.8
7 24 11.5
8 44 21.2
9 46 22.1
10 very important 68 32.7
Total 208 100.0
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.7.3a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 3 9 33 55 208
Public Affairs 0 8 18 28 48 40
Public Relations 5 10 15 45 25 20
Company 0 0 7 43 51 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 0 4 96 26
Independent 0 10 20 20 50 10
Comment
Good contacts with officials are an important determinant of effectiveness. 
88% of all respondents rate good contacts as important or very important. Only 4% 
think good contacts with officials are unimportant or not at all important.
Roughly the same proportion of public affairs consultants, company 
representatives and independent political consultants think good contacts with 
officials are very important -  the numbers are respectively, 48%, 51% and 50%. The 
evidence from Trade Associations responses indicates their institutionalised role in 
policy-making. The vast majority of Trade Associations representatives, 96%, think 
good contacts with civil servants are very important. The public relations consultants 
category rates the importance of official contacts least highly.
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How important is a knowledge of the personalities of MPs?
N = 204. Missing = 4.
Table no: A.7.4 Figure no: A.7.4
Freouencv
Valid
Percent
Valid 2 not at all important 10 4.9
3 4 2.0
4 18 8.8
5 27 13.2
6 30 14.7
7 41 20.1
8 39 19.1
9 10 4.9
10 very important 25 12.3
Total 204 100.0
Missing System 4
Total 208
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no; A.7.4a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
important Very important N
All 5 11 28 39 17 204
Public Affairs 0 5 24 37 34 38
Public Relations 10 10 25 45 10 20
Company 1 16 29 45 8 75
Trade Assoc. 12 4 36 32 16 25
Independent 11 22 11 44 11 9
Comment
Knowledge of MPs’ personalities is less important than having them as 
contacts. However 39% of all respondents think it is important to know the 
characters of MPs. But, 28% believe familiarity with the personalities of MPs is 
neither important nor unimportant, whilst a further 16% rate it as unimportant or not 
at ail important.
The most striking difference between the categories of respondents is 34% of 
public affairs consultants rate knowledge of their personalities of MPs as very 
important compared with only 8% of company representatives and 10% of PR 
consultants. Whilst only 5% of public affairs consultants rate knowing the 
personalities of MPs as unimportant or not at aii important, 20% of PR consultants 
and 17% of company representatives do so.
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How important is a knowledge of the personalities of officials
N = 205. Missing = 3.
Table no: A.7.5 Figure no: A.7.5
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all Important 1 .5
2 6 2.9
3 13 6.3
4 17 8.3
5 30 14.6
6 24 11.7
7 57 27 .8
8 34 16.6
9 9 4 .4
10 very important 14 6.8
Total 205 100.0
Missing System 3
Total 208
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.7.5a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 3 15 26 44 11 205
Public Affairs 0 19 26 45 11 38
Public Relations 20 25 30 25 0 20
Company 1 15 25 55 4 75
Trade Assoc. 4 4 12 48 32 25
Independent 0 30 20 40 10 10
Comment
Fewer respondents rate knowing the personalities of officials as \/ery 
important compared with the personalities of MPs. 44% of all respondents rate 
knowledge of the personalities of MPs as important, whilst 18% rate it unimportant or 
not at ali important.
Around one third of trade association respondents rate knowing officials’ 
personalities as very important. 56 % of public affairs consultants think knowing the 
characters of officials is very important or important, compared with 25% of public 
relations consultants and 59% of company respondents. A fifth of PR consultants 
rate this knowledge as not at all important, whilst only one per cent of company 
respondents and no public affairs consultants share this view.
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How important is the ability to form coalitions?
N = 195. Missing = 13.
Table no: A.7.6 Figure no: A.7.6
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 5 2.6
2 5 2.6
3 9 4.6
4 7 3.6
5 27 13.8
6 20 10.3
7 40 20 .5
8 46 23.6
9 10 5.1
10 very important 26 13.3
Total 195 100.0
Missing System 13
Total 208
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.7.6a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 5 8 24 44 18 195
Public Affairs 3 5 24 43 24 37
Public Relations 10 10 40 30 10 20
Company 3 12 24 53 9 68
Trade Assoc. 8 8 16 40 28 25
Independent 11 0 22 44 22 9
Comment
5% of all respondents think the ability to form coalitions is not at all important. 
Around a quarter rate it as neither important nor unimportant. 44% think this skill is 
important, whilst 18% rate it very important.
The ranking for very important is similar amongst public affairs consultants, 
trade association representatives and independent consultants, ranking 24%, 28% 
and 22% respectively. 10% of public relations consultants and 9% of company 
representatives rate this ability as very important. 8% of public affairs consultants 
rate this ability as unimportant or not at all important, compared with 20% of PR 
consultants, 15% of company representatives, and 16% of trade association 
representatives.
Judgement on Hvpothesis Seven
The hypothesis was confirmed by the data. Contacts are important. 
Knowledge of characters and personalities of policy makers is also confirmed to be 
important. The ability to construct coalitions was rated important.
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Resources: Hypothesis Eight
Lobbyists tend to be effective if the client has abundant 
resources and is skilful in deploying them.
How important are the financial resources of the client for your 
organisation’s lobbying?
N = 161. Missing = 47.
Table no: A.8.1 Figure no: A.8.1
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all Important 18 11.2
2 13 8.1
3 19 11.8
4 10 6.2
5 30 18.6
6 18 11.2
7 18 11.2
8 16 9.9
9 8 5.0
10 very important 11 6.8
Total 161 100 .0
Missing System 47
Total 208
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.8.1 a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 19 18 30 21 12 161
Public Affairs 8 16 32 37 8 38
Public Relations 11 22 28 22 17 18
Company 28 17 34 13 8 53
Trade Assoc. 24 24 35 18 0 17
Independent 22 22 11 22 22 9
Comment
Around one eighth of all respondents think the financial resources of the client 
are yery important, whilst around one fifth think they are not at all Important.
Company representatives are more sceptical about the importance of 
resources. 45% of company respondents think the financial resources of the client 
are unimportant or not at all Important, compared with 24% of public affairs 
consultants and one third of public relations consultants. Only 21% of company 
respondents think financial resources of the client are Important or very Important, 
compared with 45% of public affairs consultants and 39% of public relations 
consultants.
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Do you agree or disagree that donating money to a political party 
improves the effectiveness of the lobbyist?
N = 206. Missing = 2.
Table no: A.8.2 Figure no: A.8.2
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1.00 strongly agree 1 .5
2.00  som ew hat agree 15 7.3
3.00  som ew hat disagree 35 17.0
4 .00  strongly disagree 140 68.0
5.00  don't know 15 7.3
Total 206 100.0
Missing System 2
Total 208
Missing
somewhat agreedon’t know
somewhat disagree
strongly disagree
Title: The effectiveness of political donations
Table no: A.8.2a strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know N
All 1 7 17 68 7 206
Public Affairs 0 0 15 85 0 40
Public Relations 0 5 25 70 0 20
Company 0 8 17 65 9 75
Trade Assoc. 0 11 15 62 12 26
Independent 0 11 0 78 11 9
Comment
Donating money to political parties is an ineffective campaign tactic. 68% of 
all respondents strongly disagree with the statement that donating money to a 
political party improves the effectiveness of the lobbyist, whilst a further 17% 
somewhat disagree. Only 8% agree with the statement, and of that number, only 1% 
strongly agreed.
No public affairs consultants agree with the idea that political donations can 
improve the effectiveness of the lobbyist. This number compares with 8% of 
company representatives, 5% of public relations consultants and 11% of 
independent consultants and trade association representatives.
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How important Is a case that has limited costs for your organisation’s
lobbying?
N = 191. Missing = 17.
Table no: A.8.3 Figure no: A.8.3
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 15 7.9
2 11 5.8
3 18 9 .4
4 15 7.9
5 42 22 .0
6 22 11.5
7 32 16.8
8 23 12.0
9 10 5 .2
10 very important 3 1.6
Total 191 100.0
Missing System 17
Total 208
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Title: The importance of a case that has limited costs
Table no: A.8.3a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 14 17 34 28 7 191
Public Affairs 22 14 32 24 8 37
Public Relations 21 26 32 16 5 19
Company 9 17 37 30 5 71
Trade Assoc. 4 17 39 30 9 23
Independent 33 22 33 11 0 9
Comment
The evidence presented here is unclear. 31% of all respondents rate a case 
that has limited costs as unimportant or not at all Important. Around one third think 
that a case with limited costs is neither Important nor unimportant, whilst 35% think it 
is Important or very Important.
Around one fifth of public affairs consultants and public relations consultants 
rate a case with limited costs as not at all Important, compared to 9% of company 
respondents and 4% of trade association representatives. Approximately one third 
of public affairs consultants and public relations consultants rate a case with limited 
costs as neither Important nor unimportant, compared with 37% of company 
respondents and 39% of trade association respondents.
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How important is the salary of the lobbyist for your organisation’s
lobbying?
N = 183. Missing = 25.
Table no: A.8.4 Figure no: A.8.4
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 43 23.5
2 23 12.6
3 31 16.9
4 19 10.4
5 28 15.3
6 14 7.7
7 11 6.0
8 7 3.8
9 4 2.2
10 very important 3 1.6
Total 183 100.0
Missing System 25
Total 208
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very Important.
Table no; A.8.4a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very Important N
All 36 27 23 10 4 183
Public Affairs 43 16 27 8 5 37
Public Relations 33 50 6 11 0 18
Company 39 24 21 11 4 70
Trade Assoc. 30 25 33 0 0 20
Independent 33 33 33 0 0 9
Comment
The salary of the lobbyist is not regarded as an important variable. Only 4% 
of all respondents rate it as very important. 63% of all respondents think it is 
unimportant or not at ali important. Around a quarter think the salary of the lobbyist 
is neither important nor unimportant.
88% of public relations consultants think the salary of the lobbyist is 
unimportant or not at ali important, compared with 59% of public affairs consultants, 
63% of company respondents, and 55% of trade associations.
5% of public affairs consultants and 4% of company respondents think the 
salary of the lobbyist is very important, whilst no public relations consultants, trade 
association representatives or independent consultants hold this view.
354
Appendix A
How important is a bargaining advantage for your organisation’s
lobbying?
N = 189. Missing = 19.
Table no: A.8.5 Figure no: A.8.5
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 9 4.8
2 8 4.2
3 8 4.2
4 12 6.3
5 37 19.6
6 24 12.7
7 28 14.8
8 32 16.9
9 17 9.0
10 very important 14 7.4
Total 189 100.0
Missing System 19
Total 208
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.8.5a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 9 11 32 32 16 189
Public Affairs 3 8 35 32 22 37
Public Relations 21 5 32 26 16 19
Company 6 15 33 37 9 67
Trade Assoc. 15 12 23 27 23 26
Independent 0 11 33 33 22 9
Comment
A bargaining advantage is seen to be important or very important by 48% of 
all respondents. One third believed a bargaining advantage to be neither important 
nor unimportant, whilst a further fifth regarded it as unimportant or not at all 
important.
Judgement on Hvpothesis Eight
The results are unclear. However, more respondents think the financial 
resources of the client are unimportant than important (37% to 33%, whilst 30% think 
resources are neither important nor unimportant). Similarly, the majority of 
respondents believe political donations to be ineffective and the level of the lobbyists’ 
salary unimportant. Therefore the data do not support the hypothesis.
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Internal variables
There are varieties of internal variables that have an impact on effectiveness, 
but are not included directly in the hypotheses. We now turn to examine eight 
internal variables.
1 How important is a reputation for high ethical standards?
N = 206. Missing = 2.
Table no: A.9.1
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all Important 1 .5
5 8 3.9
6 4 1.9
7 13 6.3
8 37 18.0
9 34 16.5
10 very important 109 52.9
Total 206 100.0
Missing System 2
Total 208
Figure no: A.9.1
60 T------------------------------------------
50
40
30
20
10
7 8 9  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.9.1 a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 0 6 24 69 205
Public Affairs 0 0 3 23 75 40
Public Relations 0 0 10 35 55 20
Company 0 0 4 25 71 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 8 33 58 24
Independent 10 0 10 20 60 10
Comment
The reputation of the lobbyist is significant. 93% of all respondents regard a 
reputation for high ethical standards as important or very important. Only 6% report 
it is neither important nor unimportant.
Of public affairs consultants, three-quarters rate a reputation for high ethics as 
very important, compared with 71% of company representatives and 55% of public 
relations consultants.
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2 How important is being trusted by decision-makers?
N = 208. Missing = 0.
Table no: A.9.2 Figure no: A.9.2
Frequency
Valid
Percent
60
Valid 1 not at all important 1 .5 50'
4 1 .5
5 1 .5 40'
6 3 1.4
7 9 4.3 30'
8 26 12.5
9 50 24.0 20'
10 very important 117 56 .3
Total 208 100.0 10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.9.2a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 1 2 17 80 208
Public Affairs 0 0 5 8 88 40
Public Relations 0 5 0 40 55 20
Company 0 0 0 23 77 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 0 15 85 26
Independent 10 0 10 0 80 10
Comment
Being trusted by decision-makers is another important internal variable. 97% 
of all respondents rate trust as important or very important. Only 4% regard this 
attribute as being not at all important, unimportant or neither important nor 
unimportant.
No public affairs consultants, company representatives or trade association 
representatives rate being trusted by decision-makers as not at all important or 
unimportant, whereas 5% of PR consultants rate it as unimportant, and 10% of 
independent consultants rate it as not at all important.
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3 How important is having a long-term track record?
N = 206. Missing = 2
Table no: A.9.3
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 2 1.0
2 3 1.5
3 5 2.4
4 1 .5
5 12 5.8
6 17 8.3
7 23 11.2
8 45 21.8
9 31 15.0
10 very important 67 32.5
Total 206 100.0
Missing System 2
Total 208
Figure no: A.9.3
40 1-------------------------------------------
30
20
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.9.3a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 3 3 14 20 48 206
Public Affairs 5 5 20 33 38 40
Public Relations 10 0 20 35 35 20
Company 0 10 1 41 49 74
Trade Assoc. 0 0 8 44 48 25
Independent 10 20 30 0 40 10
Comment
A long-term track-record is important, but not as important as a having a 
reputation for high ethical standards or being trusted by decision-makers. 48% of all 
respondents report that a long-term track-record is very important, whilst a fifth rate it 
important. 14% of all respondents think a long-term track-record is neither important 
nor unimportant. 6% regard a long-term track record as not at all important or 
unimportant.
More company respondents regard a long-term track-record as important or 
very important than do public affairs or public relations consultants. The respective 
numbers are: 90%, 71% and 70%. Whilst five per cent of public affairs consultants 
and 10% of company respondents rate a long-term track-record as not at all 
important, no company respondents share that view.
358
Appendix A
4 How important is it to provide authoritative information to decision 
makers?
N = 208. Missing = 0.
Table no: A.9.4 Figure no: A.9.4
Frequency
Valid
Percent
50'
Valid 1 not at all important 1 .5 40'
3 1 .5
5 5 2.4
6 8 3.8
7 9 4.3
8 40 19.2
20'
9 56 26.9
10 very important 88 42.3 10'
Total 208 100.0 i
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very Important.
Table no: A.9.4a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 1 1 6 24 69 208
Public Affairs 0 0 8 23 68 40
Public Relations 0 0 10 30 60 20
Company 0 0 4 31 65 75
Trade Assoc. 0 0 0 23 77 26
Independent 10 10 30 10 50 10
Comment
The provision of authoritative advice is essential. 93% of all respondents 
regard the provision of authoritative information as important or very important. 6% 
rate it as neither important nor unimportant.
No public affairs consultants, public relations consultants, company 
representatives or trade association representatives rate the provision of 
authoritative information as not at all important or unimportant. 91% of public affairs 
consultants, 90% of public relations consultants and 96% of company 
representatives rate the provision of authoritative information as important or very 
important.
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5 How important is it to be a skilled advocate?
N = 200. Missing = 8.
Table no: A.9.5
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 1 .5
2 3 1.5
3 3 1.5
4 5 2.5
5 14 7.0
6 21 10.5
7 30 15.0
8 60 30.0
9 29 14.5
10 very important 34 17.0
Total 200 100.0
Missing System 8
Total 208
Figure no: A.9.5
40*1-------------------------------------------
30
20
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.9.5a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 2 4 18 45 32 200
Public Affairs 3 3 23 35 38 40
Public Relations 0 15 15 20 50 20
Company 1 3 20 56 20 71
Trade Assoc. 0 4 13 33 50 24
Independent 11 0 22 44 22 9
Comment
Skilled advocacy is important, but not as important as the provision of 
authoritative information. Whilst 69% of all respondents rate the provision of 
authoritative information as very important, only 32% rate being a skilled advocate as 
a very important attribute. 18% rate skilled advocacy as neither important nor 
unimportant, whilst a further 6% think it is not at all important or unimportant.
Company representatives and public relations consultants are less concerned 
about advocacy skills than public relations consultants. Whilst 50% of PR 
consultants think advocacy skills are very important, 38% of public affairs 
consultants and a fifth of company representatives think the same.
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6 How important is it to be committed to the client’s case?
N = 160. Missing = 48.
Table no: A.9.6 Figure no: A.9.6
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all Important 11 6.9
2 4 2.5
3 5 3.1
4 4 2.5
5 15 9.4
6 13 8.1
7 19 11.9
8 28 17.5
9 21 13.1
10 very Important 40 25.0
Total 160 100.0
Missing System 48
Total 208
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very Important.
Table no: A.9.6a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 9 6 18 29 38 160
Public Affairs 5 8 20 23 45 40
Public Relations 0 11 11 47 32 19
Company 13 2 27 27 31 48
Trade Assoc. 0 13 6 38 44 16
Independent 20 10 0 30 40 10
Comment
Commitment to a client’s case is regarded as very important by 38% of the 
sample. 29% rate it as important, whilst 15% think it is unimportant or not at aii 
important.
Public affairs consultants perceive being committed to their clients’ case is 
more important than do the clients they serve. 45% of public affairs consultants think 
commitment to the client’s case is very important and 23% rate it as important. 
These numbers compare to 31% and 27% of company representatives respectively. 
Furthermore, whilst 33% of public affairs consultants report commitment to the 
client’s case is neither important nor unimportant or lower, 42% of company 
representatives hold this view.
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7 How important is it to be identified with a political party?
N = 193. Missing = 15.
Table no: A.9.7
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all Important 101 52.3
2 23 11.9
3 23 11.9
4 14 7.3
5 18 9.3
6 4 2.1
7 6 3.1
8 2 1.0
10 very important 2 1.0
Total 193 100.0
Missing System 15
Total 208
Figure no: A.9.7
60 T-------------------------------------------
50
40
30
20
10
œ 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  10
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very important.
Table no: A.9.7a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
Important Very important N
All 64 19 11 4 1 193
Public Affairs 48 13 20 10 0 40
Public Relations 47 37 16 0 0 19
Company 65 24 9 3 0 68
Trade Assoc. 82 5 5 5 5 22
Independent 67 11 11 11 0 9
Comment
This finding supports the conclusions of the ‘Hollow Core’ by Heinz et al, 
which reported that party political identification made no significant contribution.^ 
Despite many lobbyists being associated with political parties, as members, party 
officials or local councillors, 83% of all respondents think identification with a political 
party is not at all important or unimportant. Only 5% of all respondents rate 
identification with a political party as important or very important. Trade association 
representatives, independent consultants and company respondents are slightly 
more sceptical about the value of party political identification, with 82%, 67% and 
65% respectively rating it not at ail important. Whilst ten per cent of public affairs 
consultants think party political identification is important, only 3% of company 
respondents do, whilst no public relations consultants hold that view.
Henz, J., et al (1993), p317
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8 How important Is it to have worked within the system?
N = 192. Missing = 16.
Table no: A.9.8 Figure no: A.9.8
Frequency
Valid
Percent
Valid 1 not at all important 21 10.9
2 13 6.8
3 17 8.9
4 17 8.9
5 21 10.9
6 16 8.3
7 27 14.1
8 31 16.1
9 11 5.7
10 very important 18 9.4
Total 192 100.0
Missing System 16
Total 208
Importance. 1 = not at all important. 10 = very Important.
Table no: A.9.8a Not at all 
important
Unimportant Neither 
important nor 
unimportant
important Very important N
All 18 18 19 30 15 192
Public Affairs 3 10 18 41 28 39
Public Relations 20 5 10 55 10 20
Company 18 29 27 25 2 68
Trade Assoc. 23 18 9 27 23 22
Independent 30 0 30 0 40 10
Comment
The results on the importance of having experience from within the system 
are unclear. Whilst 45% of all respondents think having worked in the system is 
important or very important, 36% think is it unimportant or not at all important. 
Furthermore around one fifth think experience of the system is neither important nor 
unimportant. Public affairs consultants rate experience from within the system more 
highly than do company respondents. 69% of public affairs consultants think having 
worked within the system is important or very important, compared with 27% of 
company respondents. Similarly, whilst 13% of public affairs consultants think 
having worked in the system is not at all important or unimportant, almost half (47%) 
of company respondents hold that view.
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A comparison of means 
Table no: A.9.9
Variable All PA PR Com pany Trade
Association
Independent
Being Trusted 9.22 9.33 8.7 9.17 9.58 8.5
Ethics 8.97 9.30 8.6 9 8.75 8.1
Quality information 8.86 8.7 8.85 8.81 9.35 7.6
Track record 8.04 7.45 7.35 8.36 8.64 6.3
Skilled advocate 7.62 7.75 7.75 7.41 8 7
Committed to case 7.16 7.45 7.58 6.75 8.06 6.7
Experience inside the 
system
5.66 7.26 6 4.72 5.55 6.1
Salary 3.72 3.70 3.22 3.71 3.75 3.56
Party ID 2.41 3.18 2.74 2.22 2.14 2.33
Judgement on Internal Variables
Being trusted by decision-makers is the most important variable. All sectors 
hold the similar views on the importance of these variables, however, public relations 
consultants report that the provision of quality information is the most important of 
these variables.
Public affairs consultants rate experience within the system more highly than 
do company representatives.
All respondents rate being identified with a political party as the least 
important variable. The salary of the lobbyist is also unimportant, being rated only 
3.7 out of 10, where 10 is very important and 1 is not at all Important.
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The Most Important Policy Actors
A comparison of means
Table no: A.9.10 (1 = very involved / 4 = not at all involved)
All Public
Affairs
Public
Relations
Companies Trade
Associations
Independent
Middle rank civil 
servants (1.4)
Middle rank civil 
servants (1.5)
National
newspapers (1.3)
Ministers (1.45) Middle rank civil 
servants (1.15)
Middle rank civil 
servants (1.44)
Ministers (1.5) Special advisers 
(1.57)
Specialist 
magazines (1.6)
Middle-rank civil 
servants (1.46)
Specialist 
magazines (1.4)
Ttiink tanks (1.6)
Top rank civil 
servants (1.7)
Ministers (1.7) Middle rank civil 
servants (1.6)
Senior civil 
servants (1.6)
Ministers (1.4) Senior civil 
servants (1.8)
MPs (1.81) Select committees 
(1.9)
MPs (1.6) MPs (1.7) Senior civil 
servants (1.5)
Specialist 
magazines (1.88)
Specialist 
Magazines (1.8)
MPs (1.92) Ministers (1.63) Select committees 
(1.8)
EU Commission 
(1.53)
No 10 Policy Unit 
(2)
National newspapers 
(1.83)
EU Commission 
(1.97)
Radio (1.65) National
newspapers (1.9)
MPs (1.8) Ministers (2)
Special advisers 
(1.9)
Senior civil 
servants (2)
Local newspapers 
(1.65)
Special advisers 
(1.9)
National
newspapers (1.9)
Select committees 
(2)
Select committees 
(1.92)
Regulators (2) Television (1.7) Specialist 
magazines (1.9)
Radio (2) Special advisers 
(2.1)
Radio (2) Ttiink tanks (2.05) Special advisers 
(1.8)
Regulators (2) Television (2) EU Commission 
(2.1)
EU Commission 
(2.1)
No 10 Policy Unit 
(2.07)
Senior civil 
servants (1.9)
EU Commission 
(2.1)
All-party committee 
(2.03)
National
newspapers (2.1)
Television (2.13) National
newspapers (2.1)
All-party
committees (2.1)
No 10 Policy Unit 
(2.2)
Select committees 
(2.1)
Television (2.2)
All-Party committees 
(2.2)
Specialist 
magazines (2.1)
Select committees 
(2.1)
Local newspapers 
(2.25)
EU Parliament 
(2.2)
Radio (2.3)
Local newspapers 
(2.27)
All-party
committees (2.15)
EU Commission 
(2.3)
Radio (2.29) Council of 
Ministers (2.3)
MPs (2.3)
Regulators (2.27) Council of 
Ministers (2.3)
Ttiink tanks (2.3) Television (2.3) House of Lords 
(2.2)
All-party 
committees (2.3)
No 10 Policy Unit 
(2.28)
Radio (2.37) No 10 Policy Unit 
(2.4)
All-party
committees (2.33)
Regulators (2.3) House of Lords 
(2.5)
Ttiink tanks (2.3) House of Lords 
(2.42)
Local government 
(2.55)
Ttiink tanks (2.5) Special advisers 
(2.4)
Council of 
Ministers (2.5)
House of Lords (2.4) Television (2.47) House of Lords 
(2.55)
EU Parliament 
(2.54)
No 10 Policy Unit 
(2.6)
EU Parliament 
(2.5)
EU Parliament (2.49) EU Parliament 
(2.47)
Regulators (2.6) House of Lords 
(2.6)
Local newspapers 
(2.69)
Regulators (2.5)
Council of Ministers 
(2.6)
Local newspapers 
(2.7)
EU Parliament 
(2.65)
Council of 
Ministers (2.7)
Ttiink tanks (2.8) Local newspapers 
(2.8)
Local government 
(2.8)
Local government 
(2.8)
Council of 
Ministers (3)
Prime Minister 
(2.9)
Local government 
(3)
Local government 
(3.2)
Prime Minister (3) Prime Minister 
(2.9)
Prime Minister 
(3.2)
Local government 
(3)
Prime Minister 
(3.1)
Prime Minister 
(3.5)
Comment
Overall, the targets most approached by those involved in lobbying 
campaigns are middle-ranking senior civil servants (grades 7-5), followed by 
ministers, top-ranking senior civil servants (grade 3-1), then MPs.
Dealing with the media is rated highly -  specialist and trade journals is the 
form of journalism most involved in lobbying campaigns. Next is national 
newspapers followed by radio and television. Local newspapers appear lower down 
the ladder.
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Those targets approached least are local government, the Council of 
Ministers, the European Parliament and the House of Lords. The least involved 
decision-maker in the average lobbying campaign is the Prime Minister.
Public affairs consultants rate ministerial special advisers as the second most 
important target (after middle-ranking civil servants) whilst public relations 
consultants and company representatives rate special advisers as 9^  ^ and 7  ^
respectively. Middle rank civil servants and ministers appear in the top three of 
public affairs consultants and company representatives, but only middle-rank civil 
servants appear in the top three for PR consultants -  ministers come fifth.
The media are regarded as important by PR consultants. National 
newspapers are the most involved institution in their type of campaigning (coming 
first), with specialist magazines second and radio in sixth place. Local newspapers 
and television come next.
Public affairs consultants rank the EU Commission higher (6^) than do PR 
consultants (13^*) and companies (10^ )^.
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The Effectiveness of the Lobbying Industry over time
How effective do you consider the 
lobbying industry to be?
Before May 1997
Figure no: A.9.9
After May
Figure no: A.9.10
1997
Title: The effectiveness of the lobbying industry before May 1997, and after May 1997 (shaded
Table no: A.9.11 Very
effective
Very
effective
Som ew hat
effective
Som ew hat
effective
Not very 
effective
Not very 
effective
Not at all 
effective
Not at all 
effective
Don't
know
Don't
know
All 17 1 0 64 60 6 14 2 3 5 7
Public Affairs 30 22 62 70 5 5 0 0 3 3
Public Relations 42 35 53 50 5 5 0 0 0 1 0
Company 1 0 3 75 62 4 19 1 4 8 1 1
Trade Assoc. 8 0 73 65 1 2 19 4 8 4 8
Independent 1 1 1 1 78 67 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
(na)
1 1
(na)
The lobbying industry reports that it has become less effective since the 1997 
General Election. The number of respondents rating the industry very effective fell 
from 18% to 10% and those rating it somewhat effective fell from 68% to 64%. The 
number of all respondents rating the lobbying industry not very effective doubled 
from 7% to 15%. Those rating the industry not at all effective increase by one per 
cent to 3%.
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Conclusions
The survey did not ask lobbyists whether they were effective in achieving their 
public policy objectives because it is difficult to generalise over issues."  ^ The survey 
sought to find out what techniques were most effective, under what circumstances 
lobbyists were effective and what internal and external variables were important.
Lobbyists are more likely to impact on policy only when certain conditions 
prevail.® Those external variables necessary for lobbyists to be effective include the 
issue being low-profile, technical and non-political; if the issue and the lobbyist's 
objective is congruent with the ideology of political decision-makers, pre-existing 
policy and previous experience of government players; and if lobbyists can include 
their client in the policy community.
This survey provided generalisations about internal variables about 
effectiveness. Several internal factors, including familiarity with routines and 
standard operating procedures; trustworthiness, high ethics, provision of 
authoritative information, contacts and the ability to produce coalitions, and 
knowledge of technical elements of policy were shown to be meaningful 
determinants of effectiveness. Donating money to political parties, having resources, 
running a multi-faceted campaign and an association with a political party were 
shown to be variables that did not impact on effectiveness.
Since the types of issues respondents are active range from high to low 
profile, from highly technical to general and from non-political to high politics the 
generalised results presented here are supplemented by case studies into four 
specific policies.
Béumgartner, F., and Leech, B., (1998), p i56 
Scbato, L , (1990), p i 35
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An assessment of the hypotheses
The survey findings suggest:
1) Hypothesis one is confirmed by the data. Lobbyists are more effective on 
technical, low-profile, non-political issues.
2) Hypothesis two is neither confirmed nor falsified by the data. External factors do 
impact on policy-making. Lobbyists can be effective when there are 
disadvantageous as well as advantageous external constraints.
3) Hypothesis three is confirmed by the data. Lobbyists are more effective if their 
client’s case is in line with government policy.
4) Hypothesis four is confirmed by the data. Lobbyists are more effective if they can 
include their client in the policy community.
5) Hypothesis five is rejected by the data. Lobbyists may be more effective if they 
run a concentrated and targeted campaign aimed at they key decision-makers 
rather than a multi-faceted campaign.
6) Hypothesis six is confirmed by the data. Lobbyists are more effective if they are 
familiar with routines and SOPs.
7) Hypothesis seven is confirmed by the data. Lobbyists’ contacts and their ability 
to spot connections to build coalitions are important for effectiveness.
8) Hypothesis eight is rejected by the data.
369
Appendix B
Appendix B
370
Appendix B
Public Affairs Newsletter
Survey of Public Affairs Practice
Why should you reply? in  the last few years, 'lobbying' has been given a poor reputation by the 
media. However, there is little  worthwhile information on the work of those who advise firms, charities, 
unions and other organisations how best to present their case to decision-makers. This study wiU give an 
accurate and neutral picture of those involved in helping organisations make a good case to decision-makers. 
Respondents are entitled to a complimentary copy of the results.
W ho sh o u ld  re p ly?  Please take the 3 OP 4  m iilU tG S  needed to complete the survey, if you
work for a Public Affairs or PR consultancy, if  you are a specialist consultant, or if you work 'in-house' in a 
company, union, charity or pressure group. We would like to hear from a wide range of organisations, from 
the large to the small.
This is the first authoritative study into those involved in making a case to government. The research is 
conducted in conjunction w ith the London School of Economics and funded by the ESRC (the Economic and 
Social Research Council is a Government-funded body).
The survey is totally confidential Respondents cannot be identified
W ith which political area do you deal the most? (please tick)
Parliament |~ | Whitehall | | EU Commission | | EU Parliament | [Local Government | | Other | | 
Which of the fo llow ing terms best describes your organisation?
Public Affairs consultancy | | PR consultancy | | Trade Association | | Company/Pic | | Charity | |
Trade Union Pressure Group Independent Consultant Other [ J
For how many years has your organisation been established?
0-2yrsQ 3-5yrs [%] 6-lOyrs [ J  ll-20yrs 21-30yrs Q  over 30yrs O
How im portant are the fo llow ing resources for your organisation's lobbying?
(Please assign each a mark out of 10. Where 1 = not at all important 10 = very important (please circle)
not at all 
important
somewhat
important
very
important
Good contact network of MPs 
Good contact network of M inisters 
Good contact network of officials 
Knowledge of parliamentary procedure 
Knowledge of o fficia l procedure
Knowledge of personalities of MPs 
Knowledge of personalities of officials 
Knowledge of inform al rules 
A case which is po litica lly neutral 
A case in  line w ith  government policy
A case which has lim ited costs 
The salary of the lobbyist 
The financial resources of client 
Ability to form  coalitions 
A bargaining advantage
< — ------->
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
2 4 5 6 8 9 10
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Thinking about your organisation's attributes, how  im portant are the fo llow ing?
Please assign each a m ark out o f 10. Where 1
not at all 
important
= not at all important. 10 = very important (please circle)
somewhat
important
very
important
■W
Reputation fo r h igh ethical standards , 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
r
10
Being trusted by decision makers i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Having a long-term  track record i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Provider o f authorita tive  in form ation  i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Being a skilled  advocate i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Being com m itted to client's case i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Being iden tified  w ith  a p o litica l party i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Having w orked inside the system i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Here are some types o f campaign activ ity . Please assign them  a m ark out o f 10 in  terms of the ir 
effectiveness. Where 1 = not at all important, 10 = very important (please circle)
not at all 
important
somewhat
important
very
important
Briefing MPs p riva te ly  
Briefing M inisters p riva te ly  
Briefing o fficia ls p riva te ly  
Media campaign 
Com bination of both media 
campaign and private  briefings
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
Thinking about the typical issues your organisation deals w ith: How involved would the follow ing people or 
institutions be? (please tick)
very
involved
somewhat
Involved
not very 
involved
not at all 
involved
not
relevant
Prime Minister □ □ □ □ □
Ministers □ □ □ □ □
Members of Parliament □ □ □ □ □
Select Committees □ □ □ □ □
A ll Party Groups n □ □ □ □
Peers □ □ □ □ □
Senior C ivil Servants □ □ □ □ □
Middle-rank C ivil Servants □ □ □ □ □
No. 10 Policy Unit □ □ □ □ □
Special Advisers □ □ □ □ n
Regulators n □ □ □ n
Local Government □ □ □ □ □
European Parliament □ n □ □ n
European Commission □ □ □ □ □
Council of Ministers □ □ □ □ □
National newspapers □ □ □ □ □
National radio □ □ □ □ □
National television □ □ □ □ □
Local newspapers □ □ □ □ □
Specialist /  trade journals □ □ □ □ □
Think Tanks' n □ n □ □
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Thinking about Parliament, how effective are the following techniques in  making a case?
 ^ (Please assign each a mark out of 10. Where 1 = not at all important 10 = very important (please circle)
not at all somewhat very
important important important
< >
Writing to MPs
Meeting MPs formally in person 
Meeting MPs socially - lunch/dinner 
Organising constituents to write to MPs
Organising constituents to meet MPs 
Organising client to write to MPs 
Arrange for client to meet MPs 
Organising petition to be sent to MPs 
Telephone contact with MPs
Writing to officials '
Meeting officials formally in person i
Meeting officials socially - lunch/dinner i 
Organising public to write to officials i
Organising client to write to officials '
Arrange for client to meet officials '
Responding to Consultation Process i
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Thinking about the c iv il service, how effective are the following techniques in  making a case?
1 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
Thinking about Ministers, how effective are the follow ing techniques in  making a case?
Writing to Ministers i
Meeting Ministers formally in person i
Meeting Ministers socially - lunch/ dinner ' 
Organising client to write to Ministers '
Arrange for client to meet Ministers '
Responding to Consultation Process i
------->
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
3 4 5 6 8 9 10
Thinking about the media, how effective are the following techniques in making a case
Briefing national newspapers 
Briefing local newspapers 
Briefing specialist /  trade press 
Briefing radio /  television 
Initiating a legal challenge 
Using opinion polls 
Using research
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very
important
somewhat
important
not very 
important
not at all 
important
not
relevant
□ □ □ □ □
□ n a □ □
n n □ □ □
n □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ n n n n
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly don't
agree agree disagree disagree know
□ □ □ □ □
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly don’t
agree agree disagree disagree know
□ □ □ □ □
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How important are the following information sources in helping you keep abreast of policy 
I developments and legislation? (please tick)
I Vote Bundle
Hansard on-line 
, EU official journal
National newspaper reports 
Specialist political publications 
Trade /  specialist press 
Radio /  television 
The Internet
, Would you say if you agree or disagree with the following statements? (please tick)
Lobbyists campaigning on low-visibility technical 
matters are more likely to be effective.
Lobbyists are more effective if they have the 
same ethnic background as decision-makers.
Donating money to political parties improves 
the effectiveness of the lobbyist.
Pre-existing policy commitments of government 
players affect the effectiveness of the lobbyist.
When you are lobbying, how important is it that 
you understand the technical issues of a policy?
In your lobbying how important are factors beyond the 
control of government? (eg global macro-economic factors)
How important is it, when you lobby, to get into the 
network of interests involved in policy-making?
Is the strategic government relations advice you 
provide to clients/ your organisation accepted?
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly don't
agree agree disagree disagree know
□ □ □ □ □
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly don't
agree agree disagree disagree know
□ □ □ □ n
very somewhat not very not at all not
Important Important Important Important relevant
□ □ □ □ □
very somewhat not very not at all not
Important Important Important important relevant
□ □ □ □ □
very somewhat not very not at all not
Important Important Important important relevant
□ □ □ □
always mostly sometimes always don't
accepted accepted rejected rejected know
□ □ □ □ n
very somewhat
6ff6CtiV6 6ff6CtiV6
not very
6ff6CtiV6
not at all
6ff6CtiV6
don't
How effective do you consider the lobbying industry to be: 
j before May 1997 
after May 1997
□  □  
□  n
□
□
□
□
□
□
j
How many staff are there in your organisation?
0-5 □  6-10 □  11-20 □  21-30 □ 31-50 □ over 50 □
Which of the companies in the government relations /  public affairs business, other than your own 
admire? (please write name here)
I, do you most
To receive a copy of the results of this survey please complete the 
enclosed form and return it separately to the Public Affairs Newsletter.
Thank-you for completing this questionnaire
Please kindly return the completed form in the enclosed FREEPOST envelope to: 
Survey of Public Affairs Practice, The London School of Economics & Political Science, 
Room H102, FREEPOST LON14052, LONDON, UK, WC2A 2BR
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